Recent advances in the Super Linguistics of pictures have laid the Super Semantic foundation for modelling the phenomena of narrative sequencing and co-reference in pictorial and mixed linguistic-pictorial discourses. We take up the question of how one arrives at the pragmatic interpretations of such discourses. In particular, we offer an analysis of: (i) the discourse composition problem: how to represent the joint meaning of a multi-picture discourse, (ii) observed differences in narrative sequencing in prima facie equivalent linguistic vs pictorial discourses, (...) and (iii) the phenomenon of co-referencing across pictures. We extend Segmented Discourse Representation Theory to spell out a formal Super Pragmatics that applies to linguistic, pictorial and mixed discourses, while respecting the particular ‘genius’ of either medium and computing their distinctive pragmatic interpretations. (shrink)

According to the free energy principle all living systems aim to minimise free energy in their sensory exchanges with the environment. Processes of free energy minimisation are thus ubiquitous in the biological world. Indeed it has been argued that even plants engage in free energy minimisation. Not all living things however feel alive. How then did the feeling of being alive get started? In line with the arguments of the phenomenologists, I will claim that every feeling must be felt by (...) someone. It must have mineness built into it if it is to feel a particular way. The question I take up in this paper asks how mineness might have arisen out of processes of free energy minimisation, given that many systems that keep themselves alive lack mineness. The hypothesis I develop in this paper is that the life of an organism can be seen as an inferential process. Every living system embodies a probability distribution conditioned on a model of the sensory, physiological, and morphological states that are highly probably given the life it leads and the niche it inhabits. I argue for an ecological and enactive interpretation of free energy. I show how once the life of an organism reaches a certain level of complexity mineness emerges as an intrinsic part of the process of life itself. (shrink)

Human‐animal chimeras—creatures composed of a mix of animal and human cells—have come to play an important role in biomedical research, and they raise ethical questions. This article focuses on one particularly difficult set of questions—those related to the moral status of human‐animal chimeras with brains that are partly or wholly composed of human cells. Given the uncertain effects of human‐animal chimera research on chimeric animals’ cognition, it would be prudent to ensure we do not overlook or underestimate their moral status. (...) However, to assess moral status, we first need to determine what kinds of capacities are morally relevant. The standard view holds that it matters, morally, if chimeric animals develop uniquely human cognitive capacities. I argue that this view is mistaken, highlighting three problems with it: that we can think of examples of uniquely human cognitive capacities that are not morally significant, that we can think of examples of morally significant cognitive capacities that are not uniquely human, and that evidence that some cognitive capacity is shared with nonhuman animals does not undermine claims that this capacity is morally significant. We need a better framework for thinking about the moral status of part‐human beings. (shrink)

There are ethical obligations to conduct research that contributes to generalisable knowledge and improves reproductive health, and this should include embryo research in jurisdictions where it is permitted. Often, the controversial nature of embryo research can alarm ethics committee members, which can unnecessarily delay important research that can potentially improve fertility for patients and society. Such delay is ethically unjustified. Moreover, countries such as the UK, Australia and Singapore have legislation which unnecessarily captures low-risk research, such as observational research, in (...) an often cumbersome and protracted review process. Such countries should revise such legislation to better facilitate low-risk embryo research.We introduce a philosophical distinction to help decision-makers more efficiently identify higher risk embryo research from that which presents no more risks to persons than other types of tissue research. That distinction is between future person embryo research and non-future person embryo research. We apply this distinction to four examples of embryo research that might be presented to ethics committees.Embryo research is most controversial and deserving of detailed scrutiny when it potentially affects a future person. Where it does not, it should generally require less ethical scrutiny. We explore a variety of ways in which research can affect a future person, including by deriving information about that person, and manipulating eggs or sperm before an embryo is created. (shrink)

The International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) has recently released the 2021 update of its guidelines. The update includes detailed new recommendations on human–animal chimera research. This paper argues that the ISSCR recommendations fail to address the core ethical concerns raised by neurological chimeras—namely, concerns about moral status. In minimising moral status concerns, the ISSCR both breaks rank with other major reports on human–animal chimera research and rely on controversial claims about the grounds of moral status that many people (...) will rightly reject. A more robust framework for regulating human–animal chimera research still needs to be developed. (shrink)

