The theme of this article is the two narratives of the Flood of the Hebrew Bible, which, despite having been sewn into a composition, can be relatively easily separated and recovered. The purpose of the article is therefore to recover the two flood narratives of the Hebrew Bible, to demonstrate its completeness and to propose historical-social interpretation for each one of them. The text of Gn 6,5-9,17 was translated, the editorial glosses were identified, each narrative was reconstituted and (...) considered complete and ready for the hermeneutical procedure. It is concluded that, written at the end of the sixth century, the first narrative, here called “Elohist monarchical narrative of the flood”, had as its function the refoundation of the government of the golah, on his return from Babylon, while, written in the mid-fifth century, the second narrative, here called “Yahwist priestly narrative of the flood”, served to introduce the expiatory sacrifice in Jerusalem, then ruled by the priestly body. (shrink)

Resumen El estudio del empleo de la palabra adelphos en el Nuevo Testamento en las últimas décadas ha tendido a un consenso donde se favorece la perspectiva literal en la cual se asocia a Jesús de Galilea “hermanos” carnales, según los testimonios de los textos griegos. Sin embargo, desde otra perspectiva como la antropología del parentesco y la historia social parental, los datos que atestigua el Nuevo Testamento no son unívocos y se interpelan a la luz de la estructura (...) familiar exogámica extendida -aspecto crucial- para señalar que los textos aportan datos e información, pero no son en sí la respuesta. A lo cual, se abre una perspectiva más rica en matices y aspectos del parentesco de Jesús y los lazos parentales en Galilea del siglo I d.C.The critical historical study of adelphos in recent decades has tended to a consensus thatfavors theperspective in which Jesus of Galilee is recogniged as “carnal brothers”, according to the testimonies of the Greek texts. However, from the parental anthropology and the social- parental history, the data attested by the new testament are not univocal and are addressed in the light of the extended exogamousfamily structure, a crucial aspect, to point out that the texts provide data and information, but they are not the answer in itself. To which, a richerperspective opens in nuances and aspects of the kinship of Jesus and the parental ties in Galilee of the 1st century AD. (shrink)

In a world where economies have no moral conscience, biblical theologians can challenge local cultures with ancient wisdom about generosity and equity. Systemic solutions require changes in the habits of virtue, and this study focuses on the habit of generosity. Building on the work of Stephan Joubert’s Paul as Benefactor, this study concentrates on Paul’s collection in one notable instance: what he says about generosity in 2 Corinthians 8-9 and, in particular, what he means by isotēs in 2 Cor 8:13–15. (...) Does it mean “equality” or “equity”? Beginning with a reinvigorated interest in the economic vision of the apostle Paul about what is meant by “weak” and “good works” and what the Pastoral Epistles communicate with eusebeia (not “godliness” but “social respectability and civility”), we reconsider the collection as an act on the part of the Pauline mission churches to express more than ecclesial unity. This act embodied a theology of grace in mutual reciprocity and in equitable provision on the part of the wealthy for the poor, not least and not limited to those in their own Christian assemblies. The term isotēs is too easily glossed over when translated as “fair balance”, “fairness”, and so the translation of the term with “equity” or “equality” comes closest to the vision of the apostle. Too few studies on this term baptize it sufficiently in the economics of the ancient world and the early Christian radical vision of siblingship and family. Contribution: From the perspective of the Historical Thought and Source Interpretation of the work of Paul, the question of systemic equality or equity is as crucial to navigating the current economic climate as it has ever been. Equality or equity is not limited to Christian communities but following the early church in embodying a theology of grace. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy ed. by Jane Kneller and Sidney AxinnJeanine GrenbergJane Kneller and Sidney Axinn, editors, Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. Pp. xi + 334. Paper, $21.95.The intent of this volume is not narrow textual exegesis but the application of Kantian themes to “problems of contemporary society,” (...) (xi). The editors thus advise their readers that “[t]he present collection is … ‘Kantian’ in a broad sense,” and that the opinions put forward by the contributors may “diverge rather widely” (viii) from Kant’s own. In an introductory essay, Jane Kneller notes further that the book distinguishes between “political” philosophy in a narrow sense, and “social” philosophy, which is concerned with “the behaviour of human beings” more broadly construed. Kant, Kneller argues, does have such a “social philosophy,” and this volume will reveal it.The book is largely successful in its stated goal. The essays run the gamut of careful, if controversial, textual analyses (e.g., Allen Wood’s and Robert Paul Wolff’s essays) to those which take Kant simply as a launching pad for an analysis of a variety of social issues. At times, this relation to Kant is a positive one (e.g., Harry van der Linden’s claim that Kant provides the basis for enterprise democracy), and at times negative (e.g., Charles Mills’ claim that Kantian respect for persons masks a “dark ontology” which supports structural racism).A careful reader can find among these varied essays interestingly opposed approaches to similar topics. Wolff and Sharon Anderson-Gold [End Page 538] end up at loggerheads over the relation of Kant’s ethical and social philosophies. Wolff makes Kant’s justification of morality derivative of the establishment of the social contract. But Anderson-Gold argues for a reversed relationship; for her, Kant’s “principle of humanity” grounds a basic human right of persons in any society to be free from certain types of state interference.Another interesting juxtaposition is found between Nelson Potter and Thomas Auxter, both of whom tackle Kant’s views on retributivism. Potter seeks to humanize retributivism by showing its basis in equality and respect for persons. Auxter takes a diametrically opposed approach, arguing that Kant’s moral theory can stand unscathed if we eliminate his now outdated retributivist commitments.A meta-issue looms in all these discussions: what does and doesn’t count as “Kantian”? This book, wisely, provides no hard and fast definition; rather, by presenting a broad variety of at times seriously divergent points of view, it constitutes a refreshingly pluralistic response to what counts as Kantian: Kantian is as Kantian does. It is rare to find such diversity of interpretation in a single volume, and this book is to be commended for achieving it.There are, however, prices to pay for the achievement of diversity, the largest being a certain disconnectedness of thought. The sectioning of the book into two parts—“Kantian Social Theory” and “Kant and Contemporary Social Issues” —instead of helping to guide the reader, ends up encouraging an ultimately strained distinction. Why does Robin Schott’s essay on feminism belong with “social theory” instead of “contemporary social issues”? Why don’t Anderson-Gold’s reflections on the relationship between moral and social issues qualify as “social theory”? It might have been better, organizationally, to highlight more specific themes by distinguishing sections on “Retributivism,” “International Law,” and the like.The individual essays vary in their success in defending their stated theses. Allen Wood is insightful and even-handed in convincing this initially skeptical reader of what seems, at first blush, a rather implausible view of Kant as an historical materialist. Though some may not find his own position to be very “liberal,” Gerald Gaus’ assessment of the current state of Kantian liberalist approaches to environmental values and his proposed alternative are cogent, enlightening and challenging. Sidney Axinn’s acceptance, without argument, of a simple analogy between individual persons and individual nation states to argue for the need for a world government makes his account ultimately dissatisfying. Charles Mills rightly takes note of an editor’s concern that... (shrink)

