What is an assurance? What do we do when we claim to know? Krista Lawlor offers an original account based on the work of J. L. Austin. She addresses challenges to contextualist semantic theories; resolves closure-based skeptical paradoxes; and helps us tread the line between acknowledging our fallibility and skepticism.

Shame is a Jekyll-and-Hyde emotion--it can be morally valuable, but it also has a dark side. Thomason presents a philosophically rigorous and nuanced account of shame that accommodates its harmful and helpful aspects. Thomason argues that despite its obvious drawbacks and moral ambiguity, shame's place in our lives is essential.

Shame is most frequently defined as the emotion we feel when we fail to live up to standards, norms, or ideals. I argue that this definition is flawed because it cannot explain some of the most paradigmatic features of shame. Agents often respond to shame with violence, but if shame is the painful feeling of failing to live up to an ideal, this response is unintelligible. I offer a new account of shame that can explain the link between shame and (...) violence. On my view, shame arises out of a tension between our identity and our self-conception: those things about which we feel shame are part of our identities, but they are not part of our self-conception. I conclude by arguing that this account of shame is a valuable moral emotion. (shrink)

Negative emotions like anger, spite, contempt, and envy are widely seen as obstacles to a good life. They are like the weeds in a garden that need to be pulled up before they choke out the nice plants. This book argues that bad feelings aren't the weeds; they are the worms. Many people are squeamish about them and would prefer to pretend they aren't there, but the presence of worms mean the garden it thriving. I draw on insights from the (...) history of philosophy to show what we've gotten wrong about bad feelings and to see how we can live better with them. The first half of the book argues that there is nothing wrong with negative emotions and that their bad reputation is undeserved. Philosophers have long argued that our emotions are part of how we value things and bad feelings are not different. Negative emotions are expressions of self-love-not egoism or selfishness, but the felt attachment to ourselves and our lives. We feel negative emotions because our lives matter to us. The second half of the book takes a detailed look at individual bad feelings: anger, envy and jealousy, spite and Schadenfreude, and contempt. I show how all our negative emotions are valuable parts of our attachment to our lives. We don't have to battle negative emotions or "channel" them into something productive. Bad feelings aren't obstacles to a good life; they are part of what makes life meaningful. (shrink)

Workplaces have transformed over the past decades in response to global forces. This case study of a Mexican-owned multinational corporation compares employee perceptions of a new work culture required to confront these demands. Employees are expected to work long hours and to produce results, obtain the right skills and knowledge, and exhibit proactivity. Drawing on extensive qualitative data, this article theorizes what the expectations mean for women and men employees. The competitive culture reinforces inequality because expectations are grounded in the (...) gendered “ideal worker” narrative. However, tensions ensue for the company that is partly characterized by paternalism yet requires a competitive work culture. The study uncovers a hybrid organizational logic with gendered assumptions undergirding a hidden inequality as professional women navigate the emergence of the glass ceiling in the global south. (shrink)

This article examines some of the key debates and interactions between the Australian government and medical profession in relation to the mental health consequences of the policy of mandatory detention of asylum seekers. It explores how, in a series of episodes between 2001 and 2005, each side claimed to represent accurately the ‘true’ nature of the detention system through asserting superior ‘objectivity’ and commitment to ‘scientific truth’ in their representations of the mental health of asylum seekers. Placing these debates within (...) the particular political objectives of the Liberal Party during John Howard’s term as Prime Minister, the article explores how science and medical advocacy have been characterized and made to signify larger conflicts within the Australian political arena. It shows how populist political ideas of ‘elitism’ have been used by the government to represent as ‘elitist untruths’ psychiatric research which has demonstrated a direct causal links between government border control policies and mental ill-health. (shrink)

Over eighty years ago, a third, previously unidentified copy of the Anglo-Norman prose chronicle, Le Livere de Reis de Engleterre,was discovered in John Rylands French MS 64. Despite this discovery, and the paucity of witnesses to this chronicle, scholars of LRE generally pass over the version contained in the John Rylands manuscript. Through an examination of the sources and variant readings of LRE, this article argues that this previously overlooked copy of LRE is more authoritative than the other two. The (...) superiority of the John Rylands manuscript enables us to determine best text readings of LRE with improved accuracy. It also allows us to date the chronicle with greater precision than previously possible, and provides grounds for tentatively locating the origins of the chronicle to northeastern England. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory has been an incredibly powerful tool for understanding and improving organisations, and their relationship with other actors in society. That these critical ideas are now accepted within mainstream business is due in no small part to the influence of stakeholder theory. However, improvements to stakeholder engagement through stakeholder theory have tended to help stakeholders who are already somewhat powerful within organisational settings, while those who are less powerful continue to be marginalised and routinely ignored. In this paper, we (...) argue that one possible obstacle preventing less powerful stakeholders from speaking up and/or being heard by organisations is found at the ontological level, where we have identified an ‘essentialist self’ underpinning the stakeholder concept. By deconstructing the stakeholder concept through how it is defined, discussed and debated, and linking this back to the practical consequences of the theory for the least powerful stakeholders, we are able to make three contributions. One, through our deconstruction, it is clear that at an ontological level, stakeholder theory is underpinned by an implicit, and problematic, assumption of the ‘essentialist self’, where the organisation is treated as the ‘natural, universal self’, and anyone not closely resembling this narrow (and unrealistic) view of self is treated as ‘other’. Two, we build on the work of authors such as Wicks et al. (Bus Ethics Q 4(4):475–497, 1994), who highlight the need for consideration of the self within stakeholder theory. We thus take our findings from contribution one and begin to build a more holistic view of the self within the stakeholder concept, where each self is encouraged to recognise common selves outside and inside the corporation. Third, we link the theoretical discussion to the practical by discussing some imperfect ways in which a more holistic, enriched stakeholder concept might begin to help mitigate marginalisation for some stakeholders. (shrink)

Despite technological and interpretative advances, the non-invasive modalities used for pre-surgical evaluation of patients with drug-resistant epilepsy, fail to generate a concordant anatomo-electroclinical hypothesis for the location of the seizure onset zone in many patients. This requires chronic monitoring with intracranial electroencephalography, which facilitates better localization of the seizure onset zone, and allows evaluation of the functional significance of cortical regions-of-interest by electrical stimulation mapping. There are two principal modalities for intracranial EEG, namely subdural electrodes and stereotactic depth electrodes. Although (...) ESM is considered the gold standard for functional mapping with subdural electrodes, there have been concerns about its utility with stereo-EEG. This is mainly because subdural electrodes allow contiguous sampling of the dorsolateral convexity of cerebral hemispheres, and permit delineation of the extent of eloquent functional areas on the cortical surface. Stereo-EEG, while having relatively sparse sampling on the cortical surface, offers the ability to access the depth of sulci, mesial and basal surfaces of cerebral hemispheres, and deep structures such as the insula, which are largely inaccessible to subdural electrodes. As stereo-EEG is increasingly the preferred modality for intracranial monitoring, we find it opportune to summarize the literature for ESM with stereo-EEG in this narrative review. Emerging evidence shows that ESM for defining functional neuroanatomy is feasible with stereo-EEG, but probably requires a different approach for interpretation and clinical decision making compared to ESM with subdural electrodes. We have also compared ESM with stereo-EEG and subdural electrodes, for current thresholds required to evoke desired functional responses vs. unwanted after-discharges. In this regard, there is preliminary evidence that ESM with stereo-EEG may be safer than ESM with subdural grids. Finally, we have highlighted important unanswered clinical and scientific questions for ESM with stereo-EEG in the hope to encourage future research and collaborative efforts. (shrink)

Our recent theory of intervocality (Cahill and Hamel 2018, 2021) provided a new model of voice as material, relational, and socially constructed. However, our work did not substantially address the complex relationship between voice and emotion, or how that complex relationship could be taken up more effectively and ethically in actor training and the theater studio. Utilizing insights from affect theory, cultural psychology, and affective neuroscience, this article argues for the need for pedagogies that substantively engage with the cultural (...) specificity of emotion, affect, and voice to create more just practices and experiences within the training studio and in performance. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial responsibility is the proper corrective to testimonial injustice. She proposes a perceptual-like “testimonial sensibility” to explain the transmission of knowledge through testimony. This sensibility is the means by which a hearer perceives an interlocutor's credibility level. When prejudice causes a hearer to inappropriately deflate the credibility attributed to a speaker, the sensibility may have functioned unreliably. Testimonial responsibility, she claims, will make the capacity reliable by reinflating credibility levels to their proper degree. I argue that (...) testimonial sensitivity may be or involve “mindreading,” the cognitive capacity by which we predict human behavior and explain it in terms of mental states. Further, I claim that, if testimonial sensibility is or involves mindreading, and mindreading is a function of brain processes, testimonial injustice cannot be corrected by testimonial responsibility. This is because 1) it appears to rely on conscious awareness of prejudice, whereas much bias occurs implicitly, and 2) it works at the individual level, whereas testimonial injustice occurs both individually and socially. I argue that the remedy for testimonial injustice is, instead, engaging in social efforts that work below the level of consciousness. (shrink)

Attitudes like shame and contempt seem to be at odds with basic tenets of Kantian moral theory. I argue on the contrary that both attitudes play a central role in Kantian morality. Shame and contempt are attitudes that protect our love of honour, or the esteem we have for ourselves as moral persons. The question arises: how are these attitudes compatible with Kant's claim that all persons deserve respect? I argue that the proper object of shame and contempt is not (...) the humanity within a person, but rather her self-conceit, or the false esteem that competes with love of honour. (shrink)

We draw from resource dependence and institutional theories to explore how board characteristics associated with directors’ capacities to provide resources and legitimacy (i.e., board size, the number of non-executive, interlocking, and female directors) along with regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive institutional conditions combine to shape firm environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. Using a process of configurational theorizing with fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis and data from firms in 32 countries, we identify multiple equifinal configurations that are associated with high and (...) low ESG performance. We find that high and low ESG performance have different drivers due to complementarities among the presence and absence of board characteristics. Our results also show that the effectiveness (or not) of the bundles of boards’ characteristics for ESG performance varies across institutional contexts. By leveraging these findings to construct a typology of board archetypes that lead to high and low ESG performance, we offer novel theoretical and empirical insights to scholars as well as implications for practice. (shrink)

Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia (1962) generates wildly different reactions among philosophers. Interpreting Austin on perception starts with a reading of this text, and this in turn requires reading into the lectures key ideas from Austin’s work on natural language and the theory of knowledge. The lectures paint a methodological agenda, and a sketch of some first-order philosophy, done the way Austin thinks it should be done. Crucially, Austin calls for philosophers to bring a deeper understanding of natural language meaning to (...) bear as they do their tasks. In consequence Austin’s lectures provide a fascinating start—but only a start—on a number of key questions in the philosophy of perception. (shrink)

This book defends a novel theory of singular concepts, emphasizing the pragmatic requirements of singular concept possession and arguing that these requirements must be understood to institute traditions and policies of thought.

Recent social psychology is skeptical about self-knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, have produced a new account of the source of the authority of self-ascriptions. On this account, it is not descriptive accuracy but authorship which funds the authority of one's self-ascriptions. The resulting view seems to ensure that self-ascriptions are authoritative, despite evidence of one's fallibility. However, a new wave of psychological studies presents a powerful challenge to the authorship account. This research suggests that one can author one's attitudes, (...) but one's self- ascriptions may lack authority. I present this new challenge from social psychology and use it to argue that first-person authority is agential authority: one's self-ascriptions are authoritative, in part anyway, because they are reliable expressions of those attitudes that govern further choices and behavior. (shrink)

Epistemic closure, the idea that knowledge is closed under known implication, plays a central role in current discussions of skepticism and the semantics of knowledge reports. Contextualists in particular rely heavily on the truth of epistemic closure in staking out their distinctive response to the so-called "skeptical paradox." I argue that contextualists should re-think their commitment to closure. Closure principles strong enough to force the skeptical paradox on us are too strong, and closure principles weak enough to express unobjectionable epistemic (...) principles are too weak to generate the skeptical paradox. I briefly consider how the contextualist might live without (strong) closure. (shrink)

We all know that being reasonable is important in daily life. Beyond daily life, major political and ethical theorists give central place to reasonableness in their accounts of just and moral behaviour. In the law, at least in the Anglo-American setting, reasonableness is the standard for a wide range of behaviour, from administrative decisions to torts. But what is it to be reasonable? In answer, I provide a genealogical account of reasonableness. The functional perspective afforded by a genealogical account has (...) numerous payoffs, explaining important features of reasonableness, and enabling us to respond to worries about vagueness or subjectivity in the meaning of ‘reasonable’. (shrink)

MDR-TB and admission to isolation can induce a situation in which individuals are normless, unable to achieve the social goals that they have learned to pursue. Described as anomie, this situation can induce deviant behaviour. Addressing the psychosocial ethics of MDR-TB and isolation, this paper responds to the call for consideration of resource allocation and liberty.

Kant’s commitment to universalism has been called into question since increasing attention has been paid to his work on race in the last 20 years. This worry can easily be applied to Kant’s work on education: when Kant describes education as allowing humanity to fulfill its Bestimmung (vocation), scholars might reasonably conclude that such a claim only applies certain racial groups. Yet Salomo Friedlaender claims that if Kant’s moral theory is taught to children, “Every person is valued according to her (...) morality and no longer, as in our crude days, according to ‘race’ or national and religious affiliation.” This interpretation of Kant might strike some contemporary Kant scholars as naïvely optimistic, but neo-Kantians were well aware of Kant’s racial claims. By examining how neo-Kantians read Kant’s work on race, I argue that Friedlaender’s interpretation provides a way of reading an unracialized Bestimmung in the pedagogy. (shrink)

Por meio de uma análise reconstrutiva da filosofia político-jurídica de Jürgen Habermas e de Rainer Forst, bem como com auxílio de literatura secundária, são analisados os conceitos de direitos culturais e tolerância. O objetivo da presente pesquisa é visualizar como Habermas e Forst desenvolvem os referidos conceitos. Para este fim, o artigo é dividido em duas seções, a partir de uma justificativa introdutória da investigação dos objetivos traçados. A primeira seção trata da questão que envolve os direitos culturais, seu significado, (...) evolução e maneira de efetivar sua garantia. A segunda seção aborda o conceito de tolerância, que Habermas trabalha enquanto necessidade procedimental a partir de direitos subjetivos a iguais liberdades de ação, enquanto Forst o trabalha a partir de uma concepção como respeito ao outro, em que será essencial o princípio de justificação da justiça, amparado no uso público da razão. Ao final, as últimas considerações apontam para o fato de que Habermas mantém seu edifício teórico da década de 1990, trabalhando a possibilidade de tolerância e a garantia de direitos culturais a partir de procedimentos democráticos e de justiça política, nos quais normas e leis devem ser racionalmente aceitas em uma cultura política compartilhada. Já Forst busca um rumo prático-normativo, em que a razão prática requer pessoas razoáveis e autônomas moralmente, trabalhando a necessidade de justificação por via procedimental. (shrink)

The close relationship between feminism and history has resulted in peaks in the production of feminist histories which coincide with high levels of feminist activity. In many instances, feminists have conceived the research and writing of history as a political act in itself. This article investigates some of the contradictions and omissions which can arise when feminism attempts to engage with its own past. Though a close examination of the coverage of the suffrage movement in the British feminist periodical Spare (...) Rib, the article considers the difficulties of constructing alternative versions of history and of integrating new knowledge into broader historical narratives. (shrink)

Epic Tales from Ancient India: Paintings from the San Diego Museum of Art. Edited by Marika Sardar. San Diego: San Diego Museum of Art, 2016. Pp. 164. $45. [Distr. by Yale Univ. Press.].

