Fluid neural networks can be used as a theoretical framework for a wide range of complex systems as social insects. In this article we show that collective logical gates can be built in such a way that complex computation can be possible by means of the interplay between local interactions and the collective creation of a global field. This is exemplified by a NOR gate. Some general implications for ant societies are outlined. ©.

En este artículo se presenta una propuesta formativa utilizando el cine como material cultural y fuente de conocimiento. Una película como Babel permite trabajar la globalización y la educación de la ciudadanía, con planteamientos que exigen un nuevo humanismo, una nueva relación interpersonal, conscientes de los problemas de comunicación, prejuicios y choques culturales derivados del desarrollo tecnológico. La película cuestiona esta existencia en un mundo global interrelacionado, evocando el viejo mito bíblico de la Torre de Babel haciendo énfasis en identificaciones (...) erróneas, malentendidos y oportunidades fallidas, como manos invisibles que nos guían; o el fin cuyo destino se nos escapa.Babel hace comprender la realidad de la globalización. Nos permite observar cuatro lugares tan distantes como Estados Unidos, Méjico, Marruecos y Japón, no sólo distanciados físicamente. Los cuatro países representan estilos culturales diferentes, tres formas de realización humana. Asistimos al choque, a la incomunicación personal, al aislamiento por la diferencia de cultura y la ficticia proximidad tecnológica. Vivimos juntos, pero aislados los unos de los otros. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account (...) to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does not posit any mysterious (...) faculty of introspection or "inner perception" mechanism. (shrink)

This essay offers a discussion and contextualisation of a series of letters exchanged between Jordi Cat and Paul Feyerabend from 1989 to 1994. These letters provide insights into Feyerabend’s later thought on a variety of themes including quantum holism, the disunity of science, the development of logical empiricism, and science activism. In doing so, we provide some original analysis and exegesis of Feyerabend’s evolving views on scientific methodology and quantum mechanics by focusing on Feyerabend’s changing attitudes towards Bohm, Bohr, (...) and his eventual colleague Hans Primas and his later sympathies with the algebraic approach. We also highlight Feyerabend’s role in the growth of the Disunity of Science movement and how he connected disunity to practical considerations in the philosophy of action. (shrink)

Recent research on autonoetic consciousness indicates that the ability to remember the past and the ability to project oneself into the future are closely related. The purpose of the present study was to confirm this proposition by examining whether the relationship observed between personality and episodic memory could be extended to episodic future thinking and, more generally, to investigate the influence of personality traits on self-information processing in the past and in the future. Results show that Neuroticism and Harm Avoidance (...) predict more negative past memories and future projections. Other personality dimensions exhibit a more limited influence on mental time travel . Therefore, our study provide an additional evidence to the idea that MTT into the past and into the future rely on a common set of processes by which past experiences are used to envision the future. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the notion and role of metaphors and illustrations in Maxwell's works in exact science as a pathway into a broader and richer philosophical conception of a scientist and scientific practice. While some of these notions and methods are still at work in current scientific research-from economics and biology to quantum computation and quantum field theory-, here I have chosen to attest to their entrenchment and complexity in actual science by attempting to make some conceptual sense (...) of Maxwell's own usage; this endeavour includes situating Maxwell's conceptions and applications in his own culture of Victorian science and philosophy. I trace Maxwell's notions to the formulation of the problem of understanding, or interpreting, abstract representations such as potential functions and Lagrangian equations. I articulate the solution in terms of abstract-concrete relations, where the concrete, in tune with Victorian British psychology and engineering, includes the muscular as well as the pictorial. This sets the basis for a conception of understanding in terms of unification and concrete modelling, or representation. I examine the relation of illustration to analogies and metaphors on which this account rests. Lastly, I stress and explain the importance of context-dependence, its consequences for realism-instrumentalism debates, and Maxwell's own emphasis on method. (shrink)