This is a timely critique of contemporary Marxist theory, its implications for social structure, and its practical dilemmas. Three themes appear throughout: the mythologizing of Marx, the rationale of Revolution, and the significance of history for social philosophy. Contrary to the approach of many commentators, Hook emphasizes the tremendous differences between the "early" and "late" Marx. He insists that "to judge Marx’s meaning by his own intent, we must go to the published works for which Marx took public (...) responsibility." In the course of the discussion, the author criticizes contemporary Marxist theory. It has itself become an "ideology," a mythology with an uncritical belief in the seemingly universal solution to human ills offered by the socialization of the means of production through revolution. Hook emphasizes that the tone of later Marxist writings, particularly Capital, had gradually shifted away from any belief in the inevitability of violent revolution. From this perspective the author traces the ambiguities of Marx’s writings that afforded the opportunity for Leninist-Stalinist revisionism on this and other issues. Hook is suspicious of the facile and selective exegesis of Marx’s writings used to support the political bias of many commentators. Revolution itself has become a symbol, which, in the author’s view, is often taken up uncritically to support a myth of society. In this context Hook has an enlightening discussion of the putative "right" to revolution. It is essentially an extralegal power, legitimate only where the context of the historical events makes intralegal change absolutely impossible. The author is therefore disturbed by the "cult of revolution" which uses a mythologized Marx to support a program of deliberate, episodic violence as a strategy of social change. The significance of historical experience is evident throughout these later chapters, particularly where Hook undertakes a reevaluation of the Bolshevik Revolution. The historical and philosophical misconceptions underlying ideologies of violence are the most frequent subjects of his criticism. These ideologies have sought to draw moral support from legitimizing examples of history, as well as from the mythologized Marx. Hook goes to great lengths to deny them any such support. Hook concludes with an examination of the emerging scheme of human rights, insisting that they must be understood in their historical context, and that democratic principles are the key to their full realization. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Original Sin Revisited:A Recent Proposal on Thomas Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challenge of EvolutionReinhard Hütter"For some years now, the theological layman has been surprised to note that in Catholic preaching, as well as in the theological literature that comes to his attention, there is either hardly any mention of the peccatum originale, or that this doctrine is even explicitly dismissed—with suppression of the canons of the Council of (...) Trent—as an erroneous path inspired by Augustine."—Robert Spaemann1Original Sin Passé—"after" Original Sin?The doctrine and later dogma of original sin had been a central topic of Catholic dogmatic theology up to the Second Vatican Council.2 One only has to consult the exhaustive bibliographies in the respective volumes Urstand, Fall und Erbsünde (in three parts) of the Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte.3 [End Page 693] Still echoing this long-standing, abiding preoccupation—researched during the Council and published in 1967—is the important tour d'horizon and noteworthy working hypothesis advanced by Henri Rondet, S.J., Original Sin: The Patristic and Theological Background.4 Soon after Vatican II a quite unexpected "sign of the time" found its way into Catholic theology—a widespread allergy to the theological topics of sin in general and of original sin in particular began to affect the post-conciliar mood, an unwillingness to acknowledge sin precisely as sin, let alone original sin and the concomitant original guilt. In polite and enlightened post-Vatican II Catholic theological society, one best ignored what was now seen as an unbecoming topic, unless the intention was, of course, to revise, that is, to "de-dogmatize," the received understanding of the Tridentine dogma of original sin, be it along Schleiermacherian lines (original sin as the sin of the world)5 or along Hegelian lines (the Fall and original sin as the unavoidable entailments of human finitude and freedom)6 or along Heideggerian lines (the co-conditionedness of the fundamental human existential situation of transcendental freedom by the historical facticity of collective human guilt since the inception of human history).7 Other post-conciliar progressive theologians took it upon themselves to go further than that and to "de-mythologize" the Catholic faith as a whole, and thus bring it up to date to the new standards of an [End Page 694] enlightened and increasingly secularized age: original sin, mortal sin, last judgment, hell, and eternal damnation all had to go in one or the other way together with angels, demons, and the evil one—at least the personhood (some sundry metaphysical principle of evil, possibly rooted in God, was, maybe, permissible; a person of a created, purely spiritual subsistence, definitely not)—into the dustbin of bygone theological notions, now thanks to a dynamic progressively transformative development of the understanding of faith, suddenly "untruths," or at best mythological remnants of a bygone pre-scientific age.8 Consequently, from the self-secularizing view of what took itself to be progressive Catholic theology, embracing the normative horizon of the immanent frame together with its immanent transcendence of perpetual human progress, the hamartiological and eschatological horizon brightened up considerably, especially in Germany, Holland, and Belgium, looking increasingly like the non-transcendent, historically immanent eschatology of Immanuel Kant's The End of all Things (1794)—a gradual vertical asymptotic approximation of human cultural and social progress to the ideal of the "kingdom of God." The problems that evolutionary theory and historical-critical exegesis of Genesis 1-3 might have posed for a de facto (salvation-)historical state of original justice became serendipitously immaterial, since the object of contention had been preemptively removed. A radically reinterpreted or simply dismissed doctrine of original sin made any concerns about a historical state of original justice and a historical fall immaterial.With original sin transposed by revisionist systematic theologians and mortal sin abolished by proportionalist moral theologians, it became increasingly unclear what Jesus Christ came to save humanity from, really, besides [End Page 695] offering the gnosis of the sublime all-embracing dynamic of an irresistible universal divine embrace, an unqualified transcendent acceptation and indeed affirmation of the very goodness of de facto human nature ("God accepts and affirms us exactly... (shrink)

The focus of this paper lies on the Islamic approach to the Qurʾān, the exegesis of the text, and the significance of Qurʾānic revelation for Muslim societies (“Sitz im Leben”) for centuries up to the present day, paying also some attention to the history of the European perception of the Qurʾān, from which ultimately modern Western Qurʾānic research emerged. As an introduction, the specific formal and thematic features of the Qurʾān, Islam’s Holy Scripture, are explained and the history of (...) the Qurʾānic text is summarized. The last topic is the historic, social, and literary contextualisation of the Qurʾān as well as its aesthetic dimension (e.g. the “audible” and the “visible” Qurʾān as artistic manifestations). The discussion includes a review of recent scholarship, which has developed some pioneering new concepts about early Qurʾānic textual history and the (re)location of the Qurʾān in its historical context in Late Antiquity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Modern Biblical Criticism as a Tool of Statecraft (1700–1900) by Scott W. Hahn and Jeffrey L. MorrowSteven C. SmithModern Biblical Criticism as a Tool of Statecraft (1700–1900) by Scott W. Hahn and Jeffrey L. Morrow (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2020), 312 pp.Almost anyone who has suffered through a course in biblical studies at a secular (or, increasingly so, Christian) university, read a book, or heard a lecture from (...) one of its scholarly progenies is acquainted with the litany of hermeneutical absolutes. Among the factum historicum are the following certainties: the Enlightenment rescued the Bible from the Dark Ages; the Old Testament was shaped out of the mythical clay of Hellenism; Israel's priesthood was a lamentable development that hijacked an earlier, socially oriented love-of-neighbor religion, replacing it with its bloodthirsty, sacrificial cult; the Documentary Hypothesis is not merely a theory, but the scientific truth of how the Pentateuch emerged; one must separate the Jesus of history from the Christ of faith; Peter and Paul clashed over their dueling Christianities; and above all, historical criticism is the only reliable lens by which the Bible is to be studied.In Modern Biblical Criticism as a Tool of Statecraft (1700–1900), Hahn and Morrow expose such positivisms as the outflow of Europe's secularized universities over these centuries. Not only did politically motivated institutions seek to diminish the theological truths of Scripture (and sadly, were often successful at it), but they eventually repurposed the Bible as "a work of historical fiction," such that the Sacred Page was "to be studied like other ancient myths and fairy tales; it is one fairy tale among many" (24). The authors present a thoroughly researched and meticulously detailed study of the period, and throughout the book amply demonstrate that the aforementioned tropes (and numerous others), no matter how often or how confidently recited, are merely one slant on "the story of biblical criticism" in the modern age.Taking their lead from the lead of Pope Benedict XVI, Hahn and Morrow provide a much-needed critique of historical biblical exegesis and its "appearance of quasi-scientific certainty."1 These salient words of the biblical-theologian Pope, articulated in a variety of contexts (e.g., Verbum Domini), provide the jumping-off point for this robust three-hundred-page voyage. And it is a journey through a divided and secularized Europe, with notable stops in England, France, and above all, Germany. This "divided" Europe, the authors explain, was not a result of the Protestant [End Page 985] Reformation, nor of the so-called "war of religions" that sprang from it—no. The divisions run much deeper still. Drawing upon Andrew Jones's important Before Church and State, Hahn and Morrow rightly lament the societal competition that developed within late medieval Christendom between church and state.2Building upon Jones's work, the authors rightly stress that there indeed existed "a unified medieval worldview wherein what we might think of as temporal authorities and spiritual authorities were united in a single purpose—the extension of the kingdom of God—and this was the background that unified Christendom" (3). As Jones point out, this earlier period of European history "was a world not of the religious and the secular, but of the New Testament and the Old, of virtue and vice, grace and law.... It was an integral vision which included all of societal reality."3 Sadly, the reality of "sacramental kingdoms," in which there lived a reciprocal respect and vision of unity between throne and alter, was torn asunder long before the 1700s, the time at which the present volume commences. Over time, this formerly unified European world gave way to the very complicated, deeply skeptical, and highly politicized world of nation-states. And biblical criticism (along with many other worthy and creative endeavors), became deeply mired in "statecraft."Here, it is worth mentioning that the book should be approached as the rightful heir to an earlier volume (which involved one of its authors, Hahn), Politicizing the Bible.4 While Modern Biblical Criticism may be intelligently read upon its own merits, the reader would do well to pick up the earlier... (shrink)

Introduction -- Social theory and enlightenment project -- Contemporary social theory -- Foucault -- Postmodernism -- References.

