In this collection of essays on the metaphysical issues pertaining to death, the meaning of life, and freedom of the will, John Martin Fischer argues that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies. He defends the claim that something can be a bad thing--a misfortune--for an individual, even if he never experiences it as bad. Fischer also defends the commonsense asymmetry in our attitudes toward death and prenatal nonexistence: we are indifferent to the (...) time before we are born, but we regret that we do not live longer. Further, Fischer argues, that immortal life could be desirable, and shows how the defense of the badness of death and the goodness of immortality exhibit a similar structure; on Fischer's view, the badness of death and the goodness of life can be represented on spectra that display certain continuities. Building on Fischer's previous book, My Way a major aim of this volume is to show important connections between issues relating to life and death and issues relating to free will. More specifically, Fischer argues that we endow our lives with a certain distinctive kind of meaning--an irreducible narrative dimension of value--by exhibiting free will. Thus, in acting freely, we transform our lives so that our stories matter. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Aufsatz analysiert den Konnex zwischen Individualisierter Medizin und der Forderung nach mehr gesundheitlicher Eigenverantwortung, der oft als plausibel angenommen wird, wenn der Individualisierten Medizin das Potential zugesprochen wird, das solidarisch finanzierte Gesundheitssystem in Deutschland zu transformieren. Ausgehend von einer logischen Rekonstruktion des Verantwortungsbegriffs, die dessen Operationalisierbarkeit unter anderem an Sanktionsvollmachten der jeweiligen Verantwortungsinstanz bindet, und basierend auf einem terminologisch präzisierten Verständnis von Individualisierter Medizin wird folgende These entwickelt: Die Annahme, im Rahmen Individualisierter Medizin sei eine verlässliche Prädiktion anlagebedingter und (...) zugleich lebensstilabhängiger Erkrankungsrisiken möglich, verpflichtet logisch nicht zur Übernahme der Forderung, Lebensstile mit negativem Einfluss auf persönliche Erkrankungsrisiken seien zu sanktionieren. Weil die Forderung nach mehr gesundheitlicher Eigenverantwortung aus dem Programm der Individualisierten Medizin logisch nicht ohne Hinzunahme normativer Prinzipien abzuleiten ist, kann man dieses Programm selbst gut heißen, ohne sich die politische Forderung nach einem Umbau des solidarisch finanzierten Gesundheitssystems unter dem Vorzeichen gesundheitlicher Eigenverantwortung zu eigen machen zu müssen. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz analysiert den Konnex zwischen Individualisierter Medizin und der Forderung nach mehr gesundheitlicher Eigenverantwortung, der oft als plausibel angenommen wird, wenn der Individualisierten Medizin das Potential zugesprochen wird, das solidarisch finanzierte Gesundheitssystem in Deutschland zu transformieren. Ausgehend von einer logischen Rekonstruktion des Verantwortungsbegriffs, die dessen Operationalisierbarkeit unter anderem an Sanktionsvollmachten der jeweiligen Verantwortungsinstanz bindet, und basierend auf einem terminologisch präzisierten Verständnis von Individualisierter Medizin wird folgende These entwickelt: Die Annahme, im Rahmen Individualisierter Medizin sei eine verlässliche Prädiktion anlagebedingter und (...) zugleich lebensstilabhängiger Erkrankungsrisiken möglich, verpflichtet logisch nicht zur Übernahme der Forderung, Lebensstile mit negativem Einfluss auf persönliche Erkrankungsrisiken seien zu sanktionieren. Weil die Forderung nach mehr gesundheitlicher Eigenverantwortung aus dem Programm der Individualisierten Medizin logisch nicht ohne Hinzunahme normativer Prinzipien abzuleiten ist, kann man dieses Programm selbst gut heißen, ohne sich die politische Forderung nach einem Umbau des solidarisch finanzierten Gesundheitssystems unter dem Vorzeichen gesundheitlicher Eigenverantwortung zu eigen machen zu müssen. (shrink)

John Martin Fischer; XIV*—Responsibility and Failure, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 251–272, https://doi.org/1.

I evaluate Patrick Todd's critique of the idea accepted by many, including (in contemporary philosophy) Nelson Pike and John Martin Fischer, that there can be non‐causal constraints on human actions (including basic actions). I suggest that Todd's critical reflections, although illuminating, are not persuasive. I defend non‐causal constraints in part by putting forward an interpretation of the intuitive idea of the fixity of the past following Carl Ginet: our freedom is the power to add to the given past.

On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of subsequentism, according to which the bad thing for the deceased, or the harm of death to the deceased, takes place after he or she has died. The main puzzle for this view is to explain how we can predicate a property at a time (such as having a misfortune or (...) being harmed) to an individual who does not exist at that time. This is the Problem of Predication. I consider alternative attempts to solve this puzzle, including one suggested by Ben Bradley, and I argue that they do not succeed. I go on to provide a new way of addressing the Problem of Predication and thus defending subsequentism against this specific threat, contrasting my approach with others currently on offer. (shrink)

This is a survey of recent work on God and human freedom. A version of the "basic" argument for the incompatibility of God's omniscience and human freedom is presented. Various possible responses are developed and discussed.

