In Mengzi 孟子 (Mencius) 6A4, Gaozi 告子 states that “yi 義 (Rightness/Propriety) is external, not internal.” In 6A5, Meng Jizi 孟季子 says of yi that “... it is on the external, not from the internal.” Their defenses are met with Mengzi’s resistance. What does he perceive and resist in these statements? Focusing on several key passages in the eponymous text, I compare six promising interpretations. 6A4 and a relevant part of 2A2 can be rendered comparably sensible under each of the (...) six. However, what Gaozi says in 6A1 clearly is evidence to Mengzi that, of the six views, Gaozi holds three although he does not convey them in his statement. As for Meng Jizi’s statement, in its defense he invokes a special occasion where one is required to act one way even though one would feel a different way. Mengzi’s response has been traditionally interpreted as boiling down to a dissenting opinion about empirical psychology, that the agent on that special occasion would in fact feel the same way as they ought to act. But on a more charitable reading, the point Mengzi makes is conceptual: Though the satisfaction of yi may not require that the feeling and the act align perfectly in this case, cases where the alignment obtains are conceptually prior. This not only refutes Meng Jizi’s statement but also enables a more elegant explanation of why the Mengzi rightly has no record of Mengzi affirming that yi is internal. I conclude that 6A5 itself uniquely favors one interpretation, as far as Meng Jizi’s position is concerned: How one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies yi. (shrink)

This chapter provides a survey of Kierkegaard's views of systematic theology, doctrine, and dogmatics. It demonstrates that while Kierkegaard's view of theology is generally negative, for he regards it as a human enterprise created in order to avoid doing God's Word, his attitude to doctrine and dogmatics is nuanced and complex. Kierkegaard rejects doctrine insofar as it objectifies Christianity, but nevertheless generally accepts the classic doctrines of the Christian faith and sees no reason to reform them. This ambivalence toward doctrine (...) stems from his conviction that the task facing the believer is not to reflect on doctrine, but to appropriate and apply it existentially to his/her own individual existence. Similarly, although Kierkegaard rejects the efforts of contemporary dogmaticians, dogmatics itself is valid insofar as it reproduces the paradoxical character of Christianity and the decision between faith and offense with which Christian dogmas confront every human being. (shrink)

I remain entirely unconvinced that anyone who claims to “just know” that the dead walk among us, or that God exists, knows any such thing. Not only do I think the rest of us have good grounds for doubting their experience, I don’t believe it’s reasonable for them to take their own experience at face value either.

Suppose Molinism is true and God placed Adam in the garden because God knew Adam would freely eat of the fruit. Suppose further that, had it not been true that Adam would freely eat of the fruit, were he placed in the garden, God would have placed someone else there instead. When Adam freely eats of the fruit, is he free to do otherwise? This paper argues that there is a strong case for both a positive and a negative answer. (...) Assuming such cases are possible under Molinism, we are left with a puzzling question: if Molinism is true, what can you do? (shrink)

The concept of autonomy plays atleast two roles in moral theory. First, itprovides a source of constraints upon action:because I am autonomous you may not interferewith me, even for my own good. Second, itprovides a foundation for moral theory: humanautonomy has been thought by some to producemoral principles of a more general kind.This paper seeks to understand what autonomyis, and whether the autonomy of which we arecapable is able to serve these roles. We wouldnaturally hope for a concept of autonomy (...) thatis value-neutral rather than value-laden. Thatis to say, we would want the judgement that Iam autonomous to depend wholly on, say,structural features of my psychology, and in noway to require us to make ethical judgements, orother value judgements. Being value-neutral isperhaps desirable in a concept of autonomyserving the first role, and plausiblyindispensible in one playing the second. Ishall argue, however, that value-neutral conceptionsof autonomy are impoverished and out of linewith our intuitions; set out and defendan explicitly value-laden conception ofautonomy; and explore the implications of such a view for theability of autonomy to play the rolesmentioned above. (shrink)