“Big Data” can revolutionize historical social science if it arises from substantively important contexts and is oriented towards answering substantively important questions. Such data may be especially important for answering previously largely intractable questions about the timing and sequencing of events, and of event boundaries. That said, “Big Data” makes no difference for social scientists and historians whose accounts rest on narrative sentences. Since such accounts are the norm, the effects of Big Data on the practice of (...) historical social science may be more limited than one might wish. (shrink)

The struggle for the recognition of indigenous rights is one of the most important social movements in Mexico. Before the 1970s, existing peasant organizations did not represent indigenous concerns. Since 1975 there has been a resurgence of indigenous movements and have raised new demands and defense of their cultural values. However, indigenous social mobilization had been laid in local and regional peasant struggles across the 1970s and 1980s. Also the indigenous movement is not homogeneous and does not include (...) all ethnic groups in the country, but it has many different expressions and encompasses different entities at local, regional and national levels. This paper aims to analyze the historical social approach and under the frame of indigenous political ecology of social movements for recognition of indigenous rights in contemporary Mexico. (shrink)

In our recent article, "Where Does Cumulative Culture Begin? A Plea for a Sociologically Informed Perspective" we commented on a fundamental notion in current approaches to cultural evolution, the “zones of latent solutions”, and proposed a modification of it, namely a social and dynamic interpretation of the latent solutions which were originally introduced within an individualistic framework and as static, genetically fixed entities. This modification seemed, and still seems, relevant to us and, in particular, more adequate for coping with (...) the archaeological record. Bandini et al. rejected our proposition and deemed it unnecessary. In their critique, they focused on: our reservations about an individualistic approach; our objections to the presumption of fully naive individuals; and our demand for an extended consideration of forms of social learning simpler than emulation and imitation. We will briefly reply to their critique in order to clarify some misunderstandings. However, the criticisms also show that we are at an impasse on certain crucial topics, such as the meaning of ZLS and the scope and nature of culture in general. Thus, we consider it necessary to make an additional effort to identify the conceptual roots which are at the very basis of the dissent with Bandini et al. (shrink)

The Psychology of Personhood: Philosophical, Historical, Social-Developmental, and Narrative Perspectives. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2014.881615.

Machine generated contents note: 1. Introducing persons and the psychology of personhood Jack Martin and Mark H. Bickhard; Part I. Philosophical, Conceptual Perspectives: 2. The person concept and the ontology of persons Michael A. Tissaw; 3. Achieving personhood: the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology Charles Guignon; Part II. Historical Perspectives: 4. Historical psychology of persons: categories and practice Kurt Danziger; 5. Persons and historical ontology Jeff Sugarman; 6. Critical personalism: on its tenets, its historical obscurity, and its (...) future prospects James T. Lamiell; Part III. Social-Developmental Perspectives: 7. Conceiving of self and others as persons: evolution and development John Barresi, Chris Moore and Raymond Martin; 8. Position exchange theory and personhood: moving between positions and perspectives within physical, sociocultural and psychological space and time Jack Martin and Alex Gillespie; 9. The emergent ontology of persons Mark H. Bickhard; 10. Theorising personhood for the world in transition and change: reflections from a transformative activist stance on human development Anna Stetsenko; Part IV. Narrative Perspectives: 11. Identity and narrative as root metaphors of personhood Amia Lieblich and Ruthellen Josselson; 12. Storied persons: the double triad of narrative identity Mark Freeman. (shrink)

Large-scale, long-term, historical accounts of social and cultural change survive as legacies of those treatises by Smith, Comte, Marx, and others grappling with the complexities of an emerging Modern Age. Postmodern and postcolonial writers have built a formidable body of work in opposition to this legacy and to its contemporary disciples. The core criticism is that these accounts rely on explanations that privilege forms of structural determinism over expressions of human agency. This book takes on this charge, presenting (...) a novel mode of inquiry for the historical social sciences that neither reduces human agency to epiphenomena nor de-links human agency from historical contingency. (shrink)

have decided to write this paper for the late Professor Ioannis Kornarakis mainly for two reasons: (1) Professor Kornarakis was the first to attempt an interdisciplinary preoccupation between the branch of Patristics and Modern Psychology; (2) Because he worked on this interdisciplinary perspective with innovation and creativity. For Professor Kornarakis’s work what is worth to be mentioned, above all, is that it was a struggle and an effort towards an unusual project: that of seeing the writings of the Church Fathers (...) and of Scriptures in ways which could be relevant to modern human problematism so that a fruitful understanding to be attained, as to what we can do with them on a personal, interpersonal and social level. Though Professor Kornarakis did not use the empirical method in his scientific research - observation-hypothesis-experiment-support, or refutation, of ideas tested-replication of the study conducted, etc. - he came across very important insights as to the human condition, that even today can elicit discussions as to the salience of his endeavours for modern pastoral psychologists.In this theoretical paper, what I am doing is to refer to Professor Kornarakis’s work historically and systematically. Historically, in terms of the development of it, since its inception, in the theological literature; systematically, in terms of the presentation of it in relation to the main ideas this was based upon. The historical preoccupation with Kornarakis’s work is being exhausted in the realm of an interview I conducted of him, when I was collecting information relevant to what he wrote, discussed and envisaged as to the association between Patristics and Psychology. The systematic preoccupation with Kornarakis’s work refers to the content and context his works were conceptualized and composed.Through both these perspectives -the historical and the systematic- Kornarakis’s work is actually put in the framework it belongs to, which is that of the theoretical foundations needed for the construction of a mode of thought in the pastoral understanding of the writings of the Fathers, and those of the Bible, in relation to what modern psychology studies in detail. Kornarakis’s work can be exhausted in terms of its chronological framework; however, it can also appear inexhaustible as to the kind of contingencies one can find in it, which are both situation-driven and hermeneutically-specific. Situationdriven, for they refer to events the modern man is bothered by; hermeneutically-specific, for they refer to issues, the exegesis of which can help the modern man’s condition to be improved. (shrink)

In the ten dense chapters of his new book, John Finnis examines and sometimes amends what he takes to be the key moral, legal, social and political doctrines of Thomas Aquinas. Finnis correctly stresses that neither ethics nor politics, in the Arstotelian tradition to which Aquinas belonged, are theoretical sciences. They are ‘practical’ or action‐guiding sciences. Since societal order originates in free choice, it is subject to moral norms. The latter are more firmly grounded by Aquinas than Aristotle because (...) the former unlike the latter has an explicit and coherent account of universal or exceptionless moral principles.Finnis natural law ethics derives from a set of self‐evident precepts that focus practical reason on the pursuit and protection of basic human goods. Finnis expanding list of the latter now include marriage. Finnis equates – implausibly, in my view – attaining the ensemble of basic human goods with Aquina's notion of beatitudo imperfecta or this‐worldly happiness.Throughout the book, Finnis' exegesis of Aquinas is slanted towards bolstering Finnis' own Thomist philosophical ethics. Accordingly, Thomistic historical scholarship, which carefully traced Aquinas' biblical and patristic sources and which locate Aquinas' theological ethics within the conditions of his own life and times, has little weight in Finnis' interpretation. Overall, Finnis shows little concern for the internal logic of the Summa theologiae and, consequently, he does not adequately clarify how Aquinas' own ethics, according to its proper principles, can be both integrally theological and rational without thereby becoming a philosophical ethics. (shrink)

This is the first book to outline a basic philosophy of ecology using the standard categories of academic philosophy: metaphysics, axiology, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, and political philosophy. The problems of global justice invariably involve ecological factors. Yet the science of ecology is itself imbued with philosophical questions. Therefore, studies in ecological justice, the sub-discipline of global justice that relates to the interaction of human and natural systems, should be preceded by the study of the philosophy of ecology. This book enables (...) the reader to access a philosophy of ecology and shows how this philosophy is inherently normative and provides tools for securing ecological justice. The moral philosophy of ecology directly addresses the root cause of ecological and environmental injustice: the violation of fundamental human rights caused by the inequitable distribution of the benefits and costs of industrialism. Philosophy of ecology thus has implications for human rights, pollution, poverty, unequal access to resources, sustainability, consumerism, land use, biodiversity, industrialization, energy policy, and other issues of social and global justice. This book offers an historical and interdisciplinary exegesis. The analysis is situated in the context of the Western intellectual tradition, and includes great thinkers in the history of ecological thinking in the West from the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities.​ Keller asks the big questions and surveys answers with remarkable detail. Here is an insightful analysis of contemporary, classical, and ancient thought, alike in the ecological sciences, the humanities, and economics, the roots and fruits of our concepts of nature and of being in the world. Keller is unexcelled in bridging the is/ought gap, bridging nature and culture, and in celebrating the richness of life, its pattern, process, and creativity on our wonderland Earth. Holmes Rolston, III University Distinguished Professor, Colorado State University Author of A New Environmental Ethics: The Next Millennium for Life on Earth Mentored by renowned ecologist Frank Golley and renowned philosopher Frederick Ferré, David Keller is well prepared to provide a deep history and a sweeping synthesis of the "idea of ecology"—including the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical aspects of that idea, as well as the scientific. J. Baird Callicott University Distinguished Research Professor, University of North Texas Author of Thinking Like a Planet: The Land Ethic and the Earth Ethic. (shrink)

