In this essay, I have rejected the inductive interpretation of the paradigm of contextual implication (to say “p”; is to imply that one believes that ) and proposed in its stead an explicatory model according to which a speaker in making a statement contextually implies whatever one is entitled to infer on the basis of the presumption that his act of stating is normal. In developing this model, I show how contextual implication depends on three distinct matters: a stating context, (...) presumptions of normality, and rules for the correct use of expressions. (shrink)

In part through correcting mistranslations of key passages in the "de logica" part of his "de corpore," hobbes is shown to have held a theory in which the intention to communicate enters into the definition of signification; and in which speech requires, In addition, (1) socially agreed-Upon correlations between kinds of utterances and kinds of things, And (2) an interrelationship of such utterances (or 'words') in what hobbes calls 'contexture'. It is shown that hobbes did not hold that for a (...) linguistic expression to have meaning is for it to stand for something, Or that what an expression means is what it stands for--Positions commonly, And mistakenly, Attributed to him. (shrink)