In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Academic Skepticism in Early Modern PhilosophyJosé R. Maia NetoAncient skepticism was more influential in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it had ever been before. Thanks to the groundwork of Charles B. Schmitt and Richard H. Popkin on the influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy and to the extensive research that followed their lead, skepticism is now recognized as having played a major role in the rise (...) of modern thought. 1There were two ancient skeptical schools, Academic skepticism and Pyrrhon-ism. Were both equally influential? Until the sixteenth century, Pyrrhonism was scarcely known. Only a few copies of Sextus’s books (the only surviving primary source of ancient Pyrrhonism) have been discovered in medieval libraries. By contrast the main source of Academic skepticism, Cicero’s Aca-demica, was occasionally referred to by medieval authors and was the object of some commentaries and criticism in the Renaissance. 2 Academic skepticism was preserved from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance not only through Cicero’s Academica, but also through Lactantius’s Divinae Institutiones and [End Page 199] Augustine’s Contra Academicos. 3 This situation changed when Sextus’s works were translated to latin and published in 1562 and 1569. Sextus presents a much more complete and detailed account and defense of ancient skepticism than that of Cicero’s Academica. Sextus presents Pyrrhonism as a coherent form of skepticism and Academic skepticism as a kind of negative dogmatism. 4 It was thus natural that the ancient skepticism that fascinated some (and troubled so many) early modern thinkers was mostly Pyrrhonian. Because of the publication of Sextus’s works, according to Schmitt, the increasing influence of Cicero’s Academica in the Renaissance was halted. Sextus’s Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos took the place of Cicero’s Academica and drastically increased the influence of ancient skepticism. 5 The skeptical crisis at the dawn of modern philosophy is called “pyrrhonienne” not “academicienne.”While the appearance of Sextus’s works in Latin turned him and Pyrrhonism into the main source and influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy, further research on the history of skepticism in the period has shown that the role of Cicero’s Academica and of Academic skepticism in general continued to be considerable. First, Cicero’s works were important items in the university curricula. Although Cicero’s works of rhetoric and morals were those more read, the students could certainly learn about Academic skepticism through at least some of them. Second, many editions of De Natura Deorum, a work of Cicero’s in which Academic skepticism is quite central, were published during the seventeenth century. Third, features of Academic skepticism, exhibited above all in Cicero’s Academica, are basic to the skepticism revived in the late Renaissance by Montaigne and Charron; were related to the new science in the first half of the seventeenth century by Gassendi; were used in the anti-Cartesian reaction of the late seventeenth century by Rapin, Huet, Bayle, and above all Foucher; and were radicalized in the eighteenth century by Hume. Despite the Academic features of Montaigne’s, Charron’s, and Gassendi’s skepticisms, it does seem that from the publication of Sextus’s works to the mid-seventeenth century, Academic skepticism was secondary to Pyrrhonism. But the appearance of Descartes and the development of Cartesianism in the second half of the seventeenth century set conditions for a complete revamping of Academic skepticism, bringing about what Schmitt thought was precluded by the appearance of Sextus in the modern scene, namely, a “full flowering of the Academica as a work to inspire new directions of philosophical thought.” 6 [End Page 200]Montaigne’s Apologie pour Raimond Sebond is rightly considered the first major result of the revival of ancient Pyrrhonism in modern thought. 7 Montaigne never cites the name of Sextus nor acknowledges his source and, by contrast, fills his Apology with passages from Cicero on the Academic skeptics. It is clear, however, that Montaigne follows closely Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the central part of the Apology where he gives a detailed and sympathetic exposition of ancient skepticism.After dwelling on the evils and problems arising from knowledge and science, Montaigne... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume and Pascal: Pyrrhonism vs. Nature José R. Maia Neto The view that Pyrrhonism is not practically viable was, according to Richard H. Popkin, held during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuriesbydifferent philosophers suchas Mersenne,Arnauld, Pascal, Ramsay, and others.1 Among the anti-sceptics, this position was usually taken as an argument against Pyrrhonism. Popkin points out that Hume's main contribution to the "Pyrrhonian controversy" is to show that (i) "the Pyrrhonian (...) doctrine was the logical outcome of philosophical analysis,"2 (ii) that the infeasibility of Pyrrhonism does not weaken its epistemological force but only its psychological plausibility, and (Ui) that this implausibility obtains because nature (the common affairs ofeveryday life and the feeUngs, impressions, and ideas thereby generated) impels the philosopher to believe.3 Popkin alsomakes an allusion to the similaritybetweenHume and Pascal on this issue.4 In this paper I compare the dilemma posed by Pascal as apropaedeutic tofaith withthe "dangerous dilemma" alluded to, but avoided, by Hume in the conclusion of book 1 of the Treatise. The dilemma follows from (i) above. At a certain point in his epistemological enquiry the philosopher is forced tomake a hard choice between the quite disadvantageous alternatives: either to continue his philosophizing, which, leading to Pyrrhonism, may bring despair and cause the annihilation ofhis life, or to abandon philosophy, makinghim aprey ofthe "errors, absurdities, andobscurities"ofanon-critical life.5 In what follows I compare Hume's solution to this dilemma with Pascal's.? In the following passage Hume shows the toughness of the dilemma and offers a first answer to it: What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? If we... condemn all refin'd reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, I know not what ought to be done Volume XVII Number 1 41 JOSE R.???? NETO in the present case. I can only observe what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression behind it. (T 268) Note that in this first answer Hume manages to avoid the normative response that the dilemma demands. He provides, instead, a descriptive account which is a kind of solution because it purports to show that human psychology makes it unlikely that someone could reach the point at which he or she would have to choose between the two parties. The dilemma does not arise because nature stops the self-subversion ofreason. Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herselfsuffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent ofmind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. (T 269) Hume means by nature in this passage both human nature and the social and natural environments which, in so far as they demand specific reactions, generate appropriate beliefs. Those beliefs imposed by nature are necessaryforour survival. So, the mere interaction ofthe philosopher with the world outside his closet suffices to dispel his sceptical crisis. According to Hume, this determination of nature is absolute and necessary. "I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live... I may, nay I must yield to the current ofnature" (T 269). This view is reaffirmed in the Enquiry. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a PYRRHONIAN may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point ofaction and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches.6 So, it would appear that the dilemma is just a fleeting impression in the imagination of the philosopher during a momentary sceptical crisis. Nature provides that such a crisis is not prolonged... (shrink)