The first study of its kind, The Impact of Idealism assesses the impact of classical German philosophy on science, religion and culture. This second volume explores German Idealism's impact on the historical, social and political thought of the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Each essay focuses on an idea or concept from the high point of German philosophy around 1800, tracing out its influence on the intervening period and its importance for contemporary discussions. New light is shed on (...) key developments of Idealist thought, such as Marxism, Critical Theory and feminism, and previously unexamined areas of Idealism's influence are discussed for the first time. This unique, interdisciplinary collection traces the impact of Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte and others in Britain, Europe, North America and beyond. Its insights represent vital contributions to their respective fields, as well as to our understanding of German Idealism itself. (shrink)

In the age of change in the institutional and conceptual setting in which the ancient tradition of Jewish learning would go forward, what we see in the two most important figures of the transitional generation is only the end of the old, not the beginning of the new. Saul Lieberman continued the received tradition that learning means exegesis of texts, but did not fully master the logic of that received tradition and so distorted it. Salo W. Baron undertook a (...) new intellectual tradition, one that pursued historical study in place of the exegesis of texts, but did. not really grasp the requirements of the kind of new history that he proposed to write. Announcing the advent of social history into the academy of Jewish learning, what he wrote as the economic part of that social history was merely the paraphrase of received texts, with glosses that look suspiciously like a kind of free-associative exegesis. While the one scholar demonstrated the decadence of an old tradition of learning, the other succeeded in showing only the difficulty of actually mastering the discourse of an entirely new academic world. (shrink)

This study concentrates on exploring the ‘logic’ of modern universities in China-a working concept that promotes a more in-depth discourse on the implicit illustrations of the ‘logic’ of universiti...

From a social science perspective, a major purpose of religion is to organize the behavior of the community of believers in order to maximize its success as a collective. The underlying premise of this lecture is that religious authority will sanction violence and aggression when they are assessed to be an effective means of realizing the goals of the collective. Conversely, when violence and aggression become unhelpful or counter- productive for realizing community goals they are forbidden. This phenomenology of (...) religion and violence is applied to the history of Judaism, Christianity and Islam to demonstrate that none of these religions is inherently more or less apt to engage in violence. Their use of belligerent and irenic behaviors are more profoundly influenced by historical context and social needs than by theology. (shrink)

One of the divine quotations narrated from the timeline of Qur’ānic revelation is seen as a word of Prophet Mohammad in the 30th verse of the surah of al-Furqān. It’s observed that the speaker of this verse is Prophet Mohammad and he complains to God about his tribe which neglects the Qur’ān. In the present study, semantic structure and the meaning area of the phrase “mahjūr”, which is the key word in this verse, the meaning of it in the timeline (...) of Qur’ānic revelation and the interpretations attributed to it in the following centuries are traced. Likewise by examining Qur’ānic exegesis chronologically and investigating the interpretations of the exegetes on the relevant verse, it’s tried to see the semantic breaking points, changes and transformations regarding this verse in the historical process. Finally, the approaches of the exegetes who interpreted this verse in terms of the method of maqāsidī tafsir or the principle of teleological interpretation are determined. The approaches detected in this respect are first explained in a descriptive style, and then they’re evaluated in an analytical point of view. The findings and conclusions we reached in this study are as follows: As stated by the majority of exegetes, especially Qatāda, al-Zamakhsharī, Ibn Atiyya, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Sa‘ālibī, the aforementioned verse belongs to the Prophet Mohammed in terms of both wording and meaning. It hasn’t been determined that there’s a conflict about the pertaining of this word to him. According to this hadith quoted in surah al-Furqān, the Qurayshi polytheists made unwarranted objections to the Prophet and the divine instructions that he brought, his heart was narrowed in the face of their attitude towards the Qur’ān, and for these reasons he complained about his tribe to God. It can be said that this meaning seen in Mecca in the tenth year of his prophethood, namely, insulting the Qur’ān, abandoning it, and denying the themes in it, also includes Muslims after the revelation period. Accordingly, it can be thought that the aspect and situation of not acting on the provisions of the Qur’ān and not thinking about its verses are also valid for the interlocutors of the next period. In this direction, when we look at the history of tafsir, it has been determined that the exegetes who interpreted this verse in terms of teleological interpretation asserted different approaches. It was seen that al-Zamakhsharī, al-Rāzī, Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī, al-Bikā‘ī, Kamālpasazāde, Sayhzāda and Ibn ʻĀshūr interpreted this complaint of the Prophet by associating it with the coming of punishment. Therefore, in compliance with them, this verse aimed to threaten all the interlocutors, especially the Quraysh. On the other hand, it has recognized that Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyah, Ibn Kathir, Bursavī and Sayyid Qutb evaluated this verse in the context of the types and ways to abandon the Qur’ān. Thus, they interpreted the relevant verse in terms of maqāsidī tafsir in a way that would cover both the first addressees of Qur’ānic revelation and other interlocutors in the following periods. In a nutshell, it can be considered that not endeavoring to understand and interpret the Qur’ān, or keeping it away from family and social life, law, understanding of earning and spending, not referring to it in such matters, or giving up living a life pursuant to it, are some of the routes and sorts of abandonment of it for Muslims. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"Awe-Inspiring, in Truth, Are the Mysteries of the Church":Eucharistic Mystagogy and Moral Exhortation in the Preaching of St. John ChrysostomDaria SpezzanoWe entrust to You, loving Master, our whole life and hope, and we ask, pray, and entreat: make us worthy to partake of your heavenly and awesome Mysteries from this holy and spiritual Table with a clear conscience; for the remission of sins, forgiveness of transgressions, communion of the (...) Holy Spirit, inheritance of the kingdom of heaven, confidence before You, and not in judgment or condemnation.—Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom"Awe-inspiring, in truth, are the mysteries of the Church; awesome, in truth, her altar."1 St. John Chrysostom was a founding figure in the development of the Byzantine mystagogical tradition, not only because he is associated with the Divine Liturgy,2 but also because of his preaching on [End Page 413] the Eucharistic mysteries, woven throughout the scriptural exegesis of his liturgical homilies.3 The themes he sounded, in particular the continual exhortation to his hearers to be mindful and properly disposed for the terrible and awe-inspiring mysteries, would become part of the fabric of Byzantine liturgical spirituality. But Chrysostom's influence extends to the West as well, for instance to Thomas Aquinas, who, it is said, would rather have Chrysostom's homilies on Matthew than be lord of Paris,4 and who shares with Chrysostom the title of "Doctor of the Eucharist."5 While the promotion of reverence in liturgical celebration and the demands of social justice are sometimes perceived today as being in tension with each other, for Chrysostom they are inseparable. In accord with the Second Vatican Council's teaching in Sacrosanctum Concilium that the Eucharist is "the source and summit of Christian life," the Catechism of the Catholic Church chooses a quote from Chrysostom to instruct that "the Eucharist commits us to the poor."6 It does so with good reason. Chrysostom urgently and vividly preaches to his wealthy congregation that not only must they approach the altar with awe and holy fear, but they must care for the poor in order to receive the Eucharist worthily. Here his characteristic moral exhortations to almsgiving find their deepest source: without care for the poor, one eats and drinks the Eucharist, like Judas at the Last Supper, to one's own condemnation.Chrysostom's Eucharistic MystagogyChrysostom's preaching on the Eucharist is profoundly rooted in Scripture and shaped by his theological and pastoral concerns. Mystagogy, as Jean [End Page 414] Daniélou has pointed out, is an exegesis of the rites: "It consists of reading in the rites the mystery of Christ and contemplating under symbols the invisible reality."7 The mystagogy of the Greek Fathers is shaped by local traditions, as is their scriptural exegesis. While the distinction risks being overdrawn, Alexandrian mystagogy is characterized by anagogy, while Antiochene mystagogy—including Chrysostom's—by a focus on the relation of the liturgy to the historical events of Christ's earthly life.8 Unlike his contemporary Theodore of Mopsuestia, however, Chrysostom is not concerned to assign to each liturgical action a specific mimetic meaning. Chrysostom everywhere "reads in the rites the mystery of Christ," exemplifying Daniélou's observation that this mystery is the one object of the Christian faith, subsisting under different modes:It is prefigured in the Old Testament; it is accomplished historically in Christ's life on earth; it is contained in the mystery of the sacraments; it is lived mystically in souls; it is accomplished socially in the Church; it is fulfilled eschatologically in the heavenly kingdom.9For Chrysostom, the entire liturgy has a "mystery character," because it is "so much an anamnesis of the saving work of Christ and a revelation of heavenly reality that its earthly form is wholly irradiated by these aspects."10 Chrysostom uses the term "mystery" in relation not only to the sacraments, but more fundamentally to the entire economy of redemption, flowing from the Paschal mystery, in which they operate. The mystery is a secret except to faith; it expresses a relation between, on the one hand, a historic event of salvation history or a material element of the... (shrink)

