In this paper I will discuss the problem of evaluating dynamic properties of the procedural rules that govern science. I will propose a novel framework for evaluating dynamic properties of such rules. This framework is based upon an analogy from New Institutional Economics. I will argue that the concept of ‘adaptive efficiency’, as it has been developed by Douglass North, solves a problem in economics that is analogous to the problem of evaluating dynamic properties of the procedural rules that govern (...) science. I will propose to apply the main ideas underlying this concept to Chrysostomos Mantzavinos’s theory of Explanatory Games. Based on these ideas, I will develop the concept of ‘explanatory efficiency’. This concept is meant to provide the means to evaluate the dynamic properties of Explanatory Games. I will argue that the proposed analogy also motivates more general applications of New Institutional Economics to traditional problems of philosophy of science. (shrink)

In this paper I will analyze and criticize Linsbichler’s recent proposition to interpret the fundamental axiom of Praxeology as analytic. I will first describe Linsbichler’s problem situation. I will then describe and criticize Linsbichler’s proposed solution to his problem; namely his interpretation of the fundamental axiom as analytic. I will argue that this idea does not fully utilize critical potentials that are available to improve the fundamental axiom. I will propose an alternative interpretation which I call the ‘critical interpretation’ that (...) conserves the progressive aspects of Linsbichler’s proposal while eliminating undesirable ones. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that problems connected to good scientific practice and scientific misconduct can be fruitfully analyzed via the means of transaction costs economics. Thus, transaction costs economics is a valuable tool for the descriptive as well as normative analysis of science. I further argue that current institutional matrices impose high transaction costs on (potential) funding agencies of scientific research. This underlies many cases of bad practice in scientific research. Lowering these transaction costs would have positive effects both (...) on the adherence of researchers to the rules of good practice as well as for the amount of funding that is spend on research. In the end, I propose an institutional reform that promises to lower these transaction costs based upon an idea of Michael Rosenblatt. (shrink)