The construction of geometrical concepts is familiar to readers of Kant’s _Critique of Pure Reason_ and _Prolegomena_ as the “shining example” [_glänzendes Beispiel_] of a priori cognition. So when Kant begins to offer constructions of concepts in physics in the _Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science_, it seems unproblematic that mathematics is being applied to matter in motion. Much of Kant’s rhetoric suggests that nothing extraordinary is going on. And yet, constructions in Kant’s philosophy of physics display such peculiarities in comparison (...) to mathematical ones that they begin to seem like unfamiliar operations, distinct from constructions in pure mathematics. (shrink)

Kant repeatedly uses the biangle as an example of an impossible figure. In this paper, I offer an account of these passages and their significance for the possibility of geometry as a science. According to Kant, the constructibility of the biangle would signal the failure of geometry. Whereas Wolff derives the no-biangle proposition from the axiom that between two points there can be only one straight line, Kant gives it axiomatic status as a synthetic a priori principle possessing immediate certainty. (...) Because we are unable to generate a schema for the biangle, the failure of the attempt to construct it is intuitively clear. The parallel between mathematical and empirical concepts is instructive because both involve the synthesis of disparate intuitions into a unity. We do not, strictly speaking, even possess a well-formed concept of the biangle, because its representation cannot fulfill certain basic requirements of concept formation. (shrink)

Two intertwined themes run through Kant’s last, unfinished work, known to us as the Opus postumum: the comprehensibility of physics as a science and of human freedom as a causal power.1 The two themes come together in Kant’s theory of self-positing. Although the Opus postumum has received substantial attention in recent decades, there has been an insufficient focus on human embodiment (self-positing) as the bridge between nature and freedom in Kant’s final period. In this paper, I contribute to remedying this (...) defect by showing the centrality of embodiment for Kant’s motivating project of a transition from the metaphysics of natural science to the actual science of physics. Many times in the disordered manuscripts, Kant characterizes this transition in terms of a schematism conceived of as parallel to—or as an extension of—the first Critique schematism. I argue here that Kant’s theory of self-positing places human embodiment in the role of serving as this schematism and making the needed transition. (shrink)

The document Justice in the World, released in 1971 by the World Synod of Bishops, is an excellent basis for thinking about pedagogical practice in Ignatian higher education as a constellation of acts of justice. I describe here my personal experience (as an ambiguously Catholic faculty member) of teaching an upper division ethics course in the core curriculum and contextualize it in terms both of Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises and the 1971 Synod document.

St. Thomas’s Third Way to prove the existence of God, “Of Possibility and Necessity” (ST 1, q.2, art. 3, response) is one of the most controverted passages in the entire Thomistic corpus. The central point of dispute is that if there were only possible beings, each at some time would cease to exist and, therefore, at some point in time nothing would exist, and because something cannot come from nothing, in such an eventuality, nothing would exist now—a reductio ad absurdum (...) conclusion. Therefore, at least one necessary being must exist. Generations of critics and defenders have contended over St. Thomas’s proof. This article argues that the principle of pros hen analogy is implicit in the Third Way and that once identified explains the ontological dependency of possible beings, as secondary analogates, on the first necessary being, as primary analogate. Thus, without the necessary being as primary analogate, possible beings simply could not exist. The fact that they do exist is evidence for the existence of the necessary being. St. Thomas makes synthesizes the principle of pros hen analogy, as found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, with the Neoplatonic principle of participation. Aristotle develops pros hen analogy in contradistinction to univocal and equivocal predication as well as to genus in Metaphysics 4.2, 11.3, 12.3-5. Since Scotus and re-enforced by modern analytic logic, philosophers have almost universally regarded any kind of analogical predication as a sub-category of equivocal predication and, thus, implicitly occlude the possibility of considering pros hen analogy in their readings of the Third Way. Distinction of per se and per accidens infinite regress and of radical and natural contingency are also central to understanding the Third Way. While resolving apparent problems in the Third Way, the article also seeks to rehabilitate the doctrine of pros hen analogy as a basic principle in Thomistic and, indeed, Aristotelian metaphysics. (shrink)

Only through a long series of accidents do we have “The Works of Aristotle” at all—the Corpus Aristotelicum. When Aristotle died in 322 B.C., he is said to have left behind a body of 156 “published” works (“exoteric,” namely, available for public consumption). They survive only in fragments, too short and too few to give much sense of them. That his esoteric works, the Corpus Aristotelicum, have survived at all has been called “miraculous.” This paper traces how those esoteric works (...) of Aristotle were transmitted over the next eighteen hundred years. My claim is that this transmission depended upon communities that kept these works of Aristotle “in print.” Further, those communities can often only be inferred, like the description of the substantial object from what is known only by its shadow. The paper concludes with reflections on the tenuous existence of historic texts and how the digital age may further threaten transmission of knowledge from the past to communities in the future. I propose that the transmission history of Aristotle’s texts may provide signposts that guide us both in handing down knowledge to future generations as well as in finding models for promoting knowledge and for establishing communities of diversity. (shrink)

