A philosophical look at the movie Inception and its brilliant metaphysical puzzles Is the top still spinning? Was it all a dream? In the world of Christopher Nolan's four-time Academy Award-winning movie, people can share one another's dreams and alter their beliefs and thoughts. Inception is a metaphysical heist film that raises more questions than it answers: Can we know what is real? Can you be held morally responsible for what you do in dreams? What is the nature of (...) dreams, and what do they tell us about the boundaries of "self" and "other"? From Plato to Aristotle and from Descartes to Hume, Inception and Philosophy draws from important philosophical minds to shed new light on the movie's captivating themes, including the one that everyone talks about: did the top fall down (and does it even matter)? Explores the movie's key questions and themes, including how we can tell if we're dreaming or awake, how to make sense of a paradox, and whether or not inception is possible Gives new insights into the nature of free will, time, dreams, and the unconscious mind Discusses different interpretations of the film, and whether or not philosophy can help shed light on which is the "right one" Deepens your understanding of the movie's multi-layered plot and dream-infiltrating characters, including Dom Cobb, Arthur, Mal, Ariadne, Eames, Saito, and Yusuf An essential companion for every dedicated Inception fan, this book will enrich your experience of the Inception universe and its complex dreamscape. (shrink)

Christopher Nolan’ Inception is more than its folding cityscapes and mind-bending ambiguous ending. It’s a film that makes its viewer question the very nature of reality. Not only is it possible that the entire movie is a dream, but multiple viewings of Inception leaves one wondering whether the same might be true of one’s experience. Indeed, according to the author of “The Fiction of Christopher Nolan” Todd McGowan, Inception calls its viewers to abandon any concern they have for (...) knowledge of reality and instead choose to believe what they want. But does this moral hold up? Is it philosophically defensible? In this chapter, after a close inspection of the movie itself, this moral will be identified and evaluated. An examination of a number of related arguments by important philosophers will reveal that, although knowledge of reality is sometimes difficult to attain, it should always be sought. (shrink)

In 2004, Michael Burawoy challenged sociologists to move beyond the ivory tower and into the realm of activism, to engage in public discourses about what society could or should be. His call to arms sparked intense debate among sociologists. Which side would "sociology" take? Who would define "the norm," and how could public sociology possibly speak for all sociologists? In this volume, which opens with a foreword by Michael Burawoy, leading Canadian sociologists continue the debate by discussing not only how (...) and why they should do sociology but also how ethical judgments influence sociological practice and the evaluation of research. Most importantly, they ask whether and under what circumstances sociologists should advocate for social change. Regardless of whether they focus on activism, research, theory, or teaching, the contributors offer insights into where the discipline is heading and why it matters to people inside and outside the university. As public sociology claims a larger voice in public debates, questioning its methods and underlying mission becomes increasingly important. This rigorous and provocative volume lays the foundation for future conversations. Ariane Hanemaayer is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Alberta. Christopher J. Schneider is an assistant professor of sociology at the University of British Columbia, Okanagan Campus. Jill Bucklaschuk, Michael Burawoy, Rick Helmes-Hayes, Anne Mesny, Laura Milne, Kyle Nolan, Susan Prentice, Scott Schaffer, Axel van den Berg, Phillip Vannini. (shrink)

What makes paternalism wrong? I give an indirect answer to that question by challenging a recent trend in the literature that I call the exclusionary strategy. The exclusionary strategy aims to show how some feature of the paternalizee’s normative situation morally excludes acting for the paternalizee’s well-being. This moral exclusion consists either in ruling out the reasons for which a paternalizer may act or in changes to the right-making status of the reasons that (would) justify paternalistic intervention. I argue that (...) both versions of the exclusionary strategy fail to explain the wrongness of paternalism and that they struggle to accommodate the mainstream view that paternalism is only pro tanto wrong. Their failure consists either in being implausibly strong expressions of antipaternalism or in struggling to spell out the scope of exclusion in an uncomplicated way. After discouraging this exclusionary strategy, I suggest we can capture what is appealing about it—as well as avoiding its pitfalls—by sketching a philosophical model in which we compare the weights of reasons for and against paternalistically interfering. To precisify this sketch, I introduce some conceptual tools from the literature on practical reasoning—in particular, the concept of modifiers—and suggest that these tools offer a better starting point for figuring out what makes paternalism (pro tanto) wrong. (shrink)

We argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief given that ‘I believe’ is used to hedge. We explore the consequences of this argument for the normative relationship between belief and assertion.

