The article offers a critical assessment of an article on "Corporate Legitimacy as Deliberation" by Guido Palazzo and Andreas Scherer in this journal. We share the concern about the precarious legitimacy of globally active corporations, infringing on the legitimacy of democracy at large. There is no quarrel with Palazzo/Scherer's diagnosis, which focuses on the consequences of globalization and ensuing challenges for corporate social responsibilities. However, we disagree with the "solutions" offered by them. In a first step we refute the idea (...) of a legitimacy of morals, maintaining that morality is a premodern mode of creating legitimacy. Even worse, moral is becoming a dangerous commodity under conditions of fundamental global disagreements and antagonisms. We secondly refute the concept of the "politicized corporation", maintaining that Palazzo/Scherer disregard the consequences of functional differentiation of modern societies and, in particular, disregard the wisdom of political restraint and constitutional guarantees for the autonomy of different spheres of society. Finally, we refute a seemingly romantic notion of deliberation, maintaining that deliberation and deliberative democracy is a worthy idea, which, however, has no place in the real world of globalized contexts. On the other hand, we also find enough common ground and common concern with Palazzo/Scherer to validate a fruitful discourse. (shrink)

Let A be a formula without implications, and Γ consist of formulas containing disjunction and falsity only negatively and implication only positively. Orevkov and Nadathur proved that classical derivability of A from Γ implies intuitionistic derivability, by a transformation of derivations in sequent calculi. We give a new proof of this result , where the input data are natural deduction proofs in long normal form involving stability axioms for relations; the proof gives a quadratic algorithm to remove the stability axioms. (...) This can be of interest for computational uses of classical proofs. (shrink)

There are mathematical structures with elements that cannot be distinguished by the properties they have within that structure. For instance within the field of complex numbers the two square roots of −1, i and −i, have the same algebraic properties in that field. So how do we distinguish between them? Imbedding the complex numbers in a bigger structure, the quaternions, allows us to algebraically tell them apart. But a similar problem appears for this larger structure. There seems to be always (...) a background and a context that we rely upon. Thus mathematicians naturally make use of Kantian intuition and references fixed by names and denotations. I argue that such features cannot be avoided. (shrink)

Buchholz presented a method to build notation systems for infinite sequent-style derivations, analogous to well-known systems of notation for ordinals. The essential feature is that from a notation one can read off by a primitive recursive function its n th predecessor and, e.g. the last rule applied. Here we extend the method to the more general setting of infinite terms, in order to make it applicable in other proof-theoretic contexts as well as in recursion theory. As examples, we use the (...) method to 1. give a new proof of a well-known trade-off theorem , which says that detours through higher types can be eliminated by the use of transfinite recursion along higher ordinals, and 2. construct a continuous normalization operator with an explicit modulus of continuity. (shrink)

Psychoanalysis sets out to solve the riddles and enigmas of the psyche. For Adorno, however, psychoanalysis itself is an enigma. Why, he asks, have both the theory and its therapeutic applications become entangled in insoluble contradictions? Adorno identifies to a certain extent with the great psychoanalytic riddle-solvers, Freud and Ferenczi, as he probes these contradictions. He hopes, however, to move beyond the limits of a theory that reduces all phenomena to psychological factors, so he also approaches the problem as a (...) sociologist. This perspective enables him to describe the static and dynamic aspects of the social structure within which psychoanalysis developed in the first half of the 20th century. And it frees him, furthermore, from the misconception that Freud passed on to most of his followers: the belief that they were pursuing a natural science of the soul, which would generate its own rigorously scientific psychological technique. (shrink)

Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843) was the most prolific German philosopher of science in the nineteenth century who strived to synthesize Kant’s philosophical foundation of science and mathematics and the needs or practised science and mathematics in order to gain more comprehensive conceptual frameworks and greater methodological flexibility for those two disciplines. His original contributions anticipated later developments, to some extent, though they received comparatively little notice in the later course of the nineteenth century—a fate which partly can be explained by (...) the unfortunate development of the so-called ‘First Friesian School,’ founded by E. F. Apelt, M. J. Schleiden and O. X. Schlömilch. This situation changed temporarily when Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) arrived on the philosophical stage and founded a second, so-called, ‘New Friesian School’ in 1903. In the following two decades, Fries’ specific transformation of Kantian philosophy gained influence within the vigorous discussions about ‘new’ foundations of mathematics and, thus, also played a role within the Berlin Group surrounding Hans Reichenbach, though his work had no direct impact on the philosophy of physics being expounded therein. -/- This essay will first outline some characteristics of Fries’ development of the Kantian approach. Then it will point out the limited impact of the ‘New Friesian School’ on the Berlin Group, while highlighting some missed chances for fruitful exchange. As the originality of this school and its importance for the development of logic and philosophy of mathematics—by and large merits of its early members Walter Dubislav and Kurt Grelling —is dealt with in separate chapters of this volume, and elsewhere, this article will focus on what Fries called the ‘mathematical philosophy of nature’ (i. e. the philosophical foundations of physics). More specifically, it will show how the New Friesian School reacted to Einstein’s theories of relativity, in a way that contrasts with the approach of the Berlin Group. This discussion about relativity will also be used to reveal different understandings of the nature of ‘scientific philosophy’ in general, as well as different models of how philosophy and the empirical sciences should interact. (shrink)

Die Abhandlung gibt eine konzentrierte Rekonstruktion der weit verstreut erschienenen Überlegungen des britisch-ungarischen Chemikers und Philosophen Michael Polanyi zur Reduktionismuskritik. Schlüssel der Kritik ist der Begriff der Grenzbedingung. Grenzbedingungen weisen auf Wirklichkeiten hin, die nicht mehr von den Gesetzmäßigkeiten der Stufe, die sie begrenzen, erreicht werden. Seine Anwendung dieses Begriffs auf Maschinen und Mechanismen ermöglicht Polanyi eine überraschende Kritik am biologischen Reduktionismus. Dieser Kritikpunkt wird durch die Entdeckung der DNA noch verstärkt.

The way physics and other parts of science work can be explained in the framework of radical constructivism. However, this constructivist view itself shows that a uniquily accepted epistemology, constructivism or any other, would not be an advantage for the developmentof science. Unlike physics some parts of science successfully use constructivist concepts inside their theories. Because this is the case particularly in learning theory, constructivist ideas can help to improve physics teaching.

From a classical proof that the gcd of natural numbers a1 and a2 is a linear combination of the two, we extract by Gödel's Dialectica interpretation an algorithm computing the coefficients. The proof uses the minimum principle. We show generally how well-founded recursion can be used to Dialectica interpret well-founded induction, which is needed in the proof of the minimum principle. In the special case of the example above it turns out that we obtain a reasonable extracted term, representing an (...) algorithm close to Euclid's. (shrink)

Jackendoff's account of relating linguistic structure and brain structure is too restricted in concentrating on formal features of computational requirements, neglecting the achievements of various types of neuroscientific modelling. My own approaches to neuronal models of syntactic organization show how these requirements could be met. The book's lack of discussion of a sound philosophy of the relation is briefly mentioned.

Several properties of monotone functionals (MF) and monotone majorizable functionals (MMF) used in the earlier work by the author and van de Pol are proved. It turns out that the terms of the simply typed lambda-calculus define MF, but adding primitive recursion, and even monotonic primitive recursion changes the situation: already Z.Z(1 — sg) is not MMF. It is proved that extensionality is not Dialectica-realizable by MMF, and a simple example of a MF which is not hereditarily majorizable is given.