The paper deals with a version of the principle that a belief source can be a knowledge source only if the subject knows that it is reliable. I argue that the principle can be saved from the main objections that motivate its widespread rejection: the claim that it leads to skepticism, the claim that it forces us to accept counterintuitive knowledge ascriptions and the claim that it is incompatible with reliabilist accounts of knowledge. I argue that naturalist epistemologists should reject (...) these claims. I introduce my treatment of the principle by considering the analogous situation posed by the closure principle. (shrink)

While in the movies or reading a novel, how can we feel terrified by monsters, ghosts, and fictional serial killers? And how can we feel sad or outraged by depictions of cruelty? After all, we know that the imagined threats that we fear do not exist and, therefore, pose no real threat to us; and we know that the instances of cruelty that bring tears to our eyes have not happened. And yet, the fear, the sadness, or the outrage experienced (...) in our imaginations feels very real. This is the so-called paradox of "fictional emotions." This and related paradoxes have become recalcitrant problems for a purely representational approach to the imagination that tries to accommodate the imagination in a belief-desire psychology, explaining our imaginings as mental states that are similar to beliefs or desires in some ways but not others—as "quasi-beliefs" or "quasi-desires." This representational approach can be seen, for example, in Kendall Walton's influential account of the imagination as "make-believe," or in Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich's boxological account of the imagination as a "pretend box," which is in close interaction with the suspiciously similar "belief box". (shrink)

I discuss the account of logical consequence advanced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I argue that the role that elementary propositions are meant to play in this account can be used to explain two remarkable features that Wittgenstein ascribes to them: that they are logically independent from one another and that their components refer to simple objects. I end with a proposal as to how to understand Wittgenstein's claim that all propositions can be analysed as truth functions of elementary propositions.

This article proposes an object properties approach to object perception. By thinking about objects as clusters of co-instantiated features that possess certain canonical higher-order object properties we can steer a middle way between two extreme views that are dominant in different areas of empirical research into object perception and the development of the object concept. Object perception should be understood in terms of perceptual sensitivity to those object properties, where that perceptual sensitivity can be explained in a manner consistent with (...) the graded representation approach adopted by some connectionist modellers. The object properties approach does justice to the differences between a perceptual system solving the binding problem, on the one hand, and genuinely perceiving objects, on the other, without running into the theoretical problems associated with treating young infants as 'little scientists'. (shrink)

The influx of modernity is approached as a guaranteed right in the economic process. The period is catalogued as a proponent of rationality in Weberian-Habermasian sense, with an adjustment as to ends. Rights adopt four characteristics in the methodological argument of modernity: a) it is calc..

1 Domains of application 2 Formulating the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction 3 Is there such a thing as nonconceptual content? 4 Developing the account of nonconceptual content .

Marko Jurjako’s article “Self-deception and the selectivity problem” (Jurjako 2013) offers a very interesting discussion of intentionalist approaches to self-deception and in particular the selectivity objection to anti-intentionalism raised in Bermúdez 1997 and 2000. This note responds to Jurjako’s claim that intentionalist models of self-deception face their own version of the selectivity problem, offering an account of how intentions are formed that can explain the selectivity of self-deception, even in the “common or garden” cases that Jurjako emphasizes.

Replies to contributions to a symposium on the book, Scepticism and Reliable Belief.

Trata-se, no presente artigo, de analisar as mudanças que historicamente tem ocorrido no EU e as rupturas na apreensâo da realidade. As atuais transformaçoes da realidade teriam levado a um asvaziamento do ser? Ou ainda, a realidade nâo teria mais nada a ver com o sujeito? Como apreender essas transformaçoes? Esta investigaçâo faz-se valer da leitura de Gramsci, por meio da qual a unidade entre se e o pensar aparece como uma possibilidade de superaçao da metafísica do sujeito à elaboraçâo (...) de uma ontología concreta. (shrink)