신남철은 한국의 급진주의 철학에서 맑스주의 계열에 속하는 대표적 사상가 가운데 한 사람이다. 그는 일제 식민지 상황과 해방 후의 혼돈된 현실을 사회적 문제로 받아 들였다. 그는 자신의 현실을 역사적으로 주어진 전체적 상황으로 보았으며, 이 전체성을 자신이 과학적 방법이라고 믿었던 유물 변증법의 방법으로 인식하고자 했다. 그것은 일종의 해부학적이고 발생론적인 방법이었다. 이 방법으로 인식된 전체성을 구체적 전체성이라 불렀다. 그는 또 한편 현실이 인간의 인간다운 生을 부정하는 것이었기 때문에, 상실된 생의 풍요한 충실성이 실현된 세상을 희망하였다. 개인의 자발성과 다양한 인간성의 구현에 대한 열망의 감정인 생의 (...) 감정은 그의 역사 사회에 대한 인식을 추동하는 주체적 동력이 되었다. 그는 서구의 르네상스 운동과 낭만주의적 신 르네상스의 인문주의적이고 인도주의적인 사상에 깊이 감동받았다. 그의 생의 감정은 이러한 인문주의적 교양을 소망하는 감정이었고, 이 감정을 토대로 진보적 민주주의를 실현함으로써 생의 전환을 이루고자 했다. 그러나 객관주의적 태도를 필요로 하는 과학적 역사관과 주관적인 낭만주의적 정열은 가까이 밀착하면 할수록 서로 분열되는 고뇌를 주는 것이었다. 신남철의 사상은 분열과 고민 속에서도, 역사적 사회를 인식하여 변형하고자 했으며, 동시에 생의 감정에 기초한 자유의 인간성을 현실화하려는 종합적 사고를 하였다. 따라서 이 논문은 그의 생 철학적 측면과 역사 사회관을 그 긴장관계에서 종합적으로 다룬다. 그리고 글을 진행하는 가운데 철학적 논의가 필요한 부분에 대해서는 비판적으로 논의하고, 현대적 의의가 있는 것에 대해서는 그 의미를 규명하고자 한다. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Plato and Pythagoreanism by Phillip Sidney HorkyGabriele CornelliPhillip Sidney Horky. Plato and Pythagoreanism. Oxford University Press, 2013. xxi + 305 pp. Cloth, $74.Ceci n’est pas un livre sur Pythagore. With these clever and rather playful words, Horky’s book starts its literary journey through a wide range of Pythagorean sources, including Epicharmus, Empedocles, Philolaus, Eurytus and Arquitas, and Pythagorean themes, like numbers, immortality of the soul, limitness/unlimitness, among others.From (...) this explosive incipit, one would think that Horky agrees with Kahn’s almost forty-year-old observation about the fact that new theories of Pythagoreanism are not necessary in our present day and age (1974, 163, n. 6):It’s hard enough to satisfy minimal standards of historical rigor in discussing the Pythagoreans, without introducing arbitrary guesswork of this sort where no two students can come to the same conclusion on the basis of the same evidence. In fact, the direct testimony for Pythagorean doctrines is all too abundant. The task for a serious scholarship is not to enrich these data by inventing new theories or unattested stages of development but to sift the evidence so as to determine which items are most worthy (or least unworthy) of belief.On the contrary, however, Horky’s approach seems surprisingly to direct the reader towards a fundamentally historiographical rather than philological brand of work, that is, one devoted neither exclusively to the exegesis of Pythagorean sources nor even to the theoretical approach of one of the themes that received specific contributions from Pythagoreanism, such as mathematics, cosmology, politics, or the theory of the immortal soul. This is mainly true when one recognizes, from the title on, that the main goal of the book is to try to determine, once and for all, what is the extent of Pythagorean influence on Plato’s thought. Rather an historiographical problem, I would say. And a good one.In order to do so, Horky needs to trace down a sort of history of mathematical Pythagoreanism from a huge variety of informed ancient sources and perspectives. Horky’s approach to the sources is well-grounded, not only in Burkert’s fundamental works, but also in the recent revival in Pythagorean studies which took over ancient philosophy scholarship in the last two decades: Huffmann’s works on Philolaus (1993) and Arquitas (2005); Zhmud (1997) and Kahn (2001) on early Pythagoreans; Riedweg on Pythagoras (2002), among many others. After the publishing of Horky’s book, two sorts of Companions to Pythagoreanism confirm the trend of the revival: Cornelli, McKirahan, and Macris (2013), acts of the On Pythagoreanism seminar held in Brasilia by Archai [End Page 353] UNESCO Chair, and Huffman (2014). Luckily, Pythagorean scholarship has now gotten rid of that old-fashioned scepticism, starting from Zeller’s famous statement that the relevant sources are a “mixture of fables and poetry.” As Horky’s book seems to suggest, the job can be done. And he has definitely proved to be able to force his way through, with both clear philological arguments and refined historiographical hypotheses.Not surprisingly, a work on Plato and Pythagoreanism starts with a chapter on Aristotle: “Aristotle on Mathematical Pythagoreanism in the Fourth Century BCE” (chap. 1). The idea of the chapter is to rely on Aristotle’s distinction between the mathematical and acousmatic branches of Pythagoreanism. While acousmatic Pythagoreans supposedly did not engage in demonstration, the so-called mathematical Pythagoreans engaged in investigations based on mathemata in order to give an account (the reason why of the world they perceived). Horky seems to drive Aristotle’s account to a specific goal: mathematical Pythagoreans would have established some kind of correspondence between numbers and sensibles, and their ontology would have a direct relation to social and political organization.Chapter 2, “Hippasus of Metapontum and Mathematical Pythagoreanism,” is entirely dedicated to the account of the later doxographical tradition on Hippasus, the alleged progenitor of mathematical Pythagoreanism. Avoiding the risk of falling into the “bottomless pit” of research on the Pythagoreans—in Guthrie’s famous words (1962, 146, n. 1)—Horky manages his inquiry boldly and in a quite elegant way. Between the peripatetic systematization and the platonic derivation of Hippasus’ philosophy, Hippasus... (shrink)

“The object of this book,” writes William C. Dowling in his preface, “is to make the key concepts of Paul Ricoeur’s _Time and Narrative_ available to readers who might have felt bewildered by the twists and turns of its argument.” The sources of puzzlement are, he notes, many. For some, it is Ricoeur’s famously indirect style of presentation, in which the polarities of argument and exegesis seem so often and so suddenly to have reversed themselves. For others, it is (...) the extraordinary intellectual range of Ricoeur’s argument, drawing on traditions as distant from each other as Heideggerian existentialism, French structuralism, and Anglo-American analytic philosophy. Yet beneath the labyrinthian surface of Ricoeur’s _Temps et récit_, Dowling reveals a single extended argument that, though developed unsystematically, is meant to be understood in systematic terms. __Ricoeur on Time and Narrative_ _presents that argument in clear and concise terms, in a way that will be enlightening both to readers new to Ricoeur and those who may have felt themselves adrift in the complexities of _Temps et récit,_ Ricoeur’s last major philosophical work. Dowling divides his discussion into six chapters, all closely involved with specific arguments in _Temps et récit_: on mimesis, time, narrativity, semantics of action, poetics of history, and poetics of fiction. Additionally, Dowling provides a preface that lays out the French intellectual context of Ricoeur's philosophical method. An appendix presents his English translation of a personal interview in which Ricoeur, having completed _Time and Narrative, _looks back over his long career as an internationally renowned philosopher. __Ricoeur on Time and Narrative___ _communicates to readers the intellectual excitement of following Ricoeur’s dismantling of established theories and arguments—Aristotle and Augustine and Husserl on time, Frye and Greimas on narrative structure, Arthur Danto and Louis O. Mink on the nature of historical explanation—while coming to see how, under the pressure of Ricoeur’s analysis, these ideas are reconstituted and revealed in a new set of relations to one another. "The scholarship in William C. Dowling's __Ricoeur on Time and Narrative____ __is impeccable; Dowling knows Ricoeur inside out. He highlights Ricoeur's most important arguments, presents them in a limpid, concise language, and links them to the relevant nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophical developments. Dowling's book provides us with a lucid, intelligible version of Ricoeur's major work, one that will be of considerable significance to philosophers, historians, and literary theorists." —_Thomas Pavel, Gordon J. Laing Distinguished Service Professor of French Literature, and the Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago_ "William C. Dowling's __Ricoeur on Time and Narrative___ _is a subtle and remarkably well-sustained piece of work. It provides a detailed introduction to a major work of philosophy and narrative theory—already a considerable achievement, given the difficulty of Ricoeur's text. However, Dowling also shows us, sometimes explicitly, sometimes simply through the way he conducts his argument, why we should bother with Ricoeur—what we have to gain from knowing him better than we do, however well we may think we know him." —_Michael Wood, Charles Barnwell Straut Class of 1923 Professor of English and Comparative Literature, Princeton University _. (shrink)

