Papers presented at Symposium "Ideologiekritik und Politische Theorie bei Hans Kelsen" held May 15-17, 1981, at Schloss Retzhof near Leibnitz, Austria.

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Ideologiekritik" verfügbar.

This chapter discusses a fundamental ambivalence in Marx's use of the term "ideology". On the one hand, he employs a cognitivist critique of ideologies, condemning them in virtue of their epistemic or cognitive insufficiencies. On the other hand, what he so describes as false is a specific second-order belief: The belief that the cognitive is independent from material practice. If this belief is false, however, a merely epistemic critique of ideologies must miss its very point. -/- The chapter argues that (...) there is a way out of this dilemma if we assume, that ideologies are correct expressions of false practices. Ideological practices are practices which are constituted by norms that deny people the opportunity to legitimately question the categories which express basic distinctions established in the practices. In this case, ideological beliefs are not false, but deficient insofar they can only be expressed by employing concepts that rely on a limitation of our cognitive abilities. (shrink)

From the outset, critical social theory has sought to diagnose people’s participation in their own oppression, by revealing the roots of irrational and self-undermining choices in the complex interplay between human nature, social structures, and cultural beliefs. As part of this project, Ideologiekritik has aimed to expose faulty conceptions of this interplay, so that the objectively pathological character of what people are “freely” choosing could come more clearly into view. The challenge, however, has always been to find a way (...) of doing this without arrogantly assuming special access to what is good for people. And this danger of paternalism is one to which social theorists have all too often fallen prey. In this brief essay, I focus on contemporary instances of clearly self-defeating behavior in contexts of complex choices. I begin by discussing a recent attempt to diagnose and solve these failures of choices, namely the public policy recommendations of behavioral economist Richard Thaler and reform-minded legal theorist Cass Sunstein. Their influential “libertarian paternalist” approach is particularly interesting, both in what it includes (attention to the socially constructed nature of choice situations and the roots of the problems in human nature) and in what it leaves out (an understanding of the social construction of human nature and an adequate appreciation of the value of autonomy). After discussing it, I consider a broadly perfectionist alternative, to the effect that the problem lies in a failure to adequately appreciate the importance of developing autonomy. I then turn to sketching the outlines of a new approach, based on the concept of “autonomy gaps,” which approaches overly demanding policies in relational and action-theoretical terms. In the final section, I show how this provides the basis for an analysis both in terms of a critique of ideology and of social pathology. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adornos Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (1963) gehört zu den umstrittensten Texten der Kritischen Theorie. Während der Titel inner- und außerhalb der akademischen Debatte längst zu einem geflügelten Wort mutiert ist, steht diesem die Kenntnis des Inhalts diametral gegenüber. Zumeist wird die Schrift als eine Polemik gegen Martin Heidegger abgehandelt, die zu einer 'philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung' Hermann Mörchen) zwischen Frankfurt und Freiburg geführt habe. Plattitüden dieser Art verkennen jedoch den ideologiekritischen Charakter der Streitschrift. Adornos Kritik am neudeutschen Jargon richtet sich keineswegs (...) primär gegen Heidegger, sondern bezieht sich auf ein breites gesellschaftliches Phänomen. Sie hat ihren Ursprung bereits in den 1920er-Jahren in der Kritik Siegfried Kracauers an der Bibel-Übersetzung von Martin Buber und Franz Rosenzweig. Ziel des Sammelbandes ist es, den Jargon der Eigentlichkeit jenseits akademischer Departementalisierungen zu erschließen und auf die Aktualität von Adornos Kritik hinzuweisen. (shrink)

Critical social science has to acknowledge that every fundamental critique of society implies the justification of alternative norms and institutions. Several current objections against such an explicitly normative understanding of critical social science are discussed. The following outline of a theory of a just society tries to meet two demands: the rational consensus of all individuals concerned and the satisfaction of individual interests. In societies characterized by class struggles, however, these two aims turn out to be incompatible. Therefore an ethical (...) realist approach is offered which takes into account the clarification and normative reinterpretation of interests. The tools of analytic philosophy can be given new application in combination with an analysis of interests under the title of a critique of ideology. (shrink)

