Histories of psychiatry in the United States can shed light on current areas of need in mental health research and treatment. Often, however, these histories fail to represent accurately the distinct trajectories of psychiatric care among black and white populations, not only homogenizing the historical narrative but failing to account for current disparities in mental health care among these populations. The current paper explores two parallel histories of psychiatry in the United States and the way that these have (...) come to influence current mental health practices. Juxtaposing the development of psychiatric care and understanding as it was provided for, and applied to, black and white populations, a picture of the theoretic foundations of mental health emerges, revealing the separate history that led to the current uneven state of psychiatric care. (shrink)

This reflection piece considers how expertise has been generated within the history of madness, disability, eugenics, psychiatry and anti-psychiatry. As numerous scholars and critics have pointed out, the power of rational argumentation can be persuasive, while its absence can be pathologized. Yet, in the fields of madness studies and critical disability studies we can see many examples of how the dividing line between normal and pathological states have been contested, especially where those categories correspond with notions of (...) expertise, experience, and insight. This short paper reflects on these themes and draws from a selection of research case studies, in the hopes of encouraging other scholars to take up these questions in their own work to destabilize concepts of expertise as fixed categories of ability and skill. Instead, I use these examples to promote a more complex and diverse way of interpreting expressions of dissent as potential forms of expertise. (shrink)

Catatonia is a psychomotor disorder that has gone through numerous descriptions since 1874, reflecting the many changes in psychiatric disease conceptualization that have occurred within that time frame. Catatonia has been variously described as a distinct disease entity, as a part of schizophrenia, and as a nonspecific manifestation of many disorders. Because of its association with schizophrenia, the description of catatonia was particularly affected by the psychopharmacological era, beginning in the 1950s, and by the development of the Diagnostic and Statistical (...) Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Changing trends in psychiatric research—especially the brain-based disease model, research methods favoured by the evidence-based medicine movement, and the codes and categories of the DSM—also profoundly influenced the evolving concept of catatonia. This paper discusses these important factors that affected recognition, treatment, and study of catatonia in order to reveal the biases and assumptions made when constructing a disease concept. (shrink)

The History of Reason in the Age of Madness revolves around three axes: the Foucauldian critical-historical method, its relationship with enlightenment critique, and the way this critique is implemented in Foucault's seminal work, History of Madness. Foucault's exploration of the origins of psychiatry applies his own theories of power, truth and reason and draws on Kant's philosophy, shedding new light on the way we perceive the birth and development of psychiatric practice. Following Foucault's adoption of 'limit attitude', (...) which investigates the limits of our thinking as points of disruption and renewal of established frames of reference, this book dispels the widely accepted belief that psychiatry represents the triumph of rationalism by somehow conquering madness and turning it into an object of neutral, scientific perception. It examines the birth of psychiatry in its full complexity: in the late eighteenth century, doctors were not simply rationalists but also alienists, philosophers of finitude who recognized madness as an experience at the limits of reason, introducing a discourse which conditioned the formation of psychiatry as a type of medical activity. Since that event, the same type of recognition, the same anthropological confrontation with madness has persisted beneath the calm development of psychiatric rationality, undermining the supposed linearity, absolute authority and steady progress of psychiatric positivism. Iliopoulos argues that Foucault's critique foregrounds this anthropological problematic as indispensable for psychiatry, encouraging psychiatrists to become aware of the epistemological limitations of their practice, and also to review the ethical and political issues which madness introduces into the apparent neutrality of current psychiatric discourse. (shrink)

The article provides historical and philosophical reconstruction of the emergence and development of the philosophy of psychiatry. The main cases of interaction between philosophy and psychiatry in the context of the development of the history of philosophical thought from antiquity to the present are demonstrated. The key points of interaction between philosophy and psychiatry from Antiquity to the middle of the twentieth century are revealed. The phenomenon of existential-phenomenological psychiatry is described as one of the (...) first attempts of thorough interaction between psychiatry and philosophy. Its main task is defined – to describe the experience of mental illness. Which is an important and necessary task to raise awareness of the impact of mental disorders on people's lives, attempts to reduce stigma. Describing this type of experience creates a unique window into understanding a person with a mental disorder, and illustrates the common and distinctive features of the experience of people with different psychiatric nosologies. These studies provide a deeper understanding of how mental pathology impoverishes a person's relationship with themselves and their community, with the subsequent use of the findings and humanization of psychiatric practice. The prerequisites for the emergence of modern philosophy of psychiatry, in particular the cognitive revolution, the development of philosophy of science, the development of analytical and continental philosophy, in particular phenomenology, existential philosophy, hermeneutics, are determined. The main directions of research in the philosophy of psychiatry are determined. Which are aimed at clarifying the meaning of terms related to mental illness and describing the phenomenon of mental illness itself, analyzing and clarifying those definitions that are directly used in clinical practice and the basis of psychiatric knowledge, as such, to highlight the prerequisites behind certain theoretical positions of psychiatry, to describe the nature of mental illness. (shrink)

