Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that (...) 'purer' and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed. (shrink)

Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman and Michael Ridge responded independently. Andrew Sepielli has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of being for to account for normative certitude. We shall (...) argue that the being for account of normative certitude is vulnerable to many problems shared by other noncognitivist theories. Furthermore, we shall argue that Sepielli’s account has its own problems: His favored normalization procedure for degrees of being for has highly problematic implications. (shrink)

Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution (...) to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude. (shrink)

In the first two volumes of On What Matters,1 Derek Parfit pursued a conciliatory project in normative ethics, which sought to dissolve the disagreement between the most plausible versions of Kantianism, contractualism and rule consequentialism. Parfit was less conciliatory in his meta-ethics, however. Does Parfit’s conciliatory project in metaethics succeed? We shall begin to address this question in the next section by, first, trying to get a grip on Parfit’s position, which now goes by the name ‘non-realist cognitivism’, and, second, (...) by examining his account of properties, and of normative properties in particular. We shall then examine whether Parfit’s triviality objection is effective against Jackson’s brand of naturalism. Finally, we will ask whether Parfit is right to think that his favoured metaethical view converges with what he thinks are the most plausible forms of naturalism and quasirealism,illustrated by Railton’s view and Gibbard’s view, respectively. (shrink)

This paper is a continuation of the authors' attempts to deal with the notion of indistinguishability (or indiscernibility) from a logical point of view. Now we introduce a two-sorted first-order modal logic to enable us to deal with objects of two different species. The intended interpretation is that objects of one of the species obey the rules of standard S5, while the objects of the other species obey only the rules of a weaker notion of indiscernibility. Quantum mechanics motivates the (...) development. The basic idea is that in the ‘actual’ world things may be indiscernible but in another accessible world they may be distinguished in some way. That is, indistinguishability needs not be seen as a necessary relation. Contrariwise, things might be distinguished in the ‘actual’ world, but they may be indiscernible in another world. So, while two quantum systems may be entangled in the actual world, in some accessible world, due to a measurement, they can be discerned, and on the other hand, two initially separated quantum systems may enter in a state of superposition, losing their individualities. Two semantics are sketched for our system. The first is constructed within a standard set theory (the ZFC system is assumed at the metamathematics). The second one is constructed within the theory of quasi-sets, which we believe suits better the purposes of our logic and the mathematical treatment of certain situations in quantum mechanics. Some further philosophically related topics are considered. (shrink)

Durante a formação, estudantes são constantemente expostos a estressores que, se persistentes, podem ocasionar a Síndrome de Burnout (SB). Considerando a importância dessa demanda, este estudo teve como objetivo identificar diferenças nas dimensões da SB em relação ao ano e turno em estudantes de Ps..

Der Forschung gelaufig ist die Rede von einer ersten (5./4. Jh. v. Chr.) und der sog. Zweiten Sophistik (2. Jh. n. Chr). Aber auch die Literatur des Hellenismus und der fruhen Kaiserzeit kennt zahlreiche Sophisten. Der Sophist, verstanden als (schlechter) Lehrer und Redner, Gegenspieler des Philosophen oder Vertreter der griechischen Bildung, bildet deshalb den Dreh-und Angelpunkt der Beitrage, die Schlaglichter auf Orte, Methoden und Personen der Bildungsvermittlung werfen. Die Beitrage zeigen, wie pagane und judische Denker, Platoniker und Stoiker Bildung als (...) Weg zum richtigen Welt- und Gottesverstandnis verstehen. Mit Beitragen von: Christian Fron, Marco Galli, Johann Goeken, Stefanie Holder, Alexandra Michalewski, Peter Scholz, Paul Schubert, Gregory E. Sterling, Werner Urbanz, Beatrice Wys. (shrink)

Contextualism about vagueness (hereafter ‘Contextualism’) is the view that vagueness consists in a particular species of context-sensitivity and that properly accommodating this fact into our semantic theory will yield a plausible solution to the sorites paradox.[1],[2] But Contextualism, as many commentators have noted, faces the following immediate objection: if we hold the context fixed, vagueness still remains, therefore vagueness is not a species of context-sensitivity. Call this ‘the simple objection’.[3] Absent a convincing reply to the simple objection, Contextualism is in (...) very bad shape. Oddly enough, defenders of Contextualism have said very little in reply. Proponents of the objection have tended to assume that this is because no reply is in the offing—the simple objection is taken to be unassailable. In this short paper, we sketch two replies to the simple objection which result in two very different kinds of Contextualism: Epistemicist Contextualism and Radical Contextualism. With these two theories in hand, the simple objection loses its force. (shrink)

Is the procreation asymmetry intuitively supported? According to a recent article in this journal, an experimental study suggests the opposite. Dean Spears (2020) claims that nearly three-quarters of participants report that there is a reason to create a person just because that person’s life would be happy. In reply, I argue that various confounding factors render the study internally invalid. More generally, I show how one might come to adopt the procreation asymmetry for the wrong reasons by misinterpreting one’s intuitions.

