Introducing the perplexed reader to a philosophy requires both a comprehensive understanding of the philosophy in question and a rigorous simplifying strategy. But clarity and accessibility come at a price: one has to cut down on complicated and perhaps unresolved lines of thought and arguments, stratifying the development of theoretical positions into a coherent and accessible narrative. This review will address both the success of this book as an introduction and, rather unjustly, those more complex topics that have been left (...) out and might be of interest to readers of this journal.First of all, let me say that Cornelis de Waal’s Peirce: A Guide for the Pexplexed is a very good introduction to Peirce’s.. (shrink)

: T.L. Short's book is a major achievement in Peirce's scholarship and probably one of the best books on Peirce ever written. However, it does not take the impact of evolutionary metaphysics on the development of semiotics into account. Furthermore, it blends out the specific conditions that final causation is subject to in the development of culture and morality.

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

The Fate of Place:. Philosophical History. Edward S. Casey. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 495 pages. 45.00 (cloth);. 19.95 (paper).

In this essay I to do three things. First, I discuss a statement from the Tractatus which says that our free will consists in our ignorance of future actions: “The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future. We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference.” (5.1362) I think this statement might well be inspired by a claim Moore made in connection with free (...) will in his 1912 book Ethics: “We can hardly ever know for certain beforehand, which choice we actually shall make”. But I think Moore’s claim in favor of free will is not convincing. Second, I discuss a question raised in Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein asks what remains if we “subtract” the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm, and he adds in brackets: “Are the kinaesthetic sensations my willing?” (621) This added reflection is a reaction to ideas put forward by William James. Wittgenstein opposes these ideas. He argues that we should not think of the will as a cause at all, kinaesthetic or not, but rather as something embedded in, and constituted by, certain contexts of learning, expectation, practice, and lack of surprise. This is a strong claim. He also returns to the question about the predictability of the future: “When people talk about the possibility of foreknowledge of the future they always forget the fact of the prediction of one’s own voluntary movements” (629). The question is whether Wittgenstein has solved, or dissolved, the problem of free will. Some think that this is the case. I doubt it is. This is the third point I wish to discuss. (shrink)

Der dialogphilosophische Konsens daruber, dass weder das Sein noch die Zeit umfassend begreifbar sei, zwingt zu der Einsicht, dass auch die Welt und ihre Elemente weder aus dem Sein noch aus der Zeit ableitbar sind: Die Phanomene sind kognitiv nicht greifbar. Die vorliegende Studie zur Dialogphilosophie geht dieser Dimension der Zeitlichkeit des Seins nach. Sie gliedert sich in zwei Teile: Der erste Teil widmet sich der Untersuchung der Zeitlichkeit in der Sprache, insbesondere in ihrem Niederschlag in der Grammatik. Darauf aufbauend (...) untersucht der zweite Teil die Zeitlichkeit des Sozialen. (shrink)