O presente artigo tem o objetivo de apresentar reflexões sobre a possibilidade da educação museal nas escolas públicas municipais de Fortaleza. A Educação Museal é uma prática educativa, democrática, crítica e transformadora, que respeita a diversidade cultural e suas epistemologias. O trabalho tem a justificativa pessoal assentada na trajetória profissional dos autores que promovem práticas educativas em diálogo com outras instituições, em especial, museus, e outros ramos dos saberes, em especial, as artes. É uma pesquisa de natureza qualitativa, que se (...) desenvolve a partir de relatos de experiência em um intercâmbio na França, do programa Professores Sem Fronteiras, além do relato de experiência a partir da obra de Descartes Gadelha, de um projeto contemplado com o edital de Boas Práticas e premiado em Feiras de Ciências, ações promovidas pela Secretaria Municipal de Educação de Fortaleza. É possível considerar que a Educação Museal e as artes como estratégias de ensino na escola podem colaborar para uma formação integral que desenvolvem sujeitos históricos críticos, participativos e transformadores da sociedade. (shrink)

Este trabalho é de natureza bibliográfica e de revisão de literatura e tem por objetivo fazer uma reflexão sobre as reinvindicações sociais que estão na pauta de grupos que por vezes foram negligenciados por discursos hegemônicos da sociedade. As reinvindicação destes grupos buscam dar visibilidade a lutas por reconhecimento de direitos básicos das mulheres, das pessoas negras, da classe trabalhadora, e de outras vozes que são silenciadas pelo totalitarismo dos discursos hegemônicos. Buscaremos utilizar estudos de Stuart Hall, Homi Bhabha e (...) Judith Butler, visando questionar a pretensa homogeneidade e estabilidade das categorias de cultura, etnia e gênero. A partir de uma compreensão de que tais categorias não são estanques, buscaremos questionar algumas vozes preconceituosas que se fundamentam na compreensão homogênea dessas categorias. Além disso, pretendemos apresentar o pensamento de Angela Davis como uma forma de unificar as reinvindicações de classe, etnia e gênero, como meio de dar mais consistência a luta daqueles que muitas vezes são excluídos do pleno exercício da cidadania. (shrink)

This article investigates if and how negotiators' self-efficacy beliefs affect their use of deception in negotiation. Specifically, we propose that self-efficacy can be interpreted as a threat to self-concept, which encourages individuals to temporarily bypass self-regulatory obstacles by morally disengaging their cognitive moral filters, thereby enabling them to use deception in negotiation. We test our hypotheses in three independent experimental studies involving an interactive negotiation simulation, totalizing 460 participants. We find that negotiators with low self-efficacy regarding their negotiation abilities are (...) more likely to use deception than those with high self-efficacy beliefs. Furthermore, we find that moral disengagement mediates the effects of self-efficacy on deception. Our findings suggest that self-efficacy plays a key role in shaping negotiators' ethical behaviors and we identify the psychological mechanism underlying this relationship. (shrink)

Fruto da experiência proporcionada pela disciplina Estágio Supervisionado III do curso de Licenciatura em Filosofia, Campus Caicó-CaC, da Universidade do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte-UERN, este relato objetiva discutir o ensino de filosofia e a relação do professor de filosofia com a filosofia a partir de uma experiência de docência em filosofia no Ensino Médio.