This paper explains the genealogical method as it is understood and employed in contemporary Continental philosophy. Using a pair of terms from Bernard Williams, genealogy is contrasted with phenomenology as an `unmasking' as opposed to a `vindicatory' method. The genealogical method is also compared with the method of Ideologiekritik and recent critical theory. Although genealogy is usually thought to be allergic to universals, in fact Foucault, Derrida, and Bourdieu do not shun universals, even if they approach them with caution. (...) The conclusion is that genealogy is a viable and productive approach to social criticism and self-transformation. (shrink)

Preface -- Introduction: the scandal of reason and the paradox of judgment -- Political judgment and the vocation of critical theory -- Critical theory: political judgment as ideologiekritik -- Philosophical liberalism: reasonable judgment -- Liberalism and critical theory in dispute -- Judgment unbound: Arendt -- From critique of power to a theory of critical judgment -- The political epistemology of judgment -- The critical consensus model -- Judgment, criticism, innovation -- Conclusion: letting go of ideal theory.

Die Krisenerfahrungen der Moderne führen zum Rückgriff auf vormoderne Ordnungsvorstellungen, die jene Legitimationsdefizite kompensieren sollen, die im Zuge einer Dialektik der Aufklärung entstanden sind: die emanzipatorische Kraft der Vernunft scheint sich in eine Instanz neuer Herrschaft zu verkehren, als deren Organ die als repressiv erfahrenen Ordnungsleistungen des Staates begriffen werden. Diese Situation begünstigt die Suche nach Kräften, die menschlichem Eingriff entzogen sind, und kommt der Rehabilitierung von Naturvorstellungen entgegen, die sich der Welt des Menschen als normative Ordnungsquelle anbieten. Inwieweit sich (...) gerade die Geschlechterbeziehungen als Ausdruck solch natürlicher Ordnung verstehen lassen, ist eine der zentralen Fragen einer kritischen feministischen Philosophie. Die Untersuchungen, die die AutorInnen dieses Bandes vorlegen, bewegen sich im thematischen Umkreis dieser Fragestellung: in der Art eines Kompendiums werden in Interpretationen von Texten der politischen Philosophie, die in der Epoche von 1600-1850 entstanden sind, paradigmatische Legitimationsfiguren herausgearbeitet und der feministischen Ideologiekritik zugänglich gemacht. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Unconventional Guest: Masao Abe’s Dialogue with the American AcademyWilliam R. LaFleurDuring the two years we were together at Princeton I once took Masao Abe to meet my parents, then alive and living in New Jersey. I had told them some things in advance about Abe, about Zen, and about what in Abe’s ways could at times be unconventional. My mother, I knew, would put lots of effort into preparing (...) the Sunday dinner we ate on the day of our visit. At the meal’s conclusion Abe turned to my mother and declared: “Mrs. LaFleur, this meal has been simply outrageous! ” For a moment I thought he might have meant “delicious” and had landed on the wrong word. But then I saw his smiling eyes and mouth. He had meant what he said. Everyone laughed and my mother promptly thanked him for his “compliment.”Being at times a genially unconventional guest, one who also in academic or dialogic contexts would say surprising or even unsettling things, was something at which Abe excelled. He was also unconventional in his teaching. He frustrated us when we expected the usual approach. In the book edited by Donald Mitchell I told how in 1969 at the University of Chicago Abe aggravated those of us graduate students who wanted to do a survey of all of modern Japanese philosophy; Abe forced us to stay with certain sentences in Nishida, wanting our minds to be changed. He would not budge.1Some years later at Princeton he proved to be maddeningly insistent on this. Reading The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch with graduate students in 1977 who knew some Chinese and Japanese was not for Professor Abe going to be exercise in the usual historico-textual excavation; all that was available, he said, in the introduction and notes to Philip Yampolsky’s translation of that text. He was not interested in an “objectification” that put distance between the voice speaking through the text and the person being addressed by it today. For him the ancient text must read as if written for us and for us today. With Abe as teacher the dialogic mode of the seminar room had to replicate in its own way the lecture hall of the Ta-fan Temple! But graduate students at Princeton, inured as they were to the conventional mode of textual-historical analysis, were made clearly uncomfortable by this. Therefore, hoping I might serve as a mediator, they asked me to ask Abe if we might be more historical and move on more quickly. When, with some trepidation, I transmitted this request [End Page 127] to Abe, he merely chuckled and smiled, leaving me to guess why we should expect no change in his emphasis. What follows is my attempt to unpack what was involved in this... and why it remains relevant today.Even some more recent scholars of East Asian Buddhism in our academy today resemble those graduate students back then in Princeton. They, too, have been suggesting that there was something “behind the times” or in need of being updated in the dialogic teaching mode used so brilliantly by Abe—as well as by Hisamatsu Shin’ichi and D. T. Suzuki. However, there is, I think, something both laughably conventional and arrogantly neocolonialist in these critics’ assumptions. They believe that textual and historicist methods (of which Ideologiekritik is an extension) remain something that the West still needs to teach to the non-West, that these render all other methods outdated and irrelevant, and that they can be deployed to expose what remains flawed in the way that, for instance, Japanese such as Abe study and teach Buddhism and Zen.Ironically, this presumptuous stance itself crumbles under historical and textual analysis—at least when applied to Japan. In various studies, Michael Pye has shown that Tominaga Nakamoto’s studies of Buddhist texts, historical and critical to the core, were done in the early seventeenth century and show a solid tradition of scholarship in this mode arising there without any influence from Europe. As Pye shows, interest in the plurality of religions and an early stage of a “science of religions” were present in Japan... (shrink)

