The out?dated intentionalistic assumptions manifest in Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action undermine a solution to the problem of order in action theory beyond utilitarianism. An analysis of his intersubjectivistic conception, which is based on the theory of the speech?act, shows that the incompleteness of Habermas's linguistic turn is due to his attempt to revive the older Critical Theory's concept of critique. The claims for a scientifically well?founded revival of a universal concept of reason ? which are asserted in this concept (...) ? invalidate the intersubjectivistic paradigm in action theory and therefore obstruct the way to a de?individualized formulation of the theory of social contract that avoids the paradox of utilitarian models. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 96 Heft: 1 Seiten: 263-270.

In seiner Einladung zur Mitwirkung hatte der Herausgeber als Arbeitstitel für diesen Band formuliert: "Erziehungswissenschaft am Ausgang der Moderne"; von dieser Vorgabe sind meine Überlegungen an­ geregt worden. 2 Dahmer I Klafkis (1968) "Ausgangs' -Diagnose war fast noch druckfrisch als die Renaissance der geistes­ wissenschaftlichen Pädagogik einsetzte. 3 Auf die sich die Postmoderne-Debatte aber nicht reduzieren läßt. 4 Weitere Varianten sind im Kontext evolutionstheoretischer Entwürfe der Pädagogik oder im Anschluß an new-wave-philosophies entstanden, vgl. z.B. Treml 1987 sowie Huschke-Rhein 1988. Auf (...) diese Arbeiten will ich im folgenden nicht eingehen, weil dadurch eine immanente Diskussion von,System' -Denken not­ wendig würde, die nicht nur von erziehungswissenschaftlichen Problemen, sondern gelegentlich über­ haupt von Theorieproblemen wegführen würde. 5 Die Rezeptionsgeschichte bei Oelkers/Tenorth 1987 b; Seiler I Meyer 1987 können im übrigen durch den Bezug auf die Herbart-Rezeption zeigen, daß solche eigentümlich verzerrenden Formen der Aneignung von Theorie in der wissenschaftlichen Pädagogik keineswegs singulär sind. 6 Mit,Systemtheorie' sei im folgenden die Form bezeichnet, zu der sich die Systemtheorie modo Luh­ mann I Schorr in der Rezeption der Pädagogen gewandelt hat. Meine Bemerkungen gelten beiden Modi der Systemtheorie. 7 Ich nutze einen Begriff, mit dem Th. Luckmann den Effekt analysiert, den die phänomenologische Theo­ rie und Philosophie den Weltbildern der Sozialwissenschaften zugefügt habe. 8 In der Analyse pädagogischer Argumente liegen solche Erweiterungen vor, z.B. bei Künzli 1986, Paschen 1988. 9 Am bekanntesten vielleicht in der pädagogischen Formel vom,Implikationszusammenhang von Ziel, In­ halt und Methode' vertreten. (shrink)

In this book the author gives a broad overview of different areas of research in nonmonotonic reasoning, and presents some new results and ideas based on his research. The guiding principles are: clarification of the different research activities in the area, which have sometimes been undertaken independently of each other; and appreciation of the fact that these research activities often represent different means to the same ends, namely sound theoretical foundations and efficient computation. The book begins with a discussion of (...) the various types of nonmonotonic reasoning, their applications and their logics. Theorem proving techniques for these logics are also described. The following chapters deal with formulations of nonmonotonic inheritance, and nonmonotonic reasoning based on nonmonotonic rules. The final chapter discusses the achievements in the field in the light of the Yale shooting example. The book will be welcomed by researchers in theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning for Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form ‘if A then normally B’. They have been discovered in the explanation debate, but were considered as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue that the prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws implies statistical normality (§2), whence normic laws have empirical content. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws is nonmonotonic, and why the understanding of the individual case is so important here. (...) After sketching some foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understand ceteris paribus laws (§6). §7 deals with the difference between physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with the difference between normicity and approximation. In §8 it is shown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding of the protection of theories against falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- and evolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason for the omnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality. (shrink)

The focus on reflexive democracy offers a meaningful perspective to reintegrate the fragmented knowledge regarding politics again. This shows that democracy is a complex historico-political concept. Against this background, "representative democracy", "direct democracy", and "deliberative democracy", on the one hand, are no longer disconnected from each other. On the other hand, it becomes possible to articulate with greater precision what "internal opening", "transnational extension", and "civil complexity" of democracy nowadays mean. (edited).