When used clinically, psychedelics may appear unusual or even unique when compared to more familiar or long-standing medical interventions, prompting some to suggest that the ethical issues raised may likewise be exceptional. If that is correct, then perhaps psychedelics should be treated differently from other medical substances: for example, by being subjected to different ethical or evidentiary standards. Alternatively, it may be that psychedelics have more in common with various existing medical interventions than first meets the eye. We argue in (...) favor of the latter position, drawing on parallels from earlier debates around genetic exceptionalism in bioethics. We suggest there are risks to adopting a stance of “psychedelic ethical exceptionalism,” and propose that consistent ethical rules and evidentiary standards should be applied across all relevant areas of clinical medicine. Importantly, this does not preclude the possibility that changes to existing standards should be made; but if so, this should not be justified by appealing to the alleged uniqueness of psychedelics. (shrink)

Psychedelics such as psilocybin reliably produce significantly altered states of consciousness with a variety of subjectively experienced effects. These include certain changes to perception, cognition, and affect,1 which we refer to here as the acute subjective effects of psychedelics. In recent years, psychedelics such as psilocybin have also shown considerable promise as therapeutic agents when combined with talk therapy, for example, in the treatment of major depression or substance use disorder.2 However, it is currently unclear whether the aforementioned acute subjective (...) effects are necessary to bring about the observed therapeutic effects of psilocybin and other psychedelics. This uncertainty has sparked a lively—though still largely hypothetical—debate on whether psychedelics without subjective effects (“nonsubjective psychedelics” or “non-hallucinogenic psychedelics”) could still have the same therapeutic impact, or whether the acute subjective effects are in fact necessary for this impact to be fully realized.3,4,5. (shrink)

In a recent book and article, James Sterba has argued that there is no free will defense. It is the purpose of this article to show that, in the most technical sense, he is wrong. There is a version of the free will defense that can solve what Sterba (rightly) takes to be the most interesting and severe version of the logical problem of moral evil. However, I will also argue that, in effect (or, we might say, in practice), Sterba (...) is correct. The only working version of the free will defense requires embracing a view that entails consequences theists traditionally have not and cannot accept. Consequently, the one and only free will solution is not viable. Unless some other solution can be found (Sterba argues there is none), the logical problem of evil, as Sterba understands it, either commits one to atheism, or a version of theism that practically all theists would regard as a heresy. (shrink)

Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to trust. even if we don’t have positive (...) reasons to do so. In this paper, we argue for a version of anti-reductivism. Roughly, we argue that we have default entitlement to trust someone to φ so long as there is an operative norm that requires S to φ. At least in such circumstances (and absent defeaters), we don’t need any positive reasons to trust S to φ. (shrink)

In recent years, educational institutions have started using the tools of commercial data analytics in higher education. By gathering information about students as they navigate campus information systems, learning analytics “uses analytic techniques to help target instructional, curricular, and support resources” to examine student learning behaviors and change students’ learning environments. As a result, the information educators and educational institutions have at their disposal is no longer demarcated by course content and assessments, and old boundaries between information used for assessment (...) and information about how students live and work are blurring. Our goal in this paper is to provide a systematic discussion of the ways in which privacy and learning analytics conflict and to provide a framework for understanding those conflicts. -/- We argue that there are five crucial issues about student privacy that we must address in order to ensure that whatever the laudable goals and gains of learning analytics, they are commensurate with respecting students’ privacy and associated rights, including (but not limited to) autonomy interests. First, we argue that we must distinguish among different entities with respect to whom students have, or lack, privacy. Second, we argue that we need clear criteria for what information may justifiably be collected in the name of learning analytics. Third, we need to address whether purported consequences of learning analytics (e.g., better learning outcomes) are justified and what the distributions of those consequences are. Fourth, we argue that regardless of how robust the benefits of learning analytics turn out to be, students have important autonomy interests in how information about them is collected. Finally, we argue that it is an open question whether the goods that justify higher education are advanced by learning analytics, or whether collection of information actually runs counter to those goods. (shrink)

