Jacek Urbaniec: Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics does not necessarily imply that there are links between the temporal physical world and the eternal world of mathematics..

The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, (...) it provoked questionable lines of criticism. We reassess the debate and point to potential pitfalls, focusing on the semantic dimension of the Thin Red Line theory. Our agenda transcends the semantics, however. We conclude that semantic considerations do not threaten the Thin Red Line theory and that the proper debate should be carried in the domain of metaphysics. (shrink)

In this article we consider linear isomorphisms over the field of rational numbers between the linear spaces ℝ2 and ℝ. We prove that if f is such an isomorphism, then the image by f of the unit disk is a strictly nonmeasurable subset of the real line, which has different properties than classical non-measurable subsets of reals. We shall also consider the question whether all images of bounded measurable subsets of the plane via a such mapping are non-measurable.

The first part of the paper is a reminder of fundamental results connected with the adequacy problem for sentential logics with respect to matrix semantics. One of the main notions associated with the problem, namely that of the degree of complexity of a sentential logic, is elucidated by a couple of examples in the second part of the paper. E.g., it is shown that the minimal logic of Johansson and some of its extensions have degree of complexity 2. This is (...) the first example of an exact estimation of the degree of natural complex logics, i.e. logics whose deducibility relation cannot be represented by a single matrix. The remaining examples of complex logics are more artificial, having been constructed for the purpose of checking some theoretical possibilities. (shrink)

Let J be any proper ideal of subsets of the real line R which contains all finite subsets of R. We define an ideal J * ∣B as follows: X ∈ J * ∣B if there exists a Borel set $B \subset R \times R$ such that $X \subset B$ and for any x ∈ R we have $\{y \in R: \langle x,y\rangle \in B\} \in \mathscr{J}$ . We show that there exists a family $\mathscr{A} \subset \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ of power ω (...) 1 such that $\bigcup\mathscr{A} \not\in \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ . In the last section we investigate properties of ideals of Lebesgue measure zero sets and meager sets in Cohen extensions of models of set theory. (shrink)

In this paper we present a characterization of hyper-connexivity by means of a relating semantics for Boolean connexive logics. We also show that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is Abelardian, strongly consistent, Kapsner strong and antiparadox. We give an example showing that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not simplificative. This shows that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not totally connexive.

The crux of the dispute on the mutual relations between attention and consciousness, and to which I have referred in this paper, lies in the question of what can be attended in spatial attention that obviously resonates with the phenomenological issue of intentionality. The discussion has been initiated by Christopher Mole. He began by calling for a commonsense psychology, according to which one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the (...) things that one is conscious of. In other words, attention is supposed to be a condition which is sufficient but not necessary for consciousness, i.e., consciousness is a necessary concomitant of attention, but attention is not a necessary concomitant of consciousness. Mole seeks to validate his stance with data from psychology labs. His view is, however, partly confronted, for instance, by Robert Kentridge, Lee de-Wit and Charles Heywood, who used their experimental research on a neurological condition called blindsight as evidence of a dissociation between attention and consciousness, i.e., that visual attention is not a sufficient precondition for visual awareness. In this meta-theoretical state of affairs, I would like to focus on the cognitive phenomenon most often referred to as Inhibition of Return and suggest that, following its micro dynamics from the perspective of micro-phenomenology, it can be used to actually showcase all of the options on both sides of the argument. One of my leading goals would be also to follow Mole’s attempt to link attention with agency but where we differ is that I wish to heuristically articulate the matter in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological notion of embodied pre-reflective intentionality. (shrink)

The author presents Leszek Kołakowski from the perspective of his private acquaintanceship, lasting for about 47 years, as a witty man and a workaholic. L. Kołakowski never formed a classic “school”, but there is something all his disciples share: a thesis, key to understanding his ideas, which holds that “THERE IS MORE THAN ONE CORRECT OPINION IN THE HUMANITIES”, i.e. we will ALWAYS have opinions for and against, which goes against any dogmatism, wherever it may appear; this also bears consequences (...) in diagnosing the socio-political reality past and present. (shrink)

In this presentation, principles of ethics are confronted with the desire of the inventor to make a profit. To this end the presentation is focused on patent protection. Patents should guarantee the return of an inventor’s investment and profit and, on the other side, ensure availability — by patent disclosure — of the invention for the society when the patent terminates. Recent patent applications made by inventors are infringing this principle and societies are paying an unexpected price for these practices. (...) Patent claims are too broad and disclosures too poor. Extreme examples will be discussed. (shrink)

