The Michael Heller’s article entitled “How is philosophy in science possible?” was originally published in Polish in 1986 and then translated into English by Bartosz Brożek and Aeddan Shaw and published in 2011 in the collection of essays entitled Philosophy in Science. Methods and Applications. This seminal paper has founded further growth of the ‘philosophy in science’ and become the reference point in the methodological discussions, especially in Poland. On the 40th anniversary of Philosophical Problems in Science we wanted (...) to make this paper freely available to the international public by reprinting its English version. In this issue it is followed by two additional articles-commentaries. (shrink)

Zygmunt Zawirski, a member of the Lwow-Warsaw Philosophical School, in 1927-28 published an extensive paper (in three parts) devoted to the critical examination of the eternal return hypothesis - the idea that the history of the universe is fundamentally a cyclic process. After presenting the development of this idea throughout the ages Zawirski discusses arguments on its behalf coming mainly from the second law of thermodynamics and from the Poincaré recurrence theorem. Zawirski's criticism is confronted with the present state of (...) art. in this domain. Three new theoretical inputs are taken into account: first, our present knowledge of the global structure of space-time geometries with closed timelike curves; second, some results of relativistic thermodynamics; third, Tipler's no-return theorem (relativistic counterpart of the Poincaré theorem). Our knowledge regarding the eternal return, although not less hypothetical, is more „formalized” and more sophisticated than it was in Zawirski's time. (shrink)

'The infinite! No other question has ever moved so profoundly the spirit of man; no other idea has so fruitfully stimulated his intellect; yet no other concept stands in greater need of clarification than that of the infinite.' David Hilbert (1862-1943). This interdisciplinary study of infinity explores the concept through the prism of mathematics and then offers more expansive investigations in areas beyond mathematical boundaries to reflect the broader, deeper implications of infinity for human intellectual thought. More than a dozen (...) world-renowned researchers in the fields of mathematics, physics, cosmology, philosophy, and theology offer a rich intellectual exchange among various current viewpoints, rather than a static picture of accepted views on infinity. The book starts with a historical examination of the transformation of infinity from a philosophical and theological study to one dominated by mathematics. It then offers technical discussions on the understanding of mathematical infinity. Following this, the book considers the perspectives of physics and cosmology: Can infinity be found in the real universe? Finally, the book returns to questions of philosophical and theological aspects of infinity"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Our present knowledge in the field of dynamical systems, information theory, probability theory and other similar domains indicates that the human brain is a complex dynamical system working in a strong chaotic regime in which random processes play important roles. In this environment our mental life develops. To choose a logically ordered sequence from a random or almost random stream of thoughts is a difficult and energy consuming task. The only domain in which we are able to do this with (...) a full success is mathematics. Leibniz’s life ambition was to extend this success, with the help of what he called _characteristica universalis_, to other areas of human activity. The belief that this is possible lies at the basis of Leibniz’s rationalist system. Reasoning within his system, Leibniz claimed that also fundamental laws of physics can be deduced from the “first principles”. Just as linguistic or conceptual units are at the basis of the _charactersistica universalis_, his monads are responsible for physical activity of material bodies. When this rationalistic strategy is applied to the philosophy of space and time, it leads to their radically relational conception. Leibniz’s rationalistic approach to philosophy and science arouses out sympathy but it was Newton’s mathematical-empirical method that turned out to be effective in human endeavour to understand the functioning of the physical world. Successes of the Newtonian method compel us to revise our concept of rationality. (shrink)

Our present knowledge in the field of dynamical systems, information theory, probability theory and other similar domains indicates that the human brain is a complex dynamical system working in a strong chaotic regime in which random processes play important roles. In this environment our mental life develops. To choose a logically ordered sequence from a random or almost random stream of thoughts is a difficult and energy consuming task. The only domain in which we are able to do this with (...) a full success is mathematics. Leibniz’s life ambition was to extend this success, with the help of what he called _characteristica universalis_, to other areas of human activity. The belief that this is possible lies at the basis of Leibniz’s rationalist system. Reasoning within his system, Leibniz claimed that also fundamental laws of physics can be deduced from the “first principles”. Just as linguistic or conceptual units are at the basis of the _charactersistica universalis_, his monads are responsible for physical activity of material bodies. When this rationalistic strategy is applied to the philosophy of space and time, it leads to their radically relational conception. Leibniz’s rationalistic approach to philosophy and science arouses out sympathy but it was Newton’s mathematical-empirical method that turned out to be effective in human endeavour to understand the functioning of the physical world. Successes of the Newtonian method compel us to revise our concept of rationality. (shrink)

Recenzja książki: John D. Barrow, Książka o niczym, tł. Łukasz Lamża, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2015, ss. 460.

