Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 4 Seiten: 626-631.

Dostoevskiĭ i ego khristianskoe miroponimanie -- T︠S︡ennostʹ i bytie -- Bog i mirovoe zlo.

This article is a short presentation of God existance in Julian Tuwim’s works. In the early period of Julian Tuwim literal output, in juveniles and Czyhanie na Boga (Wailing for God), Sokrates tańczący (Dancing Socrates), Siódma jesień (Seventh Autumn), Słowa we krwi (Words in Blood), God is shown with a passion and nostalgia. But afterwords its position changed and was usually depicted as Jesus Christ. God became a sinonime of lost love, order, consolation in the article of awe existance, justice (...) which lack of them is visible for Tuwim. God is a creation power and women become deified by him. It is hard to talk about transcendental experience in Tuwim’s poetry. There is no way out to the history, society and culture. (shrink)

In this article, I present the conception of the first object of human intellect in the thought of the leading representatives of 13th century Scholasticism. The first object of a cognitive faculty is the essence that determines the proper domain of that faculty; thus the first object of human intellect is what defines the possible extension of human epistemic possibilities. The conception of the first object of human intellect presupposes and implies definite solution of important epistemological, metaphysical, and anthropological questions. (...) While one current of scholastic opinion, represented by St. Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent favored God as the first object of human intellect, more empirically minded Aquinas upheld the Aristotelian position that the proper object of human intellectual cognition is the essence of material reality; Duns Scotus evolved an elaborate position that tried to steer the middle course between the solutions of his predecessors and overcome the one-sidedness of their insights. Finally, I proceed to vindicate my opinion, that the epistemology of the 15th century thinker Nicholas of Cusa remained under significant influence of the scholastic debates and solutions. (shrink)

Does God suffer? Some critical remarks on Dariusz Łukasiewicz’s paper ‘The suffering of God and the evil’ (Czy Bóg cierpi? Uwagi polemiczne do artykułu Dariusza Łukasiewicza 'Cierpienie Boga za zło') Author of article argues that Dariusz Łukasiewicz's criticism of Thomas G. Weinandy's book Czy Bóg cierpi?, directed towards three arguments for impassibility of God doesn't defeat Weinandy's theses. There are three reasons of that. First, Łukasiewicz criticism doesn't take into account metaphysical nature of Weinandy's arguments concerning nature of suffering and (...) God. Second, some of assumptions are attributed by Łukasiewicz to author of Does God suffer? mistakenly. Third, Łukasiewicz criticism that Weinandy's thought is too optimistic doesn't realize that philosophy cannot justify or disprove all theological theses, because many of them are beyond the reach of human reason. Article ends with some suggestions about proper use of analogy in attribution of properties to God. (shrink)

Można wyróżnić dwa rodzaje powiązań między antyrealizmem semantycznym a teizmem. Pierwsze z nich ma swoje źródło w antyrealistycznym twierdzeniu, że język rozumiemy dzięki naszej znajomości uzasadnień sądów lub zdań. W konsekwencji tego staje się czymś niemożliwym przekazanie wiedzy Boga wierzącemu, jeśli ten ostatni osobiście nie zna uzasadnienia odpowiedniego zdania. Ze szczególnie mocnym przedstawieniem tej doktryny mamy do czynienia na ostatnich stronach Logicznej podstawy metafizyki Michaela Dummetta. Można to rozumieć jako całkowite odrzucenie każdego rodzaju iluminacjonizmu, a także pewnych w jakiś sposób (...) pokrewnych mu stanowisk, takich jak idealizm transcendentalny. Drugie powiązanie ma charakter bardziej pozytywny dla teizmu. Antyrealizm musi przyjąć, że każdy sąd może być poznany, co wydaje się sprzeczne ze zdrowym rozsądkiem. Istnieje jednak prosty sposób na uczynienie tej sugestii czymś prawdziwym, a mianowicie przyjęcie istnienia wszechwiedzącego Boga, który zna każdy sąd. Ten sposób myślenia po raz pierwszy został wyeksponowany trzydzieści lat temu przez Alvina Plantingę i stał się przedmiotem szczegółowych dyskusji różnych filozofów. Należy podkreślić, że po szczegółowym zbadaniu te dwa rodzaje powiązań nie są równie mocno uzasadnione, ponieważ tylko pierwsze z nich jest silnie zakorzenione w antyrealistycznej semantyce, podczas gdy drugie jest jedynie pewną spekulatywną sugestią. (shrink)