In a recently published paper, Patrick Todd (2016, 'Future contingents are all false! On behalf of a Russellian open future') advocates a novel treatment of future contingents. On his view, all statements concerning the contingent future are false. He motivates his semantic postulates by considerations in philosophy of time and modality, in particular by the claim that there is no actual future. I present a number of highly controversial consequences of Todd’s theory. Inadequacy of his semantics might indirectly serve as (...) an argument against the philosophical view underpinning his proposal. (shrink)

In the article, I present changes that analytic philosophy of mind underwent throughout the twentieth century, as well as consequences these transformations have for the latest debates. I argue that over the past century, the analytical movement abandoned its anti-metaphysical stance and accepted materialism that supposed to respect main assumptions of the early program of analysis. However, by the end of the last century, materialism found itself in a crisis, and attempts to resolve it led to significant changes in the (...) field of the latest philosophical investigations about the mind. Observing current trends allows for making conjectures about the shape of analytic philosophy of mind in the coming decades. (shrink)

In this article I outline two epistemological theistic arguments. The first one starts from the dilemma between our strong conviction that we possess some knowledge of the world and the belief that there are some serious reasons which undermine it. In my opinion theism opens the possibility of the way out of the dilemma. The second argument depends on the premise that in every time every worldly thing is actually perceived or known. I support it by four considerations and claim (...) that the simplest explanation of the epistemic ‘non-loneliness’ of the world is the existence of the Supreme Cogniser. (shrink)

Celem poniższych analiz jest eksplikacja, ujednoznacznienie i przystępne wyłożenie znaczenia pojęcia sprawiedliwość, występującego w pismach Emmanuela Levinasa. Cel to o tyle ważny, że pojęcie to – jak mam nadzieję wykazać – jest jednym z kluczowych pojęć spajających konstrukcję myślową filozofii Levinasa, a sam Levinas – jak z przekonaniem sądzę – jest jednym z ważniejszych myślicieli XX stulecia; nie wspominając już o wadze teoretycznej i politycznej samego tego pojęcia w perspektywie uniwersalnej.

Education is increasingly coming under the shadow of economics. In this article we engage in ideology critique by applying a critical realist analysis to conventional economic models and the teaching of students. Through a historical and philosophical interrogation, we argue that the current curriculum suffers from a diminutive understanding of human being. We argue that economics education has for a long time now worked with a highly abstracted and decontextualized idea of human being that has absented other dimensions of human (...) concerns. We examine the current English Advanced level economic curriculum and the revised curriculum which will be taught from September 2015. Using an understanding of the dynamics of structure and agency and that economics operates in open systems, we argue for retroduction as an appropriate methodology. (shrink)

In this paper being a sequel to our [1] the logic with semi-negation is chosen as an example to elucidate some basic notions of the semantics for sentential calculi. E.g., there are shown some links between the Post number and the degree of complexity of a sentential logic, and it is proved that the degree of complexity of the sentential logic with semi-negation is 20. This is the first known example of a logic with such a degree of complexity. The (...) results of the final part of the paper cast a new light on the scope of the Kripke-style semantics in comparison to the matrix semantics. (shrink)

The present paper is to be considered as a sequel to [1], [2]. It is known that Johansson's minimal logic is not uniform, i.e. there is no single matrix which determines this logic. Moreover, the logic C J is 2-uniform. It means that there are two uniform logics C 1, C 2 (each of them is determined by a single matrix) such that the infimum of C 1 and C 2 is C J. The aim of this paper is to (...) give a detailed description of the logics C 1 and C 2. It is performed in a lattice-theoretical language. (shrink)

In this paper the notion of unifier is extended to the infinite set case. The proof of existence of the most general unifier of any infinite, unifiable set of types (terms) is presented. Learning procedure, based on infinite set unification, is described.

