The current monopoly of psychology in the different facets of human life becomes psychological practice care increasingly suspect. And while it states legitimate targets, they are controversial. This paper highlights the lack of an agreed target between the professionals of psychological practice care. The first part argues that psychological practice care does not provide a clear and agreed target. This dissent is due to a disciplinary problem of psychology and it damages its image of responsible profession. In the second part, (...) we propose a goal that unifies various psychological practices care beyond their differences and through which its professional action is legitimate. The hypothesis presented is that the aim of psychological practice care is what begins it, that is, relief of suffering. However, to understand the nature of suffering, psychological practice care must regain its relationship with philosophy. (shrink)

El presente artículo investiga de qué forma la centralidad del sufrimiento en la filosofía de Schopenhauer sirve para fundamentar su pesimismo. Tres son los argumentos analizados: el lugar del sufrimiento en el mundo, su lugar en la conciencia humana y su lugar frente a la felicidad. A la luz de estos tres argumentos, se destaca que el vínculo indisoluble entre el sufrimiento y la esencia del mundo, la determinación del sufrimiento en la conciencia, tanto en su génesis como en su (...) intensidad, y su anterioridad ontológica frente a la felicidad hacen del pesimismo una categoría necesaria. Finalmente, se señala una posible contribución del pesimismo schopenhaueriano a la crítica social contemporánea, considerando la idea de mundo que el capitalismo tardío promueve. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza el papel de la individualidad en la constitución del sufrimiento en la obra de Arthur Schopenhauer y lo hace a tres niveles. A nivel metafísico, se estudia la relevancia del carácter inteligible; a nivel empírico, se explora el papel de la personalidad; y, a nivel intelectual, se examina la influencia del grado de conocimiento individual sobre el dolor. Finalmente se señalan algunas consecuencias de la centralidad de la individualidad en relación al sufrimiento.

The question of how meaning serves to sustain dominance has been part of the programme of a critique of ideology from the outset. If ideology makes the meaning of the social world and its interpretations decontested, a main task of the critique of ideology is to show their contestability. I would like to reconsider the value of metaphor within this programme and claim that metaphors are noteworthy devices for the critique of ideology due to their ability to undermine ideological incontestability: (...) by calling into question its consistency, by exploring other possible interpretations and by enriching its univocal character, that is, through evoking a new way of seeing social reality, metaphors manage to disclose the contestability of the social world and its interpretations. (shrink)

Although suffering in Schopenhauer’s works may be explained by how the will to life is objectified in the world, a more precise inquiry leads us to elucidate the significance of this experience in his writings. This article claims in the first place that suffering in this author’s works is triggered by multiple sources and takes various forms. In fact, and this is the article’s second claim, these sources coincide with some later scholars’ characterizations of modern suffering. The main aim is (...) to show the value of Schopenhauer’s works in understanding modern malaise. This article is divided into 4 parts: in the first part, some considerations about suffering and modernity are indicated; in the second part, the place of suffering in Schopenhauer’s works is explored; in the third part, some of suffering’s sources are analysed; finally, a number of dimensions that may be of great value in better understanding modern malaise are noted. (shrink)

En el particular contexto filosófico de la Alemania de entreguerras, el joven H. Marcuse llevó a cabo una original recepción en clave marxista de la fenomenología existencial y de la Lebensphilosophie (I). En sus primeros artículos, «Contribuciones a una fenomenología del materialismo histórico» (1928) y «Sobre filosofía concreta» (1929), esa recepción se orientó al proyecto de elaboración de una fenomenología dialéctica y, vinculado con ello, al intento de fundamentar la acción radical en el concepto ontológico de historicidad (Geschichtlichkeit) sin descuidar (...) su componente material (II, III, IV). Asimismo, en la situación de caída (Verfallen) del Dasein, Marcuse va a otorgar una misión primordial a la filosofía concreta (V). (shrink)

En el primer apartado del artículo nos ocupamos de la relación que Karl Korsch mantuvo con el Instituto de Investigación Social y con sus figuras más representativas, desde sus primeros años de funcionamiento en Frankfurt hasta el exilio en los Estados Unidos (1). En la segunda parte se lleva a cabo un contraste entre lo que Korsch y la primera Teoría Crítica entendían por ‘realización de la filosofía’ (2). Se añade un apéndice estructurado en tres temáticas suplementarias: la recepción del (...) positivismo en la obra de Korsch (a), su vinculación con el leninismo (b) y sus críticas a la ‘teoría del colapso’ (Zusammenbruchstheorie) (c). (shrink)