This is one of the most important books on quantum mechanics ever written for lay readers, in which an eminent physicist and successful science writer, Heinz Pagels, discusses and explains the core concepts of physics without resorting to complicated mathematics. "Can be read by anyone. I heartily recommend it!" -- New York Times Book Review. 1982 edition.

According to a plausible picture of information, to acquire information is to rule out possibilities. What is the nature of these possibilities? The most natural answer---that they are possible states of the world---seems to be refuted by the existence of informative truths that are necessary, and so don't rule out any real possibilities. This seems to show that informational contents cannot be identified with the real possibilities they eliminate. Real possibilities, it seems, are too coarse-grained to do the work of (...) informational contents. ;In the first part of the dissertation, I look at two defenses of the coarse-grained conception of content. First, Stalnaker has claimed that the informativeness of necessary truths can be explained within a two-dimensional semantic framework, in which necessary truths have contingent metalinguistic contents. In Chapter 1, I argue that this metalinguistic approach misconstrues the content of mathematical truths. Second, Stalnaker has claimed that we have independent reason to adopt a coarse-grained conception of content since naturalistic views of content such as indicator views allow only for coarse-grained contents. In Chapter 2, I argue that both indicator and teleological views allow for more fine-grained contents and that, given certain assumptions, they even require them. Together, these arguments show that the best attempt to explain the informativeness of necessary truths in terms of coarse-grained entities fails, and that naturalism gives us no reason for thinking that some other attempt will succeed. Instead of explaining informativeness in terms of the elimination of real possibilities, I claim, we should explain it in terms of the elimination of more fine-grained epistemic possibilities. ;In the second part of the dissertation, I describe the characteristic features of epistemic possibilities. Chapter 3 clarifies the relevant sense of epistemic possibility by distinguishing it from related senses that have gone under the same name. I argue that P is epistemically possible for a thinker at a time just in case an operative belief that P is compatible with his operative beliefs at this time, where beliefs are called compatible, not if their contents are compatible, but if the beliefs themselves are compatible in the sense that it is possible to have them at the same time. Since epistemic possibility in this sense is a matter of what it is possible to believe, I call it epistemic possibility in the believability sense. ;In Chapter 4, I turn to the question of what sort of thing epistemic possibilities are. I argue that epistemic possibilities can be defined in terms of, but not identified with, a certain kind of fine-grained content. (shrink)

In sec. 1.1 I emphasize the meliorative purpose of epistemology, and I characterize Goldman's epistemology as reliabilistic, cognitive, social, and meliorative. In sec. 1.2 I point out that Goldman's weak notion of knowledge is in conflict with our ordinary usage of 'knowledge'. In sec. 2 I argue for an externalist-internalist hybrid conception of justification which adds reliability-indicators to externalist knowledge. Reliability-indicators produce a veritistic surplus value for the social spread of knowledge. In sec. 3 I analyze some particular meliorative rules (...) which have been proposed by Goldman. I prove that obedience to the rule of maximally specific evidence increases expected veritistic value (sec. 3.1), and I argue that rule-circular arguments are epistemically worthless (sec. 3.2). In the final sec. 3.3 I report a non-circular justification of meta-induction which has been developed elsewhere. (shrink)

Suppose two people are about to drown. We are in a position to save only one, so the other will have to die. One of the two has just culpably killed an innocent person, but has no intention of killing anybody else and there is no reason to expect that he will. Everything else being equal, should we give them an equal chance of being saved by flipping a coin? In this paper I argue that we should not. I argue (...) that the implications of a person's moral culpability for (recent or prospective) harm to a particular victim should transfer to other conflict situations in which the wrongdoer might find him or herself. This requires establishing the extent to which a person's contributing to harming another person — and his moral culpability for that harm — impinges on our decision making in situations where it is possible only to assist either the wrongdoer or some other person that is not his victim. (shrink)

This paper deals with universes in explicit mathematics. After introducing some basic definitions, the limit axiom and possible ordering principles for universes are discussed. Later, we turn to least universes, strictness and name induction. Special emphasis is put on theories for explicit mathematics with universes which are proof-theoretically equivalent to Feferman's.