O presente artigo ocupa-se em refletir sobre os fundamentos da paz entre as religiões presentes no De pace fidei de Nicolau de Cusa. O artigo se divide em cinco momentos onde tentamos partir da contextualização que motivou a escrita da obra até seus desdobramentos filosóficos, políticos e culturais que ocultam/revelam o problema da relação unidade e diversidade. Palavras-chave: Paz. Fé. Ritos. Unidade. Diversidade.

Following the publication of Pope Francis’ Apostolic Exhortation Amoris Laetitia, four aged Cardinals wrote to him asking him to clarify positions in the Exhortation they charged were causing confusion to the faithful. They even suggested he had changed some Catholic doctrines. This essay answers their questions, arguing that Francis has not changed any Catholic doctrine but has changed, in the sense that he has renewed, Catholic pastoral practice. It also argues that, while not changing any Catholic doctrines, he has reprioritized (...) some of them, especially the doctrines of the authority and inviolability of conscience and what he calls the “irregular situations” of cohabitation, same-sex unions, and divorce and remarriage without annulment. (shrink)

O estudo dos fatos e episódios científicos é importante no sentido de possibilitar a compreensão do desenvolvimento das Ciências em contextos tanto do ensino, em diversos níveis, quanto da pesquisa. No entanto, a leitura dessa construção histórica precisa considerar visões de Ciência que superem as perspectivas lineares e neutras sobre a construção do processo de produção científica. Sob tal perspectiva, propõe-se nesse artigo uma releitura do movimento de elaboração do modelo da dupla hélice do DNA a partir do aporte epistemológico (...) de Thomas Kuhn. Entendemos ser este um contexto importante que permeia a formação científica, tanto na educação básica quanto no ensino superior, no campo das Ciências Biológicas e que os conceitos desenvolvidos a partir da elaboração do modelo da dupla hélice são basilares para a compreensão de conhecimentos relacionados à genética, citologia, evolução, dentre outros. No processo de revisitar esse recorte histórico, identificamos os embates teóricos entre pesquisadores de diversos campos, a competição e o consenso como elementos que mobilizam a busca de respostas na concretização de um novo paradigma. Dessa forma, a dinamicidade da Ciência se mostra presente rejeitando a ideia do dado pronto e valorizando o processo no qual o conhecimento se constrói. Propomos que este seja um exercício de reflexão considerando-se que revisitar a história da Ciência a partir de diferentes perspectivas epistemológicas pode propiciar aos sujeitos novos olhares em um devir que descortine conceitos construídos de maneira dinâmica por homens e mulheres que, entre ires e vires, dão significado aos fenômenos que nos rodeiam. Palavras-chave: DNA, Thomas Kuhn, ciência normal, revolução científica. (shrink)

Resenha: SANTOS, Boaventura de Sousa. A difícil democracia: reinventar as esquerdas. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2016. ISBN 978-85-7559-509-1.

A ideia do reconhecimento adquire uma relevância significativa na contemporaneidade. A filosofia política vem assistindo, nos últimos anos, a um acirrado debate em torno desse conceito. Um crescente número de autores, de diversas áreas científicas, debruça-se sobre o tema. Autores do nível de Axel Honneth, atual diretor do Instituto de Pesquisa Social e Crítica de Frankfurt é um exemplo interessante desta discussão. O presente artigo tem como objetivo apresentar as principais realizações do pensamento político de Axel Honneth. Mais especificamente, a (...) filosofia do reconhecimento encontrada na teoria critica deste filósofo. Os motivos apresentados por Honneth para essa escolha são diversos. Em primeiro lugar, elucidar a relação existente entre subjetividade e intersubjetividade. Em segundo lugar, a retomada da filosofia hegeliana. E o terceiro motivo são os argumentos críticos que Honneth pretende desenvolver. Dito de outro modo, construir um “arcabouço argumentativo” capaz de refutar as teses de outros autores. Dentre eles, encontra-se Habermas. Assim, a trajetória argumentativa deste artigo segue os seguintes passos: no primeiro momento, apresentaremos os passos argumentativos de Axel Honneth a essa problemática. Em segundo, a influência hegeliana e, por fim, a quem Honneth dirige suas críticas de forma mais incisiva. Mais especificamente, criticas dirigidas a Habermas. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende discutir como Hegel critica a noção kantiana de lei. A centralidade do sujeito, no que tange ao processo do conhecer, reúne Kant e Hegel no que tange à determinação da realidade. Apesar dessa aproximação, eles se separam na medida em que o sujeito kantiano reconhece o objeto e, diferentemente de Hegel, não se reconhece aí. Tal separação é explorada por Hegel, em sua análise do conceito de liberdade em Kant. Para Hegel, a liberdade kantiana não vai (...) além de uma abstração, enquanto não se deixa determinar. O mesmo raciocínio se estende à lei, pois Hegel entende que Kant opera uma distinção entre a forma e o conteúdo da lei, que não são entendidos como conceitos complementares. Em Hegel, a lei é mais do que uma referência formal. Sem a lei, enquanto determinação histórica, a liberdade permanece uma intenção sem jamais atingir o status necessário de realidade entre os homens. (shrink)