Christian apologists, like Willian Lane Craig and Stephen T. Davis, argue that belief in Jesus’ resurrection is reasonable because it provides the best explanation of the available evidence. In this article, I refute that thesis. To do so, I lay out how the logic of inference to the best explanation (IBE) operates, including what good explanations must be and do by definition, and then apply IBE to the issue at hand. Multiple explanations—including (what I will call) The Resurrection Hypothesis, The (...) Lie Hypothesis, The Coma Hypothesis, The Imposter Hypothesis, and The Legend Hypothesis—will be considered. While I will not attempt to rank them all from worst to best, what I will reveal is how and why The Legend Hypothesis is unquestionably the best explanation, and The Resurrection Hypothesis is undeniably the worst. Consequently, not only is Craig and Davis’ conclusion mistaken, but belief in the literal resurrection of Jesus is irrational. In presenting this argument, I do not take myself to be breaking new ground; Robert Cavin and Carlos Colombetti have already presented a Bayesian refutation of Craig and Davis’ arguments. But I do take myself to be presenting an argument that the average person (and philosopher) can follow. It is my goal for the average person (and philosopher) to be able to clearly understand how and why the hypothesis “God supernaturally raised Jesus from the dead” fails utterly as an explanation of the evidence that Christian apologist cite for Jesus’ resurrection. (shrink)

It might seem incoherent or a contradiction in terms to suggest that we can be philosophical naturalists while nonetheless resisting the scientific realist's view that that the claims of our best scientific theories concerning otherwise inaccessible domains of nature are at least probably and/or approximately true. I suggest, however, that this conclusion follows only from a dogmatic and unappealingly scientistic conception of naturalism itself. I go on to argue not only that a more attractive form of philosophical naturalism can indeed (...) be coherently combined with a rejection of scientific realism, but also that this combination of views is the one that thoroughgoing and sophisticated naturalists should in fact embrace. And I conclude by offering a systematic conception of the role of philosophy of science in the resulting integrative form of naturalistic inquiry. (shrink)

A single mother is a person who is accountable for raising their children alone because they do not have a husband or live-in partner. Single mothers claim to have no co-parenting relationships at all, comparing single parents to those who are married, cohabiting, or without children, single parents experience the worst work-life balance. A single parent may feel overwhelmed by the demands of juggling child care, a career, paying bills, and maintaining household responsibilities. Single-parent households frequently deal with several extra (...) obligations and possible complications that other families would not. The study also emphasizes the difficulties and coping mechanisms faced by contractual single parents as well as their lived experiences. The study's findings, which were based on an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, were as follows: (1) Work-life balance can be difficult for single parents. They struggle to keep their jobs while taking care of their family because they are the only ones in charge of the children. (2) Single contractual mothers face particular difficulties due to a lack of resources for basic expenses. (3) Contractual single women lean on their kids, the good people in their lives, and their faith in God to get through problems. (shrink)

One of the main highlights from last year’s event was the 2022 Philippine National and Local Elections. The Philippine elections involve a lot of people interaction from poll workers and other deputized agencies. Further, this study explores the lived experiences, challenges, and coping mechanisms of poll watchers during the 2022 Philippine election. Employing the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, the findings of this study were: (1) Filipino workers value a good-paying job and preferred meaningful work. (2) Amidst the experiences and challenges, the (...) poll watchers remain determined and motivated to take part in the seasonal election. (3) Poll watchers must be physically, emotionally, and mentally prepared to participate in this crucial work. Mainly, pollwatching is a self-reliant job. (shrink)

Proponents of the problem of animal suffering claim that the millions of years of apparent nonhuman animal pain and suffering provides evidence against the existence of God. Neo-Cartesianism attempts to avoid this problem mainly by denying the existence of phenomenal consciousness in nonhuman animals. However, neo-Cartesian options regarding animal minds have failed to compel many. In this essay, I explore an answer to the problem of animal suffering inspired by the medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas. Instead of focusing on phenomenal consciousness, (...) the neo-Thomistic view of animal minds focuses on self-awareness. After proposing and providing evidence for this view, I conclude that nonhuman animal suffering is not morally significant. (shrink)

