Considering a range of present-day phenomena, from the immediacy effects of literature to the impact of hypercommunication, globalization, and sports, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht notes an important shift in our relationship to history and the passage of time. Although we continue to use concepts inherited from a "historicist" viewpoint, a notion of time articulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the actual construction of time in which we live in today, which shapes our perceptions, experiences, and actions, is no (...) longer historicist. Without fully realizing it, we now inhabit a new, unnamed space in which the "closed future" and "ever-available past" (a past we have not managed to leave behind) converge to produce an "ever-broadening present of simultaneities." This profound change to a key dimension of our existence has complex consequences for the way in which we think about ourselves and our relation to the material world. At the same time, the ubiquity of digital media has eliminated our tactile sense of physical space, altering our perception of our world. Gumbrecht draws on his mastery of the philosophy of language to enrich his everyday observations, traveling to Disneyland, a small town in Louisiana, and the center of Vienna to produce striking sketches of our broad presence in the world. (shrink)

Production of Presence is a comprehensive version of the thinking of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, one of the most consistently original literary scholars writing today. It offers a personalized account of some of the central theoretical movements in literary studies and in the humanities over the past thirty years, together with an equally personal view of a possible future. Based on this assessment of the past and the future of literary studies and the humanities, the book develops the provocative (...) thesis that, through their exclusive dedication to interpretation, i.e. to the reconstruction and attribution of meaning, the humanities have become incapable of addressing a dimension in all cultural phenomena that is as important as the dimension of meaning. Interpretation alone cannot do justice to the dimension of "presence," a dimension in which cultural phenomena and cultural events become tangible and have an impact on our senses and our bodies. Production of Presence is a passionate plea for a rethinking and a reshaping of the intellectual practice within the humanities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Maturana?Hans Ulrich GumbrechtWhy would a German scholar specializing in pedagogical thought travel thousands of miles to Santiago de Chile for an interview with a aging scientist who, it seems, has created for himself a solid reputation in the field of "biology of vision" without being hailed by his peers as a path-breaking innovator? In the German intellectual context, the answer to this question could be as (...) laconic as it would be superfluous: it consists in a deictic reference to the name and, implicitly, to the work of Niklas Luhmann. American readers, in contrast, may need some introductory explanation in order to understand the epistemological triangle between contemporary pedagogical thought, Maturana's biology, and Luhmann's philosophy—and, above all, in order to assess and even to appreciate its intellectual potential.Niklas Luhmann is certainly difficult to read, at least for starters, and to those who met him during his lifetime he invariably appeared to be a dead-serious person. But today, more than five years after Luhmann's death, we begin to discover traces of a sometimes uncanny irony—one may want to call it a "practical irony"—in his writing. One of the discursive gestures that characterized Luhmann's texts were references to academic authors who nobody had ever heard of (let alone read), presented with the same seriousness and with the same attitude of intellectual reverence that we normally reserve for the classics: for example, to the logician Gotthart Guenter, the philosopher Fritz Heider, the biologist Humberto Maturana, or the mathematician George Spencer Brown. There is no doubt that, in each case, a specific concept or a specific thought developed by one of these authors had turned out to be truly important within Luhmann's own work, and yet the "effects of authority" that his very serious quotes produced were nothing short of hilarious. For Luhmann's readers, with that self-flagellating attitude in which we academics so like to indulge, quite regularly attributed the experience that they had never heard of those seeming "authorities" to their own lack of intellectual cosmopolitