Proceedings of a conference held Dec. 4-5, 1998 at the Universit'at G'ottingen.

The paper discusses the concept of the cognitive niche and distinguishes the latter from the metabolic niche. By using these posits I unpack certain ideas that are crucial for the enactivist movement, especially for its original formulation proposed by Varela, Thompson and Rosh. Drawing on the ontology of location, boundaries, and parthood, I argue that enacting the world can be seen as the process of cognitive niche construction. Moreover, it turns out that enactivism—as seen through the lens of the conceptual (...) framework proposed in the paper—considers cognition as a kind of connection between the subject and the world. This post is pointed to as the key idea laid down in enactivism. (shrink)

This unique and pioneering book critically appraises current work from both the cognitive science of religion and the evolutionary study of religion. It addresses the question: Why does the believer possess supernatural or religious beliefs in the combined context of his cognitive biases, their adaptive usefulness measured in terms of survival and reproduction, and the impact of social learning and cultural traits? The authors outlines a pluralistic approach to the study of religion that does not treat religion as an accidental (...) by-product but an adaptation selected by natural selection. Chapters discuss the role of religious components for the evolution of cooperation and altruism, and explore the development of atheism and secular ideas, in cognitive and evolutionary terms. Topics such as the usefulness of religion, the transmission of religious beliefs, and a Darwinian approach to religion are among those addressed. Contrary to standard views, religious biases are regarded as shaped by cultural influences and not merely by natural dispositions. This monograph will particularly appeal to researchers who are looking for a scientific explanation of religion and religious beliefs but who do not stop at the level of narrow cognitive and evolutionary accounts. The work will also be of interest to students of philosophy, sociology, religious studies, theology, or anthropology who seek to explain such fascinating, complex, and unequivocal phenomena as religion and religious components. (shrink)

The book is the first formulation of a meta-philosophical scheme rooted in the embodied cognition paradigm. The latter views subjects capable of cognition and experience as living, embodied creatures coupled with their environments. On the other hand, the emergence of experimental philosophy has given rise to a new context in which philosophers have begun to search for a more thorough definition of philosophical competence. The time is ripe for these two trends to join their efforts. Therefore, the book discusses what (...) it means for a human being thought of as a living subject to pursue philosophy. In this context, in contrast to the existing literature, philosophical competence must not be conflated with competence in philosophy. The former is a skill or attitude. The book refers to this peculiar attitude as the recognition of one’s epistemic position. (shrink)

Two major philosophical movements have sought to fundamentally rethink the relationship between humans and their environment(s): environmental ethics and enactivism. Surprisingly, they virtually never refer to or seek inspiration from each other. The goal of this analysis is to bridge the gap. Our main purpose, then, is to address, from the enactivist angle, the conceptual backbone of environmental ethics, namely the concept of intrinsic value. We argue that intrinsic value does indeed exist, yet its "intrinsicality" does not boil down to (...) being independent of the interests and needs of humans. Rather, it is brought forth by what we callshared enactionof an axiological domain. The latter is built upon such core posits of enactivism as autonomy, enaction, participatory sense-making as well as the most recent concept of loving as knowing proposed by Hanne De Jaegher. (shrink)

The creation of paraconsistent logics have expanded the boundaries of formal logic by introducing coherent systems that tolerate contradictions without triviality. Thanks to their novel approach and rigorous formalization they have already found many applications in computer science, linguistics and mathematics. As a natural next step, some philosophers have also tried to answer the question if human everyday reasoning could be accurately modelled with paraconsistent logics. The purpose of this article is to argue against the notion that human reasoning is (...) paraconsistent. Numerous findings in the area of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience go against the hypothesis that humans tolerate contradictions in their inferences. Humans experience severe stress and confusion when confronted with contradictions. Experiments on the ways in which humans process contradictions point out that the first thing humans do is remove or modify one of the contradictory statements. From an evolutionary perspective, contradiction is useless and even more dangerous than lack of information because it takes up resources to process. Furthermore, it appears that when logicians, anthropologists or psychologists provide examples of contradictions in human culture and behaviour, their examples very rarely take the form of: \\). Instead, they are often conditional statements, probabilistic judgments, metaphors or seemingly incompatible beliefs. At different points in time humans are definitely able to hold contradictory beliefs, but within one reasoning leading to a particular behaviour, contradiction is never tolerated. (shrink)

The paper develops the idea that institutions are enablers. However, they do not only enable individuals and collectives to achieve their goals; first and foremost, they enable individuals and collectives to have a goal, to select and recognize certain possible states of affairs as targets of action, and as a result, to have a demand – especially a demand for further institutions. I make the case that properly functioning institutions are dedicated to making these states of affairs epistemically acquaintable. What (...) I will stress in particular is that acquaintance is first realized in the form of questions, which are linguistic expressions of acts of problematization. However, I will discuss less what an individual subject questions, but rather what the social dynamic of questioning is. This dynamic will be conceptualized in terms of epistemic dependence, and it will be singled out as the dynamic that gives rise to institutions. (shrink)

Marc-Wogau, K. Mina filosofiska fördomar.--Gustafsson, L. Om klassifikation.--Kanger, S. Några synpunkter på begreppet inflytande.--Torstendahl, R. Minikrav, optimumnormer och paradigm i historisk vetenskap.--Lagerberg, D. Punktkommentarer till dialektiken.--Nordenfeldt, L. Om olika former av interaktion.--Puterman, Z. An indeterminist interpretation of Marx's historical determinism.--Carls, R. Kunskap och frihet.--Andersson, J. S. Some notions of pragmatic implication.--Tönisson, I. A preliminary study of interpreting K[subscript x]ø¹.--Bergström, L. Vilken handlingsutilitarism är den riktiga?--Alfredsson, T. Kärlekskoefficienter.--Segerberg, K. The assignment problem as a problem of social choice.--Åqvist, L. En tidslogisk variant (...) av Morgenstjärneparadoxen. (shrink)

:Any space program involving long-term human missions will have to cope with serious risks to human health and life. Because currently available countermeasures are insufficient in the long term, there is a need for new, more radical solutions. One possibility is a program of human enhancement for future deep space mission astronauts. This paper discusses the challenges for long-term human missions of a space environment, opening the possibility of serious consideration of human enhancement and a fully automated space exploration, based (...) on highly advanced AI. The author argues that for such projects, there are strong reasons to consider human enhancement, including gene editing of germ line and somatic cells, as a moral duty. (shrink)

Abstrak: Artikel ini menyajikan pandangan Foucault tentang intelektual spesifik sebagai lawan dari intelektual universal atau tradisional yang diklaim oleh para pemikir modernis, yang pada umumnya mendasarkan pemikiran mereka pada esensi, fondasi, transendensi, universalia, atau apa yang disebut narasi-narasi besar. Intelektual spesifik Foucault tidak didasarkan pada akal universal yang dilihat sebagai sumber dari semua kapasitas manusiawi yang membebaskan. Dalam kuliah-kuliah dan seminar-seminarnya yang terakhir, Foucault berbicara mengenai parrhesia (truth-telling), yaitu bagaimana seorang individu menyadari dirinya sebagai subjek kebenaran dan etika. Intelektual sejati (...) disebutnya sebagai parrhesiast yang tidak hanya mampu kebenaran kepada orang lain, tetapi lebih dari itu ia harus mampu menyampaikan kebenaran kepada dirinya sendiri. Ini berarti bahwa ia memiliki relasi khusus dengan dirinya, dalam arti bahwa ia matang dan dewasa dalam penampilannya (model adanya), dan bahwa ia tidak hanya mampu menyampaikan kebenaran melalui kata-kata, tetapi juga melalui tindakan dan hidupnya sendiri. Nyata bahwa selalu ada relasi antara kata-kata dengan tindakan. Kata-kata Kunci: Kuasa, wacana, intelektual spesifik, parrhesia, subjek, etika, modalitas, dan permainan kebenaran. Abstract: The paper shows Foucaults own stand on specific intellectual as contrasted to the universal or traditional intellectual claimed by modernist thinkers, which is mainly based on essence, foundation, transcendence, universals, etc, or what one calls grand narratives. Specific intellectual is not based on the universal reason which is claimed to be the source of all human capacities in liberating him or herself. In his last lectures and seminars Foucault talked about parrhesia (truth-telling), that is how the individual is aware of him/her self to be the subject of truth and of ethics. The true intellectual is then called the parrhesiast, who is able not only to tell the truth to other people, but moreover he or she should be able to tell the truth to him/her self. This means that he has a special relation to him/her self, in the sense that he/she is mature in his/her mode of being, and that means he/she is able not only to tell the truth through words but also through his own conduct. There is always a correspondence between words and deeds. Keywords: Power, discourse, specific intellectual, truth-telling, subject, ethics modality, and truth-games. (shrink)

Abstrak: Paper ini berbicara mengenai parrhesia, salah satu dari sekian banyak istilah teknis utama dari Michel Foucault. Parrhesia merupakan seminar terakhir yang didiskusikan Foucault di Universitas Calofornia di Berkeley, USA, di bawah judul: ‘Discourse on Truth: The Problemati- zation of Parrhesia.’ Seri seminar ini dan seksualitas sebagaimana didiskusikan dalam History of Sexuality vol. 2 dan 3, berikut semua bahan kuliah dan interviu selama dua tahun terakhir sebelum kematiannya, dilihat sebagai puncak dari tiga jurus berpikir Foucault, terutama dalam hal ini jurus (...) subyektivitas dan etika. Di sini terlihat, bagaimana manusia menyadari diri sebagai subjek bagi dirinya sendiri atau menjadi subjek etika. Ini berarti bahwa individu, berdasarkan kebebasan dan kema- tangannya, secara praktis mampu berhubungan dengan dirinya sendiri (rapport a soi). Dengan itu, ia dapat disebut sebagai parrhesiast, yang tidak hanya menyampaikan kebenaran kepada orang lain, tetapi juga mampu menyampaikan kebenaran kepada dirinya sendiri. Dengan kata lain, supaya bisa disebut sebagai parrhesiast, seorang individu harus memper- lihatkan dalam dirinya suatu hubungan erat antara apa yang ia katakan dengan apa yang ia perbuat. Teori dan praktek selalu harus berjalan beriringan. Seseorang boleh berbicara secara meyakinkan, namun ia juga harus bertindak dan berlaku benar dan baik. Kata-kata kunci: Foucault, parrhesia, intelektual, subyek, etika. Abstract: The paper presents one of Foucault’s many pregnant technical terms called πάρήσίά (parrhesia). Parrhesia is the main topic of his last seminar delivered at the University of California in Berkeley, USA, entitled “Discourse on Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia.” These series of seminar and the issue of sexuality as discussed in his History of Sexuality vol. 2 and 3, added with all his lectures and interviews during the last two years before his death, are seen as the peak of his three axes of thought, namely the axis of subjectivity and ethics. There, we see how humanbeing is aware of him/her self as subject of him/her own self or of being the subject of ethics. This means that the invididual, based on his freedom and maturity, is practically able to relate with him/her self (rapport a soi). He is then to be called the parrhesiast, who not only tells the truth to other people, but also be able to tell the truth to him/her self. In other words, in order to be a parrhesiast, an individual should show in his/her life a correspondence between what he/she speaks and what he/she does. Theory and practice should go hand in hand. One can speak convincingly, yet is also to behave well. Keywords: Foucault, parrhesia, intellectual, subject, ethics. (shrink)

National and international research cultures for the innovation of new medicines involve various value claims about the ethics of the placebo entity as differentiating comparator. Yet, in turn, the instantiation of the placebo comparator as cultural artefact for the creation and identification of the ‘control group’ depends also upon prior social understandings of ‘comparability’. Reading back the ethics controversies surrounding the Risperidone psychiatry trials in India, the paper illustrates why drug efficacies need to be studied not only through comparative techniques (...) such as randomised controlled trials, but also through analytical modes of inquiry that can begin to place the problem of efficacy within particular social and cultural contexts, as well as across disciplines. It is suggested that future bioethics debates could benefit from a revised conception of the interdisciplinary placebo — one that is rooted in ‘placebo politics’ and that listens responsively to the voices of the global South. (shrink)

Studies have demonstrated that parents often exhibit a still face while silently reading their cell phones when responding to texts. Such disruptions to parent-child interactions have been observed during parental media use such as texting and these disruptions have been termed technoference. In the present study, we explored changes to mother-child interactions that occur before, during and after interruptions due to texting using an adapted naturalistic still face paradigm. Specifically, we examined the effect of an interruption due to either maternal (...) smartphone use or use of an analog medium on maternal interaction quality with their 20- to 22-month-old children. Mother-child interactions during free play were interrupted for 2 min by asking the mothers to fill out a questionnaire either by typing on the smartphone or on paper with a pen. Interactional quality was compared between free-play and interruption phases and to a no-interruption control group. Mixed ANOVA across phase and condition indicated that maternal responsiveness and pedagogical behavior decreased during the interruption phase for both the interruption groups but not for the no-interruption group. Children also increased their positive bids for attention during the paper-and-pencil and the smartphone conditions relative to the no-interruption control. These findings are consistent with a large body of research on the still-face paradigm and with a recent study demonstrating that smartphone interruptions decreased parenting quality. The present study, however, connects these lines of research showing the many everyday disruptions to parent-child interactions are likely to decrease parenting quality and that toddlers are likely to detect and attempt to repair such interruptions. (shrink)

This article examines some selected ethical issues in human space missions including human missions to Mars, particularly the idea of a space refuge, the scientific value of space exploration, and the possibility of human gene editing for deep-space travel. Each of these issues may be used either to support or to criticize human space missions. We conclude that while these issues are complex and context-dependent, there appear to be no overwhelming obstacles such as cost effectiveness, threats to human life or (...) protection of pristine space objects, to sending humans to space and to colonize space. The article argues for the rationality of the idea of a space refuge and the defensibility of the idea of human enhancement applied to future deep-space astronauts. (shrink)

Scholars employing an evolutionary approach to the study of religion and religious beliefs search for ultimate explanations of the origin, propagation, and persistence of religious beliefs. This quest often pairs in debate two opposing perspectives: the adaptationist and “by-product” explanations of religion and religious beliefs. The majority of scholars prefer the by-product approach, which is agnostic and even doubtful of the usefulness of religious beliefs. Despite this pervasive negativity, it seems unwarranted to deny the great usefulness of religious beliefs—particularly concerning (...) their past utility. Instead, adaptationist explanations of religion and religious beliefs must be re-established as interesting and useful approaches to the study of religious beliefs. (shrink)

The cultural policy of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland is incorporated into state-run cultural policies. The organs of public authority enforce the objectives of Church regardless of Church’s actual ability to influence the society. It should be pointed out that the secularization of religion in Poland is frequently misinterpreted and usually equated with its deprivatization. It is worth mentioning that Catholicism is the dominant religion of the country and the Roman Catholic Church has hold a special position in Poland (...) and play a major role in the country’s social and political life. In practice, however, Polish society appears to be religiously indifferent. This paper proves that the official, state-run cultural policy in Poland is based on favoritism of the Roman Catholic Church, regardless of Church’s actual ability to wield influence on society. Thus, there is a variety of implicit and explicit cultural policies implemented by the authorities to support Church. This work also aims at addressing the question of social attitudes to women, especially the one concerning the UN and EU law embracing women’s rights, until recently still not implemented in Poland. This paper further explores some peculiarities of this topic as an example of a specific outcome of Church cultural policy and its impact on both the past and present-day society. (shrink)

While humans have made enormous progress in the exploration and exploitation of Earth, exploration of outer space remains beyond current human capabilities. The principal challenges lie in current space technology and engineering which includes the protection of astronauts from the hazards of working and living in the space environment. These challenges may lead to a paradoxical situation where progress in space technology and the ability to ensure acceptable risk/benefit for human space exploration becomes dissociated and the rate of scientific discovery (...) declines. In this paper, we discuss the predominant challenges of the space environment for human health and argue that development and deployment of a human enhancement policy, initially confined to astronauts – for the purpose of future human space programmes is a rational solution to these challenges. (shrink)

Religious beliefs can be explained in two different ways, cognitive and adaptationist. Each of them is another kind of explanation, one is proximate and the other ultimate. Each of them provides the other with a specific status for religious beliefs, such as by-product or adaptation. However, there is no clarity of how cognition itself could be religiously biased and how the religious/theistic approach could work as a default cognitive mode, as Cognitive Science of Religion suggests. I would like to criticize (...) cognitive assumptions in the study of religion and show how adaptationist accounts are preferable. I specifically focus on the functional context of religious components, the social and psychological applications. I suggest how discussing about a cognitive basis does not matter in these fields and the cognitive account cannot explain the ubiquity of religious components that lie in their function, rather than the alleged connection with cognition. (shrink)

One of the most favourite subjects of ancient poetry is the oath of love. Previous research has taken it for granted that this oath always means the proverbial vow of eternal love, which may be broken unpunished, because no mortal can ever fulfil it. Apart from this manifoldly varied oath, however, there is also the one by which lovers deny an affair they have had, and this is, in contrast to the proverbial vow, a real, punishable perjury. This paper examines (...) respective poems of ancient literature on the basis of this distinction and aims to clear up misapprehensions and, on the whole, to reach a better understanding of ancient poetry of love. (shrink)

Contrary to the widely held view that the Roman-Carthaginian naval encounter Polybios reports at 1.21.9-11 was separate from the one off Mylae (260 BC) told at length right afterwards (1.23), the battle at the ‘Cape of Italy’ is in fact - as suspected by some scholars long ago - identical with the one at Mylae. However, far from mistaking (as has been suggested) Philinos’ account of the latter for a separate engagement, Polybios knowingly and deliberately told the battle of Mylae (...) twice: first in a brief summary, stripped of all detail, to illustrate how the Roman commander Cn. Scipio Asina (cos. 260) and his Punic counterpart, Hannibal, were both guilty of equally inappropriate acts of recklessness; then for a second time in detail and in its proper chronological place. Compositional considerations prompted this approach: to wait with the moralizing parallel until after his full account of Mylae (preceded in turn by the long technical disquisition on the Roman boarding bridges) would spoil the effect, and Polybios chose to place it immediately after Asina’s capture. (shrink)

As we look beyond our terrestrial boundary to a multi-planetary future for humankind, it becomes paramount to anticipate the challenges of various human factors on the most likely scenario for this future: permanent human settlement of Mars. Even if technical hurdles are circumvented to provide adequate resources for basic physiological and psychological needs, Homo sapiens will not survive on an alien planet if a dysfunctional psyche prohibits the utilization of these resources. No matter how far we soar into the stars, (...) our psychologies for future generations will be forever tethered to the totality of our surroundings. By shaping our environment toward survival and welfare during the voyage to Mars and in a Martian colony, we indirectly shape our psyches and prepare them for a mission of unprecedented alienation and duration. Once on Mars, human factors such as leadership structure, social organization and code of conduct, group size, gender balance, developmental cycle, mobility, length of stay and the ecological settings and type and manner of subsistence, will create a novel Martian culture. The degree that settlers are severed from the Earth will affect how radically foreign this culture will be when compared with cultures on Earth. (shrink)

Hugely controversial on publication, this is an insightful and characteristically entertaining survey of animal behaviour and the evolution of aggression throughout the animal world.

The Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths and virtues has been recently proposed by two leading positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman as “the social science equivalent of virtue ethics.” The very possibility of developing this kind of an “equivalent,” however, is very doubtful in the light of the cogent criticism that has been leveled at modern moral theory by Alasdair MacIntyre as well as the well argued accusations that positive psychology, despite its official normative neutrality, is (...) pervaded by specifically Western individualism and instrumentalism. In order to evaluate whether the VIA project can be considered as substantially rooted in virtue ethical tradition, the classification was assessed against two fundamental features of the classical version of the latter: (1) the substantial interconnectedness of individual virtues, as expressed by the thesis of the unity of virtue, and (2) the constitutive character of the relationship between virtue and happiness. It turned out, in result, that the two above features are not only absent from but also contradicted by the VIA framework with the latter's: (1′) construal of individual virtues and character strengths as independent variables and (2′) official endorsement of the fact/value distinction. As soon as the arguments for the superiority of the classical virtue ethical perspective are provided, the potential responses available to the VIA's proponents are discussed. (shrink)

This article presents an empirical examination of the consequences of the virtual entailment principle proposed by Jean Buridan to resolve the Liar paradox. This principle states that every sentence in natural language implicitly asserts its own truth. Adopting this principle means that the Liar sentence is not paradoxical but false, because its content is contradictory to what is virtually implied. As a result, humans should perceive the Liar sentence the same way as any other false sentence. This solution to the (...) Liar paradox received criticism for making ad hoc claims about the natural language. However, thanks to modern advancements in psychophysiology, it became possible to empirically investigate if the human brain really perceives the Liar sentence like a false sentence. We designed and conducted an experiment to examine brain activity in response to true sentences, false sentences and self-referential sentences. Our results provide support for the Buridan’s hypothesis and show that the Liar sentence is processed by the human brain identically to false sentences, while the Truthteller sentence is perceived identically to true sentences. This agrees with predictions derived from the virtual entailment principle and supports the idea that humans think with the logic of truth—a logic for which the truth is a designated value of its adequate semantics. (shrink)

This paper aims to elucidate a kind of ignorance that is more fundamental than a momentary lack of information, but also not a kind of ignorance that is built into the subject’s cognitive apparatus such that the subject can’t do anything about it. The paper sets forth the notion of cognitive confinement, which is a contingent, yet relatively stable state of being structurally or systematically unable to gain information from an environment, determined by patterns of interaction between the subject and (...) the world. In order to unpack the idea of cognitive confinement the paper discusses niche construction theory, and then, in greater detail, the notion of cognitive niche once proposed by John Tooby and Irven DeVore. Cognitive confinement is here imagined as a pathologized form of cognitive niche. This posit is substantiated by referring to a case that has come to the fore in recent years and raised debate around the world: the rise of so-called filter bubbles. They turn out to be instantiations of a more general phenomenon of cognitive confinement. (shrink)

Context: Von Foerster’s concept of eigenbehavior can be recognized against the broader context of enactivism as it has been advocated by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, by Noë and recently by Hutto and Myin, among others. This flourishing constellation of ideas is on its way to becoming the new paradigm of cognitive science. However, in my reading, enactivism, putting stress on the constitutive role of action when it comes to mind and perception, faces a serious philosophical challenge when attempting to account (...) for the way we actually perceive our environments, most importantly for the fact that we perceive things or objects. Von Foester’s eigenbehavior is understood here as a concept supposed to take on this challenge. Problem: In this article I tackle the following issues: Enactivism must be able to account for the apparent stability of the perceived world: this is not a realm of a never-ending flux of stimuli; it is a realm of stable things. Enactivism is committed to the anti-Cartesian endeavor seeking to bridge the gap between the inner and the outer; between the subjective and the objective. Now, these two points constrain each other so that one cannot address simply by regarding the apparent stability of things as a projection that springs out of the internal machinery binding inputs with outputs. This is because the very idea of such an internal machinery opposes, i.e., it employs the Cartesian dichotomy. So, enactivism is in need of an account of that would not oppose its anti-Cartesian commitment. Method: I introduce the ontology of location and niche theory, as it has been brought forth by Varzi, Casati, and Smith, and develop it so that it can be used in the philosophy of mind. This is a conceptual, semi-formal philosophical analysis. Results: I shall come up with the idea of object conceived of a product of action, and - drawing on von Foerster’s central idea - as a product of coordination of perceptions. Yet, it is not coordination of stimuli but coordination of cognitive connections. The notion of connection is thus articulated in the article and cast as the central concept in my proposal. Implications: We are able to account for both and (2. The apparent stability of the perceived world is due to the setting up and maintaining of connections between the perceiver and the things perceived, resulting in the establishment of what I call a cognitive niche. Constructivist content: Constructivism, broadly construed, takes, in my reading, a negative stance in the first place. Namely, it opposes what I call the metaphysics of the ready-made world. So, it holds that there is no ready-made reality; however it remains open when it comes to positive claims: a mind-independent reality does not exist at all or it does exist but it is not ready-made and as such it must be brought to completion, so to speak, or enacted, as Varela et al. would say, by a cognitive subject. In this article, I follow the latter and address one specific issue: how the enacted world gains its relatively stable architecture. (shrink)

Staying alive theory explains why women have more effective self-protective mechanisms in terms of woman's role as a mother and caregiver. This theory reinforces stereotypes and the relationship of oppression and submission to men. Somewhat paradoxically, it also points to women's lower quality of life, which may be explained by their greater fear of threats caused by men's power.

There is no longer any doubt that the coming decades will bring serious threats to humanity from anthropogenic climate change. As we have suggested elsewhere, horrible scenarios are far more realistic than non-horrible ones, and science and technology are incapable, especially in our non-ideal world, of equitably distributing wealth, access to resources and adaptations to climate change. In this article, we offer an alternative to these inevitable horrible scenarios. The alternative is to implement either an anti-natalist policy, or procreative beneficence (...) and reproductive rights policies aimed at radically reducing the birth rate. These alternatives, however, are potentially unfair and quite possibly unthinkable to most of humanity. (shrink)