The definition of life has been one of the greatest philosophical questions of mankind. In recent years, this debate had intensified due to the discovery of naturally occurring biological entities, such as viruses and prions, which lie at the boundary of what we consider as living. “Are viruses alive?” has turned out to be the largest vote swinging debate in an introductory course to microbiology [1], with 79% of the students changing their opinions before and after the debate compared to (...) genetic engineering (56% opinion swing) and childhood immunization (25% opinion swing). Using boundary cases as classification criteria, also known as the decision boundary or decision surface, had been well established [2]. (shrink)

Reason: The article, Kgatle, M.S., 2017, ‘The unusual practices within some Neo-Pentecostal churches in South Africa: Reflections and recommendations’, HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 73, a4656. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v73i3.4656, published on 29 September 2017 in HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies has been retracted by the journal’s Editor-in-Chief, Prof. Andries van Aarde, because of sections of plagiarised text. Verbatim work was cited but presented to the readers as paraphrased from the original, providing the impression that the lifted passages were the author’s own words. The verbatim (...) text directly affects the findings of the paper and could not be removed. The article is hereby retracted to correct the publication record.We apologise for any inconvenience to the authors and readers of HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies. (shrink)

One of the most beautiful and enigmatic texts in the corpus of the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles is beyond doubt the so-called Hymn of the Pearl, whose meaning, however, is far from getting an academic consensus in the current bibliography. As A.F.J. Klijn in his «The So-Called Hymn of the Pearl », Vigiliae Christianae, vol. 14, n. 3 156, stated a coherent analysis of the poem should bring an answer to two main questions: «What is meant with the pearl? (...) and Who is the principal person in this hymn?». The following pages will try to propose a tenable meaning to this passage by allocating it in its due conceptual context and will offer a consequent hypothesis to those questions that remain still opened. (shrink)

https://hts.org.za/index.php/hts/article/view/4772.

Under the lig ht of Being and Nothingness’s the o re t ical body – Sartre’s master piece –, it is intended to discuss the essential source of human reality as “n i h i l a t i o n” and ontological lack, as well as manifestations and cons e q u e nces from this primordial human passion to be transformed to coagulated transcendence, to be transformed in Being In-itself-For-itself: to be consciousness and, at the same t i (...) me, to be a complete and finished Being, with infinite de nsity and witho u t fissures. (shrink)

Karl R. Popper; I.—Back to the Pre-Socratics: The Presidential Address, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 1–24, ht.

Horizontal transfer (HT) is the transmission of genetic material between non‐mating species, a phenomenon thought to occur rarely in multicellular eukaryotes. However, many transposable elements (TEs) are not only capable of HT, but have frequently jumped between widely divergent species. Here we review and integrate reported cases of HT in retrotransposons of the BovB family, and DNA transposons, over a broad range of animals spanning all continents. Our conclusions challenge the paradigm that HT in vertebrates is restricted to infective long (...) terminal repeat (LTR) retrotransposons or retroviruses. This raises the possibility that other non‐LTR retrotransposons, such as L1 or CR1 elements, believed to be only vertically transmitted, can horizontally transfer between species. Growing evidence indicates that the process of HT is much more general across different TEs and species than previously believed, and that it likely shapes eukaryotic genomes and catalyses genome evolution. (shrink)

La rondelle d'argile HT Wc 3024, trouvée fortuitement en surface en 1987, semble bien démontrer la validité d'une hypothèse proposée deux ans avant sa découverte : le nombre d'empreintes de sceau sur le pourtour d'une rondelle indique le nombre d'objets impliqués dans la transaction dont cette rondelle porte témoignage (dans le cas présent, aux six empreintes de sceau correspond le chiffre six qui suit l'idéogramme de la brebis).