Pleasants argues in favour of the idea of basic moral certainties. Analogous to Wittgenstein’s basic empirical certainties, basic moral certainties are universal certainties that cannot be justified, asserted or meaningfully doubted. They are a fundamental condition of morality as such, thus allowing us to carry out other moral operations. Brice and Rummens have criticized Pleasants’ proposal, arguing that basic moral certainties are significantly disanalogous to Wittgenstein’s basic empirical certainties. Brice argues that Pleasants does not differentiate between a bottom-up and a (...) top-down approach to basic certainties nor does he acknowledge the difference that this distinction constitutes in the foundational role of a certainty. Meanwhile, Rummens claims that basic moral certainties are not universal. Conversely, they are moral hinges embedded in certain culturally and historically specific moral language-games. Pleasants has provided a response to these criticisms, while defending the universality and naturalism of basic moral certainties. In this article, I single out the problems in Pleasants’ response to the criticisms introduced by Brice and Rummens. I argue that Pleasants must present further arguments in order to demonstrate that basic moral certainties are analogous to basic empirical certainties. I also argue that the existence of basic moral certainties that coalesce with numerous exceptions and suspensions generates significant problems in Pleasants’ proposal. I advance two cases regarding euthanasia that meaningfully challenge and doubt Pleasants’ central basic moral certainty: the wrongness of killing innocent human beings. Additionally, both cases are employed to meaningfully doubt and challenge Pleasants’ basic moral certainty of the badness of death. (shrink)

El presente artículo investiga de qué forma la centralidad del sufrimiento en la filosofía de Schopenhauer sirve para fundamentar su pesimismo. Tres son los argumentos analizados: el lugar del sufrimiento en el mundo, su lugar en la conciencia humana y su lugar frente a la felicidad. A la luz de estos tres argumentos, se destaca que el vínculo indisoluble entre el sufrimiento y la esencia del mundo, la determinación del sufrimiento en la conciencia, tanto en su génesis como en su (...) intensidad, y su anterioridad ontológica frente a la felicidad hacen del pesimismo una categoría necesaria. Finalmente, se señala una posible contribución del pesimismo schopenhaueriano a la crítica social contemporánea, considerando la idea de mundo que el capitalismo tardío promueve. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a novel interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that ‘ethics is transcendental’. Initially, I set out to offer said interpretation by resorting to both Wittgenstein's understanding of ethics and his understanding of the transcendentality of logic—which entails taking Wittgenstein as endorsing a Kantian understanding of the notion ‘transcendental’. This leads to the claim that ethics is transcendental insofar as it is the condition of a certain ethical experience. Nevertheless, this interpretation involves some inadequacies due to certain incompatibilities (...) between the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the aforementioned Kantian understanding of the notion ‘transcendental’. I identify the peculiarities of Wittgenstein's understanding of the notion ‘transcendental’, and on this basis, I set forth a novel interpretation of 6.421. Specifically, I argue that ethics is transcendental insofar as it is internal to or constitutive of a certain mystical view: viewing the world sub specie aeterni as something valuable. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took (...) place). Next, I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call ‘perceptual’ and ‘self-based’ theories. I argue that those theories that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence. (shrink)

En esta investigación se muestra cómo la persistencia de una concepción jurídica diática de la propiedad ha invisibilizado el carácter hist´rocio, social y político de la misma, naturalizando la desigualdad resultante. Se realiza un examen de cómo el realismo jurídico y la concepción de la propiedad como "haces de derechos" contribuyó a resignificarla como realidad históricamente contingente, sujeta a condiciones e intereses económicos, sociales y políticos. Finalmente, en el artículo se discute cómo la cristalización de los "haces de derechos" en (...) la conceptualización y regimentación de los bienes comunes puede constituir una promisoria herramienta -analítica y normativa- para la democratización de la propiedad en el mundo contemporáneo. (shrink)

Algunas formulaciones de la filosofía política reciente han descuidado el carácter históricamente indexado de conceptos como libertad política, propiedad o soberanía, propiciando un uso anacrónico e impreciso de su significado. No obstante, su posición académica y social dominante informa el «sentido común» filosófico- político de nuestra época. Locke constituye un ejemplo de cómo la coyuntura interpretativa liberal, que se desplegó en el siglo XIX y se consolidó en el XX, ha oscurecido una parte de la complejidad y pluralidad de las (...) tradiciones intelectuales y normativas que heredó. La reconstrucción de la filosofía política lockeana a partir de su concepción fiduciaria de la libertad política contribuye a hacer de nuevo visible el significado de algunas concepciones fundamentales para la teorización normativa presente. (shrink)

This book offers a philosophical account of memory. Memory is remarkably interesting from a philosophical point of view. Our memories interact with mental states of other types in a characteristic way. They also have some associated feelings that other mental states lack. Our memories are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since we can have memories of objective events, and we can have memories of our own past experiences. Finally, our memories are epistemically special, in that beliefs formed (...) on the basis of our memories are protected from certain errors of misidentification and justified in a way which does not rely on any cognitive capacity other than memory. The aim of the book is to explain these features of memory. It proposes that memories have a particular functional role which involves past perceptual experiences and beliefs about the past and suggests that memories have a particular content as well; they represent themselves as having a certain causal origin. The book then accounts for the feelings associated with our memories as the experience of some of the things that our memories represent; things such as our own past experiences, or the fact the memories originate in those experiences. It also accounts for the special justification for belief afforded by our memories in terms of the content that memories have. The resulting picture is a unified account of several philosophically interesting aspects of memory. (shrink)

