Proponents of moral enhancement believe that we should pursue and apply biotechnological means to morally enhance human beings, as failing to do so is likely to lead to humanity's demise. Unsurprisingly, these proposals have generated a substantial amount of debate about the moral permissibility of using such interventions. Here I put aside concerns about the permissibility of moral enhancement and focus on the conceptual and evidentiary grounds for the moral enhancement project. I argue that such grounds are quite precarious.

Proper names interpreted as rigid designators do not allow us to formulate metalinguistic statements of the form ‘NN might not have been named “NN”’. All we can do is to show what we are trying to say. But we cannot properly formulate such a metalinguistic statement about a rigid name. The rigidity of the name establishes a relationship with its bearer that is much stronger than the contingent relationship that is supposed to exist in the natural languages between the name (...) and its bearer. The sentence is intuitively true as expressed in natural languages, but once we translate it, if possible, into Kripkean formal semantics it is false because once the individual is rigidly named, she cannot have been named otherwise; or even worse, as I suspect, the whole sentence is untranslatable, because in Kripkean formal semantics there is no possible world in which she would not have had the name she rigidly has. This problem in Kripkean semantics could well be termed, as Wittgenstein would say, an ineffability. Kripkean semantics makes the actual contingent property anyone has of bearing a proper name ineffable, notwithstanding it is effable in natural languages. Keywords: rigid names, metalinguistic statements, rigid quoted names, ineffability. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“It’s not true, but I believe it”: Discussions on jettatura in Naples between the End of the Eighteenth and Beginning of the Nineteenth CenturiesFrancesco Paolo de CegliaIntroduction: What is Jettatura?Non èvero...ma ci credo (“It’s not true... but I believe it”) is the title of a comedy by the Italian actor and playwright, Peppino De Filippo, younger brother of the more famous Eduardo, which was staged for the first time (...) in 1942. The narrated events take place in the twentieth century and concern Gervasio Savastano, a Neapolitan businessman who is tormented by the fear of jettatura. The character, victim of grotesque events, first sacks a worker, believing him to be a jettatore, and then hires another, who is a hunchback and so should bring him good luck. In the end, however, it is discovered that the presumed jettatore has never harmed anyone and that the hunchback is not what he seems: he has stuffed his jacket in order to enter into the good graces of the gullible businessman and marry his daughter, with whom he has planned a con trick. The “lucky” events ascribed to his presence can therefore be considered casual. The epilogue? In keeping with the logic of compromise, typical of the brothers De Filippo’s theater, even though the character is rationally convinced of the unfounded nature of his beliefs, he remains adamant: “It’s not true, but I believe it” in other words.1 [End Page 75]“Where I come from, jettatura rules,” wrote the journalist and scriptwriter Giuseppe Marotta in 1947. Indeed, it is still a part of popular Neapolitan culture today.2 Often confused with similar beliefs, such as fascination (fascino) and the evil eye (malocchio), jettatura assumed its present form between the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, at a time when a polite debate on its nature was taking shape in the city. In this period, the epistemological pluralism animating the discussions was translated into a variety of interpretative hypotheses and literary genres, in which grotesque atmospheres and spirited quips also found room, all perfectly in line with what could be considered the Weltanschauung of Savastano. It is the purpose of this article to examine these discussions, which even spread the term abroad and, with it, the “local color” of the concept.Nineteenth-century European writers on jettatura knew the Neapolitan authors well, and either quoted them explicitly or associated them with characters whose names were a deformation of real people’s: for example, Volitta for Valletta (Stendhal), don Jo (Stendhal) or Ojori (Dumas) for De Jorio. They explained that jettatura corresponded to the more familiar evil eye, but they left the term in Italian, as if to underline the fact that it was untranslatable.Is jettatura a mere anthropological issue, linked to a “primitive” culture, in the face of which official science would remain refractory? A belief that could not be exported or shared by those educated in more “highly developed” contexts? Well, in part, yes. Nevertheless, in the 1840s there was a visitor to Naples who expressed himself in the following terms: “When a foreigner arrives in Naples, at first he laughs at jettatura, then, little by little, he becomes troubled by it, and finally, after a stay of three months, you will see him covered in horns and with his right hand forever clenched [to ward off evil].”3 [End Page 76]So wrote the novelist Alexandre Dumas, père, one of the many travellers who, after having completed the Grand Tour of southern Italy, decided to describe its picturesque scenes and backward customs.4 Creating a veritable topos of travel literature, in the same period the philologist Karl August Mayer commented, “often foreigners let themselves be influenced” by local “superstitions.”5 Indeed many of them were captivated by these Neapolitan beliefs, despite their desire to remain objective and detached; and so they were “converted,” and driven to seek scientific explanations, often after meeting “a Real Jettatore,” whose image had nothing in common with the exotic fantasies of “a French Novelist’s Idea of Jettatore.”6Actually, Dumas and Mayer probably exaggerated somewhat in order to make their descriptions more... (shrink)

RESUME Dans cet article, j’aborde la perspective idéaliste de la « Phénoménologie de la perception » pour montrer que, dans cet ouvrage, l’expérience du corps propre est décrite à partir de la vision du cogito. Pour expliciter cet idéalisme, j’analyse la principale voix donnée au corps au début de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty: la voix pathologique. Les troubles de Schneider rendent explicite son impuissance symbolique, et cette impuissance est vraiment l’impuissance du corps. Le sujet malade est un être soumis (...) à la normativité immédiate de la vie, raison par laquelle il peut découvrir à chaque moment la finitude et la fragilité de l’existence. J’évoque par contre les notes du cours au Collège de France, de 1954-1955, sur la passivité et les cours sur la Nature, de 1957-1958, lorsque Merleau-Ponty examine la vie et la naissance du sens à partir d’une perspective tout à fait différente. J’analyse aussi la lecture qu’il a faite du « cas Dora » pour montrer que le philosophe trouve dans l’hystérie une expérience symbolique très particulière. Cette expérience exige la compréhension de la puissance symbolique du corps propre, l’abandon de la position idéaliste et la découverte du pouvoir de l’hystérique de narrer l’expérience de l’être. ABSTRACT In this article, I approach the idealistic perspective of the “Phenomenology of Perception” to show that in that work the experience of the body is described from a vision of the cogito. To explain this idealism, I asses the main voice given to the body in the beginning of the thought of Merleau-Ponty: the pathological voice. Schneider’s disturbances make explicit its symbolic powerlessness, and that powerlessness is in fact the body’s powerlessness. The sick is a being submitted to the immediate normativity of life, reason by which he can find out at every moment the finitude and fragility of existence. On the other hand, I evoke the course notes from Collège de France, of 1954-1955, about passivity, and the courses about Nature, of 1957-1958, when Merleau-Ponty analyses life and the birth in the sense from an entirely different perspective. Also, I analyze the reading of what he to “case Dora” to show that the philosopher finds in hysteria a very particular symbolic experience. This experience requires understanding the symbolic power of the body itself, the abandonment of the idealist position and the discovery of the power of the hysteric of narrating the experience of being. (shrink)