Thoreau’s Walden is often disregarded as a philosophical work in academic circles because of its literary form and paucity of formal argumentation. I demonstrate that Walden is a philosophical work by relating its method to Kant’s in the Critique of Pure Reason, and I show that Walden’s literary genre—autobiography as critique—is a function of the work’s philosophical intent: to produce a philosophical instrument of lifeworldly experience. I ascribe to Thoreau a modified Kantian transcendental method by which he investigates the conditions (...) of the possibility of life as such, making the transition from Kant’s “experience”(Erfahrung) as the spatiotemporal and causal ground of the sciences to Dilthey’s “experience”(Erlebnis) as including the category of life and autobiographical and historical consciousness. I highlight a number of passages where this philosophical substance of Walden becomes clear, and I appeal to …. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline Kant’s philosophy of culture in relation to teleological judgments, chiefly as exposited in the Critique of Judgment, and I show what roles teleological judgment in general and culture in particular play in Kant’s philosophy of moral action. I begin with Kant’s view of nature as organic, i. e., as possessing a systematic purposive unity even with regard to apparently contingent particulars. Nature is organic in at least two senses for Kant. First, it contains organisms, living (...) beings whose parts (organs) stand in a purposive relation to the whole being and its survival. Second, and by extension, Kant holds that nature as a whole may be viewed as having an organic unity, such that the various species of life (and even the arrangements of inorganic matter) are regarded as standing in systematic relations of purposiveness with one another. I argue here that interpreting nature organically is instrumental for the work that judgment performs, according to Kant, in applying the moral law to lived experience through culture. (shrink)

The sublime (das Erhabene) in Kant is a feeling that elevates (erhebt)! the soul and results in an aesthetic judgment. While aesthetic judgments of beauty involve a feeling of pure pleasure (Lust), aesthetic judgments of the sublime rest on a feeling of pleasure and displeasure (Lust und Unlust) at the same moment. Kant describes the sublime at one point rather paradoxically as involving a" negative pleasure"(Critique 0/Judgment, Ak. V: 245). 2 The feeling of the sublime is brought about by experiences (...) where one has a sense of the infinity (Unendlichkeit) of nature. This sense of infinity can be brought about by the sheer size (Grofle) of an object. Kant would call this a feeling of the mathematically sublime. A mountain so large that one cannot take it in at a single glance causes a feeling of the mathematically sublime. One gets a different sense of the infinity of 'Kant's deliberate connection of the noun for the sublime. (shrink)

Contributors consider the limits of our knowledge of a world of unlimited knowability by examining philosophical thought from the Classical Greeks to the present.