Can social scientific description capture the historically individual? Is the idea of an ethically committed social science morally defensible? This book offers a critical, historically-grounded perspective on these perennial methodological and ethical problems, in their current forms. It provides a series of in-depth examinations of recent work by prominent authors in sociology and philosophy. The book draws on the thought of Peter Winch to provide a coherent response to the core issues that underlie past and present debate in (...) social science and to provide a solid basis for future inquiry. The book will be of particular interest to social scientists, philosophers, and historians, and to anyone seeking a clear grasp of the demands made by historical understanding and ethics on the study of society. (shrink)

The English word ‘pain’ is commonly used by lay people in a ‘messy’ life-world of imprecise meanings. It has a complex etymology, including legal and political uses as ‘punishment’. Understandings of pain in the political theory of Hobbes and Bentham are summarized. This wider historical and philosophical account of the uses of ‘pain’ means the IASP definition can be seen in relation to medical history and to present-day clinical challenges. We can consider the misunderstandings that may occur between clinicians (...) and pain sufferers, and the ways in which ‘pain’, although ‘subjective’, is inescapably a political concern. Using Wittgenstein’s approach to meaning, however, we can envisage a context-sensitive and flexible approach to communication about pain. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.3 (2000) 361-379 [Access article in PDF] The Idea and the Reality of the City in the Thought of Philo of Alexandria * David T. Runia The theme of my paper is the conception of the city as a social and cultural phenomenon held by the Jewish exegete and philosopher Philo of Alexandria (15 bc to 50 ad). There can be no (...) doubt that the city occupied a central position in his own life. As an inhabitant of Alexandria he was thoroughly immersed in a highly urbanized form of life. From a more theoretical angle the city has an important place in his thought because of what it represents: of all physical products of human activity the city is the largest and most complex (here there is in fact little difference between Philo and us, although there is an obvious difference in scale). It is not my aim to examine Philo's political philosophy, i.e., his views on how the city should be governed, nor his views on the actual political administration of the Roman Empire in his time. These subjects have already been treated with sufficient competence by others. 1 I will argue that, though as an Alexandrian Philo was very much a homo urbanus, he nevertheless reveals a significant ambivalence towards the city. This attitude is related to his dual ideological background (Jewish and Greek), and anticipates developments in later antiquity.As always in the case of Philo, it is necessary to reflect on the methodology that should be used to reach our aim. True to his usual method, Philo nowhere examines the nature of the city in a sustained way. It is necessary to cull statements from many different places in his various works. For his views on living in the city of Alexandria we can examine his historical treatises. A more theoretical perspective is gained from his exegetical and philosophical works; but these, too, are not wholly devoid of topical remarks, such as the famous text in [End Page 361] which he complains that he has had to exchange the contemplative life for immersion in the maelstrom of Alexandrian political life (De specialibus legibus 3.1-6).In the analysis of the numerous texts in which Philo speaks of the city, it would be a mistake to try to compartmentalize his thought too much, i.e., to make a sharp distinction between historical-apologetic and exegetical-philosophical modes of thinking. It is true that Philo devotes the greatest part of his oeuvre to giving exegesis of the Law of Moses. But for him this is far from a merely antiquarian exercise. Philo is convinced of the universal relevance of the Pentateuch for both Jew and Gentile, including those who live in a complex urban environment utterly different from the circumstances of tent-dwelling Patriarchs or itinerant Israelites. The Law, it is assumed, represents the constitution of a Mosaic politeia deserving of universal admiration. So when Philo speaks of the city in his exegesis of Mosaic texts, his remarks may well be relevant to our theme. This applies also to allegorical forms of interpretation. The method of allegory enables him to bring forward the more theoretical and "philosophical" aspects of the theme.It remains a problem that our material consists of a large number of scattered and episodic remarks. These can be assembled together into the shape of a plausible and informative picture, but the aspect of a scholarly construct cannot be entirely avoided. There are compensations in Philo's case through the sheer volume of the material he has left behind. This lessens the chance that we should attribute too much significance to what may be no more than casual remarks. We should, however, have no illusions about the extent to which we can pene-trate behind the facade of his works. These were not written with the motive of disclosing his personal views on a wide scale of issues. The personality of Philo the Alexandrian Jew remains largely hidden from view... (shrink)

History, as a science, has been developing in the context of a concrete epoch of scientific paradigms and types of scientific rationality. The period of constitutionalization of social and humanitarian knowledge and history refers to the middle of the 20th century, to the epoch of a triumphal approach of positivism. The formation of a ‘classical‘ historical science was connected with the fact, that history was not considered to be an art any more. It was proclaimed, that history should (...) be based on natural sciences, dealing with real facts. The review of a ‘classical‘ scientific paradigm of history was stated in the 19th-20th centuries and it was connected with the confirmation of a principal difference between social, humanitarian and scientific knowledge. The discussion of the method and the language of science took the central place. Nonclassical paradigm of social and humanitarian science began to form. At this period, it develops the concept of ‘humanitarian story‘. At the end of the 20th century, the historical science entered postclassical period. This circumstance was accompanied by new methodological approaches with the basis on social and philosophical discourse. Integrative paradigm in history, which is based on the principle of additionality, has been forming. Within this paradigm, history becomes stereoscopic acquiring the character of ‘social and humanitarian‘ history. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Thicker Jesus: Incarnational Discipleship in a Secular Age by Glen Harold StassenSarah A. NeeleyA Thicker Jesus: Incarnational Discipleship in a Secular Age Glen Harold Stassen Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2012. 280pp. $25.00Glen Stassen’s A Thicker Jesus addresses how one can find a solid ethical identity that provides a framework and path in a rapidly changing world. Stassen begins by considering what those who have stood (...) the test of history, such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Karth Barth, Martin Luther King, and Dorothy Day, among others, have in common. He effectively argues that the common thread among these great leaders of resistance is a “thick” exegetical understanding of Jesus Christ that is implemented in daily life through incarnational discipleship. Such a “thick” interpretation of Jesus of Nazareth is rooted in Christian realism rather than Platonic idealism, meaning that incarnational discipleship does not attempt to apply lofty ideals to reality but is deeply involved, following Jesus of Nazareth, in historical struggles. Stassen then argues that this type of ethic can address all of the problems posed to ethics and faith in “a secular age” outlined by Charles Taylor’s book of the same title.Stassen’s framework of incarnational discipleship in a secular age addresses each of Taylor’s seven problems through a tapestry of argumentation that includes history, biblical exegesis, the tradition of Christian ethics, science, and politics. The work is critically engaged with historical figures in Christian ethics and current voices in the field. Stassen contributes a unique voice to the conversation by drawing upon his experiences with science as a trained physicist and with politics through his father’s gubernatorial career. Where many chose critical engagement with the natural and social sciences or with theological and biblical interpretation, Stassen does both. He approaches physics, politics, and economics with theological rigor, drawing upon traditional theological claims and offering his own critique and adaptation. Stassen, in his typical style, draws extensively on the Christian Scriptures. However, he does not simply reference numerous verses but further enhances the complexity of his argumentation through careful exegesis of the Sermon on the Mount, which he is known for, and of the Gospel of Mark.Stassen’s careful examination of the Sermon on the Mount and Mark offers the reader a picture of the particular understanding of Jesus that Stassen argues needs to be “thickly” interpreted; nonetheless, the book does not address [End Page 200] the consequences of other interpretations of Jesus being made “thicker” and the ethical dilemmas of such interpretations. To his credit, Stassen draws on several womanist interpretations of the cross as suffering in solidarity with the oppressed. But what about womanists who claim that any value placed on the suffering of the cross might lead to the excuse that the suffering of the oppressed is, in fact, redemptive suffering? Does a “thicker” interpretation of the cross necessarily address this problem?Overall, Stassen’s contribution to the field cannot be understated. He insists on addressing social problems on their own terms in the language of history, politics, economics, and science; he also rigorously engages theological and biblical ethics when such things have gone out of fashion in social ethics. As an added bonus, Stassen is clear in his call for pluralism and multiple ethical approaches while at the same time offering a rich account rooted in an interpretation of Jesus for Christians.Sarah A. NeeleyIliff School of Theology/University of DenverCopyright © 2013 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scriptural AuthorityA Buddhist PerspectiveShi ZhiruLike gold that is melted, cut, and polished, So should monks and scholars Analyze my words [before] accepting them; They should not do so out of respect.1As other papers in this volume have already noted, there is a crisis of authority in modern religion, particularly in the West. One defining characteristic of modernity is a deep sense of rupture from the old, from the traditional, (...) which is compounded by a heightened awareness of the subjectivity of self.2 Therefore, in the age of modernity, or postmodernity, critical and skeptical questioning of forms of religious authority is almost inevitable. While the crisis of religious authority is certainly enhanced in modernity, I would argue that the crisis of authority has always been part and parcel of religious innovation and transmission in Buddhist history. Critical self-reflection and skepticism of scriptural authority were present already in early Buddhism; at various junctures throughout Buddhist history, attitudes toward scriptural authority were often renegotiated in connection with major religious changes that in turn were usually prompted by larger social and historical changes. As the critical theorist Jürgen Habermas points out, “the term ‘modern’ again and again expresses the consciousness of an epoch that relates itself to the past of antiquity, in order to view itself as the result of a transition from the old to the new.” 3 Defined in this manner, the bridging of the “modern” and the past is not unique to the so-called epoch of modernity or postmodernity, but has occurred repeatedly throughout different historical periods.This paper discusses different junctures in Buddhist history when scriptural authority was problematized as part of self-reflection and criticism of the “tradition.” Rethinking the authority of scriptures often involves juxtaposing it against the authority of religious experience, and such reconsideration typically took place as part of religious change that unfolded in different sociocultural and geographical environments. It is tempting to immediately equate “religious experience” in the early Buddhist texts to the prevalent understanding of this term in the modern world, but one must caution that modern definitions and discourse on the topic are largely shaped [End Page 85] by post-Enlightenment ideals and rhetoric in Western religious history, which may not be applicable to traditional Buddhist cultures.4 Hence, it is necessary to unpack the range of premodern Buddhist understanding of “religious experience” according to its contextual references, and not hasten to assume a necessary polarity between the unmediated experience and scriptural exegesis that is generally assumed in modern discourse. Rather than a singular voice for the Buddhist position on scriptural authority, it is important to acknowledge the polyphony of voices and perspectives, sometimes even contradicting one another, in different forms of Buddhism. It is thus critical to contextualize the multiple voices within the different historical and religious circumstances that engendered a particular perspective.It should be noted that my discussion is hardly intended to be a comprehensive survey, but focuses on three examples: early Buddhism, early Mahāyāna, and Chan Buddhism. They are chosen because they aptly illustrate how Buddhists reconceived scriptural or textual authority as part of a critical rethinking of Buddhist thought and practice. Moreover, while religious experience was regularly invoked to undermine the normative scriptural authority of the time, nevertheless, in all the examples considered in this paper, the undermining of “old” scriptural authority gave way to new scriptural or literary authorities. This prioritization of religious experience in reality rarely excludes scriptural or textual authorities, but was often adopted for polemical and rhetorical purposes. The paper concludes with an attempt to broaden the understanding of Buddhist scriptural authority by highlighting the authority of scriptures as material objects, a perspective that has been largely neglected in comparative cross-cultural studies of scriptures.5 On a cautionary note, I am using the word “scripture” in a broad sense to mean the body of sacred texts accepted as the authority by a given religious tradition. As historians of religion have noted, it is necessary to dissociate sacred texts (particularly those of Asian religions) from the concept of “scripture,” which in its literal sense, as used to discuss Abrahamic religions, means the “written word... (shrink)