I offer an overview of the book, _Death, Immortality, and Meaning in Life_, summarizing the main issues, arguments, and conclusions (Fischer 2020). I also present some new ideas and further developments of the material in the book. A big part of this essay is drawing connections between the specific issues treated in the book and those in other areas of philosophy, and in particular, the theory of agency and moral responsibility. I highlight some striking similarities of both structure and (...) content between the death/meaning in life literature and the free will/moral responsibility literature. (shrink)

Our Fate is a collection of John Martin Fischer's previously published articles on the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human freedom. The book contains a new introductory essay that places all of the chapters in the book into a cohesive framework. The introductory essay also provides some new views about the issues treated in the book, including a bold and original account of God's foreknowledge of free actions in a causally indeterministic world. The focus of the book is (...) a powerful traditional argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise. Fischer presents this argument and defends it against some of the most salient criticisms, especially Ockhamism.The incompatibilist's argument is driven by the fixity of the past, and, in particular, the fixity of God's prior beliefs about our current behavior. The author gives special attention to Ockhamism, which contends that God's prior beliefs are not "over-and-done-with" in the past, and are thus not subject to the intuitive idea of the fixity of the past. In the end, Fischer defends the argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise, but he further argues that this incompatibility need not entail the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human moral responsibility. Thus, through this collection of essays, Fischer develops a "semicompatibilist" view--the belief that God's foreknowledge is entirely compatible with human moral responsibility, even if God's foreknowledge rules out freedom to do otherwise. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss sequent calculi for the propositional fragment of the logic of HYPE. The logic of HYPE was recently suggested by Leitgeb as a logic for hyperintensional contexts. On the one hand we introduce a simple \-system employing rules of contraposition. On the other hand we present a \-system with an admissible rule of contraposition. Both systems are equivalent as well as sound and complete proof-system of HYPE. In order to provide a cut-elimination procedure, we expand the (...) calculus by connections as introduced in Kashima and Shimura. (shrink)

In this paper we will investigate different axiomatic theories of truth that are minimal in some sense. One criterion for minimality will be conservativity over Peano Arithmetic. We will then give a more fine-grained characterization by investigating some interpretability relations. We will show that disquotational theories of truth, as well as compositional theories of truth with restricted induction are relatively interpretable in Peano Arithmetic. Furthermore, we will give an example of a theory of truth that is a conservative extension of (...) Peano Arithmetic but not interpretable in it. We will then use stricter versions of interpretations to compare weak theories of truth to subsystems of second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

Questions concerning the proof-theoretic strength of classical versus nonclassical theories of truth have received some attention recently. A particularly convenient case study concerns classical and nonclassical axiomatizations of fixed-point semantics. It is known that nonclassical axiomatizations in four- or three-valued logics are substantially weaker than their classical counterparts. In this paper we consider the addition of a suitable conditional to First-Degree Entailment—a logic recently studied by Hannes Leitgeb under the label HYPE. We show in particular that, by formulating the theory (...) PKF over HYPE, one obtains a theory that is sound with respect to fixed-point models, while being proof-theoretically on a par with its classical counterpart KF. Moreover, we establish that also its schematic extension—in the sense of Feferman—is as strong as the schematic extension of KF, thus matching the strength of predicative analysis. (shrink)

Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader (...) a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series. (shrink)

I seek to clarify the notion of the fixity of the past appropriate to Pike’s regimentation of the argument for the incompatibility of God’s foreknowledge and human freedom. Also, I discuss Alvin Plantinga’s famous example of Paul and the Ant Colony in light of Pike’s argument.

I discuss van inwagen's "first formal argument" for the incompatibility of causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise. I distinguish different interpretations of the important notion, "s can render p false." I argue that on none of these interpretations is the argument clearly sound. I point to gaps in the argument, Although I do not claim that it is unsound.

The Consequence Argument is one of the leading arguments for the incompatibility of causal determinism and free will in the sense of freedom to do otherwise. Thus, it challenges “classical compatibilism” of the sort defended by many philosophers, such as Hume, Schlick, Ayer, Lehrer, Perry, Lewis, Vihvelin, et, al. David Lewis has offered what has become the most influential response: local-miracle compatibilism. I present a critique of this kind of response to the Consequence Argument. My critique shows that, although Lewis-style (...) local-miracle compatibilism may effectively address some versions of the Consequence Argument, it does not succeed in refuting others. My critique consists, in large part, in arguing for a new reconstruction of the principle of the fixity of the past - a principle that played a crucial role in the history of the debate and that has, in one form or another, been employed by many important historical figures. I will also show why Lewis’s famous views about our powers in time-travel are false. (shrink)

Moral responsibility and autonomy are closely related structurally and contentwise: they are both members of the “freedom family”. Here I argue that because of these similarities, they are often conflated or at least not carefully separated, and that this has resulted in confusions in important contemporary debates. Autonomy and moral responsibility involve the agent’s identification with the sources of her actions; but autonomy-identification is more robust than responsibility-identification.