El fermento psicológico del fascismo en las sociedades capitalistas tardías aparece vinculado al proceso de debilitamiento del yo y al necesario entrelazamiento de las disposiciones subjetivas con factores situacionales. Desentrañar los mecanismos que inciden en la expansión del carácter potencialmente fascista requiere de un análisis de las tendencias de la personalidad que favorecen su arraigo y cómo se ven fomentadas por determinados procesos sociales. El presente artículo se centra en el influjo y la interacción de tres factores objetivos y tres (...) factores subjetivos. Para ello nos apoyamos principalmente en los estudios sobre la propaganda fascista y la cultura de masas llevados a cabo por los autores de la primera Teoría Crítica. (shrink)

En el presente artículo abordamos la confrontación que ciertos autores pertenecientes al llamado marxismo occidental mantuvieron con la concepción de la vida cotidiana de “término medio” (Durchschnittlichkeit) de "Ser y tiempo" (1927). Nos centramos principalmente en la obra del filósofo checo Karel Kosík (1926-2003), quien, a lo largo de su trayectoria intelectual, llevó a cabo una recepción crítica de la analítica existencial heideggeriana, así como también en los aspectos divergentes y convergentes entre la concepción de la cotidianidad de Martin Heidegger (...) y de György Lukács. En la última sección, se apuntan las posibles sendas de encuentro para un develamiento fenomenológico-marxista de la “verdad” de la cotidianidad. (shrink)

La interpretación de la dialéctica hegeliana que el joven Marcuse lleva a cabo en sus escritos tempranos «Sobre el problema de la dialéctica I y II» (1930-1931) y «Ontología de Hegel y teoría de la historicidad» (1932) contrarresta las críticas de Heidegger a la dialéctica de Hegel. La lectura de ambos autores también diverge en su comprensión acerca del estatuto y el alcance del fenómeno de la temporalidad en la filosofía hegeliana. Sin embargo, cuando dilucida el concepto de historicidad (Geschichtlichkeit) (...) en Hegel, Marcuse advierte la tensión existente en su sistema entre el concepto ontológico de «vida» y la idea del «saber absoluto». A partir de su entrada en el Institut für Sozialforschung, el autor berlinés abandonará la tematización del concepto de historicidad —tarea que había ocupado un lugar central en sus primeros escritos— por considerar que dicho concepto, demasiado distorsionado por la tradición ontológico-existencial, es inconciliable con la dialéctica materialista. (shrink)

El filósofo checo Karel Kosík (1926-2003) llevó a cabo en su obra una recepción crítica del pensamiento de Martin Heidegger. En determinados capítulos de "Dialéctica de lo concreto" (1963), así como en otros ensayos tardíos, elaboró una crítica de la analítica existencial heideggeriana, principalmente a la concepción de la estructura del ser del Dasein como “preocupación” o “cuidado” (Sorge). Nos ocupamos aquí de dilucidar el sentido y el alcance de esta crítica a "Ser y tiempo" (1927).

La teoría de los valores, la axiología, a veces suele pasar muy inadvertida en los análisis que se hacen de la obra filosófica de Mario Bunge, o autores que siguen su línea de investigación como Gustavo Esteban Romero. En este artículo voy a repasar las principales concepciones básicas en teoría de valores de los dos filósofos citados (aunque se intentará no caer en un mero análisis escolástico), centrándome en las diferencias y coincidencias con tal de lograr luego una tentativa síntesis. (...) Se expone el proceder: primeramente se tratará de explicar cada sistema por separado, destacando todas sus similitudes e implicaciones, luego se contrastarán algunas diferencias, se discutirán estas y se tratará de conformar una teoría consistente que encare la axiología con todos los aportes hechos, como rama de la filosofía científica y general. (shrink)

This paper examines a novel notion of causality, namely, fuzzy-set-theoretic causality. Over the last decade, a number of conceptual models of causality, in the language of fuzzy-set theory, have appeared in the scientific literature and have been applied to empirical research. They have circulated widely from one scientific discipline to another, weaving a unifying thread through them. However, they have received no philosophical attention. In this paper, I will discuss the value and limitations of this type of model and will (...) read into its application several dimensions of philosophical significance. (shrink)

Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.

