This essay responds to the argument that Jonathan Riley offers in the February 2013 issue of Political Theory for rendering Isaiah Berlin’s theory of pluralism consistent with his commitment to negative liberty. I show that the “standard of humanity” that Riley attributes to Berlin fails to take account of Berlin’s distinction between “political” liberty (which has nothing to do with our humanity as such) and what Berlin calls “basic” liberty (which does). Consequently, Riley ends up conflating the conditions for living (...) in a decent society (one which respects a minimal core set of human rights) with being a human being. And this leads him to make the further, mistaken assumption that humans need to “exercise” their generic human capacities in order to remain human and not become, in Riley’s words, “robots or moral idiots.” While Riley’s essay is a valuable contribution to our understanding of what we might call Berlin’s ethic of human rights, it ultimately fails in its effort to show that the domain of human rights constitutes Berlin’s standard of humanity (as opposed to decency), and therefore it fails to show that normal human beings must assign overriding moral priority to a modicum of political liberty in order to secure their humanity. (shrink)