Hudson has formulated two local deterministic theses and argued that both are incompatible with freedom. We argue that Hudson has half the story right. Moreover, reflection on Hudson’s theses brings out an important point for debates about freedom generally: that instead of focusing on the notion of entailment, debates about freedom should focus on the notions of explanation and sourcehood. Hudson’s theses provide an excellent case study for why the latter notions ought to take precedence over the former in debates (...) about freedom. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn this we explore some of the ways in which a state scientific laboratory (Daresbury SERC) reacted to the rtetoric and forces of the marketpace in the 1980s. We describe laboratory attempts to create what we call “good customers” while converting itself into a “good seller” by developing a particulat set of costing practicting that were closely related to the implementation of a management accounting system. Finally, we consider how Daresbury response to “market forces” influenced scintific and organzational practice, (...) and arsponse that the social technologies of governmentality performed by accountancy — but also by scientific and bureaucratic practice are complex, discursively heterogeneou, and used in context-sensitive ways. This means, or so we suggest, that it is difficult to mount general argunents about “science” and “the market,” and that the use of such large-scale institions impedes impedes analysis. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The applied discipline of agroecological design provides a useful case study for examining broader philosophical questions about the existence and importance of ecological generalizations or “laws.” Recent developments in the availability and use of formal meta-analyses have led to the discovery of many resilient generalizations in ecology (Linquist et al. 2016). However, these “laws” face numerous challenges when it comes to their practical application. Concerns about their reliability and scope might stem from unclear logical and epistemic connections to more foundational (...) or “unifying” generalizations (Lean in Philos Top 47(1), 2019) which, in ecology, tend to be derived from first principles and in association with highly abstract models. This raises questions about the nature of those foundational generalizations themselves. In particular, how resilient are they compared to the generalizations uncovered by empirically driven methods? Here we propose a procedure for evaluating the resilience of generalizations across five ecologically relevant dimensions. This procedure was applied to seven well known foundational generalizations in ecology. Surprisingly, it turned out to be impossible to estimate the resilience of these foundational generalizations based on the available literature. This points to the need for a more centralized repository of information about ecological generalizations, created with the explicit aim of evaluating such important dimensions as causal mechanism and predictive power. (shrink)

Statistical learning enables humans to involuntarily process and utilize different kinds of patterns from the environment. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying the simultaneous acquisition of multiple regularities from different perceptual modalities remain unclear. A novel multidimensional serial reaction time task was developed to test 40 participants’ ability to learn simple first‐order and complex second‐order relations between uni‐modal visual and cross‐modal audio‐visual stimuli. Using the difference in reaction times between sequenced and random stimuli as the index of domain‐general statistical learning, a (...) significant difference and dissociation of learning occurred between the initial and final learning phases. Furthermore, we used a negative and positive occurrence‐frequency‐and‐reaction‐time correlation to indicate implicit and explicit learning, respectively, and found that learning simple uni‐modal patterns involved an implicit‐to‐explicit segue, while acquiring complex cross‐modal patterns required an explicit‐to‐implicit segue, resulting in a X‐shape crossing of regularity learning. Thus, we propose an X‐way hypothesis to elucidate the dynamic interplay between the implicit and explicit systems at two distinct stages when acquiring various regularities in a multidimensional probability space. (shrink)

Introduction EMPIRICISM DOES NOT stand in very high repute among literary theorists these days. Regarded generally as a discredited philosophical paradigm ...

Duty of care is the core ethical responsibility of healthcare workers. Getting the workforce vaccinated will provide safety to the public, protect the vulnerable population and provide a safe working environment. While most agree that healthcare workers should be prioritised in the vaccination programme, mandatory vaccination remains a complicated and contentious issue with political, legal and ethical dimensions. This study aims to determine the ethical considerations associated with mandatory vaccinations among healthcare workers. A total of 152 abstracts were identified of (...) which, 142 were excluded based on abstracts because they did not meet the inclusion criteria. The remaining ten articles were further evaluated with three articles that fit the inclusion criteria specifically discussing mandatory vaccination among healthcare workers and the ethical issues. Benefits, risks, effectiveness, equity and justice, autonomy, reciprocity and trust were used as a framework to discuss the ethical considerations which resonated both directly from the included papers, as well as more generally from the other literature associated with this search. There is limited literature on the topic of ethical considerations associated with COVID-19 mandatory vaccination of healthcare workers, as a systematic review identified only 3 papers. Benefits, risks, effectiveness, equity and justice, autonomy, reciprocity and trust were among the seven ethical considerations identified and discussed. (shrink)

We prove convergence laws for logics of the form equation image, where equation image is a properly chosen collection of generalized quantifiers, on very sparse finite random structures. We also study probabilistic collapsing of the logics equation image, where equation image is a collection of generalized quantifiers and k ∈ ℕ+, under arbitrary probability measures of finite structures.