Since Kant, modern philosophy has reacted critically and most often dismissively to any theories or inquiries deemed "metaphysical." The Critique of Pure Reason shows that although human beings naturally seek knowledge of things that are beyond the limits of all possible experience (i.e., metaphysical knowledge), the categories by means of which we are capable of knowledge are all restricted in their legitimate application to objects of possible experience. Thus, Kant rules out any human capacity for metaphysical knowledge on epistemological grounds—grounds (...) having to do with the way knowledge-claims are legitimated. It is, therefore, surprising to find Sartre raising at least two questions in the Conclusion of Being and Nothingness that he himself labels metaphysical but nevertheless legitimate. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Path of No Path: Contemporary Studies in Pure Land Buddhism Honoring Roger CorlessJeff WilsonPath of No Path: Contemporary Studies in Pure Land Buddhism Honoring Roger Corless. Edited by Richard K. Payne. Berkeley, CA: Institute of Buddhist Studies and Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 2009. 290 pp.Roger Corless (1938–2007)—Catholic devotee, Tibetan Buddhist meditator, Pure Land interpreter, and renowned professor of religious studies—was a frequent contributor to the (...) dialogue between Christians and Buddhists in the West, including through the auspices of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies. Although he passed away in 2007, his spirit continues to enrich this historic encounter, including through several major posthumous works. Path of No Path is the first of three such works planned for release by the Institute of Buddhist Studies, a seminary and graduate studies institution associated with Jōdo Shinshū, the largest form of Pure Land Buddhism in Japan. Originally intended as a festschrift, the book unfortunately had to become a memorial volume. In addition to some laudatory material reflecting on Corless’s life, it contains articles by ten scholars focusing on the Pure Land tradition of Buddhism, broken into three categories of practice, transmission, and interpretation. Many contributors, such as Ruben Habito and Al Bloom, will be familiar to readers of Buddhist-Christian Studies.Edited anthologies are always a mixed bag, but happily Path of No Path holds together well and offers many interesting essays for scholars interested in this field, although at times the connection to Corless’s own work seems a bit forced. Alternately, we might view those essays with relatively tenuous connections to Corless’s work as representing the sort of playfulness that Corless famously displayed in his writings and speaking appearances. A good example of this is the first essay, by Harvey [End Page 225] Aronson, on Vajrasattva meditation. Vajrasattva, a major figure in Vajrayāna Buddhism, is not traditionally associated with the Pure Land tradition. Yet Aronson begins by putting a Jōdo Shinshū framework around his subsequent article, which deals with meditative visualizations as healing techniques. Like Corless frequently did, Aronson looks for connections between seemingly disparate cultures and religions. In the process, he offers some insightful comments on how Asian and Western practitioners approach healing within a Buddhist context. For example, he finds that the Westerners are far more heavily psychological in their orientation, and tend to react negatively to situations of obligation and responsibility to others that are comfortable to Asian participants.The second essay’s relationship to Corless is much more organic, as it deals with Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, a subject that he published important works on. This essay, by Charles Orzech, analyzes the Rites for Contemplation of and Offerings to Amitāyus Tathāgata (Wuliangshou rulai guanxing gongyang yigui), an esoteric text based in part on the famous Scripture on Contemplation of the Buddha of Limitless Life (Fo shuo guan wuliangshoufo ling). Orzech skillfully demonstrates how the Rites reframed the Scripture on Contemplation in a tantric context, contributing to the ongoing esotericization of Chinese Buddhism in the Tang period (618–907).James Sanford’s contribution also relates to both tantric and Pure Land forms of Buddhism. Sanford offers a translation of and commentary on the Guide to the Eighty Thousand Dharma Principles (Hōri hachiman chō). This is a short apocryphal text purporting to reveal secret teachings passed on from Jōdo Shinshū founder Shinran (1173–1263) to his grandson Nyoshin. These secret Jōdo Shinshū lineages are an important historical phenomenon that have not been given nearly enough attention, in part because they are actively disapproved of by the orthodox, nonesoteric schools of Jōdo Shinshū (and indeed orthodox Shinshū has at times persecuted these minority traditions). Sanford’s introduction, translation, and commentary therefore provide a major service to scholars of Japanese religion.Gordon Bermant’s entry is short but nonetheless contains some pithy observations on the role of “practice” in American Jōdo Shinshū, a subject that Corless himself wrote about numerous times. Traditionally Jōdo Shinshū is often understood not to include any sort of formal practice—religious practices, in fact, are seen as evidence of egoism or lack... (shrink)

Human nature and cooperation -- Tucson knows all about that -- Featuring interviews with Curtis A., Renø M., and Alanna C. -- Democracy and Sproul Plaza -- The people's library -- Featuring interviews with Zachary L. and Jaime T. -- Barcelona to Greensboro -- Student loan debt -- Featuring an interview with professor George Caffentzis -- Solidarity.