This article analyses the core values of the biggest and oldest university in Estonia, University of Tartu (UT), as 237 undergraduate students perceive them. The reporting of values is combined with critical incident technique, based on which the values in–action are obtained. It appeared that UT is best characterized by values such as ‘traditions and continuity’, ‘academic atmosphere’ and ‘quality of education’. It was also found that male students are more critical about specifically one value–set: ‘innovation and development’ and that (...) students, who fund the studies themselves, are more supportive about ‘quality of education’ and ‘concern for student’ values. Contrary to expectations, study time had no influence on the student perception of values. Implications of the results for the university are discussed, in order to better cope with the tightening competition in the educational market. (shrink)

This article discusses the ascetic–eschatological dimension of consecrated life through the lens of death. Death is not understood as an impenetrable border which separates the two worlds but as a fluid cell membrane which binds time and eternity. The phenomenon of death in consecrated life is perceived in three ritual events: baptism, religious consecration and physical death. These three moments make the so–called 3D transformation which is not only in these three events but through asceticism it is extended to the (...) whole existence of the consecrated person. Ascetic way of living is the membrane where eschaton transcends its own borders. The effort of asceticism and joy of eschaton in consecrated life are two sides of the same reality. Considering the relation between asceticism and eschaton, a convent could be named a heavenly embassy and consecrated people heavenly ambassadors. (shrink)

This book provides an intimate portrait of eighteen universal truths in Star Wars--principles that are "true for all time, all places and all people." Readers will see that the philosophy of the Jedi doesn't only apply "in a galaxy far, far away"; it is also highly relevant to everyday living.

Meira Levinson argues for a robust civics education that models the practices of good citizenship. One of the elements of that civics education is teaching students how to take up the perspectives of others. The question arises: how do we teach students and citizens alike to take up the perspectives of others? Here I argue that we can make sense of perspective-taking by appealing to Rawls’s notion of public reason as an ideal. I conclude by arguing that a commitment to (...) the ideal of public reason can help identify and resist oppression and marginalization. (shrink)

Shaming behavior on social media has been the cause of concern in recent public discourse. Supporters of online shaming argue that it is an important tool in helping to make social media and online communities safer and more welcoming to traditionally marginalized groups. Objections to shaming often sound like high-minded calls for civility, but I argue that shaming behavior poses serious risks. Here I identify moral and political risks of online shaming. In particular, shaming threatens to undermine our commitment to (...) the co-deliberative practices of morality. As a result, online shaming can undermine the very goals it is supposed to accomplish. (shrink)

One way of understanding Kant’s views about moral emotions is the cultivation view. On this view, emotions play a role in Kantian morality provided they are properly cultivated. I evince a sceptical position about the cultivation view. First, I show that the textual evidence in support of cultivation is ambiguous. I then provide an account of emotions in Kant’s theory that explains both his positive and negative views about them. Emotions capture our attention such that they both disrupt the mind’s (...) composure and serve as a surrogate for reason. As such, Kant cannot recommend that we cultivate our emotions. (shrink)

It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy (...) is not merely morally permissible, but morally valuable. Here I provide a defense of envy's moral value. I argue that feelings of envy are integral to the value that moral agents place on the goods and talents that they judge to be central to a worthwhile life. (shrink)

