James D Marshall; Wittgenstein on Rules: implications for authority and discipline in education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May.

James D Marshall; John Wilson on the Necessity of Punishment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 97–104, https://doi.org.

Geography and Ethics examines the place of geography in ethics and of ethics in geography by drawing together specially commissioned contributors from distinguished scholars from around the world.

In this paper I wish to comment upon the use of polemical argument in philosophy of education and education. Like Foucault, I believe that a whole morality is at stake because polemical argument obfuscates the search for truth at the expense of truth and the other’s veracity, integrity and dignity. The use of polemics is illustrated by two arguments. The first general argument is taken from an attack upon Albert Camus by the British writer Colin Wilson. The second more particular (...) example is taken from attacks in New Zealand by the State Department of Education upon the educational ideas of the novelist and educator Sylvia Ashton-Warner. Finally I discuss how polemics might be countered in education. (shrink)

(2000). The Boundaries of Belief: territories of encounter between indigenous peoples and Western philosophies. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 15-24.

James D Marshall, Michael Peters, Miles Shepheard; Brent's Transcendental Arguments for the Forms of Knowledge, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, I.

Lyotard talks of performativity or the subsumption of education to the efficient functioning of the social system. Education is no longer to be concerned with the pursuit of ideals such as that of personal autonomy or emancipation, but with the means, techniques or skills that contribute to the efficient operation of the state in the world market and contribute to maintaining the internal cohesion and legitimation of the state. But this requires individuals of a certain kind -- not Kantian autonomous (...) persons but Foucault's normalized and governable individuals. In constituting such individuals discourse is critically important. But how discourse effects this through the force of language is not fully developed by Foucault. This paper draws upon the performative account of language offered by John Austin to develop more fully comments made by Foucault on the force or effects of language in constituting normalized and governable individuals for the march of performativity. (shrink)

(1997). Michel Foucault: Problematising the individual and constituting ‘the’ self. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 32-49. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.1997.tb00526.x.

ABSTRACT Heidegger’s remarks about language in Being and Time do not constitute a comprehensive theory of language. Hubert Dreyfus, William Blattner and Mark Wrathall each propose a derivativist reading of these remarks. Derivativism is the theory that language is derivative of a pre-linguistically articulated experience of the world – but derivativism is not quite right. It does not account adequately for the relationship between the disclosedness of being-in-the-world and what Heidegger calls discourse [Rede]. I claim that although language has its (...) ontological foundation in the constitution of disclosedness, this does not mean that language is prefigured by a way of being-in-the-world that is existentially prelinguistic. Finally, I develop Wrathall’s claims about disclosedness into a more palatable account of the relationship between discourse and language, which I test against Heidegger’s claims about the relationship between discourse and language in Being and Time. (shrink)

In Victor Hugo’s novel, Notre-Dame de Paris, 1482, the priest says that, alas, ‘this will destroy that’, meaning that the book upon which his hand was placed would destroy the building opposite. He is looking out of a window at the immense Cathedral of Notre-Dame (Hugo, 1967, p. 197). If the cathedral is a library to be read by the religious, and if the church is the symbol of authority and the repository of medieval knowledge, then the priest means not (...) only that the book, printing and new literacy would undermine the church’s authority, but that human thought will undermine the church’s expression of its authority (Bolter, 1991). The priest continues: the principal idea of each generation would no longer write itself with the same material and in the same way, that the book of stone, so solid and durable, would give place to the book made of paper, yet made more solid and durable. (Hugo, 1967, p. 199; Bolter’s 1991 translation). (shrink)

This collection of essays provides an introduction to Nietzsche's thought and educational writings, and examines questions concerning the centrality of values for education in postmodernity.

Introducing this issue’s triptych on algorithms and culture, this article argues that prevailing modes of analysis that focus on the prospects for algorithms “taking over” are no longer useful. It advocates the need for a new conceptual vocabulary, which recognizes that algorithmic and cultural reasoning processes are already enmeshed with each other. The introduction suggests a need for an enterprise of algorithmic epistemology attuned to the fine structure of the ways in which culture and code have interacted in the past (...) and continue to interact today. (shrink)

Critical thinking, considered as a version of informallogic, must consider emotions and personal attitudesin assessing assertions and conclusions in anyanalysis of discourse. It must therefore presupposesome notion of the self. Critical theory may be seenas providing a substantive and non-neutral positionfor the exercise of critical thinking. It thereforemust presuppose some notion of the self. This paperargues for a Foucauldean position on the self toextend critical theory and provide a particularposition on the self for critical thinking. Thisposition on the self is (...) developed from moretraditional accounts of the self from Descartes toSchopenhauer, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. (shrink)

In recent educational reforms in New Zealand, a central assumption has been the existence of a free and autonomous chooser acting as a consumer of education. The present paper examines and critiques this notion of autonomy, as developed within liberal theory. Both Foucault and Lyotard provide materials for this critique of such a self, a self independent of the laws and principles of a community.

This book provides an historical and a conceptual background to post-structuralism, and in part to post-modernism, for readers entering the discussions on post-structuralism. It does not attempt to be at the cutting edge of these debates nor to be advancing research in these areas. It does however look at the educational implications of the ideas discussed. The intention behind this collection was to provide a sound introduction to the key positions of a number of French poststructuralist thinkers who are being (...) increasingly referred to, used as support, and even embraced by theorists in educational discourse. The editor and contributors to this volume are concerned that these thinkers have been misappropriated on occasions. That is why this volume concentrates on the historical and intellectual background of these philosophers. Each of the authors of the chapters in this collection deals with 'their' philosopher in the areas of: brief biographical details; key philosophical ideas; and the applications in, or implications of their work for education. (shrink)

The term ‘knowledge economy’, like the term ‘globalisation’, has become a catchword in political and educational debate over the last decade or so, especially in debates upon educational policy where the role of education in preparing young people to take their part in the Knowledge Economy is often seen as paramount over other traditional schooling activities. It is said in such debates that the production of knowledge, information and skills, will become more valuable than traditional primary and secondary production. A (...) lot is said about the knowledge required in the Knowledge Economy, and about how institutions, businesses, activities and human beings are to be ordered or structured in accordance with views of knowledge and new Management theories. But little is said of the young people expected to take their part in the knowledge economy. Do they have a choice? Is lying on a surfboard excluded from their life options? How will they be developed, trained or educated to take their part? Will they be committed to developing their selves in accordance with the model of the IT Knowledge Entrepreneur presented as a model for education by policy makers in the Knowledge Economy? This article will argue against this latter notion of the development of the self, arguing that because knowledge is prioritised over ethics, there is both an inadequate notion of the self and the educational development of the self and, because of its implicit view only of ethics, an inadequate ethical and moral view of education [246 words]. (shrink)