Let Hn stand for an assembly of n grains of salt. Then the paradox of Sorites may be presented this way:H10,000 is a heap. pIf H10,000 is a heap then H10,000-1 is a heap. pH9,999 is a heap. MPH9,999 is a heap then H9,999-1 is a heap. P19998. If H2 is a heap then H2-1 is a heap. P19999. H1 is a heap. MP20000. H1 is not a heap. P20001. H1 is and is not a heap. ConA more significant example (...) of the argument results where Ht stands for a human being at time t where t=O is the present and the human being is one year old. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2003) 297-299 [Access article in PDF] Pappas, George S. Berkeley's Thought. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 261. Cloth, $39.95. Pappas' work is a judicious interpretation of three major themes in Berkeley's thought: his denial of abstract general ideas, theory of immediate perception, and appeal to common sense. Pappas modestly characterizes his aim to illuminate how these themes are connected (...) as one of many ways to approach Berkeley's philosophy. This book, though, is no modest accomplishment. Given the fundamental character of the first two themes and the skill with which he explores them, Pappas does more than connect three themes. He illuminates Berkeley's positions on matter, existence, essepercipi, and the Luce-Jessop thesis that Berkeley is a common sense realist (CSR). The book is broader in scope than its modest beginning suggests. It is a first-rate commentary, meticulous yet highly readable.Chapter I outlines Pappas' thesis and the hermeneutical distinctions he applies in his analysis and evaluation of Berkeley's arguments. He distinguishes two ways of evaluating theories: in light of the assumptions and standards operative when it originally appeared, and in light of those operative in our time. Judged either way, Pappas defends Berkeley's modern temper and continuing relevance, for his arguments fare better than commonly supposed.The next three chapters cover Berkeley's opposition to abstract ideas; Locke's [End Page 297] version mainly, but Malebranche, Leibniz and others are mentioned. Pappas convincingly argues that the denial of abstract ideas is fundamental to Berkeley's position on existence, perception and other central tenets of immaterialism. He opens by criticizing the thesis that Berkeley's rejection of the doctrine is "localized;" textually to the "Introduction" to the Principles, and philosophically to Berkeley's defense of nominalism and his views on language. This thesis, Pappas proves, is too narrow. He marshals textual evidence from the body of the Principles and other works to show the breadth of Berkeley's concern over the problems the doctrine engenders. He then examines the impact of the doctrine, if unchecked, on Berkeley's positive views.Pappas shows how such concepts as material substratum, primary and secondary qualities, existence as a predicate, and representationalism involve abstract ideas. This makes Berkeley's plan of attack plain: if abstract ideas can be undermined, the negation of the related concepts follows. The arguments required to accomplish this, however, are more sophisticated than many realize. To show this, Pappas distinguishes four types of abstract ideas. He then sorts out which of Berkeley's arguments go with which type of abstract idea, which arguments do and do not work, and how they might be repaired. Though Pappas admits that some modified versions of the concepts might survive Berkeley's criticisms, he holds that Berkeley's arguments are largely successful especially against Locke's versions of these doctrines.Pappas also ties Berkeley's denial of abstract ideas to his heterogeneity thesis (HT) defended in New Theory of Vision. This thesis maintains that what is perceived by one sense is numerically and specifically distinct from what is perceived by another; round as seen is distinct in both senses from round as touched. Berkeley considered HT an advance in perception theory andsaw abstract ideas as a threat. To admit an abstract idea of round would imply that there is an idea of the same kind common to sight and touch. Since this would undo HT, Berkeley had to combat abstract ideas. Berkeley's independent arguments against abstract ideas do not entail the truth of HT, Pappas holds, but they remove one source of evidence an opponent might use against it.New Theory of Vision also introduces Berkeley's concept of immediate perception. On the basis of this and the broader concept used in Berkeley's later works, Pappas establishes that "physical objects" (collections of sensible qualities) are the objects of immediate perception. This allows Pappas to make some sense of the claim that Berkeley can be read as a CSR. To do this, Pappas distills ten commitments of CSR and demonstrates... (shrink)

In this paper, I try to develop an account of functions which might be of use to a biologist engaged in classifying and explaining natural phenomena. The most pressing difficulty facing such an account is the need to reconcile the normativity of function statements with their explanatory force. I consider two familiar accounts of function statements, offered by Andrew Woodfield and Larry Wright . I examine both accounts in search of the strongest possible formulation of each type of theory. I (...) fail to find a formulation of the ACT which is completely immune from counterexamples, but I do find a satisfactory formulation of the HT. In particular, I argue that the HT should incorporate a point central to the ACT that functions involve a means/end relationship between two devices. I then consider functional explanations: I argue that an ACT which holds that function statements are intrinsically explanatory cannot offer a satisfactory account. The account offered by Woodfield, who rejects this assumption, is adequate, though less attractive than the account suggested by the HT. I conclude by considering how the HT can account for functional norms. (shrink)

Industrial drug design methodology has undergone remarkable changes in the recent history. Up to the 1970s, the screening of large numbers of randomly selected substances in biological test system was often a crucial step in the development of novel drugs. From the early 1980s, such ‘blind’ screening was increasingly rejected by many pharmaceutical researchers and gave way to ‘rational drug design’, a method that grounds the design of new drugs on a detailed mechanistic understanding of the drug action. Surprisingly, however, (...) the chance-based method of random screening returned to center stage of industrial drug development in the 1990s in the form of ‘high-throughput screening’ (HTS). I will argue in this paper that this to-and-fro in the prominence of random screening comes with fundamental changes in the epistemic significance of chance experiments in pharmaceutical development. While up to the 1970s, random screening used to be chosen as an empirical search strategy primarily because suffi- cient knowledge of the mechanistic basis of drug action was lacking, it has turned with high-throughput screening into an experimental method that employs chance variation and testing to illuminate this mechanistic basis. As a consequence, research into the underlying mechanisms of drug action and the development of new drugs have become closely integrated. The rise of HTS therefore not only shows how chance experiments have assumed a new epistemic role in drug development. It also allows for a detailed study of the much debated emergence of a new relationship between scientific understanding and the development of technological artifacts. (shrink)

Ruth Saw; I—The Presidential Address: The Logic of the Particular Case, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 June 1966, Pages 1–14, ht.