Following Husserl, horizonality is a fundamental aspect of inten­tional acts, making the horizon a crucial element in consciousness across all subjective experiences. This article aims to provide a comprehensive exploration of various forms of the noetic horizon in perceiving. It not only considers the well-known inner and outer horizons, as well as the horizon of the kinesthetic “I-can,” but also explores the practical horizon, which has been somewhat over­looked in Husserl’s phenomenology. Furthermore, the original contribution of this study lies in (...) the introduction of scenic-phantasmatic representing as a peculiar type of horizon in perceiving. These latter two types of horizons have significant implications in our everyday lives. Finally, the essay examines the interaction between different types of noetic horizons. (shrink)

Affection in perception does not exhaust itself in a single subjective act of turning-towards an object. Husserl’s analyses of the propagation of affection in perception, which have not been systematically or thoroughly thematized up until now, offer a much more complex picture of affection, which this article brings to the fore. The affective power distributes itself irregularly in perception. The differentiation of perceptual field into foreground and background prepares the field for the investigation of the distribution of affections. This investigation (...) leads from lower to higher levels of constitution, from simple to complex relations, and from sensations of the lived body to egological factors. In the third section, three directions of propagation of affection and, collectively, six modes of affective awakening are thoroughly analyzed. I end with a discussion of a recent critique of Husserl’s “abstract” approach to affection, which seeks to offer an insight into how a complete theory of affection would look like. (shrink)

Theodor Lipps’ doctrine of empathy (Einfühlung) is enjoying renewed relevance today for two reasons. On the one hand, it offers heuristic potential in researching the functionality of mirror neurons. On the other hand, as many of the early phenomenologists gained their conceptions of empathy by examining Lipps’ related works, the presently widespread interest in empathy necessitates a re‑reading of Lipps in phenomenological circles. The critiques that phenomenology launches against Lipps, however, often remain bound to the established cliché interpretations of Lipps. (...) This article counters such shortsighted readings by differentiating four kinds of imitation in Lipps. The supposed persuasiveness of such critiques, as will be shown, is lost in light of this differentiation. (shrink)