In ‘My body, not my choice: against legalised abortion’, Hendricks offers an intriguing argument that suggests the state can coerce pregnant women into continuing to sustain their fetuses. His argument consists partly in countering Boonin’s defence of legalised abortion, followed by an argument from analogy. I argue in this response article that his argument from analogy fails and, correspondingly, it should still be a woman’s legal choice to have an abortion. My key point concerns the burdensomeness of pregnancy which is (...) morally relevant to the question of whether the state can coerce people to use their bodies to help another person. (shrink)

Belief in the existence of spiritual entities is an integral part of many people’s religious worldview. Angels appear, demons possess, ghosts haunt. But is belief that such entities exist justified? If not, are there conditions in which it would be? I will begin by showing why, once one clearly understands how to infer the best explanation, it is obvious that neither stories nor personal encounters can provide sufficient evidence to justify belief in spiritual entities. After responding to objections to similar (...) arguments I have published in the past, I will go on to show that there is at least an imaginable circumstance in which belief in spiritual entities would be justified but then point out that it is not reasonable to think that such conditions will ever be met. In short, if such entities were real, it would be theoretically possible to demonstrate their existence scientifically, and in doing so, one could make belief in their existence justified. But doing so would require and entail a scientific revolution equivalent to proving that the Earth is flat. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, “confirmation bias”. Confirmation bias is the human tendency only to look for evidence that confirms what one wants to believe or what one already thinks is true. Usually people are not too keen to look for evidence against what they want to believe is true. The human propensity for self‐delusion is strong. When one is confronted with sufficient evidence against some belief that one holds, what one should do (...) is reject that belief ‐ at least if one is concerned with truth. When we surround ourselves with people and views that already agree with our own, we can draw erroneous conclusions. Confirmation bias greatly hinders one's ability to find the truth. Confirmation bias and evidence denial is why we start “seeing something everywhere” once you learn about it. The more scrutiny a belief can withstand, the more likely it is that it's true. (shrink)

This paper advances a new paradigm in clinical ethics education that not only emphasizes development of individual cli but also focuses on the institutional context within which health care professionals work. This approach has been applied to the goal of improving the care provided to critically and terminally ill adults. The model has been adopted by about thirty hospitals and nursing homes; additional institutions will soon join the program, entitled Decisions Near the End of Life. Here, we describe the history (...) and rationale for this approach, its goals, pedagogical assumptions, and design. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'mystery, therefore magic fallacy' (MTM). One commits the (MTM) when one takes the fact that one cannot find a “natural” or “rational” explanation for some event or thing as a reason to favor or to accept a magical, supernatural, or fantastic explanation for that event or thing. This fallacy gets its name from the fact that we instinctually avoid it every time we watch a good magic show. (...) MTM is very common in religious circles since “God did it” is often the religious supernatural explanation of choice. In fact, MTM is simply another way of committing the appeal to ignorance fallacy. When committing MTM, one simply takes one's inability to prove there is a natural explanation (by finding one) to be a good reason to conclude there is not one. (shrink)

One commits the availability error when one pays attention to, or is compelled by, the readily available evidence – the evidence that is obvious, memorable, or psychologically compelling – instead of taking into account all the evidence or the reliable evidence. This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called availability error. The availability error contributes to confirmation bias, the tendency to only pay attention to the evidence that confirms what we believe and ignore the evidence (...) that doesn't. The availability error also encourages other fallacies, such as hasty generalization – where you generalize about an entire group based on a statistically insignificant portion of that group. In fact, memory is especially susceptible to the availability error because we are apt to remember only what is memorable, and that is often only what is psychologically compelling. (shrink)