This book is the first systematic account of Pierre Charron's influence among the major French philosophers in the period (1601-1662). It shows that Charron's Wisdom was one of the main sources of inspiration of Pierre Gassendi's first published book, the Exercitationes adversus aristoteleos. It sheds new light on La Mothe Le Vayer, who is usually viewed as a major free thinker. By showing that he was a follower of Charron, La Mothe emerges neither as a skeptical apologist nor as a (...) disguised libertine, as combatting superstition but not as irreligious. The book shows the close presence of Charron in the preambles of Descartes' philosophy and that the cogito is mainly based on the moral Academic self-assurance of Charron's wise man. This interpretation reverses the standard view of Descartes' relation to skepticism. Once this skepticism is recognized to be Charron's Academic one, it is seen not as the target but as the source of the cogito. Pascal is the last major philosopher for whom Charron's wisdom is crucially relevant. Montaigne and Descartes influenced, respectively, Pascal's view of the Pyrrhonian skeptic and of the skeptical main arguments. The book shows that Charron's Academic skeptical wise man is one of the main targets of his projected apology for Christianity, since he considered him as a threat and counter-example of the kind of Christian view of human beings he believed. By restoring the historical philosophical relevance of Charron in early modern philosophy and arguing for the relevance of Academic skepticism in the period, this book opens a new research program to early modern scholars and will be valuable for those interested in the history of philosophy, French literature and religion. (shrink)

O artigo se contrapõe a estudos recentes sobre o ceticismo seis-centista ao sustentar que ao invés de romper com a épochè este ceticismo de fato a fortalece. O artigo sugere duas razões para esta interpretação equivocada do ceticismo do século dezessete: uma in-fluência das visões cartesiana e pascaliana do ceticismo nestes estudos e a suposição que o ceticismo mais relevante no período é mais pirrônico do que acadêmico.Contrary to what has been proposed in recent literature, the ar-ticle argues that early (...) modern skepticism, rather than breaking with the central notion in ancient skepticism of épochè in fact fortifies this notion. The article suggests two reasons for the mistaken view of early modern skepticism: the influence of Descartes’ and Pascal’s views of skepticism and the supposition that Pyrrhonian skepti-cism is more relevant in the period than Academic skepticism. (shrink)

Este trabalho examina a evolução da condição humana à luz das teorias de reconhecimento social de Axel Honneth e da ética da responsabilidade de Hans Jonas. Honneth explora como a identidade e a autonomia do indivíduo são moldadas pelo reconhecimento social e pelas relações interativas na sociedade moderna. Jonas, por sua vez, destaca a necessidade de uma ética da responsabilidade diante dos avanços tecnológicos, que devem levar em consideração as consequências futuras das ações humanas. A transição do Homo Sapiens para (...) o Homo Faber simboliza a transformação do ser humano de um ser predominantemente racional e social para um agente produtivo e tecnológico. O diálogo entre Honneth e Jonas revela como a capacidade de transformar o mundo exige não apenas um reconhecimento social contínuo, mas também uma consideração ética profunda sobre o impacto dessas transformações no futuro. O texto argumenta que a intersecção das teorias de ambos oferece uma visão abrangente da nova condição humana, ressaltando a necessidade de integrar a responsabilidade ética e o reconhecimento social na era da tecnologia e da produção. (shrink)

O artigo distingue duas relações diferentes entre filosofia e literatura na obra ficcional de Machado de Assis. Em uma primeira, presente ao longo da maior parte da produção literária de Machado, os personagens e enredos ficcionais exemplificam doutrinas e perspectivas filosóficas. Em uma segunda, característica da produção de Machado nos anos 1880-1891, a filosofia e a ciência passam a ser objeto central dos dois romances que publica neste período e da maioria dos seus contos. O artigo propõe que uma polêmica (...) em parte oculta com Sílvio Romero foi decisiva para que a filosofia se tornasse central e explícita neste período da ficção machadiana, especialmente nas Memórias Póstumas de Brás Cubas. (shrink)