We reconsider the thermodynamic derivation by L. Boltzmann of the Stefan law and we generalize it for various different physical systems whose chemical potential vanishes. Being only based on classical arguments, therefore independent of the quantum statistics, this derivation applies as well to the saturated Bose gas in various geometries as to “compensated” Fermi gas near a neutrality point, such as a gas of Weyl Fermions. It unifies in the same framework the thermodynamics of many different bosonic or fermionic non-interacting (...) gases which were until now described in completely different contexts. (shrink)

Generalizations strengthen in traditional sciences, but in psychology (and social and behavioral sciences, more generally) they decay. This is usually viewed as a problem requiring solution. It could be viewed instead as a law-like phenomenon. Generalization decay cannot be squelched because human behavior is metastable and all behavioral data collected thus far have resulted from a thin sliver of human time.

Law as a leap of faith -- Legal positivism : 5 1/2 myths -- Some types of law -- Can there be a written constitution? -- How law claims, what law claims -- Nearly natural law -- The legality of law -- The supposed formality of the rule of law -- Hart on legality, justice, and morality -- The virtue of justice and the character of law -- Law in general.

Roscoe Pound, in the introduction, gives a panorama of the various schools of legal philosophy, & places natural law in its proper perspective relative to ...

How do laws resemble rules of games, moral rules, personal rules, rules found in religious teachings, school rules, and so on? Are laws rules at all? Are they all made by human beings? And if so how should we go about interpreting them? How are they organized into systems, and what does it mean for these systems to have 'constitutions'? Should everyone want to live under a system of law? Is there a special kind of 'legal justice'? Does it consist (...) simply in applying the law of the system? And how does it relate to the ideal of 'the rule of law'?These and other classic questions in the philosophy of law form the subject-matter of Law as a Leap of Faith. In this book John Gardner collects, revisits, and supplements fifteen years of celebrated writings on general questions about law and legal systems - writings in which he attempts, without loss of philosophical finesse or insight, to cut through some of the technicalities with which the subject has become encrusted in the late twentieth century. Taking his agenda broadly from H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law, Gardner shows how the key ideas in that work live on, and how they have been and can still be improved in modest ways to meet important criticisms - in some cases by concession, in some cases by circumvention, and in some cases by restatement. In the process Gardner engages with key ideas of other modern giants of the subject including Kelsen, Holmes, Raz, and Dworkin. Most importantly he presents the main elements of his own unique and refreshingly direct way of thinking about law, brought together in one place for the first time. (shrink)

In Beck, focus intervention is used as an argument for reducing Hamblin’s semantics for questions to Rooth’s focus semantics. Drawing on novel empirical evidence from Mandarin and English, we argue that this reduction is unwarranted. Maintaining both Hamblin’s original semantics and Rooth’s focus semantics not only allows for a more adequate account for focus intervention in questions, but also correctly predicts that focus intervention is a very general phenomenon caused by interaction of alternatives in different dimensions.

Explainable AI (XAI) provides methods to understand non-interpretable machine learning models. However, we have little knowledge about what legal experts expect from these explanations, including their legal compliance with, and value against European Union legislation. To close this gap, we present the Explanation Dialogues, an expert focus study to uncover the expectations, reasoning, and understanding of legal experts and practitioners towards XAI, with a specific focus on the European General Data Protection Regulation. The study consists of an online questionnaire and (...) follow-up interviews, and is centered around a use-case in the credit domain. We extract both a set of hierarchical and interconnected codes using grounded theory, and present the standpoints of the participating experts towards XAI. We find that the presented explanations are hard to understand and lack information, and discuss issues that can arise from the different interests of the data controller and subject. Finally, we present a set of recommendations for developers of XAI methods, and indications of legal areas of discussion. Among others, recommendations address the presentation, choice, and content of an explanation, technical risks as well as the end-user, while we provide legal pointers to the contestability of explanations, transparency thresholds, intellectual property rights as well as the relationship between involved parties. (shrink)

We formulate a general theory of conservation laws and other invariants for a physical system through equivalence relations. The conservation laws are classified according to the type of equivalence relation, with group equivalence, homotopical equivalence, and other types of equivalence relations giving respective kinds of conservation laws. The stability properties in the topological (and differentiable) sense are discussed using continuous deformations with respect to control parameters. The conservation laws due to the Abelian symmetries are shown to be stable through application (...) of well-known theorems. (shrink)

Four questions dominate normative contemporary constitutional theory: What is the purpose of a constitution? What makes a constitution legitimate? What kinds of arguments are legitimate within the process of constitutional interpretation? What can make judicial review of legislation legitimate in principle? The main purpose of this text is to provide one general answer to the last question. The secondary purpose is to show how this answer may bear upon our understanding of the fundamental basis of constitutional law. These two purposes (...) should suggest particular answers to the first three questions. (shrink)