El artículo presenta los resultados de una investigación sobre la violencia política en Perú y su actual incidencia en la crisis de legitimidad de las instituciones políticas democráticas. La metodología empleada supone la revisión documental y el tratamiento de otras fuentes sobre las múltiples maneras como el conflicto armado debilitó la credibilidad en los mecanismos y estamentos democráticos. Se presentan elementos concluyentes sobre la continuidad, durante y después del conflicto, de la desigualdad, la frustración en la búsqueda de la verdad (...) y justicia ante la violación de los derechos humanos como causas de la crisis e inestabilidad política en Perú. El artículo permitirá concluir con la grave crisis de gobernabilidad que atraviesa el país, que se traduce en prácticas corruptas que paralizan su desarrollo económico, marcando el paso de una crisis económica a una crisis política: un puente que une los años 1992 a 2018 y que deja como saldo una pérdida generalizada de confianza en la clase política y en las instituciones del poder público en Perú. (shrink)

This commentary on Jacob and Jeannerod’s Ways of Seeing evaluates the conclusions that the authors draw from the two visual systems hypothesis about the nature and phenomenology of visual experience.

Standard definitions of logical consequence for formal languages are atomistic. They take as their starting point a range of possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, each of which generates a unique truth value for each sentence. In modal logic, these possible assignments of semantic values are generated by Kripke-style models involving possible worlds and an accessibility relation. In first-order logic, they involve the standard structures of model theory, as sets of objects from which (...) the extralogical symbols of the language receive their denotations. I argue that there is an alternative, holistic, approach to the task of defining logical consequence for a formal language. It specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for an assignment of truth values to all the sentences of the language to be compatible with the intended interpretation of its logical constants. It achieves this without invoking possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, or the formal resources that are employed to generate these. I show how this approach can be successfully applied to modal propositional logic and to first-order logic, modal as well as nonmodal. I show that the holistic definitions of logical consequence that I supply for these languages are equivalent to the standard atomistic definitions. (shrink)

Este articulo busca interpretar los eventos narrados en las sociedades imaginadas de la serie televisiva Game of Thrones a la luz de los conceptos claves que la filosofía política contemporánea ha elaborado para analizar y comprender nuestra actual crisis civilizatoria.

Reason and Nature investigates the norms of reason--the standards which contribute to determining whether beliefs, inferences, and actions are rational. Nine philosophers and two psychologists discuss what kinds of things these norms are, how they can be situated within the natural world, and what role they play in the psychological explanation of belief and action. Current work in the theory of rationality is subject to very diverse influences ranging from experimental and theoretical psychology, through philosophy of logic and language, to (...) metaethics and the theory of practical reasoning; this range is well represented here. (shrink)

We provide all possible axiomatizations with independent axioms of E→ and R→ formulable with Anderson and Belnap’s list.

Let R+ be the positive fragment of Anderson and Belnap’s Logic of Relevance, R. And let RMO+ be the result of adding the Mingle principle ) to R+. We have shown in [2] that either a minimal negation or else a semiclassical one can be added to RMO+ preserving the variable-sharing property. Moreover, each of there systems is given a semantics in the Routley-Meyer style. In describing in [2] the models for RMO+ plus minimal negation, we noted that a similar (...) strategy would give us a semantics for R+ with minimal negation; that is, constructive R. The aim of this paper is to prove this claim. (shrink)

The logic B+ is Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic. Wedefine the logics BK+ and BK′+ by adding to B+ the K rule and to BK+the characteristic S4 axiom, respectively. These logics are endowed witha relatively strong non-constructive negation. We prove that all the logicsdefined lack the K axiom and the standard paradoxes of consistency.

3rd SIEU International Seminar on Utilitarian Studies.

El artículo aborda la carta 93 de san Agustín. Analiza los argumentos rogatistas contra el "compelle intrare", la eclesiología que subyace en ellos, el contexto sociohistórico del uso de la violencia para imponer la ley, así como la evolución agustiniana al interpretar el "compelle intrare".