The psychedelic psilocybin has shown promise both as treatment for psychiatric conditions and as a means of improving well-being in healthy individuals. In some jurisdictions (e.g., Oregon, USA), psilocybin use for both purposes is or will soon be allowed and yet, public attitudes toward this shift are understudied. We asked a nationally representative sample of 795 US Americans to evaluate the moral status of psilocybin use in an appropriately licensed setting for either treatment of a psychiatric condition or well-being enhancement. (...) Showing strong bipartisan support, participants rated the individual’s decision as morally positive in both contexts. These results can inform effective policy-making decisions around supervised psilocybin use, given robust public attitudes as elicited in the context of an innovative regulatory model. We did not explore attitudes to psilocybin use in unsupervised or non-licensed community or social settings. (shrink)

It may soon be possible to generate human organs inside of human-pig chimeras via a process called interspecies blastocyst complementation. This paper discusses what arguably the central ethical concern is raised by this potential source of transplantable organs: that farming human-pig chimeras for their organs risks perpetrating a serious moral wrong because the moral status of human-pig chimeras is uncertain, and potentially significant. Those who raise this concern usually take it to be unique to the creation of chimeric animals with (...) ‘humanised’ brains. In this paper, we show how that the same style of argument can be used to critique current uses of non-chimeric pigs in agriculture. This reveals an important tension between two common moral views: that farming human-pig chimeras for their organs is ethically concerning, and that farming non-chimeric pigs for food or research is ethically benign. At least one of these views stands in need of revision. (shrink)

The precautionary principle aims to influence decision‐making in contexts where some activity poses uncertain but potentially grave threats. This perfectly describes the controversy surrounding germline gene editing. This article considers whether the precautionary principle should influence how we weigh the risks and benefits of human germline interventions, focusing especially on the possible threats to the health of future generations. We distinguish between several existing forms of the precautionary principle, assess their plausibility and consider their implications for the ethics of germline (...) modification. We also offer a novel form of the precautionary principle: the sufficientarian precautionary principle. Some plausible versions of the precautionary principle recommend placing somewhat greater weight on avoiding threats to future generations than on achieving short‐term benefits. However, no plausible versions of the precautionary principle entail that we should outright reject the use germline gene editing in human reproduction and some, such as the sufficientarian version, might endorse its use. (shrink)

Bruineberg and colleagues' critique of Friston blankets relies on what we call the “literalist fallacy”: the assumption that in order for Friston blankets to represent real boundaries, biological systems must literally possess or instantiate Markov blankets. We argue that it is important to distinguish a realist view of Friston blankets from the literalist view of Bruineberg and colleagues’ critique.

Cognition has traditionally been understood in terms of internal mental representations, and computational operations carried out on internal mental representations. Radical approaches propose to reconceive cognition in terms of agent-environment dynamics. An outstanding challenge for such a philosophical project is how to scale-up from perception and action to cases of what is typically called ‘higher-order’ cognition such as linguistic thought, the case we focus on in this paper. Perception and action are naturally described in terms of agent-environment dynamics, but can (...) a person’s thoughts about absent, abstract or counterfactual states of affairs also be accounted for in such terms? We argue such a question will seem pressing so long as one fails to appreciate how richly resourceful the human ecological niche is in terms of the affordances it provides. The explanatory work that is supposedly done by mental representations in a philosophical analysis of cognition, can instead be done by looking outside of the head to the environment structured by sociomaterial practices, and the affordances it makes available. Once one recognizes how much of the human ecological niche has become structured by activities of talking and writing, this should take away at least some of the motivation for understanding linguistic thinking in terms of content-bearing internal representations. We’ll argue that people can think about absent, abstract or counterfactual because of their skills for engaging with what we will call “enlanguaged affordances”. We make use of the phenomenological analysis of speech in Merleau-Ponty to show how the multiple affordances an individual is ready to engage with in a particular situation will typically include enlanguaged affordances. (shrink)

We do not always benefit from the expansion of our choice sets. This is because some options change the context in which we must make decisions in ways that render us worse off than we would have been otherwise. One promising argument against paid living kidney donation holds that having the option of selling a ‘spare’ kidney would impact people facing financial pressures in precisely this way. I defend this argument from two related criticisms: first, that having the option to (...) sell one’s kidney would only be harmful if one is pressured or coerced to take this specific course of action; and second, that such forms of pressure are unlikely to feature in a legal market. (shrink)

Blumenthal-Barby (2024) argues that bioethicists should stop using the concept of "personhood" in both well-established bioethics debates (e.g., regarding cognitive disability) and emerging ones (e...