Abstract Recently, some philosophers of psychiatry (viz., Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy) have analyzed the issue of psychiatric classification. This paper expands upon these analyses and seeks to demonstrate that a consideration of the history of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) can provide a rich and informative philosophical perspective for critically examining the issue of psychiatric classification. This case is intended to demonstrate the importance of history for philosophy of psychiatry, and more (...) generally, the potential benefits of historically-informed approaches to philosophy of science. (shrink)

This review essay explores recent historical and anthropological literature on the emergence and development of transcultural psychiatry in the second half of the twentieth century. It examines how postcolonial psychiatry attempted to remove itself from its erstwhile colonial frameworks and strove to introduce new concepts and paradigms to make itself relevant in the context of decolonization and postwar reconstruction. The essay looks at both continuities and discontinuities between colonial and post-colonial transcultural psychiatry, asking how the recent surge (...) of scholarly literature in this field engaged with these issues. It also aims to identify the most important avenues for future research. (shrink)

The Hippocratic texts and other contemporary medical sources have often been overlooked in discussions of ancient psychology. They have been considered to be more mechanical and less detailed than poetic and philosophical representations, as well as later medical texts such as those of Galen. This book does justice to these early medical accounts by demonstrating their richness and sophistication, their many connections with other contemporary cultural products and the indebtedness of later medicine to their observations. In addition, it reads these (...) sources not only as archaeological documents but also in the light of methodological discussions that are fundamental to the histories of psychiatry and psychology. As a result of this approach, the book will be important for scholars of these disciplines as well as those of Greek literature and philosophy, strongly advocating the relevance of ancient ideas to modern debates. (shrink)

This article provides a historical overview of the Existential-Phenomenological tradition in psychiatry and psychotherapy, tracing its development from its origin in nineteenth and twentieth century philosophical thought, through its major European psychiatric proponents and schools, to its emergence as an influential approach in North America after World War II. The emphasis is on the implicit themes that provide continuity within this movement as well as on the distinctive contributions of individual thinkers. We conclude with a discussion of the present (...) status and future prospects of this tradition. (shrink)

A History of Modern Psychology provides students with an engaging, comprehensive, and global history of psychological science, from the birth of the field to the present. It examines the attempts to establish psychology as a science in several countries and epochs. The text expertly draws on a vast knowledge of the field in the United States, England, Germany, France, Russia, and Scandinavia, as well as on author Per Saugstad's keen study of neighboring sciences, including physiology, evolutionary biology, (...) class='Hi'>psychiatry, and neurology. Offering a unique global perspective on the development of psychology as an empirical science, this text is an ideal introduction to the field for students and other readers interested in the history of modern psychology. (shrink)

Psychiatry is rapidly changing. The authors review the history of psychiatry in the United States, its gradual integration into medicine and society, and the dialectic between its “biologic” and “mentalist” outlooks. After describing the current state of the profession and its knowledge base, they discuss the likely future of the field: psychiatry's projected mode of practice and economics; its future as a science for understanding human behavior; its expected boundaries with other treatment disciplines; its anticipated relationship (...) with academia and with the community at large; and internal issues for the profession. Unprecedented internal and external pressures on the field are likely to require important reconceptualizations of psychiatry both by its members and by the rest of the American public. (shrink)

