이데올로기 문제, 상업주의적 평화사상, 인간의 소중 함을 피력한 저자의 글 모음.

After the era of nihilism, ethical issues have been gradually focused on how to rebuild a value of “Being”. Thinkers tend to reaffirm the significance of one’s own Being and try to find a way of existence in order to resist against nothingness. In such an epoch, Levinas contends that the ethics “for the Other” and the existence are inextricably linked. Furthermore, he notes that the value of existence is not revealed against the nihilism, but realized with the ethics “for (...) the Other” in one’s act of assuming the burden of existence. The meaning of “Being” is thus revealed in the effort of “for the Other” and in the noble will of making the sense of responsibility beyond ones’ own Being to reach the Other.Después de la era del nihilismo, las cuestiones éticas se han ido enfocando gradualmente en cómo reconstruir un valor de “Ser”. Los pensadores tienden a reafirmar la importancia del propio Ser e intentan encontrar una manera de existir capaz de resistir contra la nada. En dicha época, Levinas sostiene que la ética “por el Otro” y la existencia están inextricablemente unidas. Más aún, dice que el valor de la existencia no se revela frente al nihilismo, sino que se realiza en la ética “por el Otro” en el acto mismo de asumir la carga de la existencia. El sentido de “ser” es así revelado en el esfuerzo “por el Otro” y en la voluntad noble de dar sentido a la responsabilidad más allá del propio Ser para alcanzar al Otro. (shrink)

1. Sŏŏn -- 2. Illyu sahoe ŭi tangmyŏn kwaje -- 3. 'Kŭllobŏl ch'ŏrhak (Global Philosophy)' ŭrosŏ sinsiryongjuŭi (Neopragmatism) -- 4. Sinsiryongjuŭi (Neopragmatism) ŭi kyŏngje ch'ŏrhak kwa kyŏngje ironjŏk mohyŏng -- 5. Sinsiryongjuŭi ŭi 'ch'ŏngsajin’ -- 6. Sinsiryongjuŭi (Neopragmatism) wa Miguk, Chungguk siryongjuŭi ŭi ch'aichŏm -- 7. Sinsiryongjuŭi (Neopragmatism) wa Marŭk'ŭsijŭm (Marxism) ŭi ch'aichŏm -- 8. Han'guk sahoe e taehan Sinsiryongjuŭi chŏgyong -- 9. Yoyak mit kyŏllon.

Standard animalists are committed to a stringent form of restricted composition, thereby denying the existence of brains, hands, and other proper parts of an organism . One reason for positing this near-nihilistic ontology comes from various challenges to animalism such as the Thinking Parts Argument, the Unity Argument, and the Argument from the Problem of the Many. In this paper, I show that these putatively distinct arguments are all instances of a more general problem, which I call the ‘Too Many (...) Candidates Problem’ . Given my formulation of the problem, it is evident that standard animalists are mistaken in believing that restricting composition is the only solution. I show that there is another option for solving the TMC. The advantage of such a position, which I call ‘unrestricted animalism’, is that it is compatible with unrestricted composition and the existence of brains and other proper parts of an organism. I conclude by sketching several strategies one can take regarding this latter solution to the TMC. (shrink)

In trying to establish the view that there are no non-living macrophysical objects, Trenton Merricks has produced an influential argument—the Overdetermination Argument—against the causal efficacy of composite objects. A serious problem for the Overdetermination Argument is the ambiguity in the notion of overdetermination that is being employed, which is due to the fact that Merricks does not provide any theory of causation to support his claims. Once we adopt a plausible theory of causation, viz. interventionism, problems with the Overdetermination will (...) become evident. After laying out the Overdetermination Argument and examining one extant objection to it, I will explicate the relevant aspects of an interventionist theory of causation and provide a characterization of overdetermination that follows from such an account. From this, I will argue that the Causal Principle that undergirds the Overdetermination Argument is false and hence the argument is invalid; and I claim that the only other available characterization of overdetermination would render a key premise in the argument false. Thus, the Overdetermination Argument fails to provide us with any reason to deny the causal efficacy of macrophysical objects, and therefore provides no reason to doubt their existence. (shrink)