The question of God or the Divine has essential influenced the development of Fichtian thinking and guided it from transcendental I as the first principle in the Jena period to absolute being or God and his absolute phenomenon or manifestation. The turning point came with the so-called atheism dispute due to his article »On the Ground of our Belief in a divine World-Governance« (Fall 1798), which caused him so much trouble. In this article, Fichte defended the idea that the divine (...) is not a substance or object, not a person, so no theistic God, but the moral order – a notion that could not be accepted by the Christian Church. The criticism that he is either atheist or pantheist or nihilist or a merely subjective thinker has greatly hit him and changed his horizon of thought in line with the new more religious spirit of his cultural environment. Die Frage nach Gott oder nach dem Göttlichen hat die Entwicklung des Fichtischen Denkens grundsätzlich beeinflusst, und vom transzendentalen Ich als erstem Prinzip in seiner Jenaer Zeit zum absoluten Sein oder Gott und seiner absoluten Erscheinung geführt. Der Wendepunkt kam mit dem sogenannten Atheismusstreit aufgrund des Aufsatzes von Fichte »Über den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung « (Herbst 1798), der Fichte so viele Schwierigkeiten bereitete. In diesem Artikel verteidigte Fichte den Gedanken, das Göttliche sei keine Substanz oder Objekt und keine Person, also kein theistischer Gott, sondern die moralische Ordnung – eine Vorstellung, die von der christlichen Kirche nicht akzeptiert werden konnte. Die Vorwürfe, er sei entweder Atheist oder Pantheist oder Nihilist oder ein bloß subjektiv Denkender, hat ihn stark getroffen und seinen Denkhorizont im Einklang mit dem neuen religiöseren Geist seiner kulturellen Umgebung verändert. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René DescartesDennis Des CheneRichard Watson. Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René Descartes. Boston: David R. Godine, 2002. pp. viii + 375. Cloth, $35.00.Somewhere between hagiography and debunking lies truth. Or so we may think: the biographer's sources are almost always tipped one way or the other, and it is his or her job to establish, or divine, the way of authentic (...) fact and, if facts fall short, then of sturdy sober hypothesis. In general the debunker has more fun, especially when the weight of tradition favors the ennobling, if not the beatification, of its subject.Descartes is a case in point. Until a few years ago, there was in English no satisfactory biography. Now there are three: an "intellectual biography" by Stephen Gaukroger, the Descartes of Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, and Watson's. Gaukroger dwells on Descartes's natural philosophy, especially in the early years. Only after 300 pages does he reach the period of the Discourse, Descartes's first published work. Rodis-Lewis offers a more even-handed treatment, the fruits of a lifetime of study. Her Descartes resembles, not the modern scientist or professional philosopher, but the ancient sage for whom metaphysics is a once-in-a-lifetime affair, and even natural philosophy subordinate to wisdom. Watson's Descartes is an altogether more worldly type, born into a family of lawyers, well-connected, touchy [End Page 113] about his place in social and scientific circles, and not all that interested in what we think of now as philosophy. Nor, for that matter, is Watson: you will look in vain for an analysis of the Meditations, a discussion of method, or a definition of générosité. (Watson does conclude, I should note, with a discussion of Descartes's doctrine on the soul, whose title might well have been "The future of an illusion" if Freud had not used it already.)If you like your philosophy uncluttered by context, if you find it worthwhile to read or write about "Cartesian skepticism" or "Cartesian dualism" without troubling yourself to understand who the historical Descartes was, or what might have moved him to confront the skeptics and save the soul, then Watson is not for you. It is emphatically a Life, not a Life and Works. It is, moreover, a life in the manner of many modern biographers, in which the biographer, rather than conceal himself behind the curtains of scholarly convention, figures into the narrative, retracing the steps of Descartes's passage to Italy, examining the baptismal certificate of Descartes's illegitimate daughter Francine, and eating lunch at the Queen Kristina restaurant "next door to the house in which Descartes died" (303). The quality of a biography thus written depends in part on the personality of its author (and in the case of Cogito Ergo Sum, the author's wife, who intervenes more than once on the side of common sense during their peregrinations). Watson is, to my mind, an agreeable companion, dedicated to the search for biographical truth, impatient with hagiographic fog and time-hallowed error, down-to-earth in his assessment of Descartes's motives and circumstances.One example to show the differences among the three biographies. In November 1618 Descartes met the future Latin schoolmaster Isaac Beeckman in Breda. Beeckman records with enthusiasm their joint endeavors in physico-mathematics over the next few months (Gaukroger has the details). It seems clear that the impetus for studying the various problems mentioned in Beeckman's Journal came from Beeckman, who had been pondering physical questions since 1613 or before. Descartes's contribution, at least at first, was his immense mathematical skill. Their interests lay largely within the "mixed mathematics" of the period, especially hydrostatics and mechanics. They also discussed music, an aspect of the "new science" now often neglected (but see H. F. Cohen, Quantifying Music [Dordrecht, 1984]). On New Year's day 1619 Descartes presented Beeckman with his Compendium musicæ (Gaukroger 74, Rodis-Lewis 51/29). A decade later, Descartes, having heard that Beeckman had appropriated the Compendium to himself, became angry and eventually, late in 1630, dismissed Beeckman with a masterpiece of de haut... (shrink)