In this work, we have investigated the validity of the generalized second law of thermodynamics in logamediate and intermediate scenarios of the universe bounded by the Hubble, apparent, particle and event horizons using and without using first law of thermodynamics. We have observed that the GSL is valid for Hubble, apparent, particle and event horizons of the universe in the logamediate scenario of the universe using first law and without using first law. Similarly the GSL is valid for all horizons (...) in the intermediate scenario of the universe using first law. Also in the intermediate scenario of the universe, the GSL is valid for Hubble, apparent and particle horizons but it breaks down whenever we consider the universe enveloped by the event horizon. (shrink)

Universal laws which are shown not only in a material world, but also in spiritual, represent a crystal lattice of knowledge. This base lattice is a basis for more specific and various phenomena of our life. Various sciences study the different sides of our life. However, there are common laws for all sciences, shown both in physics, and in biology; both in chemistry, and in economy; both in psychology, and in genetics.

Peter Alexander: It is presumably admitted that laws, whether causal or not, are universal in form; they are appropriately stated in universal categoricals or unrestricted hypotheticals. I assume that this is not at issue in the question set. I take our question to be this: given that causal laws are universal statements, can they be said to be about, to apply to, to hold for, individual things? -/- Peter Downing: Mr. Alexander maintains that there are 'irreducibly singular' causal statements, and (...) that from this it follows that causal laws need not be purely general. The view that there are irreducibly singular causal statements appears to commit Alexander to rejecting two theses: (i) that singular causal statements are analysable into statements containing specific generalizations, [...] (ii) That singular causal statements are analysable into statements containing incompletely specified generalizations [...]. Thesis (i) is, I think, clearly false. [...] Thesis (ii), however, is not easily refuted. (shrink)

Malebranche held that God acts only by general volitions and so is not constantly interfering in the world. The content of God's volitions appears to include the general laws of nature and the particular initial configuration of the created world, so that occasional or natural causes have an important explanatory role. It is clear that at the least Malebranche meant by a 'general volition' the willing of events which followed general laws. Steven Nadler argued that this is all we should (...) understand by a 'general volition', and so we should think that general volitions are simply particular volitions which follow a general law. I argue that this view is not the correct interpretation of Malebranche's general volitions, for it does not do justice to the theological doctrine of the Treatise, masks the genuine difference between Arnauld and Malebranche, and conflicts with what Malebranche says about practical volitions. I then argue that despite Malebranche's view of general volitions, there is still an important difference between his view and Leibniz's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

This book provides a general theory of discrimination law as practised in liberal democratic jurisdictions. Rejecting accounts that place the value of equality at the heart of the law, it argues that discrimination law protects individual autonomy. Applying the theory, the book tackles the central legal problems in applying discrimination laws.

"This work springs from a conviction of the unity of nature, expressed here in a single principle. In its earliest form this conviction was merely the sense of a hidden unity of form in nature, which the intellect had not yet identified. At that stage it had little value, except in creating the need to find a rational justification for the a-rational feeling. Soon I realised that the discovery of a universal form of process was hindered by the intellectual separation (...) of the processes of subjective experience from those of the external world. It was necessary to bring into closer relation the scientific conception of the forms of external nature and the subjective sense of the forms of experience. This in turn led to the recognition that the methods of exact science had paid inadequate attention to the irreversible or one-way character of process, which is unmistakable in the subjective realm, but is also evident in many inorganic and organic processes, such as those do which form is developed. I expressed this view in a sketch of the outlook of the sciences, entitled Archimedes, or the Future of Physics (1927). The next step was the observation that one principle only could account for the development of regular spatial forms: the principle that asymmetry decreases in isolable processes. This concept of one-way process appeared to me to be the most general conception of spatial process conceivable at the present time, so that all other types of process should be capable of being represented as special cases. I called it the Unitary Principle and determined to use it as the basis of a comprehensive scientific method."--The preface. (shrink)