What if Wittgenstein and Popper were right after all? What is psychoanalysis is not “scientific,” not scientific by any contemporary definition—including Adolf Grünbaum’s—but what if it works all the same?1 What if psychoanalysis is all right in practice, but the theory isn’t scientific? Indeed, what if “science” is defined ideologically rather than philosophically? If we so redefine “science,” it is not to dismiss psychoanalysis but to understand its origin and impact, to follow the ideological dialectic between the history of (...) psychiatry, its developing as a medical “science,” and the evolving self-definition of psychoanalysis which parallels this history. We know that Freud divided psychoanalysis into three quite discrete areas—first, a theory, a “scientific structure”; second, a method of inquiry, a means of exploring and ordering information; and last, but certainly not least, a mode of treatment. Let us, for the moment, follow the actual course of history, at least the course of a history which can be described by sorting out the interrelationship between psychoanalysis and psychiatry, and assume that we can heuristically view the mode of treatment as relatively independent of the other two aspects of psychoanalysis. What if the very claims for a “scientific” basis for psychoanalytic treatment and by extension the role of the psychoanalyst as promulgated by Freud and his early followers were rooted in an ideologically charged historical interpretation of the positivistic nature of science and the definition of the social role of the scientist? This may seem an odd premise to begin an essay on the mutual influence of psychoanalysis and psychiatry, but it is not stranger than the actual historical practice. Psychoanalysis originated not in the psychiatric clinic but in the laboratories of neurology in Vienna and Paris.2 Its point of origin was not nineteenth-century psychiatry but rather nineteenth-century neurology. That origin points to a major difference between the traditional practice of nineteenth-century psychiatry and modern clinical psychiatry in our post-positivistic age. Psychiatry in nineteenth-century Europe, in Vienna as well as in Paris, was an adjunct to the world of the asylum. Indeed, the second great battle which nineteenth-century psychiatry waged was the creation of the “alienist” as a new medical specialty. The alienist was the medical doctor in administrative charge of the asylum, rather than a medical adjunct to the lay asylum director as had earlier, in the age of “moral treatment,” been the practice. Sander L. Gilman is professor of human studies in the departments of German literature and Near Eastern studies, Cornell University, and professor of psychiatry at the Cornell Medical College. He is the author of numerous books on intellectual and literary history. His most recent study is Jewish Self-Hatred . Forthcoming is his study Oscar Wilde’s London and the English edition of his Conversations with Nietzsche. His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry is “Black Bodies, White Bodies: Toward an Iconography of Female Sexuality in Late Nineteenth-Century Art, Medicine, and Literature”. (shrink)

The paper examines Nikolas Rose's conception of the neuroscientific revolution in psychiatry. It has been repeatedly stated that the advances in neuroscience led to the radical transformation of psychiatry and that they will lead to further changes in mental health. Regardless of whether this transformation is considered as change for the better or for the worse, it is described as a radical move towards a completely new way of understanding and treating mental disorders. Rose's conception is remarkable since (...) it focuses not only on the very transformation of psychiatry, but also on the discourse of radical shift, on hopes, expectations and evaluations of these changes. This paper examines and summarizes key ideas of how the discourse of radical shift - which in fact refers to the future - influences the way psychiatry evolves. The author demonstrates that this discourse is controversial, since it is based on an ambivalent concept of the future. On the one hand, the neuroscientific revolution in psychiatry is said to establish a predictable, calculable and thus governable future in the field of mental health. On the other hand, the expected radical revolution in methods of treating and preventing mental disorders is considered as inconceivable from today's perspective. Yet, the latter is the condition of the former. This paradox forms an integral part of recent discussions on the neuroscientific revolution in psychiatry. (shrink)

Since psychiatry remains a descriptive discipline, it is essential for its practitioners to understand how the language of psychiatry came to be formed. This important book, written by a psychiatrist-historian, traces the genesis of the descriptive categories of psychopathology and examines their interaction with the psychological and philosophical context within which they arose. The author explores particularly the language and ideas that have characterised descriptive psychopathology from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day. He presents a masterful survey (...) of the history of the main psychiatric symptoms, from the metaphysics of classical antiquity to the operational criteria of today. Tracing the evolution of concepts such as memory, consciousness, will and personality, and of symptoms ranging from catalepsy and aboulia to anxiety and self-harm, this book provides fascinating insights into the subjective nature of mental illness, and into the ideas of British, Continental and American authorities who sought to clarify and define it. (shrink)

Summary In his series of lectures, Le pouvoir psychiatrique, Michel Foucault employs concepts from the military field of knowledge in order to analyse the founding scenes of psychiatry. I focus on three issues connected to Foucault's use of these military terms. Firstly, I examine why Foucault was reluctant to use concepts from sociology and psychology in Le pouvoir psychiatrique and how this affects the notions that he had formulated in his earlier work, Histoire de la folie. Secondly, I show (...) how he challenges traditional understandings of the founding scenes of psychiatry by using concepts from a different field of knowledge. In doing this, he creates metaphors, and this is something that he himself had previously been critical of doing. Thirdly, I reflect upon the fact that Foucault's creative use of concepts from different disciplines and examples from different historical times can be related to episodes in his own life; I argue why it is important to supplement a structural analysis with linguistic, phenomenological and hermeneutical ones. (shrink)

