The artificial creation of life arises both strong fascination by scientists and strong concerns, if not abhorrence, by critics of science. What appears to be the crowning achievement of synthetic biology is at the same time considered a major evil. That conflict, which perhaps epitomizes many of the cultural conflicts about science in Western societies, calls for a deeper analysis. Standard ethical analyses, which would try to relate such conflicts to a difference in fundamental values, are difficult to apply here, (...) because it is unclear what the underlying values of such emotions as fascination and abhorrence are. These emotions or affects, rather than just referring to what is morally right or wrong, seem to be rooted in our cultural heritage of desires and taboos of transgression. My analysis in this paper is primarily of historical nature. By investigating ideas about the creation of life from the earliest times to the present, I aim to clarify the cultural origins of those emotions. I argue that both the fascination and the abhorrence regarding the creation of life have a common religious basis. Moreover, unlike many commentators of 19th-century mad-scientist classics, from Mary Shelley to H.G. Wells, I argue that this basis has no ancient model in religious or mythological traditions but emerged only in the 19th century from an exchange between science and religion. As long as these emotions dominate public debates, ethical deliberations about synthetic biology are likely to be neglected. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 2 Seiten: 877-892.

Since intelligent design (ID) advocates claimed the ubiquitous mouse trap as an example of systems that cannot have evolved, mouse trap history is doubly relevant to studying material culture. On the one hand, debunking ID claims about mouse traps and, by implication, also about other irreducibly complex systems has a high educational value. On the other hand, a case study of mouse trap history may contribute insights to the academic discussion about material culture evolution. Michael Behe argued that mouse traps (...) cannot trap mice with any part missing; therefore, they cannot have a precursor with one part less, therefore, cannot have a continuous history, and therefore, cannot have evolved. The patented and seminal precursor of current flat snap traps, however, had one part less, because spring and striker were formed of one wire. Secondly, historical records that reach back into the Bronze Age suggest that its history continued for a very long time. Thirdly, all prerequisites for evolution (variation, transmission, and selection) abound in mouse trap populations. Hence, Behe’s triple-jump conclusion about mouse traps is false each step. There is no, in principle, impossibility for mouse traps to evolve. An evolutionary account of mouse trap history also has academic merits beyond its educational value. Three important conclusions can be drawn: (1) reticulate phylogenies of artifact systems may be resolvable as overlapping, but branching, phylogenies of parts; (2) homologous ideas may be realized by analogous material, that is, phylogenies of information do not necessarily coincide with those of material parts; (3) recombination of parts between different artifact systems increases the cumulative nature of cultural evolution. (shrink)

La publication des Carnets de Carnap et de sa correspondance avec Neurath nous donne de nouveaux aperçus sur l’histoire de la collaboration et de l’amitié entre les deux hommes, qui fut mise à rude épreuve au cours des cinq dernières années. L’article aborde surtout les points qui n’ont reçu jusqu’à présent aucune attention, ou du moins peu d’attention : d’une part, la question de savoir quand et comment ils sont entrés en contact et, d’autre part, comment leurs relations ont évolué (...) après leur dernière rencontre, au cinquième Congrès international pour l’unité de la science, qui s’est tenu à Harvard en septembre 1939, immédiatement après le déclenchement de la seconde guerre mondiale. (shrink)

The group selection controversy largely focuses on altruism (e.g., Wilson 1983; Lloyd 2001; Shavit 2004; Okasha 2006, 173ff; Borrello 2010; Leigh 2010; Rosas 2010; Hamilton and Dimond in press). Multilevel selection theory is a resolution of this controversy. Whereas kin selection partitions inclusive fitness into direct and indirect components (via influencing the replication of copies of genes in other individuals), multilevel selection considers within-group and between-group components of fitness (Gardner et al. 2011; Lion et al. 2011). Two scenarios of multilevel (...) selection are often distinguished (Damuth and Heisler 1988; Okasha 2006; Pigliucci 2010): (1) group structure only divides individual fitnesses into within- and between-group components (MLS1); and, (2) groups get their own component of fitness and also, in most definitions, a group-level adaptation (MLS2). (shrink)

