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Editorial ROBIN LE POIDEVIN, Religious Studies , FirstView Article(s).

Editorial ROBIN LE POIDEVIN, Religious Studies , FirstView Article(s).

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 42 Heft: 1 Seiten: 298-298.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 42 Heft: 1 Seiten: 298-298.

Editorial ROBIN LE POIDEVIN, Religious Studies , FirstView Article(s).

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 42 Heft: 1 Seiten: 298-298.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 42 Heft: 1 Seiten: 298-298.

Editorial ROBIN LE POIDEVIN, Religious Studies , FirstView Article(s).

This article is currently available as a free download on ingentaconnect.

Many traditional Mahayana, and modern Tibetan, Buddhist texts relate meditation attainment to psychic ability. This teaching served as the hypothesis—that more advanced meditators would choose a psi target correctly, significantly more often than beginners. A basic free-response design was used in which a computer programme (PreCOG) chose a target picture at random from a 4-picture set. There were 25 sets, all pictures of Tibet. PreCOG guided the participants through the procedure, in which they aimed to become aware of the target. (...) 18 participants, Tibetan monks, nuns and Western Buddhist meditators, completed 8 sessions each. Half the sessions used a clairvoyance, and half a precognition, protocol. Age and years of meditation practice correlated significantly with the psi scores (Pearson r = 0.52, p < 0.05). This suggests that, as one practices meditation, psychic awareness begins to manifest more reliably. This result was confounded by a non-significant psi-missing trend. There was no significant difference between the clairvoyance and precognition trials (t-diff (142) = 0.800). There was, however, significant psi-missing from the group of Rinpoches (t = -2.09, 2tail p < 0.05). The three participants who scored most strongly in the psi-missing direction all reported childhood memories of previous lives as monks in Tibet. Keywords: psychic awareness—Tibetan Buddhists—meditation. (shrink)

With the publication of these two volumes the ground has now been prepared for a long awaited event, the critical edition of the works of Henry of Ghent. Henry was one of the outstanding philosophizing-theologians at the University of Paris in the second half of the thirteenth century and, during the period between the death of Thomas Aquinas in 1274 and the ascendancy of John Duns Scotus near the beginning of the fourteenth century, no other Master surpassed him in terms (...) of influence or importance. During his tenure there as Master in the theology faculty, Henry conducted fifteen Quodlibetal disputes. His written versions of these, along with his Summa of ordinary Disputed Questions, constitute his most important surviving works. And of these, his Quodlibets rank first. Henry's philosophical and theological views were highly original and drew considerable reaction from other leading Masters of the time, especially from Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, and somewhat later, from Duns Scotus. While his personal thought cannot be reduced to that of any earlier thinker or tradition, his views were heavily influenced by Augustine, by Avicenna, and by various other Neoplatonic currents. At the same time, while he was quite familiar with the texts and thought of Aristotle, he reacted strongly against the more radical form of Aristotelianism developed by Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, and other Masters in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the 1260s and 1270s. Aquinas's incorporation of many Aristotelian positions into his own thought was also suspect in Henry's eyes. Given this background, Henry himself may be regarded as an outstanding representative of the Neo-Augustinian philosophical current which surfaced at Paris around 1270, which triumphed with the condemnation of 219 propositions by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in 1277, and which would continue to be a dominant philosophical force until the end of the century. The need for a critical edition of his Quodlibets and his Summa has long been recognized, since the only printed versions date from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In these first two volumes of Henry's Opera omnia Macken has prepared the way for the critical edition of Henry's works and especially of his Quodlibets. Here one finds a valuable catalog, based on first-hand inspection, of the widely scattered manuscripts of Henry's works. The catalog also contains expert codicological descriptions of the contents of these manuscripts, including works whose authenticity remains doubtful. Manuscripts are also considered which contain works that treat ex professo of Henry's doctrine. This is followed by an appendix which surveys ancient references to other manuscripts allegedly containing Henry's works, which manuscripts have not yet been found. Then there is a Répertoire, not of manuscripts but of Henry's works themselves, including certainly authentic works, works of doubtful authenticity, and finally, in another short appendix, works which have been falsely ascribed to him. A third part of this survey of Henry's works is devoted to manuscripts of other writers who discuss Henry's doctrine ex professo. The two volumes conclude with all the necessary indices. One must congratulate Macken for the care, the industry, and the meticulous scholarship with which he has prepared these two volumes. Not only are they of great value to anyone interested in the manuscript tradition of Henry's works and doctrine; they also include helpful descriptions of the writings of many other medieval authors which are contained in many of these same manuscripts. They will undoubtedly be carefully combed for decades to come by other scholars interested in these same authors and manuscripts. These volumes will be indispensable for libraries of institutions making any serious claim to expertise in the history of medieval philosophical and theological thought. One can only wish Macken and his international team of collaborators every success in their next immediate task, the actual edition of Henry's most important works, his fifteen Quodlibetal Questions.--J.F.W. (shrink)

