This book offers a philosophical account of memory. Memory is remarkably interesting from a philosophical point of view. Our memories interact with mental states of other types in a characteristic way. They also have some associated feelings that other mental states lack. Our memories are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since we can have memories of objective events, and we can have memories of our own past experiences. Finally, our memories are epistemically special, in that beliefs formed (...) on the basis of our memories are protected from certain errors of misidentification and justified in a way which does not rely on any cognitive capacity other than memory. The aim of the book is to explain these features of memory. It proposes that memories have a particular functional role which involves past perceptual experiences and beliefs about the past and suggests that memories have a particular content as well; they represent themselves as having a certain causal origin. The book then accounts for the feelings associated with our memories as the experience of some of the things that our memories represent; things such as our own past experiences, or the fact the memories originate in those experiences. It also accounts for the special justification for belief afforded by our memories in terms of the content that memories have. The resulting picture is a unified account of several philosophically interesting aspects of memory. (shrink)

Four distinguished authors have been brought together to produce this elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the economic and social context of his ideas; his theory of science; and the development of his role in debates on Marxist concepts of history and his own conception of science. Coinciding with the emerging serious interest in logical positivism, this timely publication will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy of (...) science. (shrink)

The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something? The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining which features those mental states which qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states which do not qualify as such typically lack. In (...) sections 2 and 3, I will discuss the two main existing conceptions of the conditions that a mental state must satisfy to count as an episode of remembering. The first of these approaches is backward-looking. It puts forward conditions that strictly concern the aetiology of the mental state. I will argue that the conditions offered by the backward-looking approach are both too strong and too weak: They rule out mental states which, intuitively, count as memories while including mental states which, intuitively, do not qualify as memories. The second approach is forward-looking. It puts forward conditions that only concern the use that the subject makes of the mental state while forming beliefs about their own life. I will argue that the conditions proposed by the forward-looking approach are both too weak and too strong as well. However, the discussion of the two approaches will allow us to extract some helpful lessons on the constraints that any proposal about the nature of remembering should respect. An alternative approach aimed at incorporating those lessons will be offered in section 4 by drawing on the literature on functionalism. In section 5, I will argue that this approach can, on the one hand, accommodate as memories those mental states which indicate that the backward-looking approach and the forward-looking approach are too strict while, on the other hand, excluding those mental states which suggest that the two alternative approaches are too permissive. Accordingly, I will conclude that construing memory along functionalist lines is a satisfactory approach to the nature of remembering. (shrink)

Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...) entities of some kind. The purpose of this chapter is to map the different positions on this issue, and to highlight the virtues and difficulties for each of the options. In Section 2, I will specify the question of what the intentional objects of memory are by clarifying the relevant notions of memory and intentional object. In Section 3, I will motivate the significance of identifying the intentional objects of memory by exploring the relations between, on the one hand, the intentionality of memory and, on the other hand, the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory. In Section 4, I will consider two natural candidates for being the intentional objects of memory, namely, worldly entities and mental entities, and I will raise some concerns for each of the two candidates. A promising alternative will emerge, in Section 5, as preserving the virtues of the two original candidates while avoiding their difficulties. The alternative will concern a certain combination of worldly and mental entities; a combination that involves both causal and truth-making relations. I will conclude by sketching how the alternative candidate can shed some light on the phenomenological and epistemological issues raised in the third section. (shrink)

This paper studies the ethical significance of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus. First, I elucidate what Wittgenstein means by the point of the book being ethical. I defend that the ethical point and significance of the Tractatus is to delimit the ethical and, thereby, show or make manifest what it is to live a good ethical life. Second, I study how the correct method of philosophy propounded by the Tractatus contributes to ethics and the attainment of the good ethical life. I (...) argue that, although philosophy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for achieving a good ethical life, it serves as useful tool that can help one undergo the required ethical changes to achieve said life. (shrink)

This paper shows that Wittgenstein's later explorations of the meaning of expressive moral judgements reach far deeper than has so far been noticed. It is argued that an adequate description of the meaning of expressive moral judgements requires engaging in a grammatical investigation that focuses on three interwoven components within specific language-games. First, the ethical reactions expressed by moral words and the additional purpose they may fulfil. Second, the features of the actions which are bound up with moral words and (...) are constitutive of our moral evaluations. And, finally, the forms of life in which expressive moral judgements and moral language-games are embedded. (shrink)

This is the first part of a two-part paper in which I conclude the process, initiated elsewhere, of tracking objective conditions of vagueness of representation from language to pictures, from philosophy to imaging science, from vagueness to approximation, from representation to reasoning, with a focus on the application of fuzzy set theory and its challenges.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the possible implications of Peirce's categories for a project of a community. In order to do so, I will start by analysing the first formulation of these categories in Peirce's early writings, and then I will compare them with their later formulations. Thus, we will see some their most important characteristics, namely, their universality and their dynamism, which will allow for a particular understanding of the role that logic can play in his (...) system, in a theory of scientific inquiry and, finally, in a community in general. (shrink)