São examinadas as relações pessoais e filosóficas do cético francês da segunda metade do século XVII, Pierre-Daniel Huet, com os principais filósofos seus contemporâneos que apresentaram perspectivas céticas: François de La Mothe le Vayer, Blaise Pascal, Simon Foucher e Pierre Bayle. A longa trajetória intelectual de Huet, aqui resumida do ponto de vista de sua relação com estes filósofos, ilumina a origem da configuração do que é hoje conhecido como ceticismo moderno ou cartesiano. AbstractThe paper is about the personal and (...) philosophical connections between the French skeptic of the second half of the 17th century Pierre-Daniel Huet and the main philosophers who held skeptical views at his time: François de la Mothe Le Vayer, Blaise Pascal, Simon Foucher and Pierre Bayle. Huet’s long intellectual life, abridged in the paper from the point of view of his relationship with these philosophers, sheds light on the origin of the epistemological position known today as modern or Cartesian skepticism. (shrink)

La probabilité académicienne, doctrine formulée par Carnéade, a joué un rôle capital dans l'épistémologie moderne. 1) Le pyrrhonisme dans L'Apologie de Raymond Sebond de Montaigne est surtout une réaction au probabilisme néo-académicien que se sont approprtés des apologistes huguenots ; 2) Charron et La Mothe le Vayer ne tiennent pas le probable pour la vérité parce que la probabilité est la limite anthropologique de la connaissance humaine, mais ils reconnaissent la difficulté de maintenir la suspension du jugement face au probable (...) ; 3) ce débat autour du probabilisme académicien est central dans le projet philosophique de Descartes. Academic probability, a doctrine elaborated by Carneades, played a central role in modern epistemology. 1) The pyrrhonism exhibited in Montaigne's Apology for Raymond Sebond is mainly a reaction to the neo-academic probabilism appropriated by Calvinist apologists; 2) Charron and La Mothe Le Vayer argue against taking the probable as if it were true because human cognition can attain only probable presentations but they acknowledge the difficulty of withholding assent; 3) This debate about academic probability is crucial to Descartes's philosophical project. (shrink)

O presente artigo objetiva analisar os impactos da pandemia no ensino de filosofia. Mais precisamente, se ainda é possível filosofar em uma realidade de quase “terra arrasada” que atingiu a educação brasileira, durante os meses que sucederam ao noticiário da Covid-19. Para tanto, considera-se, no primeiro momento, a realidade educacional enfrentada pelos profissionais da educação no que tange ao distanciamento exigido pelas autoridades sanitárias em virtude da pandemia. Em seguida, no segundo momento, aborda-se a necessidade do ensino de filosofia, caracterizando-a (...) enquanto possibilidade crítico-reflexiva. Apesar do distanciamento social, bem como da utilização impessoal e, por vezes, abstrata das ferramentas digitais, a práxis filosófica não pode ser descartada. Por fim, intenta-se responder à provocação inicial que dá título ao presente texto, refletindo sobre as possibilidades do ato de filosofar em realidade educacional tão hostil e, em muitos aspectos, difícil de administrar, como o contexto pós-pandemia. (shrink)

Lévinas é conhecido como pensador da alteridade, propõe um resgate à subjetividade e responsabilidade por outrem. Propomos nessa pesquisa analisar o “rosto” levinasiano, um dos elementos mais originais de sua filosofia. O rosto é a base de sua ética da alteridade. O rosto é a abertura para o infinito do ser, é discurso, é nudez, é expressão. A expressão do rosto é palavra viva, é o modo como Outro se apresenta a mim, nu e indigente. A expressão não se produz (...) como a manifestação de um forma plástica, ligados a um sistema de comparação, não se resume a características físicas, mas é o modo como o Outro se apresenta a mim. O rosto é o que escapa a qualquer manifestação que possa ser enquadrada por uma fenomenologia. Não há, em sentido habitual, uma fenomenologia do rosto. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Neste trabalho interessa-nos pensar a relaçáo entre unidade e multiplicidade, um problema fundamental tanto filosófico quanto teológico como lembra Beierwaltes (1989, p. 179), a partir do vocabulário filosófico-teológico cusano. Na primeira parte do texto fazemos uma leitura às avessas da obra cusana. Partimos da suposiçáo de que no De (...) apice tehoriae Nicolau de Cusa sugere um princípio a partir do qual pode ser lida tanto a sua última obra quanto toda a sua especulaçáo. Uma correta interpretaçáo desse princípio pode ser construída ao pensarmos o modo de ser próprio das coisas criadas. O princípio primeiro se deixa ver e as coisas principiadas sáo sua manifestaçáo e apariçáo. Porém, apariçáo perfeita do princípio é o seu Verbo. Em termos filosóficos isso significa que a apariçáo perfeita da unidade náo é a pluralidade (sua explicatio ), mas a igualdade (sua imago ). Será o De mente a nos sugerir a diferença. Na segunda parte, portanto, refletiremos sobre a complicatio - explicatio como aposta cusana para se pensar o problema da unidade e da multiplicidade. Retomamos essa discussáo a partir do De docta ignorantia e da Apologia quando Nicolau deve se defender da acusaçáo feita por Wenck, no De ignota litteratura , de ter feito coincidir criador e criatura. (shrink)