Contemporary problems associated with the notion of determinism are focused by this symposium in three major areas of inquiry--philosophy, physical science, and law and moral responsibility. Determinism in modern physics is capably analyzed by a number of eminent contributors; but with respect to its significance for a philosophy of nature, little that is new or suggestive emerges from this analysis. The distinction between "hard" and "soft" determinism and its implications in legal and moral contexts provoke the most valuable part of (...) the discussion.--J. F. D. (shrink)

A desultory caricature, ostensibly socialist in tenor, of a well-known theory of justice.--J. F. D.

In this first volume of a new series, "Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies," three independently published essays by Professor Kristeller have been gathered together in one volume. Though originally written for different occasions, all three develop the theme expressed by the title, that is, "the continued presence of medieval traits in the civilization of the Renaissance". As Kristeller himself explains in the Preface, the presence of medieval traits in the Renaissance does not militate against the acknowledged reality of (...) many nonmedieval and even antimedieval features of this same period. Nonetheless, recognition of these medieval characteristics is of great value for a fuller appreciation of the Renaissance, as each of these essays illustrates in its own way. (shrink)

A collection of essays by a British master of Marxism, this book ranges over a wide variety of related topics--ethics, human rights, social theory, ideology, religion, and philosophy. The essays are reprints or adaptations of previous articles and addresses, and are unified by the author's sympathetic interpretation of Marxist thought. Especially instructive and timely is a chapter on Sartre and Marxism.--J. F. D.

A paperbound edition of an excellent interpretative study, originally published in 1950. Though the bibliography and index are considerably abridged in the present edition, the text is complete and has been improved by numerous minor revisions prepared by the author.--J. F. D.