Ce livre est une tentative de remémoration d'une situation politique précise, celle qui se déclencha à Madrid, le 15 mai 2011, situation qui demeure incompréhensible tant qu'on ne la relie pas à une séquence plus large, celle des révoltes et révolutions dans plusieurs pays arabes, suivies, de par le monde, par les différentes vagues à d'Occupy. Cet essai voudrait constituer un témoignage, attentif aux faits, de ce monde d'assemblées et d'occupations des places en référence à l'oeuvre d'Hannah Arendt. De cette (...) oeuvre, deux ordres de questions ont particulièrement retenu notre attention. D'abord, l'insistance sur la constitution de «conseils», formulation particulière de l'organisation politique... Ensuite, la constitution d'une «pensée plurielle», qui se développe de manière privilégiée, en tant que forme de pensée propre à cette organisation en «conseils» ou en «assemblées»... C'est ce qui nous est apparu comme l'inouï, le «trésor perdu» selon Arendt, retrouvé dans les mouvements sociaux récents, à commencer par ceux d'Espagne : la possibilité d'un exercice à découvert, en plein air et libre de la pensée. Ce qui peut être décrit comme une patience de l'action. (shrink)

La evidencia empírica disponible señala de manera unánime que las nuevas políticas de tráfico y seguridad vial aplicadas en España desde 2004, y en particular la introducción del carné por puntos y la reforma del Código Penal, han tenido una fuerte incidencia positiva en la reducción de la siniestralidad. De dichos resultados se deriva que las nuevas políticas han tenido también un efecto positivo sobre la conducta de los conductores, de modo que ha sido esa mejora en la conducta al (...) volante la que finalmente se ha traducido en una reducción de la siniestralidad. No obstante, hasta el momento, los investigadores han descuidado el análisis directo de los datos sobre cumplimiento. En el presente trabajo se analizan todos los datos disponibles que ofrecen información sobre el cumplimiento de la normativa de tráfico y seguridad vial. (shrink)

Pleasants argues in favour of the idea of basic moral certainties. Analogous to Wittgenstein’s basic empirical certainties, basic moral certainties are universal certainties that cannot be justified, asserted or meaningfully doubted. They are a fundamental condition of morality as such, thus allowing us to carry out other moral operations. Brice and Rummens have criticized Pleasants’ proposal, arguing that basic moral certainties are significantly disanalogous to Wittgenstein’s basic empirical certainties. Brice argues that Pleasants does not differentiate between a bottom-up and a (...) top-down approach to basic certainties nor does he acknowledge the difference that this distinction constitutes in the foundational role of a certainty. Meanwhile, Rummens claims that basic moral certainties are not universal. Conversely, they are moral hinges embedded in certain culturally and historically specific moral language-games. Pleasants has provided a response to these criticisms, while defending the universality and naturalism of basic moral certainties. In this article, I single out the problems in Pleasants’ response to the criticisms introduced by Brice and Rummens. I argue that Pleasants must present further arguments in order to demonstrate that basic moral certainties are analogous to basic empirical certainties. I also argue that the existence of basic moral certainties that coalesce with numerous exceptions and suspensions generates significant problems in Pleasants’ proposal. I advance two cases regarding euthanasia that meaningfully challenge and doubt Pleasants’ central basic moral certainty: the wrongness of killing innocent human beings. Additionally, both cases are employed to meaningfully doubt and challenge Pleasants’ basic moral certainty of the badness of death. (shrink)

This chapter discusses interesting connections that hold between time and memory. It helps to pull temporal aspects of memory apart, and to tries to clarify them. Discussions in the chapter focus on memory for events, concentrating on a specific kind of memory for events, the “episodic” memory. The chapter first addresses a question on the metaphysics of memory. Then, it tries to specify which conditions an experience must fulfill in order to count as a memory experience. Next, the chapter tries (...) to determine whether memories represent any temporal properties of remembered events and, if so, which properties exactly. It purports to characterizes the content of memories, and determine whether time is somehow represented in mnemonic content. The chapter moves on to explain that, in memory, remembered events are not really experienced as being in the past. It concludes that the notions of time and memory are closely related. (shrink)

After September 11, Sullivan wrote that while he wasn’t worried about the heartland, “decadent coastal liberals may well mount a fifth column.†This in response, as is well known, to a thoughtful New Yorker essay by Susan Sontag. Sullivan, who Eric Alterman—not usually a sharp wordsmith—memorably calls “Young Roy Cohn†later issued “Sontag awards.†His attitude and his popularization of a sort of Lynne Cheneyist position on what “Views†are improper and thus should not be publicly aired, probably did far (...) more damage to civil liberties than Joe McCarthy’s pal Roy, who at the very least didn’t take himself seriously. (shrink)

Joan Maragall es representante del modernismo catalán, afín al simbolismo y al parnasianismo de Francia. En el poesía y vida van estrechamente ligados. Acentúa la dimensión ética y cultural de exigencia de fidelidad a la experiencia personal de sinceridad. Llega a la cuestión última sin dejar de profundizar la absoluta relación del sujeto con el mundo. Combina la profundidad unamuniana y la mundanidad orteguiana.