Aus psychoanalytischer Sicht wird die therapeutische Haltung in der Beziehungsarbeit mit psychotisch erlebenden Menschen beschrieben. Eine solche psychodynamische Haltung ist nicht nur in der Praxis des Psychoanalytikers hilfreich, sondern bewährt sich auch in der Akutstation einer psychiatrischen Klinik, in der sozialen Rehabilitation oder bei der Psychopharmakologie. Im ersten Teil wird die Arbeit in und an der therapeutischen Beziehung als Ausgangspunkt gewählt und die für die Autoren maßgebliche Haltung anhand der beiden Begriffe Engagement und Respekt dargestellt. Anhand einer klinischen Vignette wird (...) im zweiten Teil darauf hingewiesen, dass eine Therapie – nicht nur, aber auch mit psychotisch erlebenden Menschen – eine Gratwanderung zwischen beiden Dimensionen sein kann. Im dritten Teil schließlich werden die ersten beiden Teile von der Mitautorin, die psychose- und psychiatrieerfahren ist, kommentiert. (shrink)

In 1935, A. G. Tansley, who was knighted later, proposed the ecosystem concept. Nevertheless, this concept was not without predecessors. Why did Tansley’s ecosystem prevail and not one of its competitors? The purpose of this article is to pin the distinguishing features of Tansley’s ecosystem down, as far as the published record allows. It is an exercise in finding the difference that made a difference. Besides being a pioneering ecologist, Tansley was an adept of psychoanalysis. His interest even led him (...) to visit Sigmund Freud in Vienna for a while. Psychologists had to regard the mind as an entity in its own right, while knowing that it truly was part of a larger whole (body + mind), because the causal relation between body and mind was unknown. This lead Tansley to conclude that psychologists must not objectify the system under study, have to search for causes within their own field, and must not speculate unless this serves a scientific purpose. In 1925, Tansley defended psychoanalysis in a prolonged controversy against a concerted attack criticizing its speculative content and poor scientific standing. This could have been the reason why Tansley kept his ecosystem free of speculative content and unscientific connotation. The competing ecosystem-like concepts, however, have contained philosophical speculation, non-deterministic properties like vitalism or entelechy, or have been burdened with unscientific connotations. Hence, rigorous restraint distinguished the ecosystem concept and made it ready for use by later researchers. (shrink)

'Jeder denkt doch nur an seinen eigenen Vorteil'. Diese schwer überprüfbare Lebensweisheit ist in den letzten zwanzig Jahren von der neueren Ökonomik zu einer modelltheoretisch fundierten Ethik ausgearbeitet worden, die fordert, innerhalb geeigneter Rahmenbedingungen dem 'unbändigen Vorteilsstreben' nicht nur im Marktgeschehen, sondern auch im alltäglichen Zusammenleben freien Lauf zu lassen. Beispielhaft demontiert Hans-Joachim Niemann das Modelldenken der neuen Ökonomik und zeigt: Wer seine Modelle nicht durchschaut oder die Komplexität des sozialen Lebens unterschätzt, läuft Gefahr, das soziale Gefüge aus den (...) Angeln zu heben. Eine solche 'Ethik der Zukunft' brauchen wir nicht. Not tut stattdessen, die herkömmliche Moral als 'säkulare Moral' zu analysieren, zu formulieren und sie dadurch kritisierbar und verbesserbar zu machen. Das geeignete Instrument dazu ist die Problemlösungsethik des kritischen Rationalismus. (shrink)

Logical Positivists had a very lively interest in the revolutionary science of their time, but also in modern art and especially in ‘international style’ architecture. Surprisingly they never published a representative volume or longer statement on art and architecture. But: it is not well known that Otto Neurath, their leading organizer and spokesman, invited the eminent art historian and critic Meyer Schapiro to contribute a volume on art to the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Schapiro failed to deliver the promised (...) book. But from the extended correspondence and some material in the Schapiro papers one can describe the general direction the thing would have taken. The correspondence is also very interesting, because it also covers questions of the endangered peace and the approaching war, the academic scene in Europe and in the USA, and surprisingly: Martin Heidegger. Neurath died in 1945, but Schapiro came back to the Heidegger theme in 1968 when he wrote his famous harsh criticism of Heidegger’s programmatic long paper “Das Kunstwerk” where he interprets one of Van Gogh’s shoe-paintings. Schapiro’s short article caused much controversy then. (shrink)

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