With volume 5 the publication of the actual text of Henry's fifteen Quodlibetal Questions begins. Macken's edition is preceded by a valuable introduction, which itself commences with discussions of Henry's life and writings. Macken then surveys the manuscripts containing Quodlibet I and explains in detail the procedure he has adopted in reconstituting the text and the editing techniques he has employed. As he points out, Quodlibet I was given its definitive written form by Henry himself, and is not a mere (...) report drawn up by someone else who would have been present at its oral presentation. It should here be recalled that the Quodlibetal Question developed in Parisian University circles in the course of the thirteenth century as a distinctive literary genre of philosophical and theological writing. The Quodlibets themselves as we have them in written form reflect their origins in those special public oral sessions which were held twice a year in the Theology Faculty, and at which certain Masters would open themselves to questions from one and all about any appropriate topic. After this evidently taxing exercise, a Master would have the right to readdress himself to the questions that had been raised on some following day when meeting with his own students. By then he would have introduced some kind of order into the various topics originally proposed for discussion. And at some subsequent time, probably during the course of the next year, he would release them for publication, but only after having carefully revised them. As one might expect, the very nature of such an exercise opened the way for consideration of a bewildering variety of topics ranging widely over areas such as speculative and moral theology, metaphysics, natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and canon law. This variety is clearly reflected in the 42 questions examined in Henry's first Quodlibet. Thus one finds him here considering questions treating of Trinitarian theology, the hypostatic union, unicity vs. plurality of substantial form in man, Eucharistic theology, the possiblity of an eternally created universe, the relationship between essence and existence in creatures, and the possibility that prime matter could be sustained in existence by God apart from any substantial form. Questions are also raised relating to the nature of the soul both in its separated state and in its state of union with the body, and the relative priorities of intellect and will and their interrelationship in the act of choice. Finally, a host of other topics of less immediate interest to philosophers are also examined, such as the fate of infants who die without baptism, confessional jurisdiction, the guilt of a teacher who is primarily concerned with his own glory, etc. At the risk of oversimplification, certain positions defended by Henry in this Quodlibet will be mentioned because of their interest to students of metaphysics. In q. 4 he leaves open the possibility of defending unicity of substantial form in man. In qq. 7-8 he eliminates the possibility that any creature could have existed from eternity and, therefore, the possibility of an eternally created universe. In q. 9 he rejects real distinction between essence and existence in creatures and defends his well known "intentional" distinction between them. Here too he has already developed his unusual view of the essential being enjoyed by creatures insofar as they are objects of God's knowledge and have exemplar ideas in God. In q. 10 he denies that prime matter is pure potentiality and maintains that God could, if he should so choose, keep matter in existence without any substantial form. In q. 14 he defends the preeminence of the will over the intellect, and in a number of succeeding questions enters into intricate discussion of the interrelationship between reason and will in the act of choice. Perhaps these indications will be enough to give the reader some idea of the general direction of Henry's thought with respect to the topics in question. Anyone who has already examined earlier printed editions of Henry's Quodlibets will be delighted with Macken's superb edition of Quodlibet I. Apart from its great critical value, this volume is beautifully printed, handsomely bound, and appropriately indexed. This reviewer, for one, is eagerly awaiting the appearance of subsequent volumes in the series. All will be required reading for students of late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century philosophy and theology.--J.F.W. (shrink)

