This article takes as its point of departure Luce Irigaray'sElemental Passions, in which a woman‐speaker tries to make her lover and the discipline of philosophy understand that she is not how they have imagined her to be; that she is not at all but that she keeps becoming through perpetual movement. The article investigates Irigaray's investment in a form of materialist difference feminism that offers conceptual links to the posthumanist work of Karen Barad's agential realism, especially her theorization of intra‐action. (...) The link between Irigaray and Barad is established via a diffractive reading that incorporates the dance/movement research practice of Contact Improvisation. Although expressed through written language,Elemental Passionscreates the impression of the woman‐speaker dancing, of encountering herself, her environment, and her lover through moved and moving contact, searching for a practice of moving‐together, feeling‐with, and feeling‐between that can be experienced in an improvised dance duet. Exploring how touch and the sharing of weight in Contact Improvisation challenges boundaries and establishes ever‐changing configurations and entanglements between dancers, the article proposes that Irigaray's woman‐speaker envisions herself as a posthuman/ist woman and that improvised dancing offers a practice of intra‐action through which she can encounter the world in her becoming. (shrink)

How does the way things appear to us relate to the way things really are? Science tells us that the world is very different from the way we experience it. John Heil offers an explanation of why the scientific image of the world that we get from physics is our best guide to the nature of reality--to what the appearances are appearances of.

This article investigates how age categorisation and prejudicial use of age are mobilised in talk by job applicants during job interviews and how recruiters affiliate with these. The institutional goal of recruitment is to ensure an unbiased process and evaluation, nevertheless, ageism against older workers emerges as unchallenged and culturally acceptable in authentic job interviews. In line with the discursive psychology (DP) approach, the analysis focuses on -isms as discursively constructed and categories as resources to accomplish social actions. A case (...) study is conducted based on video recordings of 24 real job interviews held at an Italian staffing agency and analysed through membership categorisation and conversation analysis. The analysis provides evidence of how job applicants resort to age co-membership with recruiters to achieve affiliation – or remedy misalignment – by complaining about older workers. The study contributes to DP’s re-specification of prejudices as interactional practices and links microanalysis to macro phenomena, such as ageism, through categorisation practices. (shrink)

Through a series of interdisciplinary studies this book argues that the Athenians themselves invented the notion of 'classical' tragedy just a few generations after the city's defeat in the Peloponnesian War. In the third quarter of the fourth century BC, and specifically during the 'Lycurgan Era', a number of measures were taken in Athens to affirm to the Greek world that the achievement of tragedy was owed to the unique character of the city. By means of rhetoric, architecture, inscriptions, statues, (...) archives and even legislation, the 'classical' tragedians and their plays came to be presented as both the products and vital embodiments of an idealised Athenian past. This study marks the first account of Athens' invention of its own theatrical heritage and sheds new light upon the interaction between the city's literary and political history. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework for analysing managers’ attitudes toward moral issues in stakeholder relations, and to operationalise the developed framework by defining statements to be used as empirical measures in survey research. The research question, how can moral issues in business be examined with the stakeholder approach, is answered by paying attention to both theoretical and empirical viewpoints. The paper reveals that by analysing a company’s stakeholder relations, we can discover the important moral issues (...) in business. To validate the framework developed and the empirical measures which result, the development process is described in detail. The argument is that making the development process visible is an important task in validating empirical measures in survey research. As a result of the research process, a total of 50 moral issues in eight stakeholder relations are identified, and operationalised with 58 itemised statements. The final conclusion is that the empirical measures developed in this paper are suitable for measuring moral issues in stakeholder relations, and that they can later be used in analysing real life managers’ perceptions of moral issues in stakeholder relations. (shrink)

This paper analyses managers'' moral decision-making, and studies the role of ethical theories in it by following the research tradition using the multidimensional ethics scale. The research question is: what kinds of ethical dimensions do Finnish business managers reveal when they are making moral decisions, and how have these dimensions changed in the 1990s? This question is answered by examining what kinds of factors emerge when the multidimensional ethics scale is used to analyse Finnish managers'' attitudes toward moral dilemmas. The (...) results show that Finnish managers'' decision-making reflects a variety of ethical theories. Teleological thinking is strongly emphasised by Finnish managers, and relativist thinking is used as well, but often combined with either deontology or justice thinking. In addition, a strong moralistic dimension emerged in Finnish managers'' decision-making. The analysis was carried out in two different surveys in years 1994 and 1999, and the results show that the ways of decision-making were more complex at the end of the 1990s than almost six years earlier. (shrink)