A revista Logos apresenta o dossiê “Realidade e Ficção” como contribuição ao desenvolvimento de pesquisas empíricas e reflexões sobre fronteiras e hibridismos entre realidade e ficção nas narrativas midiáticas. Ainda que, em alguns trabalhos, o tema não desponte na linha de frente, suas implicações podem ser desveladas nas marcas das textualidades que compõem lógicas próprias e peculiares de suas abordagens. O conjunto de artigos, entretanto, permite visualizar soluções comuns encontradas pelos autores para o enfrentamento da questão, presente nos processos, métodos (...) e linguagens que conduzem ao entendimento de conceitos-chave como representação, imaginário e identidade. Do ponto de vista dos objetos empíricos analisados, o dossiê, além de contemplar o campo jornalístico, abre também espaço para o cinema e a televisão, ora situando o debate na intercessão entre tais veículos, ora explorando as especificidades de cada um. (shrink)

This article examines the conception of scepticism during the early modern period. It describes how the writings of Pierre Charron and Michel de Montaigne inspired authors to search for a balance between extreme scepticism and what was often described as the dogmatism of the Schools. It discusses the revival of scepticism in the Renaissance and early seventeenth-century philosophy and shows the impact of Cartesian doubt in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century scepticism.

This second volume in the Journal of the History of Philosophy book series (JHP Books) is devoted to the resurgence of skepticism in the Renaissance and after. It contains eight original essays by historians of early modern philosophy from Europe and North and South America, with concluding remarks by Richard H. Popkin, who reviews fifty years of scholarship on the history of early modern skepticism and evaluates its present stage. The essays uncover new material relevant to the history of skepticism (...) in the period and propose new interpretations of the nature, role, and influence of skepticism from Montaigne to Berkeley. The contributors discuss such important figures as Michel de Montaigne, Thomas Hobbes, Pierre Bayle, Henry More, René Descartes, Pierre-Daniel Huet, Pierre Gassendi, and George Berkeley. By indicating a number of new problems brought about by the early modern philosophers’ engagement with and reaction to skepticism, the authors of the important essays in this volume make a major contribution to our understanding of ancient and modern skepticism. (shrink)

This paper has two sections. In the first one I examine Pascal's appropriation in La 131 of the Cartesian argument of the deceiver God. Pascal develops a skeptical reading of the argument in order to use it as a premise for his apologetic argument of true religion. In the second section I examine Huet's appropriation of this same Cartesian argument in his Philosophical Treatise on the Weakness of Human Understanding. Based on this work of Huet's and on his margin notes (...) on Pascal's Thoughts, I show that his skeptical reading of the argument is derived from Pascal's, although Huet's and Pascal's goals are distinct: while the latter intends to provide an argument for the Fall of Man, the former intends to show the weakness of reason unassisted by supernatural faith. (shrink)

From its very beginning, Pope Francis’s Petrine ministry has been full of surprises and he has been a man of contradictions. He has given hope to many, Christians, other believers, and secular humanists, especially with his pastoral approach of mercy, but he has also met with fierce opposition, even among the upper echelon of the hierarchy, some of whom have publicly attacked his orthodoxy and called for his resignation. In his teachings on evangelization, marriage and sexuality, ecology, and social friendship, (...) Francis has opened new paths and challenged the church to make visible the merciful face of God to the world.On interreligious dialogue, the pope, as to be expected, has largely reiterated the teachings of Vatican II and so far has not issued an apostolic exhortation or encyclical on the subject. Consistent with his pastoral outlook he has emphasized the socio-political and cultural aspects of interreligious dialogue and has largely avoided still controverted doctrinal issues. On the other hand, his friendship with many non-Christian leaders and his several obiter dicta have enlarged the interreligious horizon and opened the door for further explorations in the theology of religion and the scope of the interreligious encounter. His explicit acknowledgment of non-Christian religions as “channels” of the Holy Spirit hints at their role as ways of salvation not only for their adherents but also in certain ways for Christians. Furthermore, the four principles of Francisian metaphysics suggest novel and effective ways of conducting interreligious dialogue. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to present and investigate the spirituality of communion in one of the most important movements of the Church in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, namely the Focolare Movement. It is a spirituality that seeks to reestablish communion and unity between the human being and God and between the various segments that make up the Church and society. Finally, it is stated that in the present a great number of conflicts that go from (...) the terrorism is seen, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, until arriving at wars and economic disputes. Within this worrying context, the spirituality of communion, of the Focolare Movement, is a concrete response that is possible to the construction of unity and that the human being has superficial differences only, since in the deepest being, a communion called humanity is formed. (shrink)