This Festschrift in Professor Kristeller’s honor consists of contributions by scholars who have had some connection with Columbia University, his "intellectual home in the United States for three decades." It also includes a Tabula Gratulatoria listing many other friends from the United States and Europe. The editor’s opening essay provides an interesting and informative account of this scholar’s academic career, and should be read together with the complete annotated bibliography of his publications through 1974. The latter lists 149 "major publications" (...) and 220 "minor publications." Kristeller’s contributions to the history of Renaissance philosophy are well known to historians of philosophy, and deservedly so. Here reference should be made to his groundbreaking studies on Marsilio Ficino and Pomponazzi, and on others such as Pico della Mirandola and Petrarch, as well as on Renaissance Platonism, Aristotelianism in the Renaissance, Thomism in the Renaissance, Paduan Averroism, and Alexandrism. But he has also contributed greatly to the fields of medieval and Renaissance history, and especially to our understanding of Renaissance humanism, Renaissance music, and Renaissance art. He is universally recognized as one of the world’s foremost authorities on manuscript research, as is witnessed, for example, by the cooperative project, Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum, which he founded, and by his Iter ltalicum. In all of these enterprises he has set an enviable example for other scholars by the exacting standards and the breadth of his expertise. It is only fitting, then, that the many essays in this Festschrift should reflect the breadth and depth of the scholarship so evident in the man to whom they are dedicated. Limitations of space will only permit us to list them here, with a few remarks reserved for those of more special interest to philosophers and historians of philosophy: Eugene F. Rice, Jr., "The De magia naturali of Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples" ; Donald R. Kelley, "Louis Le Caron Philosophe", on Le Caron’s effort to bring together jurisprudence and classical, especially Platonic, philosophy; Richard H. Popkin, "The Pre-Adamite Theory in the Renaissance", with fascinating material about theories concerning men before Adam in La Peyrère and widely scattered earlier sources; Richard Lemay, "The Fly against the Elephant: Flandinus against Pomponazzi on Fate", on an unedited attack by an Augustinian Bishop against Pomponazzi’s espousal of the Stoic doctrine of fate; Martin Pine, "Pietro Pomponazzi and the Medieval Tradition of God’s Foreknowledge", on Pomponazzi’s solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom inlight of his familiarity with earlier discussions by Boethius, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham; F. Edward Cranz, "Editions of the Latin Aristotle Accompanied by the Commentaries of Averroes", helpful to all who wish to consult late fifteenth- and sixteenth-century versions of the Latin Aristotle and especially the Latin Averroes; Josef Soudek, "A Fifteenth-Century Humanistic Bestseller: The Manuscript Diffusion of Leonardo Bruni’s Annotated Latin Version of the Aristotelian Economics" ; Edward P. Mahoney, "Nicoletto Vernia on the Soul and Immortality", which details a radical shift on Vernia’s part from an earlier Averroistic reading of Aristotle; Joan Kelly-Gadol, "Tommaso Campanella: The Agony of Political Theory in the Counter-Reformation", which attempts to account for some of the shifts and inconsistencies in Campanella’s political writings by placing them within the troubled personal and political circumstances of his life; Charles Trinkaus, "Protagoras in the Renaissance: An Exploration" ; Maristella de Panizza Lorch, "Voluptas, molle quoddam et non invidiosum nomen: Lorenzo Valla’s Defense of voluptas in the Preface to his De voluptate" ; Neal W. Gilbert, "Richard de Bury and the ‘Quires of Yesterday’s Sophisms"’, with much interesting material on the medieval tradition of sophismata, especially at Oxford; Malcolm Brown, "A Pre-Aristotelian Mathematician on Deductive Order" ; John H. Randall, Jr., "Paduan Aristotelianism Reconsidered", on evidence for influence of the Italian Aristotelian tradition on Galileo; William F. Edwards, "Niccoló Leoniceno and the Origins of Humanist Discussion of Method" ; C. Doris Hellman, "A Poem on the Occasion of the Nova of 1572" ; Edward Rosen, "Kepler’s Mastery of Greek" ; W. T. H. Jackson, "The Politics of a Poet: The Archipoeta as Revealed by his Imagery" ; John Charles Nelson, "Love and Sex in the Decameron" ; George B. Parks, "Pico della Mirandola in Tudor Translation" ; Richard Harrier, "Invention in Tudor Literature: Historical Perspectives" ; Helene Wieruszowski, "Jacob Burckhardt and Vespasiano da Bisticci " ; Morimichi Watanabe, "Gregor Heimburg and Early Humanism in Germany" ; Raymond de Roover, "Cardinal Cajetan on ‘Cambium’ or Exchange Dealings" ; and a series of text editions with introductions including Julius Kirshner, "Conscience and Public Finance: A Questio disputata of John of Legnano on the Public Debt of Genoa" ; John Mundy, "The Origins of the College of Saint-Raymond at the University of Toulouse" ; Charles B. Schmitt, "Girolamo Borro’s Multae sunt nostrarum ignorantionum causae " ; Guido Kisch, "An Unpublished Consiliumof Johannes Sichardus" ; Patricia H. Labalme, "The Last Will of a Venetian Patrician " ; Felix Gilbert, "The Last Will of a Venetian Grand Chancellor" ; Herbert S. Matsen, "Giovanni Garzoni to Alessandro Achillini : An Unpublished Letter and Defense" ; Theodore E. James, "A Fragment of An Exposition of the First Letter of Seneca to Lucilius Attributed to Peter of Mantua". The editor, his collaborators, and the contributors are all to be commended for the high quality of this volume.—J.F.W. (shrink)

There is no pretension here of discussing "art in general," or of forcing aesthetic categories on a uniquely "unphilosophic" art. The author, following an inquiry into the existential modes of concrete works of art, skillfully develops solutions to the vexing problems of individuality, identity, and authenticity of paintings. His realistic analysis of the creation of paintings, of their complex causal elements, suggests the conclusion that paintings are not imitations or reflections of nature, but are themselves natural objects. This conclusion necessitates (...) a fundamental distinction between paintings and pictures, and by virtue of this distinction the author seeks to overcome many of the "metapictorial" problems posed by religious and social art and especially by the "abstract" revolution in modern art. His case for modern painting and for its relevance for philosophic inquiry is both penetrating and enlightening.--J. F. D. (shrink)

This final work of the late Prof. Brightman was virtually complete at his death; however the editors have written four additional chapters and part of a fifth, basing their work on other writings of the author. The result is a lucid, unified account of the personalist position.--J. F. D.