The original view of Joseph Życiński, presented in his book _The Structure of the Metascientific Revolution _(1988), boils down to the observation that almost before our eyes a great revolution took place, not in science, but in the philosophy of science, that is the meta-scientific revolution. His concept of the meta-scientific revolution grew out of his fascination with the revolution that took place in the foundations of mathematics in the first decades of the twentieth century. Whether a change in science (...) deserves to be called a revolution is determined by whether the transformations it underwent also reached the meta-level. The set of presuppositions underlying transformations on the meta-level Życiński calls ideata. One of the aims of this article is to critically reconstruct the meaning of this term. The action of Życiński’s book takes place mainly on meta-level, but the meta-level constantly interacts with what is happening in science itself. The book sometimes makes an impression as if it were a study of the history of science, but history of science in a specific sense – something like a “sampling” of history with numerous examples. Among the creations of human thought, it is difficult to point to an area that changes more dynamically than science itself, but looking at it from a meta-perspective allows us to grasp those of its features that operate on a much broader scale. (shrink)

In the two-volume work _Theism and the Analytical Philosophy _(1985; 1988a) Joseph Życiński took up the challenge of renewing Christian metaphysics so that it could appear as a full-fledged partner in the dialogue with other streams of contemporary philosophy. This renewal should use two sources: the methodological principles of analytic philosophy, especially its philosophy of language, and certain elements of Whitehead’s process philosophy. This study presents a critical reconstruction of Życiński’s arguments contained in the first two chapters of (1985), which (...) are devoted to the problem of language. Main results of this part of Życiński’s work are negative, that is, they refute the arguments and interpretations of those analytical philosophers who show the meaninglessness of the theistic language or try to assimilate it to other standard languages, depriving it of a reference to the transcendent reality. How can a positive part of the Życiński program be developed? It seems that only by formulating specific problems in the field of philosophy of God, or even theology, and choosing the right linguistic tools to drill down on a given problem and seek its solution. This is in line with Wittgenstein’s concept of language games. Życiński tries to do this in (1988a). Życiński turned out to be a precursor of nowadays increasingly developing analytical theology. (shrink)

The issue of infinity appeared in cosmology in the form of a question on spatial and time finiteness or infinity of the universe. Recently, more and more talking is going on about “other universes” (different ones from “our”), the number of which may be infinite. Speculations on this topic emerged in effect of the discussions on the issue of the anthropic principle, and the so-called inflation scenario. In truth, this kind of speculations are hardly recognized as scientific theories, however, they (...) may be included in a sort of “scientific fringe” fulfilling a beneficial heuristic function.All of the speculations regarding numerous universes boil down to the juggling of probabilities, i.e. to the applying of the theory of probability to the universes’ set. However, without probabilistic measure being introduced onto this “set” (as it is not known whether it is a set in a technical sense of this term)—and there is no knowledge at all as to how to do this—such considerations may not go beyond a vague intuition.The producing of other universes usually results from an assumption that the disturbing of original circumstances, of values of physical constants, or of other parameters characterizing the universe is possible. On the other hand, the idea of the final theory seems to assume that the mathematical structure of this theory should be rigid, i.e. that the disturbing of its parameters leads on to the very same structure. This would have eliminated the possibility of the existence of other universes.The idea of infinite number of universes sometimes has an anti-theological undertone: there is no need for assuming purposeful acting of the Creator, since all possibilities are fulfilled. The reaction of a theologian may be as follows: Just the same, God may create just a single universe, as much as an infinite number of universes. What’s more, one may risk saying that God is not interested in nothing that may be short of infinity. (shrink)

Physical theories give us the best available information about what there exists. Although physics is not ontology, it can be ontologically interpreted. In the present study, I propose to interpret physical theories à la Quine, i.e. not to speculate about what really exists, but rather to identify what a given physical theory presupposes that exists. I briefly suggest how Quine’s program should by adapted to this goal. To put the idea to the test, I apply it to the famous Hartle–Hawking (...) model of the quantum creation of the universe from nothing, and try to discover what kind of nothingness the model presupposes. I also make some remarks concerning ontological commitments of the method of physics itself. (shrink)

Recenzja książki: Elaine Landry, _Categories for the Working Philosopher_, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, ss. xiv+471.

The founding motto of philosophy in science is “tracking down big philosophical problems in contemporary science.” Knowing the basic history of philosophy and the history of science, we more or less know what “big philosophical topics” mean. The most representative topics of this kind include: time, space, causality, matter, life, consciousness, thinking... The tables of contents of philosophy textbooks could be copied to continue this list. These topics are big not only when they remain at a high level of generality, (...) but also when they get down to special cases and particular sub-problems. Sometimes it is only then that they fully reveal their big format. (shrink)

Book review: K. Chamcham, J. Silk, J.D. Barrow, S. Saunders, The Philosophy of Cosmology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017, pp. XII + 514.