Clinical and neuroscientific studies of Buddhist meditation practices are frequent topics in the news media, and have helped certain practices achieve mainstream cultural status. Buddhists have reacted by using these studies in a number of ways. Some deploy the studies to show the compatibility of science and Buddhism, often using the authority of science to lend credence to Buddhism. Other Buddhists use meditation studies to demonstrate the superiority of Buddhism over science. Within inter-Buddhist debates, meditation studies are used to argue (...) for changes in practice or belief, but also sometimes to reinforce certain traditional practices. Benjamin Zeller's threefold categorization of religious groups’ attitudes toward science and José Ignacio Cabezón's three ideal types of relationships between Buddhism and science contribute to analysis of Buddhist uses of scientific studies of meditation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Rhetorical Sense of Philosophy by Donald Phillip VereneJeffrey Dirk WilsonVERENE, Donald Phillip. The Rhetorical Sense of Philosophy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2021. xiii + 139 pp. Cloth, $49.95Rhetoric gives philosophy the ability to speak. Philosophy gives rhetoric something to say. They are mutually indispensable, and their rivalry at times descends into enmity. There are also occasions when only the one can rescue the other from catastrophe. (...) Those are the overarching dynamics of Verene's book.There is an introduction, then two parts, "Prolegomena Philosophiae," comprising four chapters, and "Three Rhetorics," comprising three chapters, followed by an epilogue, notes, and an index.Though Verene does not mention Hume in the introduction—and only twice in the book otherwise—it is difficult not to think of him when Verene speaks of philosophy as "a theater of memory," as if correcting Hume's "theater of the mind." It is also corrective to presentism, often attributed to Hume, when Verene claims that a chief task of the philosopher "is to keep us from always living in the present. For this labor to be accomplished the philosopher must go to school with both the poets and the orators." Rhetoric, rightly understood, helps philosophy to remain philosophy and prevents it from becoming sophistry.In chapter 1, "Philosophical Thinking," Verene reminds the reader that mortality is not a choice. The bounded nature of human life leads to the pursuit of happiness and, therefore, also to the pursuit of meaning. The human responds in two ways, by creating both arguments and stories, but arguments as well as stories need words.The "and yet" comes in the second chapter, "Philosophy and the Muses." Verene writes, "The philosopher knows that the real always outstrips language." Philosophy and its kin, poetry, point beyond themselves. Writing is remembering, but what is written, even at its best, can never capture all that is remembered, and memory, even at its best, can never capture all that is.In "Philosophy and Eloquence," Verene maps a way of escaping Kant. Modern philosophy rejects rhetoric and memory in its pursuit of novelty as progress. Verene introduces the concept of ingenium, "a power philosophy shares with rhetoric." It "is the ability to perceive similarity in dissimilars.... the power to produce metaphor" and irony. Metaphor and irony are philosophy's response to the stale univocal predication of critical thinking that Verene sees as the reduction of reality to an analytic concept.In "Philosophical Style," he shows that as soon as a subject is joined to a predicate, the subject ceases to be only what it was. The predicate is an [End Page 369] otherness that is pulled into the subject such that ever after the subject has an inner dialectic. "The ball is red" is generative of a ball that is not merely a ball but also something else, something foreign to its ballness. The ball gives up nothing of what it was but, rather, gains something that it was not, and yet not in the deterministic way of necessity. The ball does not have to be red, but if it is red, then "ball" and "red" constitute an inner dialectic. The ball is red predicatively and not tautologically, but separating out the kinds of predication does not exhaust all the mystery of the inner dialectic; nothing can.The three rhetorics are of "Self-Discourse," "Absolute Thought," and "The Philosophical Frontispiece." These are chapters respectively about speech appertaining to man, God, and the political entity, though each considered slant rather than head-on.Verene juxtaposes Descartes and Vico with respect to self-discourse. Descartes reframes the human being in terms of the first-person singular pronoun, thereby transforming the personal into the categorical. Vico responds by writing not an "autobiography" but, rather, The Life of Giambattista Vico Written by Himself, thereby transforming the pronoun for the other, "he," into the self-identifier. There follows an essay on the essay and especially on the essays of Montaigne as autobiography. "To think," Verene writes, "is to move ideas in relation to each other and thus to illuminate what comes before the mind in experience." What emerges is a dialectic between the "I" and... (shrink)

Kant insists in the Rechtslehre that the right of possession is intelligible and abstracts from all sensible conditions but often maintains in his earlier drafts that empirical possession serves as the schema of intelligible possession. This paper addresses the questions, Why does Kant think in the early drafts that the right of possession requires a schematism? What work is this schematism meant to do? How does it operate in detail? What similarities between the schematism of possession and the first Critique (...) schematism justify calling them by the same name? The investigation reveals that, without the schematism of possession, no objects of choice would be available to be possessed. At the same time, the schematism must not be confused with the concept of intelligible possession. In the Rechtslehre itself, Kant retreats from a schematism of possession to a construction of right on analogy with the reciprocal relation of physical forces, and I speculate about the reasons for this change. (shrink)

Aristotle asserts that philosophy, which begins in wonder, seeks principles and causes in the world, just as mythology does, but each in a different way. This article argues that Homer analyzes the world according to Vico’s imaginative genera; early Greek philosophy according to natural genera, and philosophers in the strict sense according to rational genera. Thus, Homer’s rainbow is the goddess Iris, which Xenophanes divides into natural object and divinity, and which Aristotle calls principles or causes. In the transition from (...) imaginative to natural genus, wonder is lost because the enchanted world of mythology has become explicable in terms of the five senses. Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophical approach seeks to restore wonder without remythologizing the world. Homer’s Oceanus myth is examined, in relation to the testimony of Thales and the fragments of Xenophanes, and as reflected explicitly and implicitly in the works of Plato and Aristotle. (shrink)