This anthology of twenty papers and book-section reprints covers a judicious variety of issues in the description and normative analysis of teaching. For the enrichment of our reflections on the description of teaching activity, we are offered a stimulus-response model of teacher-student interchange, a contrasting "speech theoretic" model of teaching as verbal action, together with the deservedly recognized conceptual ruminations of Thomas F. Green and Israel Scheffler on the interrelationships and contrasts between teaching and its degenerate siblings and the logical (...) relations among teaching, learning, and knowledge, respectively. In its normative dimension, teaching is discussed as to its tasks, evaluation, and justification. The list of specific educational tasks is grievously short--the teaching of scientific method and the teaching of history, but this section opens with a distinguished discussion by James E. McClellan of the time-honored hope of bequeathing a single general method of decision-making as the task of education. Under the rubric of "evaluation" we get once more Urmson's "On Grading," a critical piece on education research, and a discussion of some putative criteria of successful teaching. Finally, the matter of justification is introduced with Scheffler's helpful "On Justifying Curriculum Decisions" and fought over in a valuable controversy concerning criteria of intrinsic worth sparked by R. S. Peters in his book Ethics and Education. This book adds another dash of color to the decreasingly dreary landscape of the philosophy of education. But its principles of selection are not altogether wise. For it would seem that the problems discussed under the topics of tasks and justification are better preserved for a book on curriculum design. Had the authors recognized this, they could have enlarged their good selection on the logic of teaching and have served us a more nourishing assortment of goodies on the moral issues as well as the problems of efficacy in teaching.--J. F. (shrink)

These seven essays comprise an outstanding collection embracing related yet distinct approaches to poetry via music and musicology, rhetoric and linguistics. Mr. Frye's penetrating essay effectively sets the tone of the variously oriented contributions. Acknowledgment of the increasing authority of linguistic criticism is especially prominent.--J. F. D.

An introduction to the author's conception of Ganzheitlichkeit and Terminalkausalität, and the first part of an inquiry into the relevance and adequacy of this conception for three different types of phenomena--atomic, biodynamic, and neural. The concept of Terminalkausalität is proposed as a basis on which the theoretical dualism of modern physics, and particularly the problems associated with the uncertainty relation, may be overcome. Further, this concept suggests the principles by which the various natural sciences may be unified. --J. F. D.

This comprehensive survey is particularly valuable for the intelligence and originality with which it approaches aesthetic speculation. The author permits the original texts to serve as the basis of his study, and exhibits each of the major aesthetic systems of the period as an integral whole involving logical and psychological principles. Each of the writers chosen from the tradition is criticized in his own terms, without detracting from the originality of his contribution to the body of aesthetic theory. A few (...) of the lesser-known aestheticians of the 18th century here receive fuller discussion than has previously been available.--J. F. D. (shrink)