In dem vorliegenden Band werden Arbeiten zusammengefafh, die sich kritisch mit Fragen von aus dem Marxschen Ideologiebegriff abgeleiteten Gesellschaftstheorien ebenso befassen wie mit der Komplexitat des Marxschen Ideologiebegriffs selbst, den orthodox-marxistischen und den marxistisch-revisionistischen Ideologietheorien, ihrem Wandel, ihren politisch-ideologischen Funktionen in unterschiedlichen histo­ risch-gesellschaftlichen Beziigen und, nicht zuletzt, ihrer theoretisch-methodologi­ schen Verwendbarkeit fiir das Verstandnis von Geist und Geschichte einerseits, Poli­ tik und Gesellschaft andererseits. Die hier versammelten Studien sind in den Jahren von 1960 bis 1975 entstanden. Sie beruhen zum (...) Teil auf Vorarbeiten, die bis in die Jahre 1954/55 zuriickreichen. Zwei Arbeiten sind bisher unveroffentlicht: der Einleitungsaufsatz »Ideologie und Ideologiebegriff. Dberlegungen zu ihrer metatheoretischen und immanent-kriti­ schen Aufarbeitung« (S. XIII-XVIII u. 1-21) und die Abhandlung »Entwurf einer Typologie des Ideologiebegriffs« (S. 82-102); aIle anderen Arbeiten sind, an ver­ streuten Stellen, bereits erschienen. 1m Laufe des letzten Jahrzehnts hat sich die theoretische Position des Verfassers insofern geklart, als er heute bestimmte Perspektiven der Wissenssoziologie und der Ideologiekritik mit einem historisch-soziologisch orientierten Funktionalismus in seinen metatheoretischen, d. h. theoretischen und forschungspraktischen, Beziigen systematisch aufzuweisen sucht. Damit wird einmal versucht, die These von der hi­ storisch-sozialen Bedingtheit von Theoriebildungen praziser als in der alteren Wis­ senssoziologie zu begriinden und historisches BewuBtsein durch positive Forschung neu zu fundieren. Mit einem solchen Ansatz versucht der Verfasser zweitens, die Kluft zwischen normativ-praskriptiven und empirisch-deskriptiven Forschungsan­ satzen, die in den Sozialwissenschaften weiterhin besteht, zu iiberbriicken. (shrink)