The question of whether biology contains laws has important implications about the nature of science. Some philosophers believe that the legitimacy of the special sciences depends on whether they contain laws. In this dissertation, I defend the thesis that biology contains laws. In Chapter I, I discuss the importance of this problem and set the stage for my inquiry. In Chapter V, I summarize the results of Chapters II, III, and IV and I offer reasons why the position I advance (...) should be preferred over the alternatives. ;In Chapter II, I argue that the epistemic functions of a priori biological laws in biology are the same as those of empirical laws in physics. I establish this claim by showing that zero force laws and singleton force laws in these sciences function in the same way. I conclude that the requirement that laws must be empirical is idle in connection with how laws operate in science. ;In Chapter III, I argue that even if there are ceteris paribus sentences, it is unlikely that there are ceteris paribus laws. If there are genuine ceteris paribus laws, then 'ceteris paribus' should be a proper part of a law statement in which it occurs. I argue that if we interpret 'ceteris paribus' in this way, the containing sentence cannot be a law because it does not satisfy a minimal condition for laws---i.e., "ceteris paribus A 's are B's" and "ceteris paribus A's are not B's" should not both be true. ;In Chapter IV, I argue that the reasons offered for the non-existence of empirical biological laws don't establish the intended conclusion. I, then, argue that the kinds of law we should expect to find in biology are biophysical laws. I defend this claim by providing a priori and a posteriori arguments. The a priori argument states that the complexity of a system is no reason to think that there are no laws about that system. The a posteriori argument states that current research in evolutionary ecology indicates the existence of biophysical laws. (shrink)

"E. B. Pashukanis was the most significant contemporary to develop a fresh, new Marxist perspective in post-revolutionary Russia. In 1924 he wrote what is probably his most influential work, The General Theory of Law and Marxism. In the second edition, 1926, he stated that this work was not to be seen as a final product but more for ""self-clarification"" in hopes of adding ""stimulus and material for further discussion."" A third edition was printed in 1927. Pashukanis's ""commodity-exchange"" theory of law (...) spearheaded a perspective that traced the form of law, not to class interests, but to capital logic itself. Until his death, he continued to argue for the ideal of the withering away of the state, law, and the juridic subject. He eventually arrived at a position contrary to Stalin's who, at that time, was attempting to consolidate and strengthen the state apparatus under the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Inevitably, Pashukanis was branded an enemy of the revolution in January 1937. His works were subsequently removed from soviet libraries. In 1954, Pashukanis was ""rehabilitated"" by the Soviets and restored to an acceptable position in the historical development of marxist law. In Europe and North America, a number of legal theorists only rediscovered Pashukanis's work in the late 1970s. They subjected it to careful critical analysis, and realized that he offered an alternative to the traditional Marxist interpretations, which saw law simply and purely as tied to class interests of domination. By the mid-1980s the instrumental Marxist perspective in vogue in Marxist sociology, criminology, politics, and economics gave way, to a significant extent due to Pashukanis's insights, to a more structural Marxist accounting of the relationship of law to economics and other social spheres." --Descripción del editor. (shrink)

Written by the world's best-known political and legal theorist, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution is a collection of essays that discuss almost all of the great constitutional issues of the last two decades, including abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, homosexuality, pornography, and free speech. Professor Dworkin offers a consistently liberal view of the Constitution and argues that fidelity to it and to law demands that judges make moral judgments. He proposes that we all interpret the abstract language (...) of the Constitution by reference to moral principles about political decency and justice. His `moral reading therefore brings political morality into the heart of constitutional law. The various chapters of this book were originally published separately and are now drawn together to provide the reader with a rich, full-length treatment of Dworkin's general theory of law. (shrink)

What is the likelihood of controlling technology by means of the law? In traditional societies, the law was deeply embedded in, and dependent on, culture (the totality of human creations for making sense of and living in the world). Industrialization required a complete restructuring of both technology and society, thus engulfing all traditions in a flood of new situations for which there were no precedents. This necessitated a growing reliance on reason at the expense of culture, thereby creating a rational (...) and technical order that evolved with less and less reference to sense (i.e. experience and culture). It is within this context that recent legal transformations must be understood as participating in an order of non-sense. This bodes ill for protecting and helping to ensure a livable, sustainable human future. (shrink)

Kant's Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ranks with Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Ethics as one of the most important works of moral philosophy ever written. In Moral Law, Kant argues that a human action is only morally good if it is done from a sense of duty, and that a duty is a formal principle based not on self-interest or from a consideration of what results might follow. From this he derived his famous and controversial maxim, the (...) categorical imperative: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature." H. J. Paton's translation remains the standard in English for this work. It retains all of Kant's liveliness of mind, suppressed intellectual excitement, moral earnestness, and pleasure in words. The commentary and detailed analysis that Paton provides is an invaluable and necessary guide for the student and general reader. (shrink)

This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though less controversial, barriers to logical consequence.

A theoretical and sociological exploration of the relationship between law and society, this book constructs an approach to law that integrates legal theory with sociological approaches to law. Law is generally understood to be a mirror of society--a reflection of its customs and morals--that functions to maintain social order. Focusing on this common understanding, the book conducts a survey of Western legal and social theories about law and its relationship within society, engaging in a theoretical and empirical critique of this (...) common understanding. (shrink)