Professor Apter has written a valuable book. His work, a non-technical introduction to the most important aspect of the use of computers in psychology, is simple, readable, yet surprisingly concentrated and provocative. His first two chapters contain an unusually clear, concise examination of the extent to which minds and machines can be compared. Although brief it successfully collates the work of famous scientists and scholars of varied disciplines into a coherent cybernetic theory. Chapter three is a simplified explanation of the (...) way a digital computer works. This serves as a handy reference for the layman during more difficult discussions in ensuing chapters. Chapters four through nine recount the progress of many researchers in copying human behavior by means of machines. Here Apter examines data that have been part of the literature of computer simulation for some time, such as the Turing test, the General Problem Solver, experiments in Pattern Recognition, etc. But he also treats new or heretofore unnoticed research which undoubtedly will become elements in future philosophical controversy. One of these new cases is a program written by J. C. Loehlin called "Aldous". Aldous is the name given individually to a number of programs which interact emotionally. Loehlin so far has programmed anAldous, Decisive and Hesitant Aldouses, and, finally, Radical and Conservative Aldouses. Although the Aldous programs may sound more amusing than sober research in this area should, the details of the programming are both fascinating and philosophically significant. Loehlin, for instance, is forced to define "emotion" strictly in terms of environmental cues and elementary behavioral parameters. However, his Aldouses achieve from this a quite impressive and sophisticated repertoire of emotional responses accounting for learning, consistent emotional responses to unknown objects, mixed emotions, moods, frustration, satisfaction. Indeed, an "experienced" Aldous will exhibit behavior as unpredictable as any human. However, one still hesitates to call these reactions "emotion." Besides the obvious lack of physiological responses Aldous has no control over his environment and a merely marginal control over his emotions. Apter sees this difficulty clearly: "In particular one would like to see added the possibility of Aldous planning rather than reacting to the current situation and also the possibility of... changing not only his attitudes but also the parameters which govern the acquisition and change of attitudes." This criticism also may be levelled against other better known "personality" programs based on individual personality theories such as Heider’s or Homan’s. Apter clearly perceives theoretical difficulties in computer simulation such as these. Always, he faces them and gauges their relevance for the explanation of human behavior. The one serious shortcoming of Apter’s book is its brevity. Especially when he struggles with the theoretical implications of a particular experiment one gets the impression that he is needlessly condensing his analysis. This is particularly noticeable in the last chapter where he presents in barely-fleshed outline his position on the problem of consciousness. Despite this difficulty, however, Apter has fulfilled quite ably a promise he made in his preface that: "... this book about computers will be of interest to students of psychology and philosophy, the general reader and... perhaps also one day to computers."—J. F. (shrink)

A semi-popular presentation of the ideals of Chinese culture derived from the classics of Taoism, Confucianism, and Mohism. Contrasts between Chinese and Western thought are often suggestive, though the latter receives a highly stylized interpretation.--J. F. D.

Bringing together in one work the points of view of comparative religion and of the history and philosophy of religion, this book should be a valuable introductory text. For the most part the author has maintained an informal, somewhat narrative style, and the text is enhanced by brief selections from representative writings of the various religious traditions. Pertinent, up to date archeological evidence is provided wherever needed, and the bibliography is unusually adequate for a work of this type. Contemporary theological (...) and cosmological issues are mentioned but not discussed.--J. F. D. (shrink)

An essay which is occasionally provocative, though somewhat cursory, in its delineation of the American democratic ideal. The author reviews the intellectual contributions of the philosophers of the Enlightenment, the Puritan tradition, ethical idealism and pragmatism to the American political tradition. But these various contributions have provided only a partial expression of the ideal of Americanism. This, the author thinks, is a personalist ethic, issuing in a "democratic personalism." --J. F. D.

A good introduction to the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of demonstration and natural science, and a standard application of the principles of this theory to the experimental sciences. --J. F. D.

