This paper focuses on the work of Czech aesthetician and ethnologist Josef Jedlička who describes ornament as a product of territorial rule. In his book The Ornament, Jedlička addresses the problem of ideological control of territorial repetition as an emergence of entropy. To understand Jedlička’s claims of entropic repetition, I propose introducing it in dialogue with Deleuze’s conception of repetition, in which differentiation is not an external but an internal rule of repetition. I argue that (...) class='Hi'>Jedlička’s conception of ornament as an externally imposed rule of senseless layering of imposed patterns allows us to understand the risk of social disconnection. In contrast, Deleuze’s account of territorial repetition as a production of erotic rhythm is based on the internal rule of differentiation, which allows us to see social connection as an ongoing variation assembled by desire. The philosophical consequences of these different approaches to repetition are further examined in their divergent readings of Franz Kafka’s work. (shrink)

Vorwort Es ist nicht ohne eine gehörige Portion Skepsis zu sehen, wenn ein Ökonom sich mit Fragen der Philosophie und Gesellschaftstheorie ...

Hermeneutics can loosely be defined as the theory or philosophy of the interpretation of menaing. It is a central topic in the philosophy of the social sciences, the philosophy of art and language and in literary criticism. This book, first published in 1980, gives a detailed overview and analysis of the main strands of contemporary hermeneutical thought. It includes a number of readings in order to give the reader a first-hand acquaintance with the subjects and the debates within it.

The text presents the general cultural-historical thesis that one cannot adequately understand philosophy after the Second World War if one does not understand it in interaction with politics and popular culture. These three spheres find themselves in a variable triangular constellation after the Second World War. Methodologically, the text is guided by the fact that this interplay is also organised in a triangular and variable way, namely according to the options of coexistence, conflict and cooperation. Adorno’s philosophy serves as a (...) challenging example. The principle of coexistence, conflict and cooperation also serves as a framework for the second part of the text, which reformulates Adorno’s socio-critical question about the possibility of change as an ontological question. In the constellation with politics, pop music can in this context express in its own way what in philosophy is called the principle of ontological contingency. (shrink)

In der klassischen Metaphysik war der alle speziellen Aspekte der Wirklichkeit übergreifende Gesichtspunkt der des „Seins". Dem entspricht in Puntels Buch ein Theorierahmen für das uneingeschränkte „universe of discourse". Methodisch angemessen ist ihm ein nicht-fundamentalistisches kohärentiell-reflexives Begreifen, dem sich auch die Sache selbst in eben dieser Struktur darstellt, nämlich als Beziehungseinheit von Begriff und Wirklichkeit, von Semantik und Ontologie, woraus sich sowohl eine an der Sprache orientierte Sicht der Dinge ergibt als auch eine mit dem Ganzen koextensive, also sich selbst (...) einschließende Geist-Strukur als reflexiver Maßstab allen Begreifens. Damit ist eine „prima philosophia" wiedergewonnen, die als methodisch-inhaltlicher Rahmen für das Begreifen der einzelnen Bereiche des Universums geeignet ist, nämlich der Naturphilosophie und Anthropologie, der Ethik und Ästhetik, der Geschichts- und Religionsphilosophie.In classical metaphysics, „Being" constituted the one viewpoint, which encompassed all particular aspects of reality. In Puntel's book, corresponding to this viewpoint is a theoretical framework for the unrestricted „universe of discourse." For him, a non fundamentalist comprehension of reality will be methodologically adequate, insofar as it is both coherent and reflexive. For only in and though the structure of this comprehending can the subject matter present itself as a relational unity of concept and reality, and of semantics and ontology. This structure will yield both a view of things that is linguistically orientated, as well as a mind-structure that is coextensive with the whole of reality, itself included. This mind-structure serves, then, as a reflexive criterion for all acts of comprehension. With this, the book regains a „prima philosophia," understood as a methodological and content-filled framework suitable for the comprehension of individual spheres of the universe, namely, the philosophy of nature and anthropology, ethics an aesthetics, as well as the philosophy of history and religion. (shrink)

Pain was one of the issues debated between Julian of Aeclanum and Augustine of Hippo. For Augustine pain was an evil caused by original sin. Julian argued that, in the context of creation as a whole, pain can be treated as a good, since its moderate forms are creational. Only in excess are they evil. This article aims at presenting Julian's position in detail, not only in the context of the debate with Augustine, but in the wider context of late (...) ancient philosophy and early Christian doctrine. Julian is well acquainted with philosophical and medical texts and with the biblical and patristic tradition. He rejects Augustine's attempt to work all these into a universal theological theory of pain and thereby deny, in Julian's view, philosophy and medicine their relative autonomy. Julian's plea—as a theologian—for a rational and empirical approach to pain draws as much upon ancient sources as it anticipates an attitude towards natural science and philosophy usually associated with much later periods in history. (shrink)

“This is a book about politics.” (XV) Bereits der erste Satz des Vorwortes gibt die Zielrichtung vor. Der an der University of California in Santa Barbara lehrende Althistoriker Harold A. Drake (D.) hat es sich auf mehr als 600 Seiten – der Verfasser spricht bescheiden von “a sketch” (XVII) – zum Ziel gesetzt, die facettenreiche Gestalt des spätantiken römischen Kaisers Konstantin (306–337) und seine Religionspolitik primär aus der Perspektive des begabten, auf einen umfassenden gesellschaftlichen Konsens hinarbeitenden Politikers zu beschreiben.