Axel Honneth and Hans Joas claim that Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology is problematically ‘solipsistic’ insofar as it fails to appreciate the ways in which human persons or selves are brought into being and given their characteristic powers of reflection and action by social processes. Here I review the main argument of Plessner’s Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch: Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie with this criticism in mind, giving special attention to Plessner’s accounts of organic being, personhood, language, (...) sociality, and historicity in that text. I argue that Honneth and Joas’s criticisms understate the extent to which Plessner takes sociality to be a constitutive condition of human forms of life within the structure he calls ‘ex-centric positionality’. This reading of Plessner also provides resources for answering a more common criticism of his philosophical anthropology – namely, that it is problematically ‘essentialist’, paying insufficient heed t.. (shrink)

Social scientific development has been greatly influenced by Galilean-Newtonian thought which emphasized formulation of abstract hypotheses valid throughout all time and space and independent of human characteristics. This influence has resulted in an artificial hiatus between social science and social problem-solving. Dissolution of certain Galilean-Newtonian assumptions has opened the way for integrating aspects of another stream of thought, the Hegelian-Marxian one, into the social scientific endeavor. Hegelian-Marxian thought emphasizes the individual becoming self-conscious of, and involved in, (...) the social-historical process. The uniting of certain aspects of Galilean-Newtonian and Hegelian-Marxian thought provides a genuinely experimental social science in which abstract hypothesis-testing is united with social action that is based on persons' awareness of relevant hypotheses viewed in historical perspective. (shrink)

In reply to the contributions to Social Imaginaries vol. 4, no. 1, this article reviews the development of the research programme that the author has been pursuing over more than three decades. It places the emphasis on the conceptual and methodological requirements for a historical sociology of social change. It insists, on the one hand, on the need to avoid overly strong conceptual presuppositions to analyze social phenomena of large scale and long duration, while, on the (...) other hand, sustaining the notion that a minimum of social and political philosophy as well as philosophy of history is necessary to comprehend the ways in which history is directed. Further emphasis is given to the difficulties that arise when studying social phenomena before 1800 and outside Europe, due to the strong epistemic impact European global domination has had since the “great divergence” at around 1800. The article concludes with reflections on the adequate kind of conceptual distinctions that are needed when analyzing large-scale phenomena such as “societies” as well as on the link between scholarly work and a critical, action-oriented diagnosis of the present time. (shrink)

Although fear and anxiety have gradually become a shared experience in the time of COVID-19, few studies have examined its content from historical, cultural, and phenomenological perspectives concerning the self-awareness and alterity. We discuss the development of the ubiquitous nature of Taijin-kyōfushō (TKS), a subtype of social anxiety disorder (SAD) originated and considered culturally-bound in the 1930s Japan involving fear of offending or displeasing other people. Considering the historical processes of disease classification, advances in cognitive neurosciences, and (...) the need to better understand the content of suffering, psychiatric nosology for SAD still appears controversial and requires further investigations. (shrink)

This article shows how macro-historical processes of change can activate robust and enduring forms of citizenship practice, providing both survey-based evidence for this claim and a theorization of the causal mechanisms involved. Focusing on the case of Portugal, where democratization followed the historically unusual path of social revolution, we examine survey data on civic practice covering twenty countries and find Portugal to be a world leader in public participation in the electronic public sphere. When we examine the subsection (...) of the population socialized politically in the country’s post-revolutionary democracy, we find another important indicator of lively citizenship practice. The article takes the examination of this specific national case as the basis for developing an argument of broad theoretical relevance on the social underpinnings of lively and participatory citizenship practice. With an empirical foundation for our claims in survey data and other sources, our analysis of Portugal offers an interpretation of the case, leading to substantial revision of assumptions in the extant literature. More importantly, through our examination of this case, we show how large-scale macro-historical processes of change can encourage lively civic practice manifested at the individual level. Our argument highlights the importance of hierarchy-challenging collective experiences that reconfigure cultural frameworks and reorient the character of institutional practice. We take up the implications of this argument for cases lacking a history of revolution and find certain parallels with national cases shaped by movements of social reform as in the social democracies of Scandinavia. (shrink)