The Mechanics of the Mind, in the words of its author, "is an attempt to interpret the phenomenon of mind in terms of the physiological processes of the nervous system and to explore the philosophical implications of a realistically conceived theory." The first four chapters of the book is little more than a survey of some neurophysiological, cognitive, psychosocial and clinical experimental data, the consideration of which presumably leads one to the conclusion that behavior is strictly neuronic. This extensive survey (...) of research data reads like a textbook in Introductory Psychology, for Lohr details experimental studies that are familiar to every college freshman. We hear once again of Kleitman’s sleep experiments, Harlow’s surrogate mothers, even Pavlov’s dogs. Yet, not only is this analysis boring, it is quite defective. Lohr relies solely on these classic experiments in order to argue his thesis; he seems largely to be ignorant of recent experimental research which directly affects his position. This fact is painfully evident both in his discussion of the Central Nervous System and in his treatment of clinical research. Concerning the CNS, Lohr does not take into account Moruzzi and Jouvet’s studies of the ARAS, the recent interest in the hippocampus and the work of Spencer, Thompson and Nielson on the neuronic basis of learning. Lohr’s clinical data are taken, almost exclusively, from the 1950 edition of Coleman’s textbook—an undergraduate primer in abnormal behavior. Yet, even if Lohr were conversant with recent physiological and clinical research it would be impossible to verify his conclusions independently since he provides not one footnote in 513 pages of technical discussion. There are occasional references to specific experiments but by author only; he does not offer dates or source of publication for any of the studies he cites. Moreover, Lohr provides no index and only a nominal bibliography whose omissions are more notable than its entries. These infractions of scholarly courtesy are, however, merely remote indications of the deeper difficulty. From his inadequate survey of experimental research Lohr concludes that an understanding of behavior as exclusively neuronic leads us back to "traditional values" once discarded by psychologists who thought their research explained away "innate tendencies." Lohr argues that "the institutions [i.e., social values] which have evolved do not reflect an artificial set of conditions imposed upon man." Rather, the shape of our nervous system forces upon us certain limits and therefore certain objective moral values. Physiological processes thus "determine" higher order behavior in that they provide an objective matrix from which certain kinds of behavior can be judged aberrant. Hence belief in God, and freedom of the will, insofar as these elements are entailed by objective moral standards, are respectable, even desirable, accoutrements of Lohr’s "mechanistic metaphysics." This reconstruction of morals on the basis of biology suggests a close parallel with certain 19th century evolutionist-philosophers, Spencer, Haeckel and Fiske being, perhaps, the most prominent of the school. These Victorian biologist-philosophers were much more certain of a direct link between neural processes and high-order behavior than their late 20th century counterparts, and they were much more liable to conflate possible social and cultural consequences of their work. Today, however, the type of connection between neural activity and higher order behavior is much less obvious due to more sophisticated research techniques and a more critical lay public. Lohr, as we have noted, does as little justice to these new techniques and trends as Spencer would have done. He completely ignores significant research and virtually all philosophical discussion concerning mind-brain identity. As a consequence, The Mechanics of the Mind fits the same genre as Spencer’s Synthetic Philosophy and Haeckel’s Riddle of the Universe—neither good science nor good philosophy.—J. F. (shrink)

A fresh, constructive inquiry into the metaphysics of knowledge and the principles of order by which the various disciplines are related and integrated. As the basis of this inquiry, the author provides a defense of metaphysical realism and intentional logic, in opposition to the reductive tendencies which he finds exemplified in naturalism, idealism, nominalism, and the "postulational" ontologies of such thinkers as Whitehead. The aim of the work is a natural classification of knowledge, based on kinds of evidence and subject (...) matter, and on an understanding of the manner in which each discipline presupposes the others.--J. F. D. (shrink)

There are thirteen essays in this collection. Sophisticated disquisitions on rather disparate topics, they contain a number of statements which are obscure to me and, I wager, to many readers, including metaphysicians. There is space here to note only a few of the several recurrent themes in Miller’s essays. First and foremost is the notion of the primacy of action. The affirmation of values, he says, is not a "matter of logic but of action," and "values become real only in (...) the deed"—values being prior to mere facts. Miller’s action-philosophy entails an exaltation of will over intellect. For instance, he says that "the pursuit of truth is itself a gesture of will." Another recurrent theme is the human inescapability of history—of time, process, transitoriness, corruptibility. What Miller calls "ahistorical sublimity" is purchased at too high a price-the price of a "radical impersonality" with an "apparent irrelevance to action and values." Miller’s view of freedom can be called intellectualist: "It is," he says, "in the ‘revision’ of truth that freedom is found." He refers not to "static" truth in the impersonal mode of physics but to dynamic truth in the mode of personal creativity. For "creative adventure," by action and experiment, he holds, is the mark of freedom. The entire "midworld" of artifacts, including arts, sciences, and languages, is the province of "responsible freedom." This whole area should be marked by "skepticism" as well as freedom, because skepticism is man’s best weapon against "absolutist pretensions," Miller persuasively argues. Furthermore, he stresses the point that there is no fact within our ken which is not linguistically expressible, so that "responsible humanism" is inconceivable without responsible use of language. The desideratum, as Miller says, is "controlled receptivity" regarding the employment of all linguistic signs and instruments. For "nature," the common object of all our knowledge, embraces not only facts but artifacts as well, including languages. He says that only "purposeful artifacts"-especially languages—put us in touch with actuality and history. History alone, he argues, leads into philosophy. "Ahistoric ideals," present everywhere in classical thought, stand in the way of this wedding of history and philosophy. A happy wedding for, according to Miller, there is no human knowledge that is not historical; everything human is dated. Miller is an action-philosopher because he is a history-philosopher. He contends that there is no freedom for us outside of history. He hails skepticism regarding "ahistoric ideals" as a kind of "negative absolutism." And he says that such skepticism is an "experience, not a theory," and that it makes "metaphysics of the transcendent" possible. He does not explain what that metaphysics is. Apparently, his "skepticism" is the awareness of the limited character of all philosophies. If so, it is, for Miller, our chief safeguard against the use of bloated language in the service of the ahistoric ideal.—J.F.A. (shrink)