El autor recorre los hechos y episodios que configuran a un Estados Unidos previo a su 11 de septiembre, cuyo gobierno, en las palabras históricas de Luther King, es “el mayor proveedor mundial de violencia”, a lo que agrega Chomsky que el aparato (industrial-bancario-político-militar) que gobierna EE.UU. es la más poderosa organización terrorista de la historia mundial. Pero para sí mismo vivía el sueño de un gigante sonámbulo que soñaba ser Dios en los paraísos artificiales de la tecnología y el (...) consumo. Sueño hermoso, pero insostenible. Ese 11de Septiembre revienta la burbuja en la que el gran sonámbulo flotaba. El sueño se hace vigilia. Para bien o para mal, todos somos hermanos y hermanas, y es necesario despertar. (shrink)

All paradoxes of self-reference seem to share some structural features. Russell in 1908 and especially Priest nowadays have advanced structural descriptions that successfully identify necessary conditions for having a paradox of this kind. I examine in this paper Priest’s description of these paradoxes, the Inclosure Scheme (IS), and consider in what sense it may help us understand and solve the problems they pose. However, I also consider the limitations of this kind of structural descriptions and give arguments against Priest’s use (...) of IS in favour of dialetheism. IS fails to identify sufficient conditions for having a paradox of self-reference. That means that, even if we identified a problem common to any reasoning satisfying IS, that problem would not explain why some of those reasonings are paradoxical and some others are not. Therefore IS cannot justify by itself the claim that some particular theory offers the best solution to the paradoxes of self-reference. We still need to consider aspects concerning the content and context of occurrence of every paradox. (shrink)

Although most consumers are positive about socially responsible companies, in order to benefit from CSR efforts, effective and clear CSR communication is important. However, due to the constantly rising profusion of eco-labels, based on either own claims from the organization or claims made by an external third party, consumers may encounter difficulties in identifying truly responsible firms, which could result in less effective CSR initiatives, even for those responsible firms. Therefore, building on attribution theory, this study seeks to identify how (...) uncertified internal CSR claims and external third-party CSR labels should be used in order to deter greenwashing and increase positive consumer evaluations. Within a 3 × 2 design, respondents are exposed to different coffee product packages measuring their attitude toward the brand, corporate credibility, purchase intention, and scent perception, as well as perceived attributional CSR motives. Overall, findings indicate that especially an external CSR label affects consumer responses toward the firm. Moreover, perceived CSR motives serve as a mediator between an external CSR label and corporate credibility and brand attitude, respectively. These findings warrant further consideration of introducing an external multilevel rating systems by governmental law. (shrink)

This paper examines a novel notion of causality, namely, fuzzy-set-theoretic causality. Over the last decade, a number of conceptual models of causality, in the language of fuzzy-set theory, have appeared in the scientific literature and have been applied to empirical research. They have circulated widely from one scientific discipline to another, weaving a unifying thread through them. However, they have received no philosophical attention. In this paper, I will discuss the value and limitations of this type of model and will (...) read into its application several dimensions of philosophical significance. (shrink)

Base-of-the-pyramid business models aim to achieve profitability and poverty reduction by including poor people into corporate value chains. This goal duality creates tensions. Actors’ responses to these tensions are influenced by their cognitive frames of the phenomena building the tension. Applying a cognitive perspective, I investigate how corporate actors with different frames of poverty respond proactively or defensively to the poverty–profitability tension by adapting business model elements. I find that proactive and defensive responses differ for actors holding different cognitive frames (...) of poverty. The responses have consequences for the poverty impact potential of BOP business models. (shrink)

How do we know our current states of mind--what we want, and believe in? Jordi Fernández proposes a new theory of self-knowledge, challenging the traditional view that it is a matter of introspection. He argues that we know what we believe and desire by 'looking outward', towards the states of affairs which those beliefs and desires are about.

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 25, Issue 4, Page 405-411, December 2011.

En el presenteartículo revisamos las formas de interacción de los cuerpos con los discursos y la praxis pedagógica. Para ello revisamos, desde la pedagogía hermenéutica las formas de ocultación y emancipación de los cuerpos educandos. Partiendo de la idea original que habitualmente se ha objetivizado a los cuerpos educandos a través de la mirada hermenéutica es posible hablar de corporalidad o subjetividad de los cuerpos.