We live in a world of technical systems, designed in accordance with technical disciplines and operated by a personnel trained in those disciplines. This is a unique form of social organization without historical precedent. It overshadows traditional democratic institutions and largely determines our way of life. Technosystem: The Social Life of Reason reconstructs the idea of democracy for this brave new world. The author draws on the tradition of radical social criticism represented by Herbert Marcuse and (...) the Frankfurt School as well as contemporary Science and Technology Studies. The social critics recognized the role of instrumental rationality in modern societies, but they did not analyze any actual technologies in detail, nor did they develop a convincing theory of democratic resistance to the new forms of domination by rational systems. STS has developed methods of analysis for a fine-grained study of technology. Technosystem brings these methods to bear on the resistances emerging in the world described by the radical social critics of the Frankfurt School.--. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Achieving Social and Cultural Educational Objectives through Art Historical Inquiry PracticesJacqueline Chanda (bio)Some overburdened art or generalist teachers may ask: "With all the things we have to know and do these days, why should we be interested in art history inquiry processes? What educational value is there in promoting the use of art history inquiry processes in teaching and learning?" The answer to the first question lies (...) in art history's relationship to the humanities and the visual arts. The humanities is the branch of learning concerned with human thought and relations. We turn to the humanities when we wish to understand the human condition, social and cultural values, and ourselves. But some might say that historical inquiry methods do the same thing. What distinguishes art historical inquiry from general historical inquiry is the focus on the visual arts. Visual arts are in the branch of learning that deal with the production and study of visual imagery and material objects. In the context of art history inquiry, visual imagery and material objects are the primary data used for the study of changes in ourselves; religious, social, and cultural values; and human conditions. Visual imagery is one of the universal ways that the human condition and social and cultural values of the past and present are expressed. It is one of the fundamental means by which humans communicate feelings, emotions, ideas, ideologies, etc.Art educators have acknowledged for a long time the importance of the study of images and visual elements in the lives of children and the field of art education. This is even more evident today as the discipline moves to embrace notions of "visual culture," which emphasize exploring and studying all the things that visibly shape our lives. The acknowledgment of art history as an inquiry process rather than simply the study of facts about past artworks developed in the discipline-based arts education (DBAE) [End Page 24] movement of the 1980s and 1990s.1 In spite of the recommendations that art history be explored as a discipline of inquiry, much of the art history investigations that take place in the classroom today focus on understanding the artist through his/her biography and understanding the work of art through analysis of style and formal description.2 While the artist biography brings to light the artist's intention and a formal description examines what one can see in the work and makes reference to aspects of style and formal elements, the two approaches do not provide enough information to generate meaning and speculate about what social and cultural elements may have caused the work of art to look the way it does or the effects it may have had at the time of its creation. Unfortunately, many educators are not aware of how to extend their investigations to uncover these levels of analysis.Erickson provides one definition of inquiry as describing, attributing (determining who created the work), reconstructing (determining what the object originally looked like), and interpreting the artwork.3 While these aspects are all a part of an art historical investigation, they do not go far enough into the practices utilized by art historians when exploring a work of art. Therefore, in the context of this article the phrase "art historical inquiry processes" refers to the use of authentic activities (asking questions, collecting and analyzing data, interpreting, speculating about cause or effect, and disseminating knowledge) and approaches that art historians use when studying works of art; this approach goes beyond what is clearly seen in visual imagery in order to reveal not only the denotative but also the connotative meanings that are relevant to the historical and cultural context of the artwork. These authentic activities incorporate approaches related to structural analysis (that is, contemporary analysis—iconography, iconology semiotics, feminism, etc.—that draws from literary reading skills to generate meaning) and explore, examine, and facilitate the drawing of conclusions about the significance and place of visual imagery and material objects in the societies from which they come.4 The purpose of this article is to discuss the value of studying visual images and material objects using authentic art history inquiry processes to uncover meanings, and by extension... (shrink)

I argue that work in medical ethics which attempts to humanize medicine without examining hidden assumptions (about medicine's ontology, explanations, goals, relationships) has the dehumanizing effect of legitimating practices which treat persons as abstractions. After illustrating the need to reexamine the field of medical ethics and the doctor-patient relationship in particular, I use Foucault's work to provide a social, historical framework for discussion. This background begins to demonstrate that doctor-patient relationships cannot be made satisfactory by new hospital policies (...) or interpersonal skills, but have deep-rooted problems due to medicine's place in social history. Real progress requires social or structural change. (shrink)

Peter Homans offers a new understanding of the origins of psychoanalysis and relates the psychoanalytic project as a whole to the sweep of Western culture, past and present. He argues that Freud's fundamental goal was the interpretation of culture and that, therefore, psychoanalysis is fundamentally a humanistic social science. To establish this claim, Homans looks back at Freud's self-analysis in light of the crucial years from 1906 to 1914 when the psychoanalytic movement was formed and shows how these experiences (...) culminated in Freud's cultural texts. By exploring the "culture of psychoanalysis," Homans seeks a better understanding of what a "psychoanalysis of culture" might be. Psychoanalysis, Homans shows, originated as a creative response to the withering away of traditional communities and their symbols in the aftermath of the industrial revolution. The loss of these attachments played a crucial role in the lives of the founders of psychoanalysis, especially Sigmund Freud but also Karl Abraham, Carl Jung, Otto Rank, and Ernest Jones. The personal, political, and religious losses that these figures experienced, the introspection that followed, and the psychological discovery that resulted are what Homans calls "the ability to mourn." Homans expands this historical analysis to construct a general model of psychological discovery: the loss of shared ideals and symbols can produce a deeper sense of self (psychological structure-building, or individuation) and can then lead to the creation of new forms of meaning and self-understanding. He shows how Freud, Jung, and other psychoanalysts began to extend their introspection outward, reinterpreting the meanings of Western art, history, and religion. In conclusion, Homans evaluates Freud's theory of culture and discusses the role that psychoanalysis might play in social and cultural criticism. Throughout the book, Homans makes use of the many histories, biographies, and psychobiographies that have been written about the origins of psychoanalysis, drawing them into a comprehensive sociocultural model. Rich in insights and highly original in approach, this work will interest psychoanalysts and students of Freud, sociologists concerned with modernity and psychoanalysis, and cultural critics in the fields of religion, anthropology, political science, and social history. (shrink)

There has been considerable interest in recent years in German social thinkers of the Weimar era. Generally, this has focused on reactionary and nationalist figures such as Schmitt and Heidegger. In this book, Austin Harrington offers a broader account of the German intellectual legacy of the period. He explores the ideas of a circle of left-liberal cosmopolitan thinkers who responded to Germany's crisis by rejecting the popular appeal of nationalism. Instead, they promoted pan-European reconciliation based on notions of a (...) shared European heritage between East and West. Harrington examines their concepts of nationhood, religion, and 'civilization' in the context of their time and in their bearing on subsequent debates about European identity and the place of the modern West in global social change. The result is a groundbreaking contribution to current questions in social, cultural and historical theory. (shrink)

Thorstein Veblen is perhaps best thought of as America’s answer to Karl Marx. This is sometimes obscured by the rather unfortunate title of his most important work, The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), which misleading, insofar as it suggests that the book is just a theory of the “leisure class.” What the book provides is in fact a perfectly general theory of class, not to mention property, economic development, and social evolution. It is, in other words, a system (...) of theory that rivals Marx’s historical materialism with respect to scope, generality and explanatory power. Furthermore, it is a system of theory whose central predictions, with respect to the development of capitalism and the possibilities for emancipatory social change, have proven to be essentially correct. When stacked up against Marx’s prognostications, this success clearly provides the basis for what might best be described as an invidious comparison. (shrink)

An important consideration which runs through the adjudication process in each dimension is that of insight vs. blindness. Whether it is a question of deciding if one description is a persuasive critique of another, or which of two rivals is more adequate empirically, or which is a more plausible and convincing narrative, one is always involved in assessing how far and how much each of the accounts permits us to see. The centrality of this notion certifies the inescapably hermeneutical character (...) of social description adjudication. It precludes the possibility of a decision-procedure, but not of rationality. The alternative to a canonical method of description adjudication is not relativism but hermeneutics. ;My argument for a hermeneutical approach to social description adjudication is made largely via consideration of a series of examples. I look at a collection of rival accounts of the same portion of social reality and at the process of choosing between them. I consider the sorts of reasons and arguments that might be advanced for preferring one to another and I evaluate them. The descriptions I look at are accounts of the French Revolution of 1848 and they include Karl Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis-Bonaparte, Victor Hugo's Napoleon the Little, Gustave Flaubert's Sentimental Education and the works of two recent twentieth century social historians. ;I show that these descriptions are complexes of at least three analytically distinct components: critical, empirical and narrative. I show, therefore, that the choice between them can be made from at least three corresponding standpoints. But I also argue that these three dimensions are not independent of one another; each, rather, presupposes the others and none is foundational with respect to the others. Adjudicating between competing social descriptions, then, turns out to be a complex non-canonical process of weighing the relative merits within each dimension. ;I counterpose to the decision-procedure model of social description adjudication a hermeneutical model. I show that good and convincing reasons for preferring one social description or historical interpretation to another need not be strictly derivable from or translatable into a set of universal rules capable of being formulated independently of and in advance of the consideration of the particular case. I show, rather, that rational adjudication between competing social descriptions consists in creative rule-transcending judgment akin to Aristotelian phronesis or Kantian reflective judgment. ;It is often presupposed that choices between competing theories, interpretations, actions or whatever qualify as rational just in case they result from the application of some decision-procedure. I take issue with this assumption when what is at stake is choosing between competing descriptions of social reality. I argue that there is not and cannot be a decision-procedure governing such choices, but that such choices may nonetheless be rational and intersubjectively defensible. (shrink)