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  1. Varieties of Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On & James Sias - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):699-713.
    After offering a characterization of what unites versions of ‘expressivism’, we highlight a number of dimensions along which expressivist views should be distinguished. We then separate four theses often associated with expressivism – a positive expressivist thesis, a positive constitutivist thesis, a negative ontological thesis, and a negative semantic thesis – and describe how traditional expressivists have attempted to incorporate them. We argue that expressivism in its traditional form may be fatally flawed, but that expressivists nonetheless have the resources for (...)
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  2. (How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism a Hybrid View?Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman & James Sias - 2014 - In Guy Fletcher & Michael Ridge, Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 223-247.
    According to ethical neo-expressivism, all declarative sentences, including those used to make ethical claims, have propositions as their semantic contents, and acts of making an ethical claim are properly said to express mental states, which (if motivational internalism is correct) are intimately connected to motivation. This raises two important questions: (i) The traditional reason for denying that ethical sentences express propositions is that these were thought to determine ways the world could be, so unless we provide an analysis of ethical (...)
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    The Self as a Reason to Regulate.James Sias - 2019 - Philosophical Topics 47 (2):129-148.
    Notably absent from much of the psychological literature on emotion regulation are attempts to answer explicitly normative questions about the phenomenon. It is one thing to explain how emotional states are regulated. It is another thing to say something about what reasons there are to regulate our emotions, whether and why we might sometimes be obligated to regulate our emotions, and how we regulate our emotions well, or optimally. This paper is an attempt at the latter task, focused specifically on (...)
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  4.  67
    Ethical Intuitionism and the Emotions: Toward an Empirically Adequate Moral Sense Theory.James Sias - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3):533-549.
    IntroductionEthical intuitionists have never known quite what to make of the emotions. Generally speaking, these philosophers fall into two camps: rational intuitionists and moral sense theorists. And by my lights, neither camp has been able to tell a convincing story about the exact role and significance of emotion in moral judgment. Rational intuitionists are for the most part too dismissive of the emotions, either regarding emotions as little more than distractions to moral judgment,Samuel Clarke, for instance, after naming our “faculties (...)
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  5. Ethical Expressivism.James Sias - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Ethical Expressivism Broadly speaking, the term “expressivism” refers to a family of views in the philosophy of language according to which the meanings of claims in a particular area of discourse are to be understood in terms of whatever non-cognitive mental states those claims are supposed to express. More specifically, an expressivist theory of claims […].
     
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  6.  31
    Naturalism and Moral Realism.James Sias - unknown
    My aim is to challenge recent attempts at reconciling moral realism and naturalism by pushing ethical naturalists into a dilemma. According to one horn of the dilemma, ethical naturalists must either build unique facts and properties about divergent social structures into their subvenient sets of natural facts and properties, and so jeopardize the objectivity of moral truths, or insist, in the face of all possible worlds in which people have different moral beliefs than ours, that they are all mistaken—this despite (...)
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    Being Good and Feeling Well.James Sias - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (4):785-804.
    This paper attempts to clarify the relation between moral virtue and the emotions, but with an ulterior motive: I want an account of this relation that is not only plausible on its own, but also, one that helps to explain when, and how, our emotions might contribute to the justification of moral beliefs formed on their basis.
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    Rethinking the Thin-Thick Distinction among Theories of Evil.James Sias - 2019 - Arendt Studies 3:173-194.
    According to a standard interpretation of Hannah Arendt’s remarks about evil, she had a psychologically thin conception of evil action. This paper has two aims. First, I argue that the distinction between psychological thinness and thickness is poorly conceived, at least as it commonly applies to theories of evil action. And second, I argue that, according to a better conception of the thin-thick distinction, Arendt is being misinterpreted.
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