Chinese philosophy of religion is a less discussed and less clearly formed area in the study of Chinese philosophy. It is true that there is virtually no discussion in Chinese philosophy about rationality or justification of religious beliefs comparable to the discussion of the same issues in Western philosophy of religion. The inquiry about rationality and justification of religious beliefs has shaped Western philosophy of religion. However, the scope of philosophy of religion in the Western context has been widened since (...) Hume and Kant. When the West began to be exposed to non-Western religions, philosophical reflection on non-Western religions is also brought into the scope of philosophy of Religion. We can expect that the concept of religion will become much broader, the scope of philosophy of religion will expand and new issues, especially, issues concerning specific and non-Western religions, will be framed. When we look at philosophy of religion in a broad sense, the field of Chinese philosophy of religion begins to emerge. In this survey paper, I will focus on several issues which, in a broad sense of philosophy of religion, can be construed as the issues of Chinese philosophy of religion. One of the issues is about the religiosity of Confucianism. The second issue is about the concept of Tian. The third is the issue regarding the origin and nature of Chinese state religion and its characteristics which also have caught the attention of scholars, especially, in China. Is Confucianism a religion? How should we construe the religiosity of Confucianism if it does have a religious dimension? Is Tian a theological term? How does Tian differ from Western God? Is the sacrifice to Tian religious and a form of monotheism? What is the nature of state religion in traditional China? What is the relation between the state religion and Confucianism in traditional China? The debates on the issues addressing these questions will be introduced and discussed in this paper. (shrink)

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English. COVID-19疫情的爆發，突顯出公共健康倫理中自主性與公共健康之間的緊張關係。以“publichealth”、“ethics”、“autonomy”為主題詞在WebofScience核心合集數據庫中 進行文獻收集，借助CiteSpace6.1軟件進行信息可視化分析，發現2020年1月1日至2022年5月14日期間，生命倫理/公共健康倫理領域對於“自主性”概念的討論大體上集中在“知情同意”、“健康保 健政策"、“健康質量”、“信息技術”和“老年歧視/老年群體”範圍。本文在此基礎上提煉分析COVID-19疫情中的四個“自主性‘‘難題 如何避免以公共健康/公共利益為名過度限制自主性、在數字技術應用中如何保障自主性、如何保障老年群體的自主性和生命權，如何通過促進自主性來推動公共健康目標的實現。COVID-19疫情是一個重塑公共健康倫理 自主性概念的歷史契機。冷酷的病毒已經作為一種媒介把人類的命運緊密地聯繫起來，而基於關懷倫理和共同體倫理重塑的自主性概念則有望給疫情下的世界帶來團結、温暖和希望。 In the field of public health ethics, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the tension between autonomy and public health. Using CiteSpace 6.1 software and information visualization analysis, we performed a search of literature in the Web of Science core collection database using thematic words such as “public health”, “ethics” and “autonomy”, we found that from January 1, 2020 to May 14, 2022, discussions on the concept of “autonomy” (...) within the field of bioethics/public health ethics were generally focused on the following topics: “informed consent”, “health care policy”, “health quality”, “information technology”, “ageism” and “elderly group”. In this paper, we distill and analyze four controversial issues: how can we avoid excessive restrictions on autonomy in the name of public health/public interest? How can we protect autonomy when using digital technology? How can we protect the autonomy and rights of the elderly? How can we advance the goals of public health by promoting autonomy? The COVID-19 pandemic is a unique historical opportunity to reshape the concept of autonomy within the field of public health ethics. Although the virus has bound the fate of humanity together, a reinvented concept of autonomy based on care and community ethics holds the promise of bringing solidarity, comfort, and hope to the world in the midst of the pandemic. (shrink)

The past decade has seen major advances in cognitive, affective and social neuroscience that have the potential to revolutionize educational theories about learning. The importance of emotion and social learning has long been recognized in education, but due to technological limitations in neuroscience research techniques, treatment of these topics in educational theory has largely not had the benefit of biological evidence to date. In this article, I lay out two general, complementary findings that have emerged from the past decade of (...) neuroscience research on emotion and social processing, with a view to beginning a dialogue about the meaning of these findings for educational theory. First, emotion and cognition are intertwined, and involve interplay between the body and mind. Second, social processing and learning happen by internalizing our subjective interpretations of other people's beliefs, goals, feelings and actions, and vicariously experiencing aspects of these as if they were our own. Together, these two results from neuroscience could have important implications for the design of learning environments; to discover these will require reconciling established educational learning theories with the current neurobiological evidence. (shrink)

Social emotions about others’ minds, for example, admiration for virtue and compassion for social pain, play a critical role in interpersonal relationships, motivation, and morality. However, historical biases toward studying emotions as automatic reactions generated within a solitary individual limit our ability to study emotions about others’ minds, which are inherently complex, social, and subjective. Here, I argue that a microdevelopmental approach, that is, considering these emotions as dynamic, context-dependent mental constructions actively organized from simpler cognitive and affective psychological components, (...) may help to overcome the difficulties of studying these emotions by providing new perspectives on: reliably inducing these emotions; parsing the ensuing experiences into component psychological processes organizing over time; and relating these component processes to patterns of brain activation. (shrink)

