Recent discussions on corporate citizenship highlight the new political role of corporations in society by arguing that corporations increasingly act as quasi-governmental actors and take on what hitherto had originally been governmental tasks. By examining political and sociological citizenship theories, the authors show that such a corporate engagement can be explained by a changing conception of corporate citizens from corporate bourgeois to corporate citoyen. As an intermediate actor in society, the corporate citoyen assumes co-responsibilities for social and civic affairs and (...) actively collaborates with fellow citizens beyond governmental regulation. This change raises the question of how such corporate civic engagement can be aligned with public policy regulations and how corporate activities can be integrated into the democratic regime. To clarify the mode of CC contributions to society, the authors will apply the tenet of subsidiarity as a governing principle which allows for specifying corporations’ tasks as intermediate actors in society. By referring to the renewed European Union strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility, the authors show how such a subsidiary corporate-governmental task-sharing can be organized. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to identify the manifestations of speciesism in the history of research into theory of mind in non-human animals and, more importantly, to identify the cognitive biases that contribute to the adoption of incautious and, as we will see in later chapters, often misinterpretations of empirical research. The influence of speciesism is also visible in broadly understood animal studies. The manifestations of species-related chauvinism are present, inter alia, in in considerations on the theory of mind. (...) An analysis of the already classic articles by Premarck and Woodruff (1978) and Calla and Tomasello (2011) reveals an attempt to maintain faith in human uniqueness. Maintaining this belief sometimes involves constructing careless interpretations. (shrink)

Robots as social companions in close proximity to humans have a strong potential of becoming more and more prevalent in the coming years, especially in the realms of elder day care, child rearing, and education. As human beings, we have the fascinating ability to emotionally bond with various counterparts, not exclusively with other human beings, but also with animals, plants, and sometimes even objects. Therefore, we need to answer the fundamental ethical questions that concern human-robot-interactions per se, and we need (...) to address how we conceive of »good lives«, as more and more of the aspects of our daily lives will be interwoven with social robots. (shrink)

This volume of essays studies the problem of transition in economics from a historical perspective. It uses historical ideas and theories in a modern context to examine economic thought. It aims to show that social and historical context are important when considering economic transitions.

cz. 2. Demokryt, Sokrates, Platon, Arystoteles.

Fidelity as a moral value which may qualify persons or determinate modes of behaviour is discussed. Some examples of fidelity are given to show that fidelity may have various forms depending on whom or what it concerns and how deeply one is engaged. Fidelity is determined as a personal value consisting in a persistent approval of some chosen ensembles of values, in connection with the willingness to serve them in the way required by them in various situations. If fidelity is (...) one of moral values there are applicable to it all the statements concerning moral values in general. The difference between fidelity and other moral values lies in the qualitative specificity which may be grasped intuitively. The realization of fidelity must be accomplished consciously and the corresponding acts must spring from the centre of our „ego”. The fidelity to the ensembles of values preferred to others should not violate the objective hierarchy of values, i.e., it should appear within orderly relations to the whole system of values. (shrink)

For a long time the representatives of the social sciences had been passionately interested in whether certain identities in the moral aspect of different cultures, which are so numerous and different, can be found.

Since their arrival in Europe in the Middle Ages the Gypsies have suffered from discrimination on the grounds of racial prejudice. In the 20th century the NAZI doctrine lead to Porrajmos - the Gypsy Holocaust. In the post-war communist countries, Gypsies were forced to give up their traditional ways of life and become productive. Persecution of Gypsies - those who stayed in the post-communist countries and those who migrated to the West - continued in Europe after the big changes of (...) 1989 and up to the present time. (shrink)

This article suggests that the best available normative framework for guiding conduct in war rests on categories that do not echo the terms of an individual rights-based morality, but acknowledge the impossibility of rendering warfare fully morally justified. Avoiding the undue moralization of conduct in war is an imperative for a normative framework that strives to actually give behavioral guidance to combatants, most of whom will inevitably be ignorant of the moral status of the individuals they encounter on the battlefield (...) and will often be uncertain or mistaken about the justice of their own cause. We identify the requirement of military necessity, applied on the basis of what we refer to as the “St. Petersburg assumption”, as the main principle according to which a combatant should act, regardless of which side or in which battlefield encounter she finds herself. This pragmatic normative framework enjoys moral traction for three reasons: first, in the circumstances of war it protects human life to a certain extent; second, it makes no false claims about the moral justification of individual conduct in combat operations; and, third, it fulfills morally important functions of law. However, the criterion of military necessity interpreted on the basis of the St. Petersburg assumption does not directly replicate fundamental moral prescriptions about the preservation of individual rights. (shrink)