Historically, philosophical discussions of relations have featured chiefly as afterthoughts, loose ends to be addressed only after coming to terms with more important and pressing metaphysical issues. F. H. Bradley stands out as an exception. Understanding Bradley's views on relations and their significance today requires an appreciation of the alternatives, which in turn requires an understanding of how relations have traditionally been classified and how philosophers have struggled to capture their nature and their ontological standing. Positions on these topics range (...) from the rejection of relations altogether, to their being awarded the status as grounds for everything else, to various intermediary positions along this spectrum. Love them, hate them, or merely tolerate them, no philosopher engaged in ontologically serious metaphysics can afford to ignore relations. (shrink)

Review by: Johanna N. Y. Franklin The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 115-118, March 2013.

Processes constitute the world of human experience - from nature to cognition to social reality. Yet our philosophical and scientific theories of nature and experience have traditionally prioritized concepts for static objects and structures. The essays collected here call for a review of the role of dynamic categories in the language of theories. They present old and new descriptive tools for the modelling of dynamic domains, and argue for the merits of process-based explanations in ontology, cognitive science, semiotics, linguistics, philosophy (...) of mind, robotics, theoretical biology, music theory, and philosophy of chemistry and physics. The collection is of interest to professional researchers in any of these fields; it establishes - for the very first time - crossdisciplinary contact among recent process-based research movements and might witness a conceptual paradigm shift in the making. (shrink)

Medizinethik wie auch Pflegeethik werden allgemein als Disziplinen verstanden, die das Handeln von Menschen auf die Geltung seiner Ziele, Motivationen und Resultate hin untersucht. Ausgangspunkt solcher Formen der Ethik bildet die zum Problem gewordene Situation, in der vermeintlich eindeutige Grundziele, wie zum Beispiel Lebensverlängerung einerseits und Leidensverminderung andererseits, miteinander in Konflikt geraten. Es stellen sich dann Fragen, deren praxisanleitende Beantwortungen von einer Pflegeethik gefordert werden. In der theoretisch fundierten Beantwortung dieser Fragen jedoch entfernen sich Medizin- und Pflegeethik von dem, was (...) Menschen tun und erleiden. Mit Hilfe der seinsgeschichtlichen Hermeneutik Heideggers und des amerikanischen Pragmatismus, vertreten durch John Dewey und Richard Rorty, entwickeln die Autoren eine Methode, die - jenseits sogenannter Grundfragen einer medizinischen Ethik - alltägliche Krisen des heutigen klinischen Miteinanders im Spannungsfeld technischer Medizin und individueller Situation lösungsorientiert neu verstehen lässt. Jene werden - derart als Fragen von Mitgefühl und Selbstbestimmung neu verstanden - zu Chancen einer verantwortungsvollen klinischen Praxis. Die Krankenpflege bildet dabei als neu belebter metaphorischer Fundus den poietischen Horizont dieser Praxis, deren methodischer Vollzug von der Ausbildung bis zum beruflichen Handeln ärztlichen und pflegenden Klinikpersonals reicht. Die kulturellen, sprachlichen, rechtlichen und institutionellen Bedingungen des Handelns in Kliniken werden auf den Prüfstand gestellt und neu bewertet. Schließlich wird die Methode eines Klinischen Pragmatismus, als neue Ethik der Pflege, anhand von einschlägigen Fallbeispielen aus der Praxis beispielhaft angewandt. (shrink)

Theories in fundamental physics are unlikely to be ontologically neutral, yet they may nonetheless fail to offer decisive empirical support for or against particular metaphysical positions. I illustrate this point by close examination of a particular objection raised by Wolfgang Pauli against Hermann Weyl. The exchange reveals that both parties to the dispute appeal to broader epistemological principles to defend their preferred metaphysical starting points. I suggest that this should make us hesitant to assume that in deriving metaphysical conclusions from (...) physical theories we place our metaphysical theories on a purely empirical foundation. The metaphysics within a particular physical theory may well be the result of a priori assumptions in the background, not particular empirical findings. (shrink)

Abstract“Integrative Social Robotics” (ISR) is a new approach or general method for generating social robotics applications in a responsible and “culturally sustainable” fashion. Currently social robotics is caught in a basic difficulty we call the “triple gridlock of description, evaluation, and regulation”. We briefly recapitulate this problem and then present the core ideas of ISR in the form of five principles that should guide the development of applications in social robotics. Characteristic of ISR is to intertwine a mixed method approach (...) (i.e., conducting experimental, quantitative, qualitative, and phenomenological research for the same envisaged application) with conceptual and axiological analysis as required in professional studies in applied ethics; moreover, ISR is value-drivenand abides by the “Non-Replacement Principle”:Social robots may only do what humans should but cannot do. We briefly compare ISR to other value-sensitive or value-directed design models, with a view to the task of overcoming the triple gridlock. Finally, working from an advanced classification of pluridiscplinary research, we argue that ISR establishes a research format that can turn social robotics into a new transdiscipline. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 12, December 2024, Page 32-34.

This article argues that Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory fails to offer a true alternative to expected utility theory. Under commonly held assumptions about dynamic choice and the framing of decision problems, rational agents are guided by their attitudes to temporally extended courses of action. If so, REU theory makes approximately the same recommendations as expected utility theory. Being more permissive about dynamic choice or framing, however, undermines the theory’s claim to capturing a steady choice disposition in the (...) face of risk. I argue that this poses a challenge to alternatives to expected utility theory more generally. (shrink)

A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf of other people. Are we permitted to implement any (...) of the rationally permissible risk attitudes, is there some specific risk attitude that is required when choosing for others, or are we required to defer to the risk attitudes of the people on whose behalf we are choosing? This article elaborates on this question, explains its wider practical and theoretical significance, provides an overview of existing answers, and explores how to go about providing a more systematic account of how to choose on behalf of others in risky contexts. (shrink)

In “Mind and Knowledge,” John Heil notes that our knowledge of the world depends on our nature as knowers. He argues that the fact that it is unclear how we could convincingly establish, in a noncircular manner, that the world is as we think it is, suggests skepticism, and that realism and skepticism go hand in hand. Heil discusses the implications of such a view, particularly as they concern knowledge we seemingly have of our own states of mind. (...) He considers the view that to calibrate ourselves as knowers we should proceed from resources “immediately available to the mind” to conclusions about the external world. He evaluates Descartes's attempt to do this, and examines two other possibilities: an externalist view of mental content and an internalist approach to content. (shrink)

The metaphysical doctrine of emergence continues to exert a powerful pull on philosophers and metaphysically inclined scientists. This paper focuses on a recent account of emergence advanced by Jessica Wilson in Metaphysical Emergence, but the discussion has the broader aim of making explicit some of the underlying themes that inspire thoughts of emergence generally. These prove to be, not merely optional, but largely lacking in merit.

_First_ and _last_ have been variously described as ordinals, superlatives, or both. These descriptions are generally not accompanied by extensive argumentation, and those who label _first_ and _last_ as superlatives do not present and argue for a particular decomposition. Thus, _first_ and _last_’s status as ordinals vs. superlatives and their internal composition remain open issues. In this paper, I argue that _first_ and _last_ are superlatives, in particular the superlative forms of _before_ and _after_. To argue that _first_ and _last_ (...) are superlatives, I show that they pattern like superlatives and unlike ordinals (_second_, _third_, etc.) with respect to plurality, modifier choice, “modal superlatives” with _possible_, and the ordinal superlative construction. I next argue that the relations between _before_ and _first_ and between _after_ and _last_ show themselves overtly in many languages and in English paraphrases; furthermore, _first_ and _last_ semantically differ in ways that _before_ and _after_ have also been noted to differ. While I acknowledge one observation that _prima facie_ counterexemplifies these claims, I argue that it constitutes a genuine counterexample only if one formalizes my decomposition of _first_/_last_ using a standard Heimian (Heim in Notes on superlatives. Manuscript, MIT ( 1999 )) entry for _-est_. The counterexample, which concerns the “upstairs _de dicto_” reading of superlatives, ceases to be an issue if one treats _before_ and _after_ as simplex and formalizes my decomposition using a Containment Hypothesis-inspired semantics (Bobaljik in Universals in comparative morphology: Suppletion, superlatives, and the structure of words, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2012 ) for _-est_. (shrink)

This first book of the series, contains the theory and technique on how to recognize your own presence and your connectedness to everything else, experiencing oneness, through the state of awareness. Making emphasis on how to clear the soul from any blockages, emotions or other filters that may affect that experience of recognizing the true self.

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft Jahrgang: 21 Heft: 2 Seiten: 145-176.

Appeals to dispositionality in explanations of phenomena in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, require that we first agree on what we are talking about. I sketch an account of what dispositionality might be. That account will place me at odds with most current conceptions of dispositionality. My aim is not to establish a weighty ontological thesis, however, but to move the discussion ahead in two respects. First, I want to call attention to the extent to which assumptions philosophers have (...) made about dispositionality are far from innocent. The assumptions incorporate substantive theses that, by constraining the space of acceptable answers to particular philosophical questions, have inhibited the search for answers to those questions. Second, and more positively, I hope to open up the space of possibilities by offering an alternative way of conceiving dispositionality developed by C. B. Martin. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Jie Gao (Synthese 194:1901–17, 2017) has argued that there are acceptance-based counterexamples to the knowledge norm for practical reasoning (KPR). KPR tells us that we may only rely on known propositions in practical reasoning, yet there are cases of practical reasoning in which we seem to permissibly rely on merely accepted propositions, which fail to constitute knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that such cases pose no threat to a more broadly conceived knowledge-based view of (...) practical reasoning. I will first motivate the view that rational acceptance depends on a knowledge-based condition being met. I will then show how KPR can be amended—yielding what I call KPR+—to include this condition. I will argue that KPR+ not only avoids Gao’s counterexample, but harbours additional explanatory power by providing an account of the normative role of acceptance in practical reasoning. Finally, I will defend KPR+ against objections by employing theoretical tools that are readily available to those sympathetic to knowledge-based views. (shrink)

Freedom and the subject were guiding themes for Michel Foucault throughout his philosophical career. In this clear and comprehensive analysis of his thought, Johanna Oksala identifies the different interpretations of freedom in his philosophy and examines three major divisions of it: the archaeological, the genealogical, and the ethical. She shows convincingly that in order to appreciate Foucault's project fully we must understand his complex relationship to phenomenology, and she discusses Foucault's treatment of the body in relation to recent feminist (...) work on this topic. Her sophisticated but lucid book illuminates the possibilities that Foucault's philosophy opens up for us in thinking about freedom. (shrink)

The weakly random reals contain not only the Schnorr random reals as a subclass but also the weakly 1-generic reals and therefore the n -generic reals for every n . While the class of Schnorr random reals does not overlap with any of these classes of generic reals, their degrees may. In this paper, we describe the extent to which this is possible for the Turing, weak truth-table, and truth-table degrees and then extend our analysis to the Schnorr random and (...) hyperimmune reals. (shrink)

This paper defends revealed preference theory against a pervasive line of criticism, according to which revealed preference methodology relies on appealing to some mental states, in particular an agent’s beliefs, rendering the project incoherent or unmotivated. I argue that all that is established by these arguments is that revealed preference theorists must accept a limited mentalism in their account of the options an agent should be modelled as choosing between. This is consistent both with an essentially behavioural interpretation of preference (...) and with standard revealed preference methodology. And it does not undermine the core motivations of revealed preference theory. (shrink)

That we may rely on our knowledge seems like a platitude. Yet, the view that knowledge is sufficient for permissible reliance faces a major challenge: when much hangs on whether we know, relying on our knowledge seems to license irrational action. Unfortunately, extant proposals to meet this challenge (Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008; Williamson, 2005a; Schulz, 2017, 2021b) either fail to make the correct predictions about high-stakes cases or, as I will argue, face a substantial objection. In this paper, I will (...) offer two novel proposals for defending the sufficiency of knowledge for permissible reliance. My favoured proposal, which I call Flexible Fallibilism, is based on the idea that stakes can affect how we rely on our knowledge and how our knowledge determines what is rational for us to do. Besides making the correct predictions about high-stakes cases, I will argue that Flexible Fallibilism also provides us with a knowledge-based account of when to simplify our practical reasoning. Afterwards, I will present another proposal, which I call Dual Infallibilism, that combines two recent claims by Moss (2013, 2018) and Jackson (2019a) about credal knowledge and the metaphysics of doxastic states. While the offered proposals share various virtues, I will argue that we ultimately should prefer Flexible Fallibilism. (shrink)