In this study, we use a mixed methods research design to investigate how national cultural forces may impede or enhance the positive impact of females’ economic and political empowerment on increasing gender diversity of corporate boards. Using both a longitudinal correlation-based methodology and a configurational approach with fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, we integrate theoretical mechanisms from gender schema and institutional theories to develop a mid-range theory about how female empowerment and national culture shape gender diversity on corporate boards around the (...) world. With our configurational approach, we conceptually and empirically model the complexity that is associated with the simultaneous interdependencies, both complementary and substitutive ones, between female empowerment processes and various cultural dimensions. Our findings contribute unique insights to research focused on board gender diversity as well as provide information for firm decision makers and policymakers about possible solutions for addressing the continuing issue of the underrepresentation of women on corporate boards. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Spring Fishing Song, Prehistoric Paros JOHN ERIC HAMEL Come, tuna, iridescent whorl, Spin color through our rain-locked sea. Come, scatter winter’s smoke and spitting hail, The brazier’s headache, days of coiling clay, The endless shuttle. Let the restless needle be. Come, return the sea to life. The days of winter card our limbs to rope. Restore the muscle with your flesh, unfurl The cold’s crushing boredom into the (...) sun. We’ve burnished long enough our winter soul. The heat begins to double back. The stars That mark the Oar re-stroke at last the salt. All turns. By island and straight you loop and belt, In time with star and turning tide. Shake sail, Bring oar and rope. The barley weaves new fleece. Come, bless our boats, wake us from the hours Of dropping lines over bleached gunnel, The nights of damp and cold breathing sea. Raw mackerel for days to eat, until A line is bumped like a lover’s finger touch, And fins cut water fast as breakers flash. The circled sea within our fleet erupts With flailing fins as sharp as swords. We gaff the bleeding gills into our boats. arion 28.3 winter 2021 44 spring fishing song, prehistoric paros Come, strong fish with gemstone scale, Blow on the coals of our blood, renew our strength. The deep obsidian light of winter clouds Begins to pour molten copper thick as oil All down the sea. We’re born for sails and shrouds, We’re born in waters of a mother’s wave, And return our marble souls into the grave. 2017... (shrink)

One of the more notorious passages in Kant occurs in the Doctrine of Right where he claims that ‘bloodguilt’ will cling to members of a dissolving society if they fail to execute the last murderer (MM, 6: 333). Although this is the most famous, bloodguilt appears in three other passages in Kant’s writings. These have received little attention in Kant scholarship. In this article, I examine these other passages and argue that bloodguilt functions as a symbol for the demandingness of (...) justice. I then offer a sympathetic interpretation of the passage from the Doctrine of Right. (shrink)

Although moral philosophers have argued that shame is a valuable moral emotion, feminist philosophers have been skeptical. From the feminist perspective, shame appears to be an emotion more mediated by social circumstances than moral philosophers acknowledge. It is, they will argue, not an accident that shame occurs more frequently in people with marginalized identities. If who I am is a social subordinate, this would explain why women feel more shame. This argument relies on the assumption that the reason women feel (...) more shame is because they internalize negative social judgments about themselves. Although this explanation is tempting, in this chapter I want to evince a skeptical position against it. I want to put pressure on the claim that women internalize their oppression and that this process explains their shame. Instead, I argue that their shame can be explained by the difficulties of navigating one’s identity under conditions of oppression. (shrink)

Moral philosophers have defended anger as an important part of our moral lives. In spite of these defenses, skeptics have nonetheless argued that it would be better all things considered to get over anger to the extent that we can. They will often point to moral exemplars like Martin Luther King, Jr. or Gandhi to show both (a) that we can successfully overcome our feelings of anger and (b) that we would be morally better off doing so. In this chapter, (...) I argue against this aspiration. Those who advocate for such an aspiration fail to recognize that getting over anger would require us to radically reshape our moral psychology. I argue that feelings of anger are more central to our moral emotional lives than skeptics realize and that they cannot be removed without altering other valuable moral commitments. (shrink)

The point of knowledge is to answer our need for information that will let us successfully navigate our world. So says Edward Craig in Knowledge and the State of Nature. This claim may sound anodyne, but according to Craig, it is crucial we keep this fact uppermost in our minds as we theorize about knowledge. Craig argues that our concept of knowledge begins its life by answering our need to mark out those who have the information we seek. A priori (...) analysis may not reveal the application conditions of our concept of knowledge, but reflection on its function can. (shrink)

This article explores how and why high levels of income inequality result from configurations of different types of entrepreneurial activities and elements of the institutional context in a multicountry sample. A configurational approach is used to unpack the complexities associated with how income inequality arises from different types of entrepreneurial activities embedded in different institutional contexts associated with Whitley’s national business systems dimensions. The findings from fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis reveal that high levels of both high-growth and necessity entrepreneurial activity (...) are associated with income inequality in certain contexts that are characterized by distinct institutional complementarities. (shrink)