Theodor Geiger (1891-1952) zählt zu den vernachlässigten Klassikern der deutschen Soziologie. Realismus und Ideologiekritik bilden die Klammer für ein Opus, das von der Schichtungs-, Rechts- und Erziehungssoziologie über Fragen zur Eugenik bis hin zur Erkenntnis-, Modernitäts- und Demokratietheorie reicht. Die vorliegende Studie ist der Versuch, trotz der zahlreichen Wechselfälle in Geigers Leben eine Gesamtwürdigung seines umfangreichen und heterogenen Werkes vorzulegen. Berücksichtigt werden die zum Teil schwer zugänglichen Schriften aus dem skandinavischen Exil sowie einige bislang unveröffentlichte Arbeiten aus dem Nachlass. (...) Dies erlaubt es, wissenschaftsbiographisch aufschlussreiche Aspekte aus der Zeit der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung zu erhellen. Der Vergleich mit alten und neuen Klassikern macht deutlich, dass dem "Querdenker" Geiger innerhalb der frühen deutschen Soziologie eine Ausnahmerolle zukommt. So ist er zum einen Pionier einer kritischen Problem- und Wirklichkeitswissenschaft, der danach strebt, die Soziologie mit den Mitteln der empirischen Sozialforschung und der Sozialstatistik auf eine methodisch kontrollierte Grundlage zu stellen. Zugleich ist Geiger aber auch Machtkritiker, Wertnihilist und Modernist. Als Ausdruck dieser Grundposition lässt sich nicht nur die entschiedene Gegnerschaft zu Kulturkritik, Gemeinschaftsschwärmerei und der NS-Ideologie verstehen, sondern auch sein Beitrag zur Entwicklung einer "realistischen" Demokratiekonzeption. (shrink)

The politics of memory and culture of the Polish People’s Republic alludes to Ideologiekritik in its idiosyncratic way characterized by Marxist utopianism. In reality, this leads to reversing this theory. The causes of fascism are seen in “German imperialism”. For political and strategic reasons the German Democratic Republic becomes one of the main partners of the Polish People’s Republic, with regard to which it is capable of accomplishing the guidelines of its policy in the cultural dimension. This is accompanied (...) by an intensive cultural exchange between the two countries. In the language of official politics manifested, for instance, in the strategy of publishing houses of the Polish People’s Republic the culture of the two countries develop in a parallel fashion, which is an obvious product of the propaganda. (shrink)

I argue that 'deep' ecology (as exemplified by the work of Arnie Naess) involves three inter-related commitments: (1) to an ethics of nature or axiological anti-humanism in which natural entities, processes or systems can possess intrinsic value independently of human beings; (2) a metaphysical naturalism or anti-humanism in which human beings are themselves conceptualized as natural products; (3) a transformative aspect. Although (3) is sometimes cast in personal or psychological terms, I think the idea can be given a properly philosophical (...) reconstruction along the lines of a kind of Ideologiekritik. I give the examples of Heidegger and Adorno to show how deeply our understanding of nature has been corrupted, and hence the depth of conceptual transformation required correctly to conceive nature. But both these thinkers simultaneously demonstrate a hostility to metaphysical naturalism and therefore have ultimately limited value for deep ecology. I then outline three possible relations of axiological to metaphysical commitments: (a) the abandonment of naturalism about values; (b) a projective or transcendentally idealist account of values; (c) an account of values as themselves lodged within the operation of natural systems. My reconstruction of the Ideologiekritiker shows them belonging to (b). So that if deep ecology is to avoid (a), it must embrace (c). Deleuze is much touted by environmental philosophers as contributing to (c). I argue that this is correct, but that the axiological commitments Deleuze manifests in his account of nature are ultimately quite different from those to which deep ecologists appear sympathetic. (shrink)

While it is clear that the Gadamer–Habermas debate has had a major influence on Paul Ricoeur, his commentators have had little to say about the nature of this influence. I try to remedy this silence by showing that Ricoeur''s account of tradition is a direct response to the Gadamer–Habermas debate. First, I briefly explain the debate''s importance and describe Ricoeur''s reaction to it. Next, I show how his discussion of tradition in Time and Narrative steers a middle course between Gadamerian (...) hermeneutics and Habermasian Ideologiekritik. Finally, I raise some critical questions about the adequacy of Ricoeur''s middle course. Specifically, I argue that it rests on an implausible distinction between the form and the content of tradition. (shrink)