Pleasants has developed the idea of basic moral certainties. Analogous to Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties, they are best described as universal moral certainties which are natural and nonpropositional, and show unreflectively in the way we act. A clear-cut example is the wrongness of killing innocent human beings. Philosophers have levelled three damaging criticisms against Pleasants' proposal by (i) offering counterexamples to his proposed example of moral certainty, (ii) highlighting some disanalogies between moral certainties and Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties and, lastly, (...) (iii) showing the lack of arguments and evidence offered by Pleasants to substantiate the claim that moral certainties are natural. To address these criticisms, Laves has revised Pleasants' proposal by providing numerous amendments. In this paper, I develop some concerns about Laves' proposed amendments and indicate that, at present, they are unable to fully overcome the criticisms levelled against the idea of basic moral certainty. Whether Laves' proposal can escape these troubles demands further attention. (shrink)

All paradoxes of self-reference seem to share some structural features. Russell in 1908 and especially Priest nowadays have advanced structural descriptions that successfully identify necessary conditions for having a paradox of this kind. I examine in this paper Priest’s description of these paradoxes, the Inclosure Scheme (IS), and consider in what sense it may help us understand and solve the problems they pose. However, I also consider the limitations of this kind of structural descriptions and give arguments against Priest’s use (...) of IS in favour of dialetheism. IS fails to identify sufficient conditions for having a paradox of self-reference. That means that, even if we identified a problem common to any reasoning satisfying IS, that problem would not explain why some of those reasonings are paradoxical and some others are not. Therefore IS cannot justify by itself the claim that some particular theory offers the best solution to the paradoxes of self-reference. We still need to consider aspects concerning the content and context of occurrence of every paradox. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo ofrece un replanteamiento del debate sobre la conveniencia de atribuir poderes probatorios al juez. Para ello, se sostiene, por un lado, que la respuesta para ese debate debe vincularse necesariamente al modelo de proceso y de juez que se pretenda implementar, así como a la necesidad de sostener el objetivo de averiguación de la verdad en el proceso judicial. Por otro lado, una respuesta adecuada al problema planteado requiere un análisis cuidadoso de los distintos poderes probatorios y (...) del reparto de los mismos entre el juez y las partes. Abstract: The paper analyzes the debate on the convenience of attributing evidential powers to the judge. Ii is argued, on the one hand, that any response for this debate depends necessarily upon 1) the features of two models to be implemented: the model of the judicial process and that of the judge; as well as upon 2) the need to assume the search for truth as the aim in every judicial process. On the other hand, a correct answer to the problem needs a careful analysis of the different -and differently distributed- evidential powers the judge and the parties have. (shrink)

I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will (...) point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way. (shrink)

This study shows that firms respond in strategic ways to institutional pressures that stem from social scandals. Through the formal analysis of the historical narrative of events, the authors studied how seven pharmaceutical companies reacted over the years to accusations of being socially irresponsible in dealing with the HIV virus in Africa. The analysis shows that institutional and task environmental factors interact to precipitate pharmaceutical companies' reactions. Although firms' behaviors were indeed affected by institutional pressures exerted by activist groups and (...) the media, they did not passively adapt to these pressures. Instead, they decoupled their core technical activities from their policy announcements (by delaying the implementation of promised concessions) and used institutional pressure in the organizational field as a way of pursuing their own economic interests. (shrink)

My analysis of the military campaign carried out by the armies of the Upper Mesopotamian Kingdom in the lands of Qabra and Nurrugum centers on the different treatment allotted by the armies of Samsi-Addu and Išme-Dagan to the populations defeated during that campaign. While the inhabitants of Nineveh were captured and some even incorporated into the army of Išme-Dagan, the tribe of Ya’ilanum was annihilated. This drastic action was the result of deep-seated prejudices of the leaders of the Upper Mesopotamian (...) Kingdom against non-urban populations, who were frequently perceived as subhuman and dangerous beings meriting annihilation. (shrink)

Tradicionalmente se ha considerado a la antroponimia como la vía prioritaria de acceso al conocimiento de la piedad popular en el marco de las culturas del Próximo Oriente Antiguo. Sin embargo, determinados problemas asociados a la utilización de este tipo de material limitan sus posibilidades. En el presente trabajo, junto a la recopilación de la antroponimia fenicio-púnica hallada en la Península Ibérica, se ha intentado proceder a su contextualización en el marco de la religión cananea del primer milenio y su (...) expansión hacia el Mediterráneo occidental. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend the view that judgments based on episodic memory are immune to error through misidentification. I will put forward a proposal about the contents of episodic memories according to which a memory represents a perception of a past event. I will also offer a proposal about the contents of perceptual experiences according to which a perceptual experience represents some relations that its subject bears to events in the external world. The combination of the (...) two views will yield the outcome that the subject is always an intentional object of her own memories: In episodic memory, one remembers being the subject whose extrinsic properties were experienced in some past perception. For that reason, one cannot misidentify oneself in memory unless one is having an inaccurate memory. Thus, the source of immunity to error through misidentification in memory lies in the nature of mnemonic content. (shrink)

Although most consumers are positive about socially responsible companies, in order to benefit from CSR efforts, effective and clear CSR communication is important. However, due to the constantly rising profusion of eco-labels, based on either own claims from the organization or claims made by an external third party, consumers may encounter difficulties in identifying truly responsible firms, which could result in less effective CSR initiatives, even for those responsible firms. Therefore, building on attribution theory, this study seeks to identify how (...) uncertified internal CSR claims and external third-party CSR labels should be used in order to deter greenwashing and increase positive consumer evaluations. Within a 3 × 2 design, respondents are exposed to different coffee product packages measuring their attitude toward the brand, corporate credibility, purchase intention, and scent perception, as well as perceived attributional CSR motives. Overall, findings indicate that especially an external CSR label affects consumer responses toward the firm. Moreover, perceived CSR motives serve as a mediator between an external CSR label and corporate credibility and brand attitude, respectively. These findings warrant further consideration of introducing an external multilevel rating systems by governmental law. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Rhizomata Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 2 Seiten: 148-176.

My purpose in this essay is to clarify the notion of explanation by computer simulation in artificial intelligence and cognitive science. My contention is that computer simulation may be understood as providing two different kinds of explanation, which makes the notion of explanation by computer simulation ambiguous. In order to show this, I shall draw a distinction between two possible ways of understanding the notion of simulation, depending on how one views the relation in which a computing system that performs (...) a cognitive task stands to the program that the system runs while performing that task. Next, I shall suggest that the kind of explanation that results from simulation is radically different in each case. In order to illustrate the difference, I will point out some prima facie methodological difficulties that need to be addressed in order to ensure that simulation plays a legitimate explanatory role in cognitive science, and I shall emphasize how those difficulties are very different depending on the notion of explanation involved. (shrink)

Base-of-the-pyramid business models aim to achieve profitability and poverty reduction by including poor people into corporate value chains. This goal duality creates tensions. Actors’ responses to these tensions are influenced by their cognitive frames of the phenomena building the tension. Applying a cognitive perspective, I investigate how corporate actors with different frames of poverty respond proactively or defensively to the poverty–profitability tension by adapting business model elements. I find that proactive and defensive responses differ for actors holding different cognitive frames (...) of poverty. The responses have consequences for the poverty impact potential of BOP business models. (shrink)

Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For that reason, (...) memory can produce justification for belief through the process of remembering. This is why a subject may be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of memory even if, in the past, she was not justified in believing it through any other source. The resulting picture of memory is a picture wherein the epistemically generative role of memory turns out to be grounded on its intentionally generative role. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary volume gathers selected, refereed contributions on various aspects of public health from several disciplines and research fields, including the philosophy of science, epidemiology, statistics and ethics. The contributions were originally presented at the 1st Barcelona conference of “Philosophy of Public Health”. This book is intended for researchers interested in public health and the contemporary debates surrounding it.

The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the (...) subject violates this epistemic obligation. I argue that construing this type of self-deception as a failure of selfknowledge explains two important aspects of it: The tension that we observe between the subject’s speech and her actions, and our inclination to hold the subject responsible for her condition. I compare this proposal with two other approaches to self-deception in the literature; intentionalism and motivationalism. Intentionalism explains the two aspects of self-deception but it runs into the so called ‘paradoxes’ of self-deception. Motivationalism avoids those paradoxes but it cannot explain the two aspects of self-deception. (shrink)

I offer a model of self‐knowledge that provides a solution to Moore's paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self‐knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher‐order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first‐order belief. Then, I argue that the model in (...) question can account for both versions of Moore's paradox. Moore's paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self‐knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one's own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one's own mind is a matter of forming first‐order beliefs and corresponding second‐order beliefs on the same basis. (shrink)