We review recent research to introduce human brain organoids into the brains of infant rats. This research shows these organoids integrate and function to affect behaviour in rats. We argue that this raises issues of moral status that will imminently arise and must be addressed through functional studies of these new life forms. We situate this research in the broader context of the biological revolution, arguing we already have the technological power to create fully human embodied animals. This raises profound, (...) so far unaddressed ethical issues which call for urgent attention. (shrink)

In Markets Without Limits and a series of related papers, Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski argue that it is morally permissible to buy and sell anything that it is morally permissible to possess and exchange outside of the market. Accordingly, we should open markets in “contested commodities” including blood, gametes, surrogacy services, and transplantable organs. This paper clarifies some important aspects of the case for market boundaries and in so doing shows why there are in fact moral limits to the (...) market. I argue that the case for restricting the scope of the market does not turn on the idea that some things are constitutively non-market goods; it turns instead on the idea that treating some things according to market norms would threaten the realization of particular kinds of human interests. (shrink)

DNA databases have significant commercial value. Direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies have built databanks using samples and information voluntarily provided by customers. As the price of genetic analysis falls, there is growing interest in building such databases by paying individuals for their DNA and personal data. This paper maps the ethical issues associated with private companies paying for DNA. We outline the benefits of building better genomic databases and describe possible concerns about crowding out, undue inducement, exploitation, and commodification. While certain (...) objections deserve more empirical and philosophical investigation, we argue that none currently provide decisive reasons against using financial incentives to secure DNA samples. (shrink)

A theoretical assumption of this chapter on time in mind is that people ought to take phenomenological descriptions of temporal experience at face value. The chapter begins with a brief review of Rick Grush's trajectory estimation model of temporal representation – the predictive inference model. It introduces the issues of whether temporal properties as they appear should be thought of as primary or secondary qualities. A constraint runs from the best science of the mind back to phenomenology that the best (...) phenomenological descriptions of experience cohere with the best science of the human mind. Grush's model bears a close resemblance to computational theories in neuroscience that take perception to consist in predictive inference. A section explains the relationship between the Orwellian interpretation of postdiction and the Husserlian view of temporal experience. The chapter also presents a discussion on “the time as its own representation view” (TOR) and supervenience thesis (SUP). (shrink)

Greely’s target article outlines six categories of ethical issues associated with human brain surrogate research. Some of these issues are familiar from other research contexts; others, less...

One common objection to establishing regulated live donor organ markets is that such markets would be exploitative. Perhaps surprisingly, exploitation arguments against organ markets have been widely rejected in the philosophical literature on the subject. It is often argued that concerns about exploitation should be addressed by increasing the price paid to organ sellers, not by banning the trade outright. I argue that this analysis rests on a particular conception of exploitation, and outline two additional ways that the charge of (...) exploitation can be understood. I argue that while increasing payments to organ sellers may mitigate or eliminate fair benefits exploitation, such measures will not necessarily address fair process exploitation or complicity in injustice. I further argue that each of these three forms of wrongdoing is relevant to the ethics of paid living organ donation, as well as the design of public policy more generally. (shrink)

Polygenic risk scores (PRSs) have recently been used to inform reproductive decision-making in the context of embryonic screening. While this is yet to be widespread, it is contested and raises several challenges. This article provides an overview of some of the ethical considerations that arise with using PRSs for embryo screening and offers a series of regulatory considerations for jurisdictions that may wish to permit this in the future. These regulatory considerations cover possible regulators and regulatory tools, eligibility criteria, information (...) and education requirements and the need for ongoing refinement of the relevant technology, research and consultation. (shrink)

My commentary takes up the two issues Heras-Escribano focusses on in the precis of his book: the ontology and normativity of affordances. The dispositional account of affordances Heras-Escribano ….