This book offers a philosophical account of memory. Memory is remarkably interesting from a philosophical point of view. Our memories interact with mental states of other types in a characteristic way. They also have some associated feelings that other mental states lack. Our memories are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since we can have memories of objective events, and we can have memories of our own past experiences. Finally, our memories are epistemically special, in that beliefs formed (...) on the basis of our memories are protected from certain errors of misidentification and justified in a way which does not rely on any cognitive capacity other than memory. The aim of the book is to explain these features of memory. It proposes that memories have a particular functional role which involves past perceptual experiences and beliefs about the past and suggests that memories have a particular content as well; they represent themselves as having a certain causal origin. The book then accounts for the feelings associated with our memories as the experience of some of the things that our memories represent; things such as our own past experiences, or the fact the memories originate in those experiences. It also accounts for the special justification for belief afforded by our memories in terms of the content that memories have. The resulting picture is a unified account of several philosophically interesting aspects of memory. (shrink)

Una respuesta al debate metafilosófico sobre si hay o no unos criterios regulativos en filosofía cómo área de investigación lo ofrece la denominada filosofía sintética. Dentro de esta posición se propone una forma de abordar toda la filosofía y teorizar en base a diferentes criterios propuestos, que suelen ser generalmente: la claridad semántica, la coherencia interna, la coherencia externa con las ciencias y la fecundidad teórica con otros campos de estudio. Estos criterios de corte naturalista a su vez se ofrecen (...) como debatibles y ampliables a otros criterios. Se razonará la necesidad de demarcar la filosofía, y, poniendo el foco en su metodología, se argumentarán los previos criterios con tal de fomentar la filosofía sintética como marco general de trabajo filosófico riguroso. Esto excluye de la disciplina tanto aquello que no sea filosófico como aquello que intente emular la filosofía sin serlo en verdad, la pseudofilosofía. (shrink)

The aims of this study were to analyze the peak physical demands in elite futsal by quantifying the most demanding scenarios of match play and to identify the differences between playing positions and the seasonal trend for five different rolling average time windows. The most demanding scenarios of external load from distance, speed, acceleration, and deceleration variables were obtained from 14 elite futsal players using a local positioning system during 15 official matches in the premier Spanish Futsal League. The results (...) showed an extremely large effect of the time window for all dependent variables in all positional groups. Another important finding of this study was that, in regard to the seasonal trend, only defenders reported clear moderate-large positive trends for high-speed running efforts, high-acceleration efforts, and high-deceleration efforts. Finally, moderate-large individual differences in player means for all dependent variables and clear differences between games for most dependent variables were found, suggesting how likely contextual factors may exert an influence on how “demanding” the most demanding scenarios are. The findings of this study provide coaches and strength and conditioning coaches further knowledge of the peak physical demands in elite futsal competition. This valuable information may lead to a more precise position-specific training prescription. (shrink)

My analysis of the military campaign carried out by the armies of the Upper Mesopotamian Kingdom in the lands of Qabra and Nurrugum centers on the different treatment allotted by the armies of Samsi-Addu and Išme-Dagan to the populations defeated during that campaign. While the inhabitants of Nineveh were captured and some even incorporated into the army of Išme-Dagan, the tribe of Ya’ilanum was annihilated. This drastic action was the result of deep-seated prejudices of the leaders of the Upper Mesopotamian (...) Kingdom against non-urban populations, who were frequently perceived as subhuman and dangerous beings meriting annihilation. (shrink)

Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining why memory judgments (...) are indeed IEM. The main tenet in the account of IEM to be proposed is that this aspect of memory is grounded, on the one hand, on the intentionality of perception and, on the other hand, on the relation between the intentionality of perception and that of memory. (shrink)

Four distinguished authors have been brought together to produce this elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the economic and social context of his ideas; his theory of science; and the development of his role in debates on Marxist concepts of history and his own conception of science. Coinciding with the emerging serious interest in logical positivism, this timely publication will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy of (...) science. (shrink)

The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.

Sometimes, one can imagine, in virtue of having some experience, that one is someone else having some property. This is puzzling if imagination is a guide to possibility, since it seems impossible for one to be someone else. In this paper, I offer a way of dissolving the puzzle. When one claims that, by having some experience, one imagines that one is someone else having some property, what one imagines, I suggest, is that if the other person had the property (...) in question, then having it would be, for them, like having the relevant experience is for one. I discuss two alternative views about the content of these episodes of imagination, and argue that both of them are too weak and too strong. The proposed view avoids the two difficulties while preserving some intuitions about the phenomenology and the epistemology of imagination which are captured by the alternative views. (shrink)