In this paper we deal with two applications of the square of opposition to controversial issues in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The first one concerns the kind of opposition represented by states in superposition. A superposition of “spin up” and “spin down” for a given spatial direction, for instance, is sometimes said to originate particular kinds of opposition such as contradictoriness. The second application concerns the problem of identical particles. Identity and indiscernibility are entangled in discussions of this problem (...) in such a way that a proper conceptual treatment of those issues through the square seems profitable. (shrink)

In this bold book, Jonas Grethlein proposes a new dialogue between the fields of Classics and aesthetics. Ancient material, he argues, has the capacity to challenge and re-orientate current debates. Comparisons with modern art and literature help to balance the historicism of classical scholarship with transcultural theoretical critique. Grethlein discusses ancient narratives and pictures in order to explore the nature of aesthetic experience. While our responses to both narratives and pictures are vicarious, the 'as-if' on which they are premised (...) is specifically shaped by the form of the representation. Form emerges as a key to how narratives and pictures constitute an important means of engaging with experience. Combining theoretical reflections with close readings, this book will appeal to art historians as well as to textual scholars. (shrink)

WHEN MAN FIRST BEGAN to interpret the nature of things—and this he did when he began to be man—life was to him everywhere, and being the same as being alive. Animism was the widespread expression of this stage, "hylozoism" one of its later conceptual forms. Soul flooded the whole of existence and encountered itself in all things. Bare matter, that is, truly inanimate, "dead" matter, was yet to be discovered—as indeed its concept, so familiar to us, is anything but obvious. (...) That the world is alive is really the most natural view, and largely supported by prima facie evi dence. On the terrestrial scene, in which experience is reared and contained, life abounds and occupies the whole foreground exposed to man's immediate view. The proportion of manifestly lifeless matter encountered in this primordial field is small, since most of what we now know to be inanimate is so intimately intertwined with the dynamics of life that it seems to share its nature. Earth, wind, and water—begetting, teeming, nurturing, destroying—are anything but models of "mere matter." Thus primitive panpsychism, in addition to answering powerful needs of the soul, was justified by rules of inference and verification within the available range of experience, continually confirmed as it was by the actual preponderance of life in the horizon of its earthly home. Indeed not before the Copernican revolution widened this horizon into the vastness of cosmic space was the proportional place of life in the scheme of things sufficiently dwarfed so that it became possible to disregard it for most of what henceforth was to be the content of the term "nature." But to early man, standing on his earth arched by the dome of its sky, it could never occur that life might be a side-issue in the universe, and not its pervading rule. His panvitalism was a perspective truth which only a change of perspective could eventually displace. Unquestioned and convincing at the beginning stands the experience of the omnipresence of life. (shrink)

Discusses the ethical implications of modern technology and examines the responsibility of humanity for the fate of the world.

Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.

Das «Neue Handbuch des Philosophie-Unterrichts» nimmt Entwicklungen der Fachdidaktik Philosophie und Ethik der letzten dreißig Jahre auf. Es bietet Einblicke in die Frage der Auswahl und Strukturierung von Inhalten, in verschiedene Unterrichtsthemen, in die didaktisch-methodische Planung und Durchführung des Unterrichts, in Fragen der Leistungsbewertung sowie in traditionelle und neuere philosophiedidaktische Modelle. Die Beiträge enthalten zahlreiche Anregungen zur Vorbereitung, Gestaltung und Reflexion des eigenen Unterrichts. Das Handbuch eignet sich somit als Nachschlagewerk sowohl für angehende als auch für erfahrene Lehrpersonen.