Luke Semrau argues that the documented harms of existing organ markets do not undermine the case for establishing regulated systems of paid kidney donation. He offers two arguments in support of this conclusion. First, Semrau argues that the harms of kidney selling are straightforwardly amenable to regulatory solution. Second, Semrau argues that even in existing black markets, sellers would likely have experienced greater harm if the option of selling a kidney were not available. This commentary challenges both of Semrau’s claims. (...) I argue that there is no reason to believe that kidney sellers benefit from the current black market trade in organs, and highlight a number of potential issues regarding the effectiveness and feasibility of Semrau’s proposed market regulations. (shrink)

Genomic research can reveal ‘unsolicited’ or ‘incidental’ findings that are of potential health or reproductive significance to participants. It is widely thought that researchers have a moral obligation, grounded in the duty of easy rescue, to return certain kinds of unsolicited findings to research participants. It is less widely thought that researchers have a moral obligation to actively look for health-related findings. This paper examines whether there is a moral obligation, grounded in the duty of easy rescue, to actively hunt (...) for genomic secondary findings. We begin by showing how the duty to disclose individual research findings can be grounded in the duty of easy rescue. Next, we describe a parallel moral duty, also grounded in the duty of easy rescue, to actively hunt for such information. We then consider six possible objections to our argument, each of which we find unsuccessful. Some of these objections provide reason to limit the scope of the duty to look for secondary findings, but none provide reason to reject this duty outright. We argue that under a certain range of circumstances, researchers are morally required to hunt for these kinds of secondary findings. Although these circumstances may not currently obtain, genomic researchers will likely acquire an obligation to hunt for secondary findings as the field of genomics continues to evolve. (shrink)

Moral theories often issue general principles that explain our moral judgments in terms of underlying moral considerations. But it is unclear whether the general principles have an explanatory role beyond the underlying moral considerations. In order to avoid the redundancy of their principles, two-level theories issue principles that appear to generalize beyond the considerations that ground them. In doing so, the principles appear to overgeneralize. The problem is conspicuous in the case of contractualism, which proposes that moral principles are grounded (...) in generic reasons that operate in only a subset of the cases covered by the relevant principle. Arguments that motivate the use of generic reasons on the basis of guidance, institutional necessity, or fairness are unsatisfactory. But the generality of moral principles can be justified in terms of the idea of a generic interest, which is an interest that all occupants of a standpoint have in virtue of what occupants of the standpoint as such typically take an interest in. The notion of a generic interest therefore acknowledges a distinction between having and taking an interest, and its use in moral theory is a way of giving expression to the significance of autonomy. This is reminiscent of the idea of a normative power; but the idea of a generic interest is less expensive and makes better sense of the way in which autonomy features in our moral lives. (shrink)

Both Jago, in his 2020 article ‘A short argument for truthmaker maximalism’ and his 2021 article ‘Which Fitch?’, and Loss in his 2021 article ‘There are no fundamental facts’, employ arguments similar to that familiar from the Church–Fitch Paradox to infer some substantial metaphysical claims from their mere logical possibility. Trueman in his 2022 article ‘Truthmaking, grounding and Fitch’s paradox’ and Nyseth in his 2022 article ‘Fitch’s paradox and truthmaking’ respond by using exactly the same kind of argument to prove (...) contrary theses. Intended as bad company objections, these counterarguments cast doubt on the original arguments, but do not actually identify their flaw. This paper aims to fill this gap. (shrink)

Neuronal signalling involves multiple neuropeptides that are diverse in structure and function. Complex patterns of tissue‐specific expression arise from alternate RNA splicing of neuropeptide‐encoding gene transcripts. The pattern of expression and its role in cell signalling is diffecult to study at the level of single neurons in the complex vertebrate brain. However, in the model molluscan system, Lymnaea, it is possible to show that alternate mRNA expression of the FMRFamide gene is specific to single identified neurons. Two different transcripts are (...) expressed in a mutually exclusive manner in different neurons. Post‐translational processing of the two precursor proteins leads to completely distinct sets of neuropeptide transmitters. The function of these transmitter cocktails, resulting from alternate mRNA splicing, was studied physiologically in identified neurons forming part of a behaviourally important network regulating heartbeat. (shrink)

This book analyzes the general structure of constitutional rights reasoning under the Geman Basic Law. It deals with a wide range of problems common to all systems of constitutional rights review. In an extended introduction the translator argues for its applicability to the British Constitution, with particular reference to the Human Rights Act 1998.

In their recent paper in this journal, Zümrüt Alpinar-Şencan and colleagues review existing dignity-based objections to organ markets and outline a new form of dignity-based objection they believe has more merit: one grounded in a social account of dignity. This commentary clarifies some aspects of the social account of dignity and then shows how this revised account can be applied to other perennial issues in bioethics, including the ethics of human embryo research and the ethics of creating part-human chimeras.