No one denies the importance of applying knowledge to actions. But claiming identity (unity) of knowledge and action is quite another thing. There seem to be two problems with the claim: (1) the identity claim implies that the sole cause for one to fail to act on what one judges to be right is ignorance, but it is obviously false that the sole cause of failure in moral actions is ignorance. (2) The identity statement implies non-separation of knowledge and action. (...) But knowledge does not necessarily lead to action. However, the identity of knowledge and action is what a famous Ming Confucian scholar, W ang Yang-ming, proposed and the concept became the central doctrine of his teaching. Though there are several major interpretations of Wang’s doctrine in contemporary literature, it is not clear to me how they deal with the above mentioned difficulties. In this article, I will discuss these interpretations of the doctrine and propose a new interpretation. My purpose is to give an interpretation of Wang’s doctrine that has the capacity of dealing with these challenges to the doctrine and also captures the essence of his teaching. (shrink)

According to Eric Olson, the Thinking Animal Argument (TAA) is the best reason to accept animalism, the view that we are identical to animals. A novel criticism has been advanced against TAA, suggesting that it implicitly employs a dubious epistemological principle. I will argue that other epistemological principles can do the trick of saving the TAA, principles that appeal to recent issues regarding disagreement with peers and experts. I conclude with some remarks about the consequence of accepting these modified principles, (...) drawing out some general morals in defending animalism. (shrink)

In this article, I examine two conflicting readings of Zhuangzi's butterfly dream story in the second chapter of the book named after him: the internal transformation and the external transformation reading. I argue that the external interpretation is better supported by the theme of the second chapter and stories in the second chapter and other chapters. However, I argue, the internal transformation interpretation does not necessarily contradict the external transformation interpretation; rather, it reinforces the external transformation interpretation if we give (...) a different reading to the content of the internal transformation interpretation. (shrink)

Joseph Keim Campbell has attempted to say “farewell” to a particular version of source incompatibilism, viz. direct source incompatibilism, arguing that direct source incompatibilism is committed to two theses that are in tension, thereby threatening the coherence of the position. He states that direct source incompatibilism is committed to the following claims: SI-F: there are genuine Frankfurt-style counterexamples. SI-D: there is a sound version of the Direct Argument. Campbell argues that both of these theses cannot be simultaneously held since a (...) sound version of the Direct Argument would undermine Frankfurt-style counterexamples, and vice versa. After laying out Campbell’s argument, I will first make some preliminary comments regarding actual direct source incompatibilists and their commitment to SI-F and SI-D. I then object to Campbell’s argument, arguing that one can accept both SI-F and SI-D, thereby vindicating direct source incompatibilism from the charge of incoherence. (shrink)

Relationships between children and parents pervade the Star Wars saga, especially if people include surrogate parents. Anakin's relationship with his mother, Shmi, in the prequels impacts his trajectory toward the dark side. In The Mandalorian, Mando's role as a surrogate father to Grogu transforms them into a “Clan of Two”. But the most significant parent‐child relationship in the saga may be the one between Luke Skywalker and Darth Vader. Confucius's teachings highlight the importance of benevolence, social order, and ritual propriety (...) among other virtues and values. This chapter shows that understanding Luke's surrender to Vader in terms of Confucian filial piety makes sense of how Luke is able to overcome the allure of the dark side and become a Jedi. Confucius's Analects has a moral framework called “exemplarism”. This is the idea that moral knowledge and practice do not start with principles, rules, duties, consequences, or character traits. (shrink)

Related Works: Part II: C. T. Chong, Yue Yang. $\Sigma_2$ Induction and Infinite Injury Priority Argument, Part II: Tame $\Sigma_2$ Coding and the Jump Operator. Ann. Pure Appl. Logic, vol. 87, no. 2, 103--116. Mathematical Reviews : MR1490049 Part III: C. T. Chong, Lei Qian, Theodore A. Slaman, Yue Yang. $\Sigma_2$ Induction and Infinite Injury Priority Argument, Part III: Prompt Sets, Minimal Paries and Shoenfield's Conjecture. Mathematical Reviews : MR1818378.

1. Chŏngch'ijŏk olbarŭm (Political correctness, PC) -- 2. Miguk chŏngsin ŭi chongmal (The Closing of the American Mind) -- 3. Munhwa chŏnjaeng (Culture war) -- 4. Chwap'a chŏngch'i (Left-wing politics) -- 5. Up'a chŏngch'i (Right-wing politics) -- 6. Chinbojuŭi (Progressivism) -- 7. Posujuŭi (Conservatism) -- 8. Taejungjuŭi (Populism).