Em sua obra Semiótica dos Jogos Infantis, Pierre Normando Gomes-da-Silva situa o movimento humano e, por conseguinte, a Educação Física, no campo da linguagem, especificamente das semióticas (francesa, americana e russa). Apresenta um arcabouço teórico e desenhos de análise semiótica que permitem visualizar e acompanhar a produção de sentido ou a semiose que transcorre em diferentes jogos infantis. O sujeito da aprendizagem foi tomado como configuração sígnica das experiências vividas, denominando-as corporeidades. O movimento como signo motor é descrito como ocorrências (...) comunicativas, situações de movimento, que produzem uma ambiência afetiva, temporalidade em que se realizam as aprendizagens, produzindo efeitos de interpretação nos participantes, alterando as configurações existenciais. (shrink)

Resenha de Peter S. Fosl, Hume’s Scepticism: Pyrrhonian and Academic. Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 2020, 378pp.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Filosofia ellenistica e cultura moderna: Epicureismo, stoicismo e scetticismo da Bayle a Hegel by Giovanni BonacinaJosé R. Maia NetoGiovanni Bonacina. Filosofia ellenistica e cultura moderna: Epicureismo, stoicismo e scetticismo da Bayle a Hegel. Firenze: Casa Editrice Le Lettere, 1996. Pp. 358. Paper, L 52,000.The Hellenistic schools played a major role in the rise of modern philosophy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Stoicism was influential in the development (...) of a secular ethics emancipated from theology, Epicureanism in the mechanical and corpuscular views of the new science, and Skepticism in the predominant role that epistemology assumed in modern philosophy. Bonacina shows that this influence continued to be considerable during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He examines the treatment of these three Hellenistic philosophies by a large number of (mostly German) historians of philosophy and by the main philosophers of the period. Among the historians, Bonacina detects a progressive drive towards historical objectivity. However, the religious interest in the assessment of the ancient schools is still noticeable until the early eighteenth century when it begins to be increasingly replaced by contemporary philosophical sympathies and affiliations. This interest is even stronger among the main philosophers of the period, who use the Hellenistic philosophies as weapons in the intellectual battles in which they were engaged. A brief summary of the main aspects of this use, first of Stoicism and Epicureanism, and then of Skepticism, by some of the major philosophers examined by Bonacina will illustrate this central point of the book.Bayle continues Gassendi’s project of rehabilitating Epicurus. But his effort is not to make Epicureanism compatible with Christianity. He uses Epicurus’ philosophy to enhance his opposition to rational theology and Epicurus’ alleged virtuous life to corroborate his view that forced conversions cannot be justified by the need to make atheists or heretics good citizens. According to Bayle, Stoics—unlike Skeptics and Epicureans and like Catholic monks—are intolerant dogmatists, holding views incompatible with the true religion. A few years later, in the context of the French Enlightenment, the assessment of Stoicism and Epicureanism is still determined by antireligious controversy, but now revelation itself becomes the main target. Diderot, d’Holbach and La Mettrie all hold that a Stoic ethics which despises the passions is incompatible with human nature (just like Christian morals and contrary to Epicurean morals). Voltaire’s evaluation of Stoicism and Epicureanism strikes both his contemporary materialists and Christianity. Stoic deism is for Voltaire the alternative both to materialism and to revealed religion. Bonacina also shows that the Stoic/Epicurean opposition in ethics is an important weapon among the British moralists. While Shaftesbury finds in Stoicism [End Page 324] support for his view of innate moral feelings, Mandeville opposes him, attacking Stoicism and defending Epicureanism. Moving to the German context, Bonacina shows that Kant is often sympathetic towards Epicurus, in particular when the ancient philosopher is contrasted with modern ones. Epicurus’s materialism may have had only a phenomenal status and is more internally consistent than a modern materialism such as Locke’s, who accepts the existence of a nonmaterial God and soul. As to Stoic ethics, Kant claims that it is partially true—to the extent that virtue is not conditioned—and partially false, for the Stoics think of the summum bonum as empirically available whereas it is an ideal of practical reason. Hegel also uses Stoicism and Epicureanism for the vindication of his own philosophy and criticism of established ones. For instance, Stoic ethics is a step in the development of the Mind, but just like Kantian ethics it is empty, deprived of ethicity and therefore in need of being dialectically overcome.Skepticism