Although most consumers are positive about socially responsible companies, in order to benefit from CSR efforts, effective and clear CSR communication is important. However, due to the constantly rising profusion of eco-labels, based on either own claims from the organization or claims made by an external third party, consumers may encounter difficulties in identifying truly responsible firms, which could result in less effective CSR initiatives, even for those responsible firms. Therefore, building on attribution theory, this study seeks to identify how (...) uncertified internal CSR claims and external third-party CSR labels should be used in order to deter greenwashing and increase positive consumer evaluations. Within a 3 × 2 design, respondents are exposed to different coffee product packages measuring their attitude toward the brand, corporate credibility, purchase intention, and scent perception, as well as perceived attributional CSR motives. Overall, findings indicate that especially an external CSR label affects consumer responses toward the firm. Moreover, perceived CSR motives serve as a mediator between an external CSR label and corporate credibility and brand attitude, respectively. These findings warrant further consideration of introducing an external multilevel rating systems by governmental law. (shrink)

I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will (...) point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way. (shrink)

En el presente texto se trazan algunas directrices sobre la situación de la antropología del deporte en los estudios universitarios ofertados en España. Para ello se realiza un análisis de los planes de estudio en grado y postgrado en universidades públicas y privadas. Como principales resultados, se resaltan algunos lineamientos que explican la situación actual de este campo y algunas de sus principales consecuencias. Finalmente, se señalan las aportaciones más sustanciales que esta disciplina puede realizar al conocimiento de los basamentos (...) socioculturales del deporte, así como algunos de los principales retos y perspectivas de futuro. (shrink)

El debate en torno a la antropología aborda aquí una cuestión de categorías fundamentales en torno a la estructura básica del ser humano: hombre y mujer, niño y anciano. La terminología articulada por la categoría «espíritu - pneuma» abre las posibilidades de una nueva comprensión ante los retos planteados por las ciencias experimentales, la ética, la moral, incluso la religión. El esquema diádico «cuerpo y alma» se muestra agotado ante los callejones sin salida con los que se ha encontrado al (...) llegar hasta nuestros días. Por este motivo, el artículo defiende poder recuperar la antropología brotando de los datos de la revelación judeocristiana, tomados como auténticos y válidos para vehicular la verdad de la realidad humana. En efecto, resulta necesario recuperar la originalidad de la estructura triádica de espíritu, alma y cuerpo, presentada por el apóstol Pablo, de forma totalmente inesperada en su primera carta a los Tesalonicenses (1Te 5,23). (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the (...) subject violates this epistemic obligation. I argue that construing this type of self-deception as a failure of selfknowledge explains two important aspects of it: The tension that we observe between the subject’s speech and her actions, and our inclination to hold the subject responsible for her condition. I compare this proposal with two other approaches to self-deception in the literature; intentionalism and motivationalism. Intentionalism explains the two aspects of self-deception but it runs into the so called ‘paradoxes’ of self-deception. Motivationalism avoids those paradoxes but it cannot explain the two aspects of self-deception. (shrink)

The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something? The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining which features those mental states which qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states which do not qualify as such typically lack. In (...) sections 2 and 3, I will discuss the two main existing conceptions of the conditions that a mental state must satisfy to count as an episode of remembering. The first of these approaches is backward-looking. It puts forward conditions that strictly concern the aetiology of the mental state. I will argue that the conditions offered by the backward-looking approach are both too strong and too weak: They rule out mental states which, intuitively, count as memories while including mental states which, intuitively, do not qualify as memories. The second approach is forward-looking. It puts forward conditions that only concern the use that the subject makes of the mental state while forming beliefs about their own life. I will argue that the conditions proposed by the forward-looking approach are both too weak and too strong as well. However, the discussion of the two approaches will allow us to extract some helpful lessons on the constraints that any proposal about the nature of remembering should respect. An alternative approach aimed at incorporating those lessons will be offered in section 4 by drawing on the literature on functionalism. In section 5, I will argue that this approach can, on the one hand, accommodate as memories those mental states which indicate that the backward-looking approach and the forward-looking approach are too strict while, on the other hand, excluding those mental states which suggest that the two alternative approaches are too permissive. Accordingly, I will conclude that construing memory along functionalist lines is a satisfactory approach to the nature of remembering. (shrink)

In jurisprudential literature, the adjective ‘defeasible’ appears as a predicate of many terms: concepts, laws, rules, reasoning, justification, proof, and so on. In this paper, we analyze the effects of some versions of the thesis of the defeasibility of legal norms on the reconstruction of the notion of legal validity. We analyze some possible justifications of this thesis considered as a claim concerning validity, and enquire into two possible sets of problems related to the defeasibility of the criteria of identification (...) of a legal system. We also provide a formalization of some options regarding defeasible criteria of identification, which can be used as a tool for meta-jurisprudential analysis. Finally, the thesis according to which defeasibility is better conceived of as a feature of legal application is examined and questioned. (shrink)

