We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled) partnership games, also known as potential games. Lastly, mixed equilibria of partnership games are shown (...) to be always unstable under all dynamics of this class. (shrink)

We introduce a new class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising players are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the payoffs of strategies which revising players are abandoning. We show that stable games subsume many well-known classes of examples, including zero-sum games, games with an interior ESS, wars of attrition, and concave potential games. We prove that (...) the set of Nash equilibria of any stable game is convex, and offer an elementary proof of existence of equilibrium. Finally, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of a stable game is globally asymptotically stable under a variety of evolutionary dynamics. These convergence results are proved by constructing Lyapunov functions defined in terms of revision potentials—that is, potential functions for the protocols agents follow when they consider switching strategies. (shrink)

Articles, speeches, etc. on communism and Christianity.

We consider Perruchet & Vinter's (P&V's) central claim that all mental representations are conscious. P&V require some way of fixing their meaning of representation to avoid the claim becoming either obviously false or unfalsifiable. We use the framework of Dienes and Perner (1999) to provide a well-specified possible version of the claim, in which all representations of a minimal degree of explicitness are postulated to be conscious.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Malcolm X and Black Nationality—from Separation to Human RightsSefi Josef Kuperman1. Black Nationalism and the Issue of SeparationThe first question we have to raise when discussing the thought of Malcolm X is "Which Malcolm X are we discussing?" Malcolm X, who was a member of the Nation of Islam (1952–1964) and served as its speaker, is not the same Malcolm who left the organization and founded Muslim Mosque, (...) Inc. (1964), and both are different from the Malcolm who embraced Sunni Islam (from 1964 until his assassination in 1965). In each of these periods, Malcolm held a different perception of the desired future of members of black communities in the United States. Despite that, Malcolm X remained faithful to the idea of black nationality throughout his active years—even if the contents of this idea changed along the years. In this paper, I show that the developments that took place within Malcolm's positions, and specifically the changes on the issue of emigration, do not affect his support for black nationalism.I do not begin this discussion with an attempt to define black nationalism, as there is no one clearly and timelessly defined black nationalism. The perception of black nationalism that took center stage in the nineteenth century is fundamentally different from that of the twentieth century. In fact, as we will soon see, even in the nineteenth century, one can find conceptual plurality of black nationalisms, and the same is true for the twentieth century.Malcom's activism begins in the days of abundant civil and governmental support for the practice of racial segregation. Facing it is the Nation of Islam organization, of which Malcolm is a member in the first phase of his activism, calling for—in a sort of amplified mirror-image, redesigned so as to remove the sting of white nationalism—a complete territorial separation between whites and blacks, for the benefit of the black community, of course. The [End Page 23] organization links this call to what is termed "the racial problem" and argues that territorial separation is the only solution to the problem (Essien-Udom 259).When discussing separation, rather than emigration, in the context of the Nation of Islam, the emphasis is on Elijah Muhammad's (hereafter: E. Muhammad) demand for the US government to allocate a dedicated territory for the founding of the physical black nation.1 Along with land—and here we encounter a motif that is repeated in Malcolm X's speeches—is the demand for material aid for some time, so the black nation can find its footing (Essien-Udom 260). In fact, it is a call for independence on a territory allocated for that purpose, but part of the territory of the United States. Later, at the beginning of Malcolm's second phase of activism, after leaving the Nation of Islam, he said the following in a radio interview with A. B. Spellman:Spellman:What is the program for achieving your goals of separation?Malcolm:A better word to use than separation is independence. This word separation is misused. The thirteen colonies separated from England but they called it the Declaration of Independence; they don't call it the Declaration of Separation, they call it the Declaration of Independence. When you're independent of someone you can separate from them. If you can't separate from them, it means you're not independent of them.(Malcolm X, "Independence, Not Separation" 71–72)Whereas separation is a negative move—I break away from something—independence is a positive one: I become my own sovereign. In order to illustrate this, Malcolm argues, "[w]hen you're independent of someone, you can separate from them"—that is, that independence is a sufficient condition for separation. To this, he adds: "If you can't separate from them, it means you're not independent of them." That is, Malcolm emphasizes that separation is a necessary condition for independence. On the other hand, however, Malcolm's phrasing implies that separation is not enough for independence. Independence includes another process that separation lacks. It is therefore not "a better word," as stated in the beginning of the answer, but another process... (shrink)

This book is the first English version of Prolegomena zu einer kritischen Grammatik, published by Julius Springer, Vienna, 1935, as Volume 10 of the Vienna Circle's series Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung. The prefatory remarks of both editor and author acknowledge the influence ofWittgenstein in a general way. However, in aim and approach, the work differs from Wittgenstein's Philosophische Grammatik. This is indeed based on material going back to 1932, some of which Schachter must have known. On the other hand, the (...) present Prolegomena not only explains the general, philosophical principles to be followed, but in the light of these proceeds to cover the entire range of conventional grammar, showing where that is uncritical. Whether Wittgenstein in his turn knew of Schachter's work has never been explored. Schachter's object is universal grammar. As is natural, the examples in the original are largely drawn from German grammar, with occasional minor excursions into other languages. For English readers, what matters are the general problems of grammar: there is no point in tying these to the linguistic peculiarities of German, let alone a local variety of it. One who can grasp German at that level might as well read the original. The translation is therefore twofold: the text as a whole has been rendered into English, and the entire apparatus of examples has been replaced, as far as this can be done, by illustrations from English grammar, chosen so as to bring out the same kinds of problem as in the original. (shrink)