Wernham's critical edition includes the complete text of the Tractatus Politicus and all the portions of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus having to do with politics and ethics, with Latin and English texts conveniently printed face-à-face. The introduction and notes are balanced and substantial; they conclude from a detailed comparison of Spinoza's political thought with Hobbes' that Spinoza, while less "modern" in outlook than his English contemporary, may nevertheless possess greater relevance for current political philosophy.--J. F. D.

No. 20 in the Marquette series "Mediaecal [[sic]] Philosophical Texts in Translation," this translation is based on J. R. O’Donnell’s edition of the only extant manuscript of the Universal Treatise, and is preceded by a helpful introduction of 28 pp. plus a selected bibliography. An English version of this work should be welcomed by scholars not versed in Latin who are nonetheless interested in Nicholas’ thought, whether because of his highly critical reactions to Aristotle and Averroes or because of certain (...) similarities between his philosophical views and those of Hume. If the latter are primarily to be found in his two extant letters to Bernard of Arezzo, the former constitute the very heart of this work. It should also be noted that the Universal Treatise was originally intended to recall university professors, especially at Paris, to the study of Christianity and ethics. Written c. 1340, its attacks on Aristotle and Averroes were intended to contribute to this purpose. Nevertheless, some of the positions expressed therein were to bring Nicholas himself into conflict with ecclesiastical authority. Not least among these troublesome views from the standpoint of religious orthodoxy was the suggestion that all things are eternal. The situation was further complicated by Nicholas’ contention that not all the views found in the Treatise represent his own convictions. Many are to be taken as probable or more probable. In his attacks on Aristotle and Averroes he does not claim to disprove demonstratively what they held, but only to show that their opinions are less probable than those he advances. Granted that the chief unifying factor in this work is negative, its anti-Aristotelian and anti-Averroistic thrust, yet, as is suggested in the introduction, some kind of positive unifying theme is also at work, Nicholas’ view of the good. Since the universe must always contain the same amount of goodness, everything in it must remain in existence. Therefore the universe consists of unchangeable atoms. From this atomism follows the view that space consists of points and time of instants. Since change in quantity and place cannot produce or destroy real being, Nicholas must therefore hold that quantity is really identical with material substance and that movement is nothing but change in the position of atoms. Moreover, if things are eternal, it is probable that the same holds for the actions of the soul. As eternal such acts remain unchanged and hence do not vary in degree of intensity. They simply pass from person to person. Consequently, the same object cannot be seen clearly and obscurely. Nicholas also suggests that all things are as they appear, granted that such must be accepted not because it has been proved but because this conviction gives pleasure to the mind. Again, he argues that since a cause can produce only one kind of effect, not all things have been produced by God whether as their total or as their partial cause. He then suggests that because God’s power is infinite, no effect can be produced by him naturally. As finite such an effect would not be proportioned to his infinite power. His arguments against any kind of Averroistic theory of one separate intellect for all mankind are both interesting and unusual. In fact he appears to go to the opposite extreme, not only defending individual intellects for individual men but also suggesting that in one and the same soul there are as many intellects as concepts. That Nicholas himself saw some difficulties with this position may be inferred from his admonition that further thought be given to this matter. If the same might be said of other unusual theories advanced in the Treatise, its translators are to be commended for having made it available to English language readers.—J. F. W. (shrink)