This article highlights the emerging ethical issues related to reducing the environmental cost of medicines, health technologies and health services, taking as an example the situation of inhalation devices for the relief of various respiratory disorders, i.e., “inhalers”. Inhalers emit greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. Recently proposed regulatory changes aim to control the use of greenhouse gases, but exceptions are necessary for inhalers due to the lack of less polluting substitutes and their vital importance for certain patients. Healthcare (...) professionals and medical associations are actively campaigning for greater awareness and better education on the subject. On the political front, there are calls for legislation to encourage a rapid transition to cleaner inhalers. Long-term solutions include the use of low-carbon inhalers, such as those that use dry powder, as well as changes in prescribing and use practices. Stakeholders agree on the need to reduce environmental impact while prioritizing patient health, but ethical tensions can arise around possible real or perceived trade-offs between therapeutic efficacy, risk and inhaler durability. Our case study highlights the importance of integrating environmental considerations into health policy and clinical practice while recognising the ethically sensitive issues at this intersection, areas of uncertainty and other challenges to be overcome. (shrink)

In this article we will examine, in Sartre, the imminent need for the for-itself has to be based near his conscience. The question by questioning the fundamental design of the for-itself will allow the analysis of human reality as a conscious being, freedom and marked by the anguish of freedom. So how is it possible and how much power it will find a basis for human reality? Sartre's philosophy reveals the human reality as being characterized from the for-itself. Following this (...) proposal, the article will illustrate, first, the discovery of being in-itself, i.e., that being opaque and closed in on itself, the one who possesses the self from itself and that distances itself from the possibilities, being marked by being exactly what it is; the in-itself is what is, or arguably be a quota. On the other hand, is the for-itself, the being who pretends to be in itself, to conduct themselves as a definite being, overcoming the initial contingency in itself, but keeping for itself. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that human reality becomes quite marked by freedom life sentence, since it opened to the latent possibilities as a project to be played in the world, a being who is not content to be what is not and not be what it is, a being who constantly seeks the reasons for its being and resilience of its latent contingency. Thus, it is essential to highlight that, according to Sartre, the for-itself seeks to justify itself and be realized as a conscious thing, that is, a being-in-itself-for-itself. However, when faced with the gratuity of its existence, the for-itself will be transported to an incessant need to live with himself. Thus, the for-itself discovers the trouble, what will make you live in the shadow of their freedom and their choices. (shrink)

The professionalisation of care has resulted in ever increasing specialisation, use of technical innovations and informatisation. This has had consequences for the level and way of involvement of the care provider vis-à-vis the patient. The result has been growing alienation on the part of the patient and flight into non-classical medicine, as well as frustration on the part of medical personnel, likewise with respect to the reactions of patients.A solution is usually sought in more communication. This might be styled the (...) professional answer to alienation and frustration, whereby ‘the human factor’, it is hoped, can be better accounted for. Enhanced communication implies two elements: 1) to better cater for the feelings of patients by trained communicators, i.e. more openness, more client satisfaction; 2) to better take into account patient rights and to actually implement them.The question is whether measures in terms of communication, geared at enhancing client satisfaction and the implementation of patient rights, are the real answer to the above mentioned alienation and frustration. Perhaps the trouble has deeper reasons and requires taking other dimensions into account such as decency and human dignity, which cannot be captured simply in terms of satisfaction and rights.This would mean that the answer must be sought at a deeper level than communication. This level might be called ‘conversation’ . In the second part of the paper, the possible relationship between care and conversation will be briefly analysed. (shrink)

Can we find true bliss in any kind of knowledge or is it proper to wisdom only? In this essay I consider different medieval models of the relationship of knowledge to wisdom and pleasure, beginning with Augustine, then to monastic models, before turning to Scholastic models: the early Scholastic model of the relationship between knowledge is very different from the Aristotelian understanding of intellectual felicity developed by Scholastic philosophers and theologians in the thirteenth century. For Nicholas of Cusa intellectual pleasure (...) is above any pleasure that can be attained by discursive reason; finally, I discuss Charles Bovelles’ synthesis between the neo-Platonic model of the relationship between knowledge and wisdom, which he himself devised, and Augustine’s understanding of the distinction between the two. Thus, after a long historical development we return to the beginning. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the current conditions of the Shoah’s memory transmission. The purpose is to point out the frames where a contemporary theory and praxis of the collective memory can be formulated. The first section, reffering to most recent studies, shows both components caracterizing today’s process of memorizing the Shoah: the passagge from memory to post-memory (Hirsh) and the whirling increase of the chance to record and reproduce the past (Derrida, Ferraris). In the second secion, referring to this theoretical (...) frame, I analyse the radical trasformations of the monument as the traditional media of the european public memory. The reference to the empirical case of the Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas, the Shoah’s Memorial designed by Peter Eisenman, underlines the shift from monument to counter-monument (Young, J. E.) by materializing both the troubles and an inventive strategy to exit the saturation of the current memorial speech. (shrink)