This collection of short stories and essays call into question the medical-scientific narrative, its understandings of psychoanalysis and madness, and the identity, purpose and ethics that flow from and sustain its narrative. These stories are gathered from meetings with people on in-patient units and in private practice. Emphasis is placed on the centrality of the Freudian unconscious in the process of listening, understanding and responding in the analytic discourse. Collectively, they reintroduce the identity of the analytic practitioner as the shaman (...) of contemporary times, a mind-poet who sees the world through a magical--as opposed to a scientific--visionary experience. "With a wry humour and piercing intellect, Dr. Kavanaugh's Stories from the Bog... evokes the Celtic legacy of story-telling in psychoanalysis."--David L. Downing. "A scintillating book that dances on edges of the human mind. At once, challenging, reflective and enriched by details of therapeutic work."--Michael Eigen, author, Contact with the depths. "Dr. Kavanaugh captures the essence of the psychoanalytic enterprise.... this book is a work of psychoanalytic art by one of its most creative practitioners."--Marvin Hyman. (shrink)

Adolf Reinach began his education in phenomenology with the teachings of Theodor Lipps before encountering Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations in 1902. What attracted Reinach to the Logical Investigations was the philosophical realism he saw accompanying Husserl’s criticism of psychologism and discussions of the formal structures of meaning therein. However, shortly after Reinach and a number of the Munich Circle members began studying with him in Göttingen, it became clear that the position Husserl espoused was shifting into transcendental idealism. Reinach maintained (...) a theoretical independence from Husserl while embarking on the richest kind of dialogue with his revolutionary texts and teachings. By bringing out the strengths of some of Husserl’s ideas and finding ways to repair the weaknesses of others, Reinach discovered new applications for the realism he found so attractive and significant in the Logical Investigations. I argue that this was how Reinach’s response to Husserl took shape and grew, and set the foundation for the version of phenomenology that Reinach would continue to build upon with his own students until he left for the battlefield of World War I. This article sets forth and explores Reinach’s realist response to Husserl by focusing on his expansion of the a priori, and his ontological work on essence and states of affairs – including his original contributions to jurisprudence. (shrink)

Greek philosophy, especially Aristotelianism, because of the concept of God present in this thought, did not raise the issue of divine omniscience and divine knowledge of evil. The divine omnisciene seemed to be contrary to God’s perfect being. In the time of Themistius, whose thought I present in this paper, Neoplatonism and Christian Neoplatonism showed new possibilities of solving this problem. Themistius being aware of these new topics and including them in his own philosophy, still however represents ancient Aristotelianism with (...) all its limitations. He asked about divine knowlegde of evil, but in his answer he repeated only the Aristotelian doctrine: God knows only Himself, because He Himself is the most perfect object of knowledge and cannot know less perfect beings. (shrink)

Scientists, when they want to understand properties of complex systems, they divide them into simple parts and – knowing the parts and their relations – reconstruct the whole. This approach is effective in the case of simple systems: atomic nuclei, atoms, chemical compounds, stars and so on. In biology it is supplemented by the theory of evolution. However the situation is hopeless when one wants to explain the astonishing properties of the Universe generally known as Anthropic Principle. Discussing that problem, (...) philosophers use the metaphor of God as a Mathematician. The aim of the paper is to prove the inadequacy of this metaphor. (shrink)

Artykuł stanowi odpowiedź na Stanisława Judyckiego argument z odwróconego spektrum aksjologicznego za koniecznością odwołania się do Bożych nakazów dla uzasadnienia naszych przekonań moralnych. Tekst składa się z trzech części. W pierwszej prezentuję Judyckiego argument z odwróconego spektrum aksjologicznego oraz odwołanie się do Bożych nakazów dla uzasadnienia naszych moralnych przekonań. Na potrzeby tego tekstu uznaję potrzebę odwołania się do teizmu dla pokonania sceptycyzmu moralnego. W części drugiej wysuwam zarzut, że stanowisko Judyckiego popada w błędne koło. W części trzeciej proponuję alternatywną wersję (...) teistycznego uzasadnienia wiedzy moralnej, zgodnie z którą możemy odwołać się do Boga jako tego, który stworzył ludzi w taki sposób, aby dysponowali zdolnością wiarygodnego poznania moralnego. (shrink)