The paper discusses the impact of the thought of Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911) on several Polish emigré writers, including Józef Czapski and Gustaw Herling-Grudziński, but first of all Czesław Miłosz (1911–2004) and Aleksander Wat (1900–1967). Miłosz’ approach oscillated between early fascination through an unjust rejection during the war, due to the “appropriation” of Brzozowski’s thought by the right wing publicists, to the new phase of fascination after the war, culminating in the publication of a book on Brzozowski ( A Man Among (...) Scorpions , 1962) and prolonged in several important articles till the very end of his life. Wat’s approach shifted from the communist practice of “overcoming” Brzozowski through the affirmation of his criticism and rejection of catholic obscurantism to the process of the internalization of the catholic faith. (shrink)

(1999). Freud's Metapsychology and the Culture of Philosophy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 29, Supplementary Volume 25: Civilization and Oppression, pp. 211-226.

Where does domestic policy leave off and foreign policy begin? I point out that many domestic policies have major repercussions forother countries, some of them of a kind that are conducive to violence if not outright warfare. My examples are the drug laws, which create huge incentives for foreign criminals as well as domestic ones; concerns about “global warming” which are likely to impoverish many poor countries or prevent them from advancing; and the penchant for extensive government intervention in the (...) economy, which affects both directly and indirectly the progress of other countries. (shrink)

This is the age of the welfare state. The general assumption is that something is amiss if governments do not provide benefits to its people. Since these benefits are funded by coercive taxation, this implies that those who are taxed are morally required to pay for benefits for others. This paper argues that this assumption is mistaken. Like the founders of the American republic, I argue that government should protect individual liberty, not provide benefits to the needy.

This paper presents the life and work of Alfred Tarski, one of the most distinguished and influential logicians in the entire history.

This volume provides a critical roadmap through the major historical sources of legal semiotics as we know them today. The history of legal semiotics, now at least a century old, has never been written (a non-event itself pregnant with semiotic possibility). As a consequence, its sources are seldom clearly exposed and, as word, object and meaning change, are sometimes lost. They reach from an English translation of the 1916 inaugural lecture of the first Chair in Legal Significs at the Amsterdam (...) University, via mid 20th century studies on "property" or "contract," to equally fascinating essays on contemporary semiotic problems produced by former students of the Roberta Kevelson Semiotics Roundtable Seminar at Penn State University 2012 and 2013. Together, the materials in this book weave the fabric of semiotics and significs, two names for the unfolding of semiotics in law and legal discourse at least until the second half of the 20th century, and both of which covered a lawyer's focus on sign and meaning in law. The latter is embedded within the cultural imperatives of the civilization that gave these terms meaning and made them an effective tool for the dissection of law, its reconstitution as an instrument to be used by the lawyer to advance the interests of her clients, and for judges as a means to restructure language as a narrative of law whose power could bend behavior to its strictures. Legal semiotics has become an indispensible part of the elite lawyer's toolkit and a fundamental approach to analysis of legal texts. Two previous volumes published in 2011 and 2012 explored the conceptual, methodological and epistemological progress in the field of legal semiotics, the modern forms of semiotics study, and the mechanics of meaning making processes by lawyers. Yet the great lessons of semiotics requires a focus on the origins of the concepts and frameworks that would become contemporary legal semiotics, its origins as an object of the consciousness of meaning making-one whose roots, as lessons for the oracular conversations of law, are expanded in this volume. (shrink)

Una concepción tradicional de la argumentación jurídica considera que se debe resolver casos jurídicos a través de subsunción y deducción. Hugo Zuleta disputa esta posición, rechazando así la "concepción puente" de las normas, la que fue defendida en particular por Carlos Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin. Según la "concepción puente" la norma condicional incluye una modalidad deóntica solo en su consecuencia, mientras su antecedente consiste en un enunciado descriptivo. En cambio, Zuleta propone la "concepción insular", que pone la modalidad deóntica adelante (...) del condicional ). Discutiré estas concepciones, evaluando su adecuación en distintos ámbitos de aplicación. En particular, defenderé la tesis de que la crítica a la "concepción puente" tiene razón en cuanto se trata de conflictos normativos. Así, la "concepción insular" puede tener una aplicación importante en la teoría de los principios, que trata justamente del análisis de normas en conflicto. The traditional conception of legal argumentation is that legal cases are resolved by means of subsumption and deduction. Hugo Zuleta disputes this position, rejecting the "bridge conception" of norms, which was defended in particular by Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin. According to the "bridge conception", the conditional norm includes a deontic modality only in its consequence, whilst the antecedent consists of a descriptive sentence. By contrast, Zuleta defends the "isle conception", which puts the deontic modality in front of the conditional ). I will discuss these conceptions, assessing their adequacy in distinct fields of application. In particular, I will defend the thesis that the critique of the "bridge conception" is correct in the case of norm conflicts. Thus, the "isle conception" can have an important application in the theory of principles and the analysis of norm conflicts. (shrink)