This article presents a multimodal video corpus with the principal aim to model and predict the effects of aging in Mild Cognitive Impairment situation on pragmatic and communicative skills. We take as observable variables the verbal pragmatic markers and non-verbal pragmatic markers. This approach, at the interface of the psycholinguistics, cognitive sciences and rehabilitation medicine (speech-language pathology and therapy) is part of a longitudinal research process in an ecological situation (interviews conducted by close intimate of the elderly).In the first part (...) of the article we present the linguistic, cognitive and social characteristics of aging in its continuum up to mild cognitive impairment and pathological disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease. In the second part, we develop a multimodal approach, in particular to inform and enrich speech and language therapy knowledge. Finally, we present our experimental design and preliminary results on two female participants over 75 years of age with mild cognitive impairment.Our general findings indicate that with aging, verbal pragmatic markers acquire an interactive function that allows people with Mild Cognitive Impairment to maintain intersubjective relationships with their interlocutor. In addition, at the non-verbal level, gestural manifestations are increasingly mobilized over time with a preference for non-verbal pragmatic markers with a referential function and an interactive function. One such non-verbal manifestation compensates for naming deficits, planning difficulties, discursive hitches; while another optimizes and maintains the interaction with the interlocutor.Clinicians have a duty to develop their professional practice through an evidence-based clinical approach whose main objective is to reconcile clinical practice with the best evidence from research (Dollaghan 2007). In the case of speech-language pathology, clinicians consider themselves very limited in this approach (Lof 2011; McCurtin 2011), especially for patients with Mild Cognitive Impairment (Mungas et al. 2010; Hopper 2013; Morello 2017) and more specifically when it comes to assessing or supporting language functions (Cummings 2014).The studies focusing on Mild Cognitive Impairment require longitudinal corpora i) to understand the naturally occurring evolutions in subjects, ii) the implication of the cognitive reserve in each individual, and iii) to take advantage of these parameters as evidence for research and earlier rehabilitation. We aim to show the benefits of linguistic and interactional scientific investigation methods through fragile aging, for health professionals and everyday caregivers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"Even now, now, very now"Mimesis's and Imitation's TemporalitiesJoão Cezar de Castro Rocha (bio)Had we but world enough and time.—Andrew Marvell, "To His Coy Mistress"THE EMPIRE OF NOWNESSIn the contemporary world our lives seem to become ever more Girardian, and to such an extent that even everyday language speaks of this circumstance. I think especially of a tool that is omnipresent in our societies: One just has to listen carefully (...) to the concepts employed daily by billions of users of the digital universal, and more particularly pay attention to the naturalization of an extremely aggressive behavior by the users of social networks.Is it not true that we all want our posts and tweets and photos to go viral? Haven't we all have lost some precious time looking at an infinity of memes scrolling down mechanically screen after screen? In political science, there is even a new approach, memetic, specialized in the study of the production [End Page 47] of memes and above all in understanding the overwhelming impact of their reception—notably in the political arena. Among so many possible examples, the Italian movement Cinque Stelle, the election of both Donald Trump in the United States (2016) and Jair Messias Bolsonaro in Brazil (2018), and the outcome of the Brexit plebiscite (2016) are events intrinsically (although not exclusively) related to a sort of mass production of memes and other gadgets typical of social networks.And that is not all: The word contagion is commonly employed by users in almost a technical Girardian sense. The paroxysm of a world for which social relations are dominated by aggravated internal mediation also deepens the mimetic drive underlying the digital universe. What is one to say of a new "profession" that is flourishing nowadays? I am referring to the digital influencer, whose only possible parallel is given by the uncontrollable multiplication of coaches for every single aspect of life. The reader of René Girard's fundamental work cannot but close her eyes and anticipate the next step. Digital influencers and coaches are only successful if they present themselves as an authentic skandalon to billions of users around the globe, for their lifestyle, although seemingly inaccessible or precisely because of it, becomes the explicit object of desire of their followers. Girardian concepts come naturally to mind: Metaphysical desire defines the profile of such followers—they want to be exactly like the coaches and influencers they admire. The double-bind nature of this predicament is a perfect recipe for the escalation of symbolic violence and abusive language that permeates the digital universe. Influencers and coaches are, so to speak, active nonreaders of Gregory Bateson's work, urging their followers to adopt them as undisputable models, but at the same time, because they are the coaches and the influencers, they are making it clear that the followers will not be able to achieve what nonetheless they are led to covet because of the same influencers and coaches. Otherwise, if every follower became a coach, the "profession" would at once reach its apogee and its destruction!(You understand that redundancy imposes itself here because it is a powerful mimetic machine.)In Bateson's words, the double bind is "a situation in which no matter what a person does, he 'can't win.' It is hypothesized that a person caught in the double bind may develop schizophrenic symptoms."1 This paradoxical structure evokes the classic situation of the fable, in which the character who desires everything [End Page 48] gains nothing; finding himself midway between two treasures, he is unable to settle on one for fear of losing the other. This is a conflictive situation provoked by the digital universe on a daily basis and on a planetary scale in an unprecedented manner.The "best" is yet to come: This troubling escalation of mimetic rivalry and therefore mimetic violence, although entangled in embarrassingly trite matters, has a shocking outcome: the obsessive repetition of the mimetic resolution offered by the so-called "virtual lynching," and the omnipresence of the "cancel or call-out culture," an obvious variation of the scapegoat mechanism, widely employed and rendered properly epidemic due to an... (shrink)

In this essay I explore the role of dialectics for how social theory can take account of the problem of structure and agency, or, determination and freedom, in a critical and emancipatory way. I discuss the limits and possibilities of dialectical, and of anti-dialectical, criticisms of Hegelian dialectics. For this purpose, I look at Judith Butler’s discussion of dialectics and the concepts of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ in her writings between 1987 ( Subjects of Desire ; republished 1999) and 1990 ( (...) Gender Trouble , republished 2000). Butler’s book Gender Trouble remains a key text of contemporary feminist theory. Butler formulates in this book a critique of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex based on her claim that Beauvoir makes a distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ that implies the notion of the sexed body as a pre-cultural entity. In her earlier writings, though, her evaluation of de Beauvoir had been much more positive. The change in Butler’s evaluation of de Beauvoir is part of her increasing rejection of dialectics: Butler rejected in Gender Trouble any form of Hegelian dialectics with reference to Luce Irigaray’s (1985) claim that it is ‘phallogocentric’. Although Butler subsequently returned to Hegelian themes, she seems never to have revoked this claim made in her most momentous work. I argue that this change in the theoretical structure of Butler’s argument weakens her critique of identity politics and I suggest reading Butler backwards, from Gender Trouble to the more open discussion of dialectics in her earlier texts. Drawing on Adorno’s Negative Dialectics and other formulations of critical theory, I argue that the valid aspects of the critique of Hegelian dialectics can better be formulated as a dialectical critique of dialectics (Adorno; Butler, 1987a) than as a rejection of dialectics (Derrida; Irigaray; Butler, 1990). Retracing the genealogy of Butler’s argument will be a necessary backdrop, too, for evaluating her more recent comments on the Hegelian and ‘Frankfurt School’ traditions such as her Adorno Lectures given in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, in November 2002. Key Words: Theodor W. Adorno • agency • Judith Butler • Simone de Beauvoir • dialectics • emancipation • G. W. F. Hegel • sex/gender distinction • structure • subjectivity. (shrink)