In this paper I give an overview of my “framework for moral responsibility,” and I offer some reasons that commend it. I contrast my approach with indeterministic models of moral responsibility and also other compatibilist strategies, including those of Harry Frankfurt and Gary Watson.

Hartry Field distinguished two concepts of type‐free truth: scientific truth and disquotational truth. We argue that scientific type‐free truth cannot do justificatory work in the foundations of mathematics. We also present an argument, based on Crispin Wright's theory of cognitive projects and entitlement, that disquotational truth can do justificatory work in the foundations of mathematics. The price to pay for this is that the concept of disquotational truth requires non‐classical logical treatment.

We typically think we have free will. But how could we have free will, if for anything we do, it was already true in the distant past that we would do that thing? Or how could we have free will, if God already knows in advance all the details of our lives? Such issues raise the specter of "fatalism". This book collects sixteen previously published articles on fatalism, truths about the future, and the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human freedom, (...) and includes a substantial new introductory essay and bibliography. Many of the pieces collected here build bridges between discussions of human freedom and recent developments in other areas of metaphysics, such as philosophy of time and the nature of metaphysical "dependence". Ideal for courses in free will, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion, Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge will encourage important new directions in thinking about free will, time, and truth. (shrink)

Reflection principles are of central interest in the development of axiomatic theories. Whereas they are independent statements they appear to have a specific epistemological status. Our trust in those principles is as warranted as our trust in the axioms of the system itself. This paper is an attempt in clarifying this special epistemic status. We provide a motivation for the adoption of uniform reflection principles by their analogy to a form of the constructive \(\omega \) -rule. Additionally, we analyse the (...) role of informal arithmetic and the conception of natural numbers as an inductive structure, also with regard to extra conceptual resources such as a primitive truth predicate. (shrink)

This is a selection of essays on moral responsibility that represent the major components of John Martin Fischer's overall approach to freedom of the will and moral responsibility. The collection exhibits the overall structure of Fischer's view and shows how the various elements fit together to form a comprehensive framework for analyzing free will and moral responsibility. The topics include deliberation and practical reasoning, freedom of the will, freedom of action, various notions of control, and moral accountability. (...) The essays seek to provide a foundation for our practices of holding each other (and ourselves) morally and legally accountable for our behavior. A crucial move is the distinction between two kinds of control. According to Fischer, "regulative control" involves freedom to choose and do otherwise ("alternative possibilities"), whereas "guidance control" does not. Fischer contends that guidance control is all the freedom we need to be morally responsible agents. Further, he contends that such control is fully compatible with causal determinism. Additionally, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access to alternative possibilities in order for there to be a legitimate point to practical reasoning. Fischer's overall framework contains an argument for the contention that guidance control, and not regulative control, is associated with moral responsibility, a sketch of a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility (that ties together responsibility for actions, omissions, consequences, and character), and an account of the value of moral responsibility. On this account, the value of exhibiting freedom (of the relevant sort) and thus being morally responsible for one's behavior is a species of the value of artistic self-expression. (shrink)

I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we can (...) see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned (even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own account. (shrink)

Near-death experiences offer a glimpse not only into the nature of death but also into the meaning of life. They are not only useful tools to aid in the human quest to understand death but are also deeply meaningful, transformative experiences for the people who have them. In a unique contribution to the growing and popular literature on the subject, philosophers John Martin Fischer and Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin examine prominent near-death experiences, such as those of Pam Reynolds, Eben Alexander (...) and Colton Burpo. They combine their investigations with critiques of the narratives' analysis by those who take them to show that our minds are immaterial and heaven is for real. In contrast, the authors provide a blueprint for a science-based explanation. Focusing on the question of whether near-death experiences provide evidence that consciousness is separable from our brains and bodies, Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin give a naturalistic account of the profound meaning and transformative effects that these experiences engender in many. This book takes the reality of near-death experiences seriously. But it also shows that understanding them through the tools of science is completely compatible with acknowledging their profound meaning. (shrink)

"There are seven chapters, addressing philosophical issues pertaining to death, the badness of death, time and death, ideas on immortality, near death experiences, and extending life through medical technology. The book is shorter, and less elaborate, than Kagan's Death. And it goes into more depth about a selection of central issues related to death and immortality than May's book. It gives an original take on various basic puzzles pertaining to death, and integrates a discussion of these philosophical issues with an (...) analysis of near-death experiences, as well as an exploration of contemporary efforts to extend life by heroic medical means"--. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an account of both components. The authors go on (...) to offer a sustained defense of the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism. (shrink)