“Big Data” and data analytics affect all of us. Data collection, analysis, and use on a large scale is an important and growing part of commerce, governance, communication, law enforcement, security, finance, medicine, and research. And the theme of this symposium, “Individual and Informational Privacy in the Age of Big Data,” is expansive; we could have long and fruitful discussions about practices, laws, and concerns in any of these domains. But a big part of the audience for this symposium is (...) students and faculty in higher education institutions (HEIs), and the subject of this paper is data analytics in our own backyards. Higher education learning analytics (LA) is something that most of us involved in this symposium are familiar with. Students have encountered LA in their courses, in their interactions with their law school or with their undergraduate institutions, instructors use systems that collect information about their students, and administrators use information to help understand and steer their institutions. More importantly, though, data analytics in higher education is something that those of us participating in the symposium can actually control. Students can put pressure on administrators, and faculty often participate in university governance. Moreover, the systems in place in HEIs are more easily comprehensible to many of us because we work with them on a day-to-day basis. Students use systems as part of their course work, in their residences, in their libraries, and elsewhere. Faculty deploy course management systems (CMS) such as Desire2Learn, Moodle, Blackboard, and Canvas to structure their courses, and administrators use information gleaned from analytics systems to make operational decisions. If we (the participants in the symposium) indeed care about Individual and Informational Privacy in the Age of Big Data, the topic of this paper is a pretty good place to hone our thinking and put into practice our ideas. (shrink)

Conscious technology features in many Black Mirror episodes. For example, there are the cookies in White Christmas, the people uploaded into the San Junipero simulation, Robert Daly's digital copies of his coworkers in USS Callister, and the copy of Clayton Leigh that is exhibited in Black Museum. But would such pieces of technology really be conscious? Would they, for example, feel pain? And how could we tell? Is uploading or replicating someone's consciousness even possible? This chapter explores these questions and (...) discusses the ethical issues that are raised by consciousness technology. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'anthropomorphic bias'. One displays an anthropomorphic bias when one displays a tendency to ascribe humanlike characteristics, usually mental properties or agency, to things that do not have it. One is guilty of the anthropomorphic bias, however, when one stretches this kind of reasoning too far – when one sees a single or limited number of things that remind him of humanlike behavior and then jumps to the conclusion that (...) the entity in question possesses a humanlike mind. An example that is a bit more obvious and egregious is when people conclude that ghosts are the cause of unexplained noises or motions. Although this invokes the mystery therefore magic fallacy, it also includes ascribing humanlike agency to something that does not have it: the cause of the noise or motion. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: the constructive nature of human perception. Many of the things that we believe are generated by our senses interacting with the outside world. Our brains make decisions about what information to interpret and how to do so mostly based on our assumptions, preconceptions, and desires. An assumption that informs how we interpret the information that our brain receives is that the size, color, and shape of objects is constant. (...) This allows us to perceive an object the same way even if how we are seeing it is changing. There are of course countless visual illusions that demonstrate this fact. This is why science has proved to be such a powerful tool in understanding the world; it is designed specifically to guard against the way our senses can lead us astray. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'all or nothing (AON)'. AON presents a false dilemma by suggesting that there are only two options – either all or nothing – when in fact there are many more options in the middle ground between those two extremes. AON also happens in the political arena anytime a politician insists that being against one of the policies is equivalent to being against all of them. Often people adopt (...) a kind of all or nothing attitude when it comes to supporting a candidate or political party. Of course, the argument suggests that gun laws would be completely ineffectual – criminals would still find ways to buy guns. But AON also appears in politics when people are proposing or drafting laws and policy. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'Galileo gambit'. Perhaps the best way to describe the fallacy is as an association fallacy or a faulty analogy. The Galileo gambit fallacy is committed by those theories that contradict the mainstream scientific consensus. The Galileo gambit is often used to suggest that science is not open to criticism, but nothing could be further from the truth. No one is more open to criticism than the scientist; that (...) is how we make sure we are not wrong and get closer to the truth. Persons who are making the Galileo gambit in recent times are Rupert Sheldrake and his morphic resonance/fields, Bigfoot believers, UFO enthusiasts, creationists, conspiracy theorists of all stripes, and people who deny climate change. (shrink)