J’explore de façon critique la supposition du DSM[1] et de théoriciens tels que Wakefield et Gert selon laquelle les troubles mentaux doivent être attribués à un individu plutôt qu’à un groupe de personnes. Cette supposition est particulièrement problématique en pédopsychiatrie où le système familial est très souvent au centre de l’attention clinique. Il y a bien sûr des éléments de preuve substantiels indiquant que certains troubles mentaux des individus sont causés par leurs relations avec les autres et que (...) leur guérison est grandement facilitée en traitant le groupe, tel que la famille, comme un tout. Malgré cela, il y a eu beaucoup moins de travail conceptuel visant à définir ce que cela pourrait être pour un couple, une famille ou un autre groupe que de se voir attribuer un trouble mental. Pour traiter de cette question, j’utilise un débat entre Wakefield et Murphy et Woolfolk sur la question de savoir s’il fait partie du concept de trouble mental que celui-ci soit causé par une dysfonction interne de la personne. Je discute aussi de la proposition faite par Bolton d’abandonner complètement le concept de trouble mental et d’utiliser plutôt le concept, plus large, de problème de santé mentale. Je soutiens qu’en fin de compte le caractère individuel des troubles mentaux ne constitue pas une vérité conceptuelle a priori, et qu’il faut faire intervenir des considérations pragmatiques pour décider s’il est utile de nous limiter à une telle définition ou si nous pourrions être mieux servis par une définition plus extensive. Je fais le lien avec le pragmatisme et je soutiens qu’une approche pluraliste non réductive est particulièrement appropriée en pédopsychiatrie.I critically explore the assumption of the DSM and theorists such as Wakefield and Gert that mental disorder must be attributed to an individual rather than a group of people. This assumption is especially problematic in child and adolescent psychiatry where very often the focus of clinical attention is the family system. There is of course substantial evidence that some mental disorders of individuals are caused by their relationships with other people and that their recovery is greatly facilitated by treating the group, such as a family, as a whole. However, there has been much less conceptual work on defining what it might be for a couple, family or other group to itself be attributed a mental disorder. To address this issue, I employ a debate between Wakefield , Murphy and Woolfolk on whether it is part of the concept of a mental disorder that it is caused by an internal malfunction of a person. I also discuss the proposal of Bolton that we do away with the concept of mental disorder altogether and instead use a broader concept of mental health problem. I argue that ultimately it is not an a priori conceptual truth that mental disorders are individual, and we need to bring in pragmatic considerations to decide whether it is helpful to restrict ourselves to such a definition or whether we could be better served by a more expansive definition. I link this to the philosophical view of pragmatism and argue that a pluralistic nonreductive approach is especially appropriate in child and adolescent psychiatry. (shrink)

Tout animal, chaque fois qu'il surmonte une difficulté, éprouve en retour une satisfaction, que son organisme lui procure sous forme de récompense. Rien de plus universel. Mais l'homme est cet animal singulier qui a appris à jouir pour lui-même de son plaisir cognitif. Ce qui n'était qu'un instrument est devenu un but en soi, qui a libéré l'homme de son environnement tout en l'enchaînant à sa propre quête de jouissance. Il en découle une thèse historique aux conséquences capitales. Depuis (...) que, à l'aube de sa préhistoire, l'homme a découvert son aptitude au plaisir, le devenir des civilisations n'a obéi qu'à une seule logique, profondément addictive : l'intensification de ce plaisir. Le processus de très longue durée qui est alors enclenché s'appelle l'anthropocène. Car les sociétés humaines ont toujours avancé dans une même direction, mais elles le faisaient à leur insu : non pas en visant ce progrès de la civilisation qu'idéalisaient les philosophes des Lumières, mais entraînées par la poussée invisible de leur libido cogitandi. Si Ben que, de la révolution néolithique jusqu'à notre mondialisation effrénée, leur course a toujours été une course folle, ignorante de la force qui l'impulsait."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Francis de Lorraine, an important Catholic military leader of the first war of Religion, is mentioned in two chapters of the Essays which relate his behaviour outside the siege of Rouen (I, 23) and during the battle of Dreux (I, 45). Montaigne compares the conduct of the Duke of Guise with that of Augustus, then with that of Philopœmen and Agesilaus, in two parallels based on borrowings from Seneca and Plutarch. The analysis of chapters I, 23 and I, 45 allows (...) us to grasp Montaigne’s judgement of this controversial figure and the way in which his assessment is elaborated in the mirror of ancient conflicts. The evocation of the battle of Dreux, if it justifies the temporisation of Francis de Lorraine, who did not engage while the Constable of Montmorency was in trouble, suggests the possible moral imperfection of an effective choice. The anecdote of the siege of Rouen, on the other hand, celebrates the virtue of an ineffective clemency, which did not allow the Duke of Guise to escape assassination but demonstrated his moral value and the strength of his faith. Although Montaigne therefore praises the qualities of the Catholic leader, the parallels do not obscure the gaps of a portrait that does not offer the details expected in a ‘life’, a narrative form praised in the Essays, and instead make the silences and uncertainties evident. (shrink)

Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are a highly complex and rich phenomena, and this has a number of important clinical, theoretical and methodological implications. However, until recently, this fact has not always been incorporated into the experimental designs and theoretical paradigms used by researchers within the cognitive sciences. In this paper, we will briefly outline two recent examples of phenomenologically informed approaches to the study of AVHs taken from a cognitive science perspective. In the first example, based on Larøi and Woodward (...) (Harv Rev Psychiatry 15:109–117, 2007 ), it is argued that reality monitoring studies examining the cognitive underpinnings of hallucinations have not reflected the phenomenological complexity of AVHs in their experimental designs and theoretical framework. The second example, based on Jones (Schizophr Bull, in press, 2010 ), involves a critical examination of the phenomenology of AVHs in the context of two other prominent cognitive models: inner speech and intrusions from memory. It will be shown that, for both examples, the integration of a phenomenological analysis provides important improvements both on a methodological, theoretical and clinical level. This will be followed by insights and critiques from philosophy and clinical psychiatry—both of which offer a phenomenological alternative to the empiricist–rationalist conceptualisation of AVHs inherent to the cognitive sciences approach. Finally, the paper will conclude with ideas as to how the cognitive sciences may integrate these latter perspectives into their methodological and theoretical programmes. (shrink)