Over the course of the last century, physicians have written a number of articles about suicide among their own. These articles reveal how physicians have fundamentally conceived of themselves, how they have addressed vulnerability among their own, and how their self-identification has changed over time, due, in part, to larger historical changes in the profession, psychiatry, and suicidology. The suicidal physician of the Golden Age (1900–1970), an expendable deviant, represents the antithesis of that era’s image of strength and invincibility. (...) In contrast, the suicidal physician of the modern era (1970 onwards), a vulnerable human being deserving of support, reflects that era’s frustration with bearing these unattainable ideals and its growing emphasis on physician health and well-being. Despite this key transition, specifically the acknowledgment of physicians’ limitations, more recent articles about physician suicide indicate that Golden Age values have endured. These persistent emphases on perfection and discomfort with vulnerability have hindered a comprehensive consideration of physician suicide, despite one hundred years of dialogue in the medical literature. (shrink)

This chapter examines the history of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of psychiatry as subfields of philosophy of science that emerged in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The chapter also surveys related literatures that developed in psychology and psychiatry. Philosophy of psychology (or philosophy of cognitive science) has been a well-established subfield of philosophy of mind since the 1990s and 2000s. This field of philosophy of psychology is narrowly focused on issues in cognitive psychology and (...) cognitive science. Compared to the thriving subfield of philosophy of cognitive science, there has been a lack of corresponding interest among philosophers of science in broader methodological questions about different paradigms and fields of study in psychology. These broader methodological questions about psychology have been addressed in the field of theoretical psychology, which is a subfield of psychology that materialized in the 1980s and 1990s. Philosophy of psychiatry emerged as a subfield of philosophy of science in the mid-2000s. Compared to philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of psychiatry literature in philosophy of science engaged with issues examined in an older and more interdisciplinary tradition of philosophy of psychiatry that developed after the 1960s. The participation of philosophers of science in the literature on theoretical psychology, by contrast, has been limited. (shrink)

This paper focuses on one of the original moments of the development of the “phenomenological” current of psychiatry, namely, the psychopathological research of Ludwig Binswanger. By means of the clinical and conceptual problem of schizophrenia as it was conceived and developed at the beginning of the twentieth century, I will try to outline and analyze Binswanger’s perspective from a both historical and epistemological point of view. Binswanger’s own way means of approaching and conceiving schizophrenia within the scientific, medical, and (...) psychiatric context of that time will lead us to grasp the epistemological stakes at the origins of his project of reforming psychiatry by means of phenomenology. I will finally attempt to upgrade and update Binswanger’s project in light of the current reappraisal of phenomenology within the ongoing debate on psychopathology engaged by studies in the field of science and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This article focuses on performative articulations of critiques of psychiatry, with two forms of demonstration in particular: First, the Mad Pride Parades, which have been held in various German cities since 2013, and second actions by the “Blaue Karawane” in Bremen, a movement that emerged in the 1980s in the wake of the dissolution of a psychiatric clinic. Although they are situated in different temporal and local contexts, both rely on forms of street protest to question the demarcation between (...) ‘normal’ and ‘mad’ and to promote the equal recognition of mental alterity. A detailed examination of the forms of action highlights the importance of carnivalesque celebration, provocation and spectacle for both forms of psychiatric critique. We argue that these forms allow experiencing this critique and, at the same time, make drafts of a different—better—society tangible. To elaborate on these aspects, we draw on queer and gender theoretical considerations as well as on approaches from performance studies. Looking at Mad Pride parades and the Blaue Karawane in their respective contexts reveals similarities in the way in which critique of the exclusion of mental alterity is articulated, but also highlights differences in terms of affectedness, participation and argumentation. (shrink)