Much philosophical work on pop culture apologises for its use; using popular culture is a necessary evil, something merely useful for reaching the masses with important philosophical arguments. But works of pop culture are important in their own right--they shape worldviews, inspire ideas, change minds. We wouldn't baulk at a book dedicated to examining the philosophy of The Great Gatsby or 1984--why aren't Star Trek and Superman fair game as well? After all, when produced, the former were considered pop culture (...) just as much as the latter. This will be the first major reference work to right that wrong, gathering together entries on film, television, games, graphic novels and comedy, and officially recognizing the importance of the field. It will be the go-to resource for students and researchers in philosophy, culture, media and communications, English and history and will act as a springboard to introduce the reader to the other key literature in the field. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the role played by guardians and tyrants in Star Wars. The Jedi align themselves with the light side of the Force, while the Sith align themselves with the dark side. Although the Jedi are guardians of the galaxy, they refrain from ruling directly, acting as willing servants of the Old Republic. In Attack of the Clones, Anakin Skywalker and Senator Amidala demonstrate the trajectory of Plato's thinking when they engage in a semi‐serious debate about the politics of (...) the Republic. Plato's views in the Republic mirror the different types of rule in the Star Wars galaxy surprisingly well: democracy is vulnerable, tyrants only care about their own interests, and guardians of peace and justice are the state's best chance for flourishing. While democracy fails, allowing the Emperor to become a malevolent tyrant, the Jedi Council is cut off in its service to the Republic. (shrink)

The problem of animal suffering considers whether God would allow millions of years of animal pain, disease, and death. Philosophers who debate this issue often assume that pain and suffering are evils a loving God would not allow without good reason. Moreover, a considerable amount of the debate regarding the problem of animal suffering involves whether animals are capable of experiencing pain and suffering. But this raises the question of whether pain and suffering are intrinsically evil. In this essay I (...) explore the nature of pain and suffering from a Thomistic perspective. First I briefly explain how the intrinsic values of pain and suffering are crucial regarding the problem of evil and the problem of animal suffering in particular. Next I explain the Thomistic concepts of pain and suffering and show that they do not contradict their contemporary philosophical and scientific counterparts. Afterward I determine whether pain and suffering are intrinsically evil experiences that an all-good God should refrain from causing. I conclude that pain and suffering are not intrinsically evil and that the problem of animal suffering is not a problem in addition to the problem of natural evil. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas is often mentioned in the debate regarding best possible worlds. Some philosophers believe Aquinas’ writings entail that God must create a best possible world while most think he rejects the notion. Additionally, it is thought that Aquinas’ position falls prey to the problem of no best world. However, a closer examination of Aquinas’ metaphysical views shows that he has been misunderstood in the current debate. In this essay, I first examine some contemporary views regarding Aquinas’ thought on best (...) possible worlds. Afterward, I discuss Aquinas’ concepts of God’s goodness and God’s purpose for creating and determine their implications for his position regarding best possible worlds. Understanding these concepts helps to show why Aquinas’ position has been misrepresented. I conclude that while Aquinas does reject the popular notion of a best possible world, his arguments are not susceptible to the problem of no best world. (shrink)

We revisit the question of price elasticity of employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) take-up by directly examining changes in the take-up of ESI at a large firm in response to exogenous changes in employee premium contributions. We find that, on average, a 10% increase in the employee's out-of-pocket premium increases the probability of dropping coverage by approximately 1%. More importantly, we find heterogeneous impacts: married workers are much more price-sensitive than single employees, and lower-paid workers are disproportionately more likely to drop coverage (...) than higher-paid workers. Elasticity estimates for employees below the 25th percentile of salary distribution in our sample are nearly twice the average. (shrink)

It is almost universally believed that some infinite regresses are vicious, and also almost universally believed that some are benign. In this paper I argue that regresses can be vicious for several different sorts of reasons. Furthermore, I claim that some intuitively vicious regresses do not suffer from any of the particular aetiologies that guarantee viciousness to regresses, but are nevertheless so on the basis of considerations of parsimony. The difference between some apparently benign and some apparently vicious regresses, then, (...) turns out to be a matter of a more general assessment of costs and benefits, making viciousness of regresses in some cases less of a local matter than is usually thought. (shrink)

In the concluding chapter of Exceeding our Grasp Kyle Stanford outlines a positive response to the central issue raised brilliantly by his book, the problem of unconceived alternatives. This response, called "epistemic instrumentalism", relies on a distinction between instrumental and literal belief. We examine this distinction and with it the viability of Stanford's instrumentalism, which may well be another case of exceeding our grasp.

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 172-187, June 2012.

This encylopedia entry describes the "Canberra Plan" approach to conceptual analysis, a method closely related to the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis approach to analysing the meaning of theoretical terms.