À la suite de la phénoménologie de Michel Henry ce texte analyse la structure fondamentale de la vie auto-affective se supportant toujours elle-même pour être co-originairement également la jouissance d'elle-même. En toute souffrance il faut alors reconnaître cette vie transcendentalement individuée qui veut vivre son « Je-Peux » fondamental en toutes ses modalisations. Toute « thérapie » se trouve ainsi plongée dans un « pathos-avec » dont l'exercice concret se révèle dans ce « regard transcendantal » sur la souffrance (...) d'autrui sans méconnaître les possibilités de la science médicale qui reste, cependant, soumise à cette « communauté intro-pathique » primordiale. De cette manière, une certaine « praxis phénoménologique » peut affronter alors les défis de la civilisation d'aujourd'hui. Following the phenomenology of Michel Henry, this paper analyses the fundamental structure of the auto-affective life, always supporting itself for being equally co-originally the self-enjoyment. Therefore, one must acknowledge in every suffering this transcendentally individuated life which wants to live its fundamental "I can" in all its modalisations. Then, every "therapy" is plunged into a "pathos-with" whose concrete exercise reveals itself in this "transcendental view" on the other's suffering, without ignoring the possibilities of the medical science, that remains, however, subjected to this primordial "intropathic community". So, a certain "phenomenological praxis" can then face the challenges of today's civilization. (shrink)

What kind of thing do you believe when you believe that you are in a certain place, that it is a certain time, and that you are a certain individual? What happens if you get lost, or lose track of the time? Can you ever be unsure of your own identity? These are the kind of questions considered in my thesis. Beliefs about where, when and who you are are what are called in the literature de se, or self-locating beliefs. (...) This thesis examines how we can represent de se beliefs, and how we can reason about de se uncertainty. In the first part of the thesis, I present and motivate a specific account of the content of de se belief, based on the one given by David Lewis. On this account, the content of de se beliefs are centred propositions. I defend this view against a rival account, put forward by Robert Stalnaker, according to whom the content of de se beliefs are ordinary propositions. In the second part of the thesis, I explore how we can reason probabilistically about de se uncertainty. I start by defining probabilities over centred propositions, and investigate what probabilities mean in this context. As it turns out, all the main interpretations of probability can be extended to centred propositions. The only trouble seems to arise for the Bayesian principle of updating via conditionalization. After giving a diagnosis of the problem, I offer a solution by formulating a natural extension of conditionalization, which I argue preserves the essential features of Bayesian reasoning. In the final chapter, I apply my view and show that it leads to a natural resolution of a puzzle that is generally taken to be a test case for any account of centred updating. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Allman PAUL DE MAN, DECONSTRUCTION, AND DISCIPLESHIP God may be dead, but his vocabulary lives on, oddly enough, in the militandy secular pages of recent literary theory. Just when we thought it was safe to plunge the depths of postmodernism without the muddying mystifications of worship, religious language seems to have resurrected itself and is walking once again on the troubled waters of literary criticism. In an essay (...) on "The Institutional Control of Interpretation," forexample, Frank Kermode suggests that the Church offers us the best model for understanding the "exegetical activities" ofliterary critics everywhere: "self-perpetuating, hierarchical, authoritative, much concerned with questions of canon, and wont, as we are, to distinguish sharply between initiate and uninitiate readings, the Church is a model we would do well to consider as we attempt to understand our own practice."1 We can find traces of sacred vocabulary in the description not only of the Church of Criticism in general, but also of particular sects within this institution, even those determined to undermine the notion that anything is sacred. In fact, religious language seems most abundant in critical assessments ofdeconstruction, by all appearances the most iconoclastic of recent modes of interpretation. Gerald Graff, for example, argues that the deconstructive project transforms literature into "a vehicle for a nihilistic metaphysics, an anti-didactic form of preaching." Literature becomes "once again the great oracle of truth, but now the truth is that there is no truth. In a curiously inverted restatement of the religion of literature, the literary work is made the sole source of truth only in the sense that it alone refuses to succumb to the delusion that the truth can be spoken."2 Focusing on the style rather than the Philosophy and Literature, © 1990, 14: 324-339 John Allman325 dogma of deconstruction, Mark Felperin echoes a number of theorists (both radical and conservative) when he comments that de Man, Derrida, and their brethren, much like "high priests ofa new mystery cult," are guilty of "a deliberate obscurantism designed to exclude all but an elite—only those who already know will understand and be saved."3 And John Ellis suggests that "deconstructive logic" is simply a crude version of "a standard formula in many branches of religious mysticism."4 Clearly, Ellis, Graff, and others so stigmatize deconstruction not by way of providing neutral descriptions of an interpretive approach, but rather as part of a polemical strategy intended to expose flaws in deconstruction—its hypocrisy, its elitism, its unoriginality. Despite this appropriation of religious language in the rhetoric denouncing deconstruction, it seems to me to be both possible and useful to examine how religious vocabulary might offer a fair as well as illuminating means of describing rather than proscribing the critical phenomenon known as deconstruction. In particular, I would like to look at the ways in which the relation between the originators ofdeconstruction and their successors resembles that between master and disciple. To those sympathetic to deconstruction, such an approach may seem inappropriate, if not hostile; deconstructionists, accustomed to charges that they are presenting a metaphysics of absence, a religion of antirepresentationalism, have consistentiy denied that their practices are in any way religious. What I would like to suggest, however, is that deconstruction, like the texts it reads, is governed by the very forces it resists. By studying the relation between one "exemplary" deconstructive critic— Paul de Man—and one of his influencial students—Barbara Johnson—I hope to illustrate how the survival of deconstruction depends paradoxically on its ability to both resist and restore the powers that shape the relation between master and disciple. Particularly useful in the context ofmy argument are the observations of two sociologists of religion, Joachim Wach and Max Weber, whose sociological perspective permits them to comment on the dynamics of the master-disciple relationship without referring to any particular set of beliefs or teachings. Wach's essay "Master and Disciple" is especially helpful, for he begins his discussion of this dynamic by contrasting the relation between master and disciple with that between teacher and student. For Wach, the essential difference between master and teacher is that the teacher "gives a definite subject matter" while the master "provides only... (shrink)

