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Jay Zameska [3]Jay A. Zameska [2]
  1.  34
    An Uncertainty Argument for the Identified Victim Bias.Jay A. Zameska - 2022 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 39 (3):504-518.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  2.  33
    The Sufficientarian Alternative: A Commentary on Setting Health-Care Priorities.Jay Zameska - 2020 - Diametros 18 (68):46-59.
    In this commentary on Torbjörn Tännsjö’s Setting Health-Care Priorities, I argue that sufficientarianism provides a valuable perspective in considering how to set health care priorities. I claim that pace Tännsjö, sufficientarianism does offer a distinct alternative to prioritarianism. To demonstrate this, I introduce sufficientarianism and distinguish two forms: Tännsjö’s “weak sufficientarianism” and an alternative strong form of sufficientarianism that I call “revised lexical sufficientarianism.” I raise a problem for Tännsjö’s sufficientarianism, and advocate for the revised view on this basis. I (...)
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  3.  43
    Luck Egalitarianism and COVID-19: The Case for Compensating Children for School Closures.Jay Zameska - 2023 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 42 (1):65-81.
    The Covid-19 pandemic resulted in school closures around the world, leaving lasting negative impacts on many children. Given that such closures are justified public health measures, this raises the question of compensating children for school closures. In this article I address the question of compensation from the perspective of a popular theory of justice: luck egalitarianism. In doing so, I examine a problem with applying luck egalitarianism to children, called the agency assumption. I then argue this assumption results in a (...)
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  4.  28
    ‘Take the Pill, It Is Only Fair’! Contributory Fairness as an Answer to Rose’s Prevention Paradox.Jay A. Zameska - 2021 - Public Health Ethics 14 (3):221-232.
    One proposal to significantly reduce cardiovascular disease is the idea of administering a ‘polypill’—a combination of drugs that reduce the risk of heart disease and carry few side effects—to everyone over the age of 55. Despite their promise, population strategies like the polypill have not been well-accepted. In this article, I defend the polypill by appealing to fairness. The argument focuses on the need to fairly distribute the costs to individuals. While the fact that population strategies like the polypill impose (...)
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  5.  15
    Why we should not “help bad choosers:” screening, nudging, and epistemic risk.Jay Zameska - 2024 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 27 (3):419-429.
    One prominent line of support for nudging in screening programs is the claim that nudging can help ‘bad choosers’ — that is, it can help some patients make choices more in line with their own values and preferences. In this article, I argue that due to the presence of epistemic risk in many screening programs, the argument that nudging can help ‘bad choosers’ should be revised or rejected. Expanding on the work of Biddle, J. B. 2020. Epistemic risks in cancer (...)
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