Taking a cue from Philo we may ask: If the adoption of the "seeing" approach from Greek philosophy was a misfortune for theology, does the repudiation or overcoming of that approach in a contemporary philosophy provide a conceptual means for theology to reform itself, to become more adequate to its task? Can it thus lead to a new alliance between theology and philosophy after, e.g., the medieval one with Aristotelianism has broken down? The question assumes that some use of philosophy, (...) i.e., of the elucidation of the nature of reality by secular thought, and of the nature of thinking about reality in secular thought, is desirable and even necessary for theology. This assumption must be granted, since theology, as the logos about things divine, is by definition the discursive, in some sense scientific, elucidation of the contents of faith and thus, for one thing, comes under the rules and norms of elucidation and discourse as such; and since the contents of faith comprise the dealings of God with the world and with man, the elucidation of the mundane and human side of this polarity must be informed by a knowledge of what world and man are, and philosophy is supposed to provide such knowledge. It would then follow that that philosophy is most adequate to theology which is most adequate to being, i.e., which is most nearly true—by the criteria of philosophy itself, i.e., by the criteria of secular reason. But since for a decision on this the theologians cannot wait for the consensus of philosophers, nor even necessarily trust its authority, they may be guided in their choice by the appeal of affinity, the lessons of past experience with philosophical liaisons, the present needs of their discipline, and by appraising which philosophy is most helpful to the discharge of theology's task, or least dangerous to its own trust, to its own genuineness, least seductive, least alienating—by any or all of these considerations, but as little as possible by fashion. On all these counts the theologian would do well to exercise a great deal of caution and mistrust. Especially in the face of tempting similarity: what theology needs in this relationship is the otherness of philosophy, not its similarity. On this I need not elaborate before a theological audience. However, the experiment of relationship itself is inescapable, and the one choice closed is abstention. Thus, the openness to contemporary thought shown by theology in the present experiment—as it was shown at all times—is to be welcomed. (shrink)

Ce livre important reprend les concepts clés de l'éthique, de l'éducation, de la politique et de l'histoire. Il discute pied à pied les idéaux du progrès et les utopies et fait toute sa place aux limites de tolérance de la nature, à la souffrance, à la peur et à l'espérance responsable. L'accueil réservé à cette grande oeuvre - des philosophes aux décideurs politiques et des pédagogues aux scientifiques - témoigne de l'urgence d'une telle réflexion.

Landscapes of Wisdom seeks wisdom in contemporary thought. The author, as scholar, and seeker, examines scientific, religious and literary writings, to synthesize a way of knowing accessible to the modern mind, an intellectual path meeting the challenge of science with an equally universal message that speaks of the world and its workings, but also of transcendence and the deepest core of human experience.

Can art, religion, or philosophy afford ineffable insights? If so, what are they? The idea of ineffability has puzzled philosophers from Laozi to Wittgenstein. In Ineffability and its Metaphysics: The Unspeakable in Art, Religion and Philosophy, Silvia Jonas examines different ways of thinking about what ineffable insights might involve metaphysically, and shows which of these are in fact incoherent. Jonas discusses the concepts of ineffable properties and objects, ineffable propositions, ineffable content, and ineffable knowledge, examining the metaphysical pitfalls (...) involved in these concepts. Ultimately, she defends the idea that ineffable insights as found in aesthetic, religious, and philosophical contexts are best understood in terms of self-acquaintance, a particular kind of non-propositional knowledge. Ineffability as a philosophical topic is as old as the history of philosophy itself, but contributions to the exploration of ineffability have been sparse. The theory developed by Jonas makes the concept tangible and usable in many different philosophical contexts. (shrink)

Social contract theories generally predicate the authority of rules that govern society on the idea that these rules are the product of a contractual agreement struck between members of society. These theories embody values, such as equality, reciprocity and rationality, that are highly prized within our culture. Yet a closer inspection reveals that these features exclude other important values, relations and even persons from the realm of contractual morality and justice, especially people with severe intellectual disabilities. Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry explores (...) the moral status of intellectually disabled people in social contract thought and argues that this tradition needs to be revisited to include the most vulnerable. Addressing this problem will have concrete repercussions in law and policy, because many issues that people with disabilities face are connected to deeply rooted assumptions about their status as full citizens or full members of our moral, political and legal communities. (shrink)

Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.

_Germany and the French Wars of Religion, 1560-1572_ explores how the first decade of the religious wars in France was interpreted by German Protestants and why they felt compelled to intervene.

This paper presents a paradox based on the following assumptions: that emotions are warranted when you are justified in thinking that the emotion is fitting, that there are warranted cases of past-directed fear, that fear is fitting in the face of its formal object: dangerousness, and that this formal object consists in a probability of damage or harm to something of value. The paper then discusses three likely solutions: (1) denying that past-directed fear can be warranted, (2) using an alternative (...) formulation of fear's formal object, and (3) giving up warrant as justified as fittingness. Finally, it provides a case for the third solution and presents a warrant-based approach to fittingness and the appropriateness of emotions in general. (shrink)