ABSTRACT The goal of this paper is to find out if Michael Smith's version of the causal theory of action is able to solve David Velleman's agency par excellence challenge. Smith has claimed that his theory can deal with the challenge insofar as the exercise of the capacity to be instrumentally rational plays the intermediating role which Velleman thinks of the agent as playing in the causation of action. However, I argue Smith misunderstands the challenge at hand, thereby failing to (...) find the agent's proper role in action explanation. Moreover, I claim Velleman's objection puts Smith's account of the causal theory in trouble by showing it cannot reconcile the causal explanation of intentional action with our ordinary conception of agency. If Smith intends to explain what a 'full-blooded' intentional action is, I then believe he needs to incorporate into his theory a more robust account of rational guidance. Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é descobrir se a versão da teoria causal da ação de Michael Smith é capaz de resolver o desafio da agência por excelência de David Velleman. Smith tem sustentado que sua teoria pode lidar com o desafio na medida em que o exercício da capacidade de ser instrumentalmente racional desempenha o papel que Velleman imagina que o agente desempenhe na causação da ação. Contudo, argumento que Smith não compreende corretamente o desafio em questão, falhando desse modo em encontrar o papel adequado do agente na explicação da ação. Além disso, defendo que a objeção de Velleman põe a abordagem da teoria causal de Smith em apuros ao mostrar que ela não é capaz de reconciliar a explicação causal da ação intencional com nossa concepção ordinária de agência. Se Smith pretende explicar o que uma ação intencional 'plena' é, então acredito que ele precisa incorporar em sua teoria uma abordagem mais robusta de orientação racional. (shrink)

" La philosophie des formes symboliques " est une tentative pour fonder une philosophie de la culture - la culture non seulement entendue comme la pratique humaine en général, ce qui inclut aussi bien l'usage de l'outil et les troubles du langage (tome I) que les cérémonies religieuses et l'organisation d'une cité (tome II) ou la pensée scientifique et ses catégories (tome III). A l'interprétation " allégorique " des produits culturels, qui s'efforce de les rapporter à une instance extérieure, (...) ce qui a pour effet d'annihiler leur spécificité et leur diversité, Cassirer veut substituer une interprétation symbolique. La fonction symbolique, la " forme symbolique ", n'est donc rien d'autre que la loi de production de ces produits, l'orientation générale qui, par exemple, transforme une pratique magique en geste religieux, et qui confère à un objet resté identique un sens inédit. On abandonne ici les lois universelles de la nature humaine puisque, à l'inverse, ce sont les lois de production elles-mêmes, les " formes symboliques ", qui distinguent et définissent (génétiquement, à la manière de Spinoza) les domaines culturels. (shrink)

Transcendence, Levinas tells us, is not a failed immanence. It presupposes an Exteriority that cannot be integrated into a totality. Such is its excellence: a surplus that rends Being's monism and allows for a pluralism that is not a "missed union". In the first sections of this article I show how the ethical relation with the Other is the only one that, for Levinas, satisfies the conditions he thus imposes on a metaphysical — i.e. transcendent — relation. I subsequently link (...) this 'return' to Plato's idea of a 'Good beyond Being' to the problem of Evil. If Evil is the refusal of the Good, we should, of course, first understand what it means that, as Levinas contends, the Good has chosen us before we could choose it. Are we to think of this 'election' as a command or as an invitation? Concretely: is the appeal of the Other something one cannot not hear, or does it only have the force to disturb those who "retain it"? In other words: should one think of Evil in terms of a choice for irresponsibility which is already situated in the horizon of a responsibility one cannot refuse; or should what in the former case is called Evil, not rather be thought of in terms of a deafness that is sui generis and not the privation of a hearing that ought to be there? Could there not be an irresponsibility that is not the refusal of responsibility, and that, instead of being situated within ethics, would rather complicate our way of conceiving the ethical relation? In the last section I oppose to Levinas's way of conceiving the relation between transcendence and immanence a different approach: the Good is inevitably incarnated and thus pluralized to a point where it becomes difficult to still present it as the Good. Incarnating the transcendent is not merely wrapping it in a context which leaves it unaltered. The incarnans is not just the envelope for the incarnatum. It is its "originary supplement" (Derrida). But then, inevitably, the relation between 'the' Good and 'Being' becomes anti-platonic: transcendence becomes mortal and fragile. It can bleed! It is in terms of such bleeding that we ought to look at some of the conflicts that trouble our societies — multiculturalism being one example amongst others. (shrink)

SummaryMarc'antonio de Dominis is well known to historians as a figure in the political and religious culture of early modern Britain and Europe. This article contends that he was also a major theorist of civil power: his critique of Catholic scholastic political thought is compelling and his account of divine right kingship sheds light on conceptual problems that troubled a range of early modern thinkers. De Dominis dismantled the scholastic theory of political power on its own terms, insisting that Almain, (...) Bellarmine, Suárez and others could not distinguish, as they sought to, between the potestas politica in general and the rule of particular princes. By this insight de Dominis could vindicate royal authority against the deposing pretensions of the Pope, the main objective of James I's supporters during the Allegiance Controversy, but his own positive account of how to think about power ran into theoretical trouble which he evidently perceived himself. If the potestas politica cannot be abstracted from a specific regime, and if the prince's absolute sovereignty depends on this fact, can politics be understood only at the level of the particular and contingent? The article closes by setting Thomas Hobbes—well versed in Jacobean polemic—in the context of this question. (shrink)

Prolific research suggests identity associates with pro-environmental behaviours that are individual and/or group focused. Individual PEB is personally driven, self-reliant, and are conducted on one's own. Group focused PEB is other people-reliant and completed as part of a group. A wide range of identities have been related to PEBs. For example, a recent systematic qualitative review revealed 99 different types of identities studied in a PEB context. Most studies were correlational, few had an experimental design. However, the relationships between all (...) these identities and PEBs have so far not been tested quantitatively with meta-analytical techniques. As such, a clear overview of this field is currently lacking. Due to the diverse nature of the field, a priori hypotheses were not possible and relatively broad definitions of identity had to be used to encompass all types of identities and the diverse meanings of identity that have been included in PEB research. What prior theory did allow for was to assess the distinction between two main types of identity, namely how people label, describe, and recognise oneself individually, or as part of a group. Our overall goal was thus to assess the current state of knowledge on identities and PEBs. In 104 studies using a meta-regression following the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses guidelines, our random-effects meta-analysis showed that the overall concept of identity associated with PEB with a medium Pearson's r. Furthermore, we found that individual identities associated more strongly with PEBs than group identities. The associations between individual and group identities were stronger when the identity and PEB were from the same category. Methodologically, the findings revealed that group identities and group PEBs were most strongly associated for self-reported rather than observed PEBs. Overall identity associated most strongly with group PEBs in the field rather than in the lab and in student- rather than non-student samples. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications. (shrink)