The following logics are the most noteworthy from the perspective of the calculus of combinators: the Hilbert’s positive implicational logic , the Church’s weak theory of implication , the BCK-logic, and the BCI-logic. Their significance is due to a certain correspondence between combinators and implicational formulas . The first three logics mentioned have been immensely investigated but it was not so in case of the remaining one. The BCI-logics was mentioned by A. N. Prior in the second edition of his (...) Formal Logic of 1962 where it was credited to C. A. Meredith and dated in 1956 . A. (shrink)

The first two sections of the paper draw attention to some incompletely interpreted issues within two Romantic dramas: the unclear status of the protagonist in Dziady, Part IV (on the one hand, representing the indefinability of man and, on the other, constituting the illustration of how lightly one may lose consistency and identity), and the ambiguous relationship between Goplana and Grabiec in Balladyna (which can be perceived in terms of the complex relations between ‘the angelic soul and the bluff head’ (...) (dusza anielska i czerep rubaszny). The third section of notes is an encouragement to discuss two topics: ‘From Zygmunt Krasiński’s Leonard to Jerzy Andrzejewski’s Diego de Manente’; ‘From Pierścień Wielkiej-Damy, czyli: Ex-machina-Durejko by Cyprian Norwid to Tango by Sławomir Mrożek’. (shrink)

This is a summary of the recent research related to the issue of future contingents. It focuses on the aspects that were largely neglected in the traditional debate, such as relativism, pragmatics of assertion, probability, epistemology, and metaphysics.

t. 1. Etyka ogólna -- t. 2, cz. 1-2 Etyka szczegółowa.

This book is dedicated to the life and work of logician Janusz Czelakowski on the topic of logical consequence. It consists of three parts – a biography, a survey and research sections. The volume begins with an autobiographic chapter by Janusz Czelakowski followed by a historical chapter written by Jacek Malinowski. The survey section forms the backbone of the volume with each chapter covering one of Janusz Czelakowski’s results. They focus on his results in the area of logical consequence, (...) demonstrate how his results influenced following research, and presents potential future results, problems and applications. This volume is of interest to logicians and mathematicians. (shrink)

Recently I defended a hybrid view of persistence whereby simple objects endure while composite objects are stage related. I argued that it deserves further investigation given the explanatory work it does with regard to two problems raised in the literature on the metaphysics of the persistence of objects. In this paper I look at two further problems that have been raised—one from natural explanation, the other from time travel. I show how the hybrid view is able to deal with these (...) problems. In doing so I further build the case that the hybrid view is a serious contender in the persistence debate based on the explanatory work it can do. (shrink)

The kernel of this volume is an English translation of Jan Łukasiewicz’s classic work on the concept of cause (1906). It is the starting point for analytical considerations on causality of two generations of philosophers belonging to the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School.

Review of the book: Człowiek na granicy istnienia. Dyskusje o śmierci mózgowej i innych aspektach umierania, Grzegorz Hołub, Piotr Duchliński, Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2017.

There is considerable discussion in contemporary philosophical inquiry concerning the problematics of personalism. Among these inquiries is the book of Wojciech Słomski, a professor of philosophy at the Higher Institute of Psychotherapy and Rehabilitation in Warsaw, entitled The Personalist Vision of Freedom: Examining Emmanuel Mounier's Concept of Personal Freedom. This is the second edition of the book which once appeared under the title Personal Freedom According to Emmanuel Mounier in 1996. The new additions are the first chapter, in which the (...) author introduces E. Mounier as a man and philosopher, as well as chapter five, which deals with the role and significance of freedom. This is rounded off by the remaining chapters. The book, therefore, is composed of six chapters and the bibliography. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to prove that it was Ludwig Feuerbach’s anthropology that influenced Bakunin’s philosophical path. Following his example Bakunin turned against religion which manipulates, as Hegelianism does, the only priority human being has—another human being. Although Feuerbach’s philosophy did not involve social problems present at Bakunin’s works, we would like to show that it was Feuerbach himself who laid foundation for them and that Bakunin’s criticism of the state was the natural consequence of Feuerbach’s struggle for the (...) individual. Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin proved that Feuerbach’s attempts to rise anthropology to the rank of theology are not sufficient to free the individual from the power of abstractions as in his opinion it is not only God that should be overthrown but also the state. (shrink)

In the presented article, I have analyzed the famous Saul Kripke statement that some a priori truths are contingent. I show, that despite Kripke’s thesis, in the historical understanding of contingency, the notions of contingency and apriority are in deep conflict with each other. In this understanding of contingency, the past, which can be known a priori, is not contingent, and the future, which is contingent, has difficulty acquiring a priori knowledge. Having stated Kripke’s thesis more precisely, I propose three (...) means in order to defend it in the historical understanding of possibility: by introducing the notion of “factual” future, by replacing the notion of apriority with the notion of apriority-in-the-future; by replacing the notion of apriority with the notion of historical apriority, and the notion of contingency with the notion of once-apriority. In the annex of the article, I present the formal analysis of the problem that I have introduced and three solutions which I have proposed in the language of temporal-modal logic of predicates for models of indeterministic time. (shrink)