Children's utterances from late infancy to 3 years of age were examined to infer their conception of knowledge. In Study 1, the utterances of two English-speaking children were analysed and in Study 2, the utterances of a Mandarin-speaking child were analysed – in both studies, for their use of the verb know. Both studies confirmed that know and not know were used to affirm, query or deny knowledge, especially concerning an ongoing topic of conversation. References to a third party were (...) rare. By implication, 2-year-olds have a conception of knowledge that underpins their exchange of information in conversation. Implications for the child's developing theory of mind are discussed. (shrink)

As argued above, if we examine each "form of knowledge" within a modern historical context, it seems that we can see a sequentially transformational and coincident historical line that links the material, then the institutional, and then the cultural, while maintaining the sequential development of the linked trends from beginning to end. Even a summary of Lin Yusheng's hypothesis is a continuation of the "mind's" function orientation. This framework, however, must still answer the following question: In the process whereby "forms (...) of knowledge" become intimately connected with transformational events or time sequencing, do they appear in the form of a totalitarian theoretical model, or do they exert their influence in the form of the dispersed role of a discourse? More concretely, in the case of China: When the traditional "forms of knowledge" of modern Chinese intellectuals—for example, the methodology and behavior within the "thought discourses" of the Confucian School—faced the challenge of the West, did they use "a comprehensive theory" to undertake self-adjustment? Michel Foucault raised a query about the role of totalitarian discourse in saying: "At the beginning of any research I expressed a query about these long-established ‘unified’ models. Traditionally, according to these ‘unified’ models we differentiate infinite, repetitive and fecund territories within the discourse. Must we necessarily, on these ‘unities’ which actually are not unities, pile up yet another even more obscure and even more controversial ‘unitary’ model?". (shrink)

In agreement with Comrade Hu Qiaomu's talk on the problem of social science philosophy planning, let me also offer a few suggestions. I shall speak on the topic, "Development Plan of Social Science Philosophy and the Policy of Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom and a Hundred Schools Contend.".

Objectives: To quantify the use of do-not-resuscitate orders in a tertiary-care children’s hospital and to characterise the circumstances in which such orders are written.Design: Retrospective study conducted in a 500-bed children’s hospital in Taiwan.Patients: The course of 101 patients who died between January 2002 and December 2005 was reviewed. The following data were collected: age at death, gender, disease and its status, place of death and survival. There were 59 males and 42 females with a median age of 103 months (...) . 50 children had leukaemias, and 51 had malignancies other than leukaemia. The t test and the χ2 test were applied as appropriate.Results: The study found that 44% of patient deaths occurred in the paediatric oncology ward; 29% of patient deaths occurred in the intensive care unit; and 28% of patients died in their home or at another hospital. Other findings included the following: 46 of 101 patients died after attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation and 55 died with a DNR order in effect. The mean age at death was 9.8 years in both groups with or without DNR orders.Conclusions: From the study of patient deaths in this tertiary-care children’s hospital, it was concluded that an explicit DNR order is now the rule rather than the exception, with more DNR orders being written for patients who have been ill longer, who have solid tumours, who are not in remission and who are in the ward. (shrink)

Several philosophers have argued that property dualism and substance materialism are incompatible positions. Recently, Susan Schneider has provided a novel version of such an argument, claiming that the incompatibility will be evident once we examine some underlying metaphysical issues. She purports to show that on any account of substance and property-possession, substance materialism and property dualism turn out incompatible. In this paper, I argue that Schneider’s case for incompatibility between these two positions fails. After briefly laying out her case for (...) incompatibility, I present an account of substance—one that relies on a relational ontology—that makes the combination of substance materialism and property dualism unproblematic. Then I show that even under the theories of substance that Schneider considers—those that rely on a constituent ontology—there still is no incompatibility problem. (shrink)

This paper offers a fine analysis of different versions of the well known sure-thing principle. We show that Savage's formal formulation of the principle, i.e., his second postulate (P2), is strictly stronger than what is intended originally.

Constituent ontologies maintain that the properties of an object are either parts or something very much like parts of that object. Recently, such a view has been criticized as leading to a bizarre and problematic form of substance dualism and implying the existence of impossible objects. After briefly presenting constituent and relational ontologies, I respond to both objections, arguing that constituent ontology does not yield either of these two consequences and so is not shown to be an unacceptable ontological framework.

This paper addresses the issue of finite versus countable additivity in Bayesian probability and decision theory -- in particular, Savage's theory of subjective expected utility and personal probability. I show that Savage's reason for not requiring countable additivity in his theory is inconclusive. The assessment leads to an analysis of various highly idealised assumptions commonly adopted in Bayesian theory, where I argue that a healthy dose of, what I call, conceptual realism is often helpful in understanding the interpretational value of (...) sophisticated mathematical structures employed in applied sciences like decision theory. In the last part, I introduce countable additivity into Savage's theory and explore some technical properties in relation to other axioms of the system. (shrink)