Despite how he begins, suggesting that it is somehow a problem for me that I think "there is such a thing as philosophy, which could then be useful for psychopathology," ultimately it is clear that the possibility of philosophy is not the issue for Ghaemi. Rather, his issue is with academic philosophy of psychiatry, as he sees it, and with my failure to ask what underlying assumptions typically operate in it.I do not dispute that someone like Jaspers would want (...) to ask such a question, nor do I dispute that it is, in general, a perfectly good question. But Ghaemi thinks that my paper is missing out on something by not posing it. The reason he thinks this is because he thinks my paper is an instance of a pattern in the discipline against which he evidently has an axe to grind. In particular, he thinks philosophy in general should be more attendant to the ways in which Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) categories are (problematically) socially constructed. The fact that philosophers have failed to critically point this out allegedly shows philosophy of psychiatry's— and my—unexamined sympathy with the postmodern tendencies—understood as tendencies toward "relativism about truth" and "skepticism about science"—of psychiatry itself. This is odd for a number of reasons, especially in the present context. Firstly, I am not presently in a position to exhaustively defend all of philosophy of psychiatry on the charge of 'postmodernism,' or on the charge of failure to critically engage with the DSM, but it is worth simply stating that I find these to be rather patently unsubstantiated charges. Prominent works that falsify the latter and easily come to mind are by Tsou (2011), Cooper (2004, 2007), Horwitz and Wakefield (2007), Murphy (2006), Poland and von Eckhardt (2013), and Lalumera (2016). Of these, only Lalumera is interested in defending a DSM-style descriptivism (which perhaps Ghaemi would call a kind of "social constructionism"), but even she limits her defense of DSM categories to their role as reference-fixing representations. It is also true that Tsou's paper is an argument that the practical considerations which go into shaping the DSM categories sometimes represent values that permissibly operate in psychiatry. Perhaps this could be construed as a kind of social constructionism as well, and presumably Ghaemi would disagree with it, but no one here is guilty of a failure to engage critically with the DSM and its history. Further, whichever position is taken by these theorists on whether the DSM does, or even one day could, cut nature at its joints, or whether some of the values that shape its construction do so permissibly or impermissibly, one's acceptance or rejection of relativism about truth is an entirely logically independent matter. (shrink)

Using the example of the feminist magazine Courage, the article shows how its participatory production process enabled a psy-feminist knowledge generation that also included women with psychiatric experience. The magazine makers combined the women’s observations, perceptions and interpretations with visual representations and a canon of literature that extended far beyond the field of psychiatry (criticism). Instead of medical psychopathologies, the women of Courage implemented writing styles and visual languages, which emphasised the experience of mental suffering and alterity and related (...) it to the social position of women. At the same time, Courage also presented alternative feminist treatments and therapies. The Courage’s critique of psychiatry was characterised by a multi-perspective approach that removed the topic of “women in psychiatry” from the narrow field of psychiatry, psychology and psychotherapy and expanded it to include artistic, patient- and experience-oriented and socio-critical perspectives. (shrink)

The name of the Genevan critic Jean Starobinski will most likely evoke masterful\nreadings of Rousseau and Montaigne, or insightful reconstructions of the world\nof the Enlightenment. With the possible exception of the history of melancholy,\nmuch more rarely will it be associated with the history of psychology and\npsychiatry. A small number of the critic’s contributions to this field have\nappeared in some of his books. Most of them, however, remain scattered, and\nnothing suggests that they are known as widely as they deserve.\nStarobinski’s (...) work in the history of psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis\nis exemplary in its perspective of the problematic relations between\npsychological concepts and experiences, and between medical thought and the\nlarger culture. (shrink)

BackgroundDepression and alcohol dependence are among the most prevalent psychiatric disorders that commonly co-occur. Therefore, gaining a better grasp of factors related to this comorbidity is particularly interesting for clinicians. Past research has highlighted the significant role that time perspective and family history of alcohol dependence play in the occurrence of depression and AD. However, much remains unexplored in the understanding of the association between them. This study explored how temporal profile and other sociodemographic characteristics of patients diagnosed with (...) AD impact the severity of depression and AD in them.MethodsThis study was multi-centered, including 381 patients. Cross-sectional information was collected from both inpatient and outpatient psychiatric clinics in China. Data were acquired using validated self-report scales, including Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test, Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale, and Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory-Chinese version. Multiple linear regression analyzes were conducted to control social demographic variables and construct prediction models to inspect the influence factors of variables. Moderation models were constructed to inspect further interplay between variables using hierarchical regression and PROCESS Macro.ResultsResults showed that of all the patients in Chinese psychiatry clinics diagnosed with AD according to the International Classification of Diseases-10, 59.9% met the criteria of depression according to the questionnaire, and time perspective was correlated with the severity of depression. Furthermore, using regression analysis, we found that time perspective and depression could predict AD severity. The moderating role of a past negative time perspective and FH was confirmed between depression and AD. We found that, in our study, only in patients with FH and relatively moderate to high scores of past negative time perspective could the severity of depression predict the severity of AD. Therefore, during the treatment and care of patients with AD, their depression level, time perspective score, and FH should be considered. (shrink)