The problem of individuality, physical and mental, is one which obviously has great interest for philosophy. The unity and continuity of the ordinary human consciousness—the “ ego,” the “personality—give us the concrete standard by which we ordinarily judge other systems which have tended towards individuation. A comparative and evolutionary study of biological data, however, will provide us with many facts which throw a new light on the problem. They are often puzzling, but must be taken into account.

The notion of “event” is often used, in contemporary philosophy, as a way to overcome the end of metaphysics since it challenges both the metaphysical conditions of appearing and knowing. Thanks to a comparative analysis of the works of Hannah Arendt and Jean-Luc Marion, the authors show that even though the event appears as a questioning of the modern concept of history in the texts of the former, and as a modality of saturated phenomena in the Marion’s phenomenology of givenness, (...) its use allows us to re-evaluate the relationship of both philosophers with metaphysics. After pointing out a fundamental difference of the conception of the event in Arendt and Marion, it is then possible to reveal their position regarding the possibility of thinking after the end of metaphysics. (shrink)

Duas formulações oferecidas por Leibniz de seu princípio de causalidade são examinadas, e a incompatibilidade, segundo Leibniz, do princípio com a possibilidade de causas indiferentes com respeito a seus efeitos é considerada. Acompanhamos o desenvolvimento de sua teoria da escolha a partir de suas teses sobre causalidade e indiferença. Por fim, procuramos explicar por que Leibniz sustentava que sua teoria de escolha não exclui a liberdade. Some remarks about causality, choice and freedom in LeibnizTwo statements of Leibniz’ principle of causality (...) are discussed, and their alleged incompatibility with there being causes which are indifferent with respect to their effects is considered. We follow the development of his theory of choice on the basis of his views on causality and indifference. Finally, we attempt to explain why Leibniz maintained that his theory of choice does not rule out freedom. (shrink)

Two aspects of the chromatin repeat length (r t) are discussed: (i) Why is r t, longer for slowly dividing cells than in rapidly dividing cells?, and (ii) Why is the temporal evolution of r ta decreasing function of time (t) in mammalian cortical neurons, whereas it is an increasing function of t for granule cells around the time of birth? These questions are discussed in terms of a hypothesis which assumes a correlation between deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) packaging, transcription, and (...) replication. (shrink)

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Technology and Society at Saint Xavier University in Chicago, Illinois. Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of digital social games such as Zynga's FarmVille is that they are designed in such a way that any user, regardless of their skills and experience, can familiarise themselves in a matter of moments with the object of the game, the interface, and the tools and options involved in playing them. (...) In contrast, developers of collaborative platforms for teaching and research have been struggling for the last 15 to 20 years to gain a wide acceptance among users, and with very limited success. Although simple and intuitive usability has long been recognised as a key design goal, no-one has, apparently, yet succeeded in integrating all the tools and functions required for academic work into a platform with an intuitive interface that target groups make enthusiastic use of. This paper investigates which principles and features may be adopted to make the use of these platforms easier and more intuitive. This electronic document is a "live" template. The various components of your paper [title, text, heads, etc.] are already defined on the style sheet, as illustrated by the portions given in this document. (shrink)

Grecia creó la filosofía en la polis, produciendo una forma de vivir y convirtiéndose en centro de referencia. La sociedad actual ha modificado los modos de vida y convivencia, lo que podría modificar la función de la filosofía. El trato con los otros repercute en la vida de los ciudadanos. Igualmente, la tecnología facilita hoy nuestro habitar en el mundo y la presencia de la diversidad cultural en una sociedad globalizada plantea si podemos vivir en una comunidad libre y justa, (...) que alumbraron los griegos. Se presenta un ejemplo para llevar al aula estas ideas desde la práctica filosófica. (shrink)

El carácter de circunstancialidad es reconocido por el propio Ortega para su obra que aparece en el entorno de los ideólogos del 98, a la cabeza de los cuales se alza Unamuno. Sin el ambiente de la España del 98, Ortega sería un imposible histórico. Sólo desde ese marco puede explicarse en Ortega el proceso ascendente de su secularización desde el primer momento, que culminará en su laguna respecto a la teodicea, su helado teísmo, como una reacción por rechazo de (...) la mística unamuniana y su orgulloso yo, que intenta sobresalir incluso sobre Unamuno mismo. (shrink)