The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing Principle where Savage left it. In particular, we show that each of P2 and P3 is equivalent to a dominance condition; (...) that they strengthen in different directions a common, basic dominance axiom; and that they can be explicitly combined in a unified dominance condition that is a candidate formal statement for the Sure-Thing Principle. Based on elementary proofs, our results shed light on some of the most fundamental properties of rational choice under uncertainty. In particular they imply, as corollaries, potential simplifications for Savage’s and the Anscombe- Aumann axiomatizations of Subjective Expected Utility. Most surprisingly perhaps, they reveal that in Savage’s axiomatization, P3 can be weakened to a natural strengthening of so-called Obvious Dominance. (shrink)

Savage’s famous representation theorem is based on seven postulates of rational choice. We resolve some loose ends in the literature concerning the relationship between different versions of Savage’s axioms. This leads us to the present form of the representation theorem. We also discuss some issues regarding the historical development of Savage’s representation theorem.

In diesem Beitrag wollen wir zeigen, wieso die Fachdidaktik Philosophie und Ethik (neue) Ansätze entwickeln muss, um dem Anspruch auf (philosophische) Bildung von Menschen mit sonderpädagogischem Förderbedarf gerecht zu werden. Dafür zeigen wir anhand von Schüler_innen mit eingeschränkten Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten auf, wie Philosophieren mit ihnen dennoch möglich ist. Gleichzeitig wenden wir uns im Beitrag dem Haupteinwand zu, der darin besteht, dass Philosophieren mit dieser Schüler_innengruppe nicht möglich sei. Wir erklären unter welchen Umständen dieser Einwand nicht aufrecht erhalten werden sollte, sondern vielmehr (...) eine moralische Pflicht besteht, Menschen mit Behinderung philosophische Bildungsprozesse zu ermöglichen. (shrink)