It is possible to argue that the first world is presently living through a period of radical global reaction against the social democratic consensus of the twentieth century. In this context, the use of Slavoj Zizek's Lacnaian theory of ideology to critique the traditions of thought which inform this reaction becomes a vital task. In this paper, I use Zizek's Lacanian theory of ideology to critically analyse de Maistre's remarkable work: particularly his 'Considerations on France'. Zizek's emphasis on the role (...) of the Real in ideology, it is argued, allows us unique purchase on de Maistre's ideological position. It allows us to show, furthermore, how reactionary conservatism does not 'conserve' the symbolic Other of the discourse of the master, since it is animated by fear and trembling that the symbolic can no longer hold in conditions of secularisation. In this context, the proximity of de Maistre with de Sade emerges as something that goes beyond superficially similar celebrations of the role of violence in human affairs. What is minimally at stake in reactionary thought per se, this paper argues, is the attempt to reground lost authority in the unmediated Real, a procedure in which the laying down of the law verges into the need to divide and sacifice others for the Jouissance of the Other. In this way, Lacan's comment that right-wing intelectuals are knaves who, if pushed, are willing to do whatever it takes to preserve power is vindicated and also elaborated. For De Maistre, the paper shows, was nothing if not a
collosally royal knave
. (shrink)

Por más evidente que sea su caducidad, cuesta muchísimo que cualquier disciplina científica admita nuevas metodologías, aunque con ello mejore su visión y alcance, y la economía es emblemática al respecto. Al final, le fue más fácil aceptar que se producían diferentes comportamientos en los niveles macroeconómicos en base al género, y dicha aceptación -con la tenacidad de las pioneras- se trasladó a las políticas de ajuste estructural, para acabar cubriendo el extenso campo de la macroeconomía. En este sentido, el (...) consumo no es una excepción: se trata de una variable de considerable valor explicativo que gana peso cuando de consumo agregado se trata ya que las diferencias de comportamiento generalizadas y sistemáticas influyen en la macroeconomía y ayudan a descubrir la vinculación del consumo agregado -y con género- con otros componentes del Producto Nacional como el ahorro y la inversión. (shrink)

Consensus identifies an underlying continuity to Wittgenstein's treatment of the self and 'I', despite certain obvious surface variations and revisions. Almost all Wittgenstein's arguments and observations concerning 'I' and the self in the Tractatus are arranged as attempts to explicate. The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world, not a part of it. The picture that forms around the (...) consensus view is certainly enlightening about Wittgenstein on 'I' and the self, but this is so because rather than in spite of the difficulties we face in making it match. Contrary to the consensus view, there is little or no 'denigrating' of the first person in his thought, whether of the reductionist or eliminativist kind, and where it may be manifest limited uses only, and by contrast with the general case. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a la (...) luz de una interpretación natural e interesante de la teoría de las propiedades implícita en sus argumentos. Bajo esta nueva interpretación, en términos modelo-teóricos (véase apartado 4), obtenemos diversas posibilidades de relaciones formales entre las tesis de superveniencia y la reducción, según la lógica utilizada. Al menos bajo una interpretación interesante, los argumentos de Kim y Sider no son correctos, quedando demos-trado así que dichos argumentos no son válidos en general. We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties (i.e., reduction). According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory (see § 4), we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general. (shrink)

Calvino probeert te komen tot een definitie van werken die 'klassiek' kunnen worden genoemd. Hij gaat daarbij onder meer in op de vraag of het voor het eerst lezen van een klassiek werk tijdens de jeugd of op oudere leeftijd verschil maakt, op de invloed van de sporen die deze werken dragen in onze cultuur, en op de wisselwerking tussen 'klassiek' en 'actueel'.

Article traitant du problème des Ajnād omeyyades. Il s'agit des vastes districts militaires constitués dans l'Orient byzantin après la conquête arabe et qui ont persisté jusqu'à l'époque médiévale. Ils sont la source d'un des problèmes majeurs de l'histoire omeyyade comme de celle de l'Orient proto-byzantin.

We propose a new approach for tracing value change. Value change may lead to a mismatch between current value priorities in society and the values for which technologies were designed in the past, such as energy technologies based on fossil fuels, which were developed when sustainability was not considered a very important value. Better anticipating value change is essential to avoid a lack of social acceptance and moral acceptability of technologies. While value change can be studied historically and qualitatively, we (...) propose a more quantitative approach that uses large text corpora. It uses probabilistic topic models, which allow us to trace values that are latent. We demonstrate the approach for five types of value change in technology. Our approach is useful for testing hypotheses about value change, such as verifying whether value change has occurred and identifying patterns of value change. The approach can be used to trace value change for various technologies and text corpora, including scientific articles, newspaper articles, and policy documents. (shrink)

Considerando a relevância da interação entre os homens, e que se dá de maneira privilegiada no âmbito dos processos comunicativos, filósofos e lingüistas do Brasil e da Alemanha juntaram-se para investigar o fenômeno da interação comunicativa. Os resultados dessa investigação estão reunidos nos artigos desta coletânea.

It is time for a paradigm shift in our study of world capitalism and the global ruling class. The statecentrism informing much theorization and analysis of world politics, political economy, and class structure is less and less congruent with 21st century world developments. Global capitalism represents a new stage in the ongoing and open-ended evolution of world capitalism, characterized by the rise of transnational capital and a globally integrated production and financial system commanded by a transnational capitalist class, or TCC, (...) that attempts to exercise its class power through transnational state apparatuses. The TCC, as the new global ruling class, has been attempting, albeit with limited success, to construct a global hegemonic bloc in which one group, the TCC, exercises leadership and imposes its project through the consent of those drawn into the bloc, while those from the majority who are not drawn into this hegemonic project, either through material rewards or ideological mechanisms, are contained or repressed. Global capitalism is in crisis. A popular revolt is spreading worldwide, thus posing many challenges. Transformative struggles must be informed by an accurate analysis of global capitalism and its ruling class. (shrink)