The conceptualization of the notion of subjectivity within the Anthropocene finds in Rosi Braidotti’s posthumanism one of its most explicit and profuse modulations. This essay argues that Braidotti’s model powerfully accounts for the Anthropocene’s subjectivity by conceiving the “self” as a transversal multiplicity and its relationality to the “others” and the “world” as non-hierarchized by nature–culture distinctions; however, by being ontologically grounded on a neo-Spinozistic monism, Braidotti’s model blurs the notions of finitude, agency, and change, obscuring the possibility of critical (...) dissent while decreasing the overall theory’s consistency. An alternative ontological model capitalizing on these elements can be found in Object-Oriented Ontology and its notion of withdrawal. By associating OOO’s non-onto-taxonomical pluralism with Braidotti’s posthuman subjectivity, this essay aims at ontologically discretizing the latter in order to overcome these limitations. Grounded on this association and invoking a narrative imaginary propelled by the Greek terms xenos and xenia, the article paves the way for a form of subjectivity deviating from Braidotti’s ecological model and defined as xenological, arguing that, within the context of the Anthropocene, it constitutes an adequate alternative to Braidotti’s subjectivity. (shrink)

Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...) entities of some kind. The purpose of this chapter is to map the different positions on this issue, and to highlight the virtues and difficulties for each of the options. In Section 2, I will specify the question of what the intentional objects of memory are by clarifying the relevant notions of memory and intentional object. In Section 3, I will motivate the significance of identifying the intentional objects of memory by exploring the relations between, on the one hand, the intentionality of memory and, on the other hand, the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory. In Section 4, I will consider two natural candidates for being the intentional objects of memory, namely, worldly entities and mental entities, and I will raise some concerns for each of the two candidates. A promising alternative will emerge, in Section 5, as preserving the virtues of the two original candidates while avoiding their difficulties. The alternative will concern a certain combination of worldly and mental entities; a combination that involves both causal and truth-making relations. I will conclude by sketching how the alternative candidate can shed some light on the phenomenological and epistemological issues raised in the third section. (shrink)

If I remember something, I tend to believe that I have perceived it. Similarly, if I remember something, I tend to believe that it happened in the past. My aim here is to propose a notion of mnemonic contentaccounts for these facts. Certain proposals build perceptual experiences into the content of memories. I argue that they Have trouble with the second belief. Other proposals build references to temporal locations into mnemonic content. I argue that they have trouble with the second (...) one. I propose a notion of mnemonic Content that can account for the rationality of both beliefs. (shrink)

Base-of-the-pyramid business models aim to achieve profitability and poverty reduction by including poor people into corporate value chains. This goal duality creates tensions. Actors’ responses to these tensions are influenced by their cognitive frames of the phenomena building the tension. Applying a cognitive perspective, I investigate how corporate actors with different frames of poverty respond proactively or defensively to the poverty–profitability tension by adapting business model elements. I find that proactive and defensive responses differ for actors holding different cognitive frames (...) of poverty. The responses have consequences for the poverty impact potential of BOP business models. (shrink)

The ontological abyss that separates real objects from sensual objects is one of the central principles of Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), which has its most explicit and profuse modulation in Timothy Morton’s notion of rift. This article argues that, despite succeeding in explaining the radical difference that inhabits every object, Morton’s rift fails to explain the object’s unification, rendering the overall theory inconsistent. An alternative approach that accounts simultaneously for disjunction and conjunction between essences and appearances can be found in Eugenio (...) Trías’s philosophy of the limit, a term widely ignored in OOO despite its deeply non-relational conception of the reality of things. The article further argues that the reinterpretation of Trías’s twofold liminal approach in light of OOO successfully addresses the inconsistencies found in Morton’s rift, paving the way for a theory of limits within Harman’s ontological framework. (shrink)

This study shows that firms respond in strategic ways to institutional pressures that stem from social scandals. Through the formal analysis of the historical narrative of events, the authors studied how seven pharmaceutical companies reacted over the years to accusations of being socially irresponsible in dealing with the HIV virus in Africa. The analysis shows that institutional and task environmental factors interact to precipitate pharmaceutical companies' reactions. Although firms' behaviors were indeed affected by institutional pressures exerted by activist groups and (...) the media, they did not passively adapt to these pressures. Instead, they decoupled their core technical activities from their policy announcements (by delaying the implementation of promised concessions) and used institutional pressure in the organizational field as a way of pursuing their own economic interests. (shrink)