Several remarks on the book by Professor Andrzej Kisielewicz, Logic and Argumentation. Practical Course in Critical ThinkingProfessor Andrzej Kisielewicz’s book concerns active forms and methods of teaching logic, also outside the context of university education. It possesses prac­tical value and may also be an auxiliary material for, among others, high school students. Despite some shortcomings, such as unjustified ascription of the status of hypothesis to statements, a flawed definition of the methodological and epistemological concept of a historical fact, it contains (...) many valuable and original logical propositions pertaining to critical and logical thinking.Undoubtedly, the book will be useful in education and helpful in introducing teachers and learners to using grammatical and logical rules. It will allow the reader to detect post-truth in the media or the shuffling of premises in argumentation. After implementing indispensable corrections and additions, it should become an obligatory reading — not only in the context of university education. (shrink)

According to Robert Alexy’s dual‐nature thesis, “law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical one.” I will suggest, first, that various dualisms need to be distinguished, in particular the empirical and the normative, the real and the ideal, the formal (procedural) and the substantive; second, that the dualism of the empirical and the normative and, within the latter, of the real and the ideal “ought,” is not specific to law but pertains to any normative (...) system; and, third, that a dualism that distinguishes law from morality is a dualism of formal and substantive principles, which also serves to explain the authoritative character of law. (shrink)

This article is about a new definition of health and how this relates to transition processes. It focuses on the practical translation of the new concepts into challenges for mental health nurses. To that aim the Engagement Model is examined and operationalized. We did so as nurse researcher and lecturer involved in training nurse practitioners.

Although affect and emotion are often discussed in institutional and organizational research, they are rarely studied systematically and in accordance with their overall relevance. To investigate the decisive but subtle, sometimes barely noticeable or taken-for-granted power of institutions, we need to achieve a better understanding of the close intertwining of institutional rules, operations, and spaces with complex affective dynamics. In this article, we therefore develop an analytical framework that allows to investigate the countless affective dynamics that characterize institutions. First, this (...) framework can help to come to terms with the multidimensionality of institutional affect and thus inform empirical studies of institutions. Second, our approach allows scholars and researchers to make visible those developments and modes of agency that run counter to the official functions and self-understandings of institutions. As a an initial step, we propose a conceptual clarification of „institution“ and „organization“ that incorporates various references to social theory which already foreshadow some dynamics of institutional affect. Further detailing this perspective, we develop an analytical grid that focuses, first, on what we call the „guiding affects“ of institutions and, second, on the internal affective dynamics of institutions. The proposed framework provides a variety of links to discussions of institutions in cultural studies and the social sciences. (shrink)

Two problems are discussed: Can and should psychological concepts be defined, and can and should they be organized in an axiomatic system? I point out that definitions in terms of physiological or behavioral measures are strictly impossible because any particular measure can mean anything, whereas phenomenological definitions always point to antecedents and consequents. I then point out that definitions of antecedents and consequents can be given either in terms of causes or in terms of reasons, and that causes and reasons (...) belong to two incompatible languages. Causes exist independently of persons and reasons exist only for persons. Only the latter belong to psychology, as I see it. The working of the system of psycho-logic is illustrated by an analysis of the conditions of trust. I conclude that psychological terms should be defined by means of semantic primitives, and that one should try to organize them in an axiomatic system. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Can the law benefit from an evolutionary perspective? This little book shows how the idea of survival of the fittest can help explain legal development and the rise and fall of legal institutions. The reader is invited to join in on a journey of discovery in which the world of Darwin is connected to the topics of legal change, convergence of law, legal complexity, law in hip-hop music and the adoption of the price-payment rule. Exploring these five themes from an (...) evolutionary angle indisputably upsets our traditional view of the law, but it does fit the author's view of academia as a place for cross-disciplinary research steered by curiosity. (shrink)