plays perhaps an even larger role in the philosophical debates of the period. Bayle takes the Skeptic standpoint (in opposition to the dogmatist in general and to the Stoic in particular) as the model for the historian of ideas who must objectively report the views and critically examine them without religious and philosophical preconceptions. Even more than Epicurus, Pyrrho is presented as a foe of rational theology and as indirectly showing the need of appealing to pure faith. Bonacina then examines the role played by Skepticism in the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pierre Bayle dans la République des Lettres: Philosophie, Religion, CritiqueJosé R. Maia NetoAntony McKenna and Gianni Paganini, editors. Pierre Bayle dans la République des Lettres: Philosophie, Religion, Critique. Paris: Honoré Champion, 2004. Pp. 589. Cloth, €90.00.Pierre Bayle is an early modern philosopher who has received relatively little attention given the philosophical relevance and historical influence of his work. Fortunately this situation has been rapidly changing in recent years. (...) This volume, edited by Antony McKenna and Gianni Paganini, is a good sample of the volume, quality, scope, and polemical nature of current Bayle scholarship. The book contains twenty-five articles by the main Bayle scholars from France, Italy, England, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States. It also contains an introduction by the editors, who give an overview of current scholarship, summarizing its main trends and achievements, and a useful name index. The articles are organized in five sections, each dealing with some aspect of Bayle's life and thought.The first set of articles, gathered under the heading, "Interlocutors, Friends and Enemies," deals with Bayle's personal relations as a Huguenot exiled in the Netherlands. Luisa Simonutti deals with Bayle's relations to one of the radical Reformed groups in Holland, the Quakers. Although Bayle disagreed with their religious views, he respected and maintained [End Page 476] healthy intellectual exchanges with them. Hans Bots examines Bayle's view of the "republic of letters," of which he was a major architect—a republic whose right to citizenship required the suspension of religious, political, and national partisanship and engagement in free intellectual debate. H. H. M. van Lieshout contests the entrenched view that Bayle lived as a recluse scholar in Rotterdam. Both she and Bots show how Bayle's main work, the Dictionary, exhibits his life committed to the "republic of letters." Finally, Hubert Bost focuses on Bayle's activity as a journalist, crucial in this republic but also revealing the difficulty of the pursued ideal of neutrality.The next three sections of the book deal with Bayle's thoughts on religion and philosophy. Anna Belgrado denies the late Bayle scholar Elizabeth Labrousse's thesis that Bayle's thought is wrought with Protestantism. Bayle's views on the Jews, the Middle Ages, and women are examined, respectively, by Myrian Yardeni, Gregorio Piaia, and Maria-Cristina Pitassi, who concur in concluding that, although not free from the prejudices of his time, Bayle's views are more complex and balanced than those of his contemporaries.Bayle's political views and in particular his view on tolerance receive a good deal of attention in the volume. Stefano Brogi explains Bayle's attack on the "rational theologians" (Le Clerc), at first sight puzzling given their defense of religious tolerance, pointing out Bayle's radical opposition between faith and reason. According to Jean-Michel Gros, it is this radical separation of philosophy from theology that renders Bayle's view of tolerance so modern, unlike Locke's, for instance, which still has a theological ground. Jonathan Israel explains another apparent puzzle: Bayle's defense of absolute monarchism despite his philosophical and religious ideas, which were no less radical than Spinoza's. Bayle, unlike Spinoza, does not support republicanism because of his pessimistic view of human nature. John Christian Laursen shows that the political menace posed by the Millenarians explains Bayle's unusual lack of tolerance towards them.One of the most influential contemporary Bayle scholars, Gianluca Mori, summarizes his view of Bayle as a philosophical atheist, and he is contested in this by Jean-Luc Solère, who argues that for Bayle, materialism does not provide a coherent metaphysical system alternative to the Christian one, so that Bayle's position amounts to a radical skepticism with regard to reason. In his contribution to the volume, Mori argues that Bayle's skepticism is restricted, and is not relevant to the issue of theism versus atheism. He replies to Solère's objections to his interpretation in an appendix to his article. Mori's interpretation relies on the method of reading Bayle's text as containing irreligious views hidden beneath apparently orthodox claims. Thomas Lennon relies on the opposite approach to argue... (shrink)