Hildebrand oftentimes said that his disciples—even when they believed they were deeply indebted to him for knowledge, wisdom, and truth—had a duty to criticize and overcome any error they would find in his philosophy, because the sole purpose of his writings was to state the truth. He himself gave some extraordinary examples of self-critique. In the following, I wish to treat such an example: a significant error about the nature of the free volitional response, which Stephen Schwarz was the first (...) to note and which Hildebrand himself later explicitly revoked. Furthermore, I wish to show that Hildebrand’s rejecting this error makes his ethics as a whole much more consistent, and opens the way to bringing his philosophy of love closer to our experience. (shrink)

It is well known that Maimonides rejects the Kalam argument for the existence of God because it assumes the temporal creation of the world, a premise for which he says there is no “cogent demonstration (burhan qat'i) except among those who do not know the difference between demonstration, dialectics, and sophistic argument.”Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), I:71:180. All references are to this translation; parenthetic in-text references are to part, chapter, (...) and page. By contrast, he claims to establish belief in the existence of God “through a demonstrative method as to which there is no disagreement in any respect” (I:71:182). Taken at his word, Maimonides’ proofs for the existence of the deity, like Aquinas’s five ways, have traditionally been read as models of medieval natural theology: of the power of human reason to independently establish revealed truth. In recent years, however, the same demonstrations have assumed a second kind of significance. For scholars, like myself, who argue that Maimonides holds severe views about the limitations of human knowledge of divine science and metaphysics, these demonstrations are the strongest conceivable counterevidence.The locus classicus for this view is Shlomo Pines, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge According to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. I Twersky, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), I:82–109. See also his “Les Limites de la Métaphysique selon Al-Farabi, ibn Bajja et Maimonide; Sources et Antitheses de ces Doctrines chez Alexandre d’Aphrodise et Chez Themistius,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13 (1981): 211–25; “Dieu et L’Etre Selon Maimonide: Exégese d’Exode 3,14 et doctrine connexe,” in Celui qui est: Interprétations juives et chrétiennes d’Exode 3, 14, ed. A. de Libera et E. Zum Brunn (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf [Collection “Patrimoines”], 1986), 15–24; and “The Relation between Maimonides’ Halakhic and non-Halakhic Works,” in Maimonides and Philosophy, ed., S. Pines and Y. Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). Pines concludes, on the basis of the limitations of the intellect with respect to knowledge of metaphysics, that Maimonides, like Kant, gives priority to the practical over the theoretical. For arguments drawing different ‘skeptical’ conclusions, see my “Maimonides in the Skeptical Tradition,” ms.; “Maimonides on the Growth of Knowledge and the Limitations of the Intellect,” to appear in Tony Levy, ed., Maimonide: Traditions philosophiques et scientifiques médievales arabe, hébraique, latine; “Logical Syntax as a Key to a Secret of the Guide of the Perplexed,” (in Heb.), Iyyun 38 (1989): 137–66; “Maimonides on Language and the Science of Language,” in Maimonides and the Sciences, ed., H. Levine and R. Cohen (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), pp. 173–226; and The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide (forthcoming). If Maimonides really held that humans cannot apprehend metaphysical truths about the deity, how could he have demonstrated (or even thought he could demonstrate) the existence of God? If he does demonstrate it, then humans evidently do have knowledge of metaphysics. As one distinguished scholar has recently protested, it is nothing less than “perverse” to interpret Maimonides as “meaning that the existence of God is unknowable when he in fact prides himself on having demonstrated the existence of God in four different ways.”Herbert A. Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge,” Maimonidean Studies 3 (1992–1993): 49–103, 86. See also Alfred L. Ivry, “The Logical and Scientific Premises of Maimonides’ Thought,” in Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism, ed. Alfred L. Ivry, Elliot R. Wolfson, and Allan Arkush (Amsterdam: Harwood Publishers, 1998), pp. 63–97, 70. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze and belief in the world -- A struggle against oneself: cinema as technology of the self -- The evidence of film and the presence of the world: Jean-Luc Nancy's cineastic ontology -- Cinema as human art: rescuing aura in gesture -- Exhibiting or presenting?: politics, aesthetics and mysticism in Benjamin's and Deleuze's concepts of cinema -- Made and yet true: on the aesthetics of presence of the heroic -- An art of gesture: returning narrative and movement to images (...) -- It is if we could trust: fiction and aesthetics of the political -- All you need is love: Cavell and the comedy of remarriage of film and philosophy. (shrink)

This work looks at the phenomenon of cosmopolitanism: the fears that it triggers, the contradictions inherent within in, the threats that befall it, the hopes that it nourishes, and the challenges that a cosmopolitan society brings with it. In this essay, Girschovich addresses over two millennia of cosmopolitan ideas. Looking at numerous ancient and modern sources--from literature, philosophy, music, and religion to contemporary popular culture--he investigates the origin of the term "cosmopolitan" along with different concepts of the cosmopolitan: from the (...) Cynic Diogenes to the cocktail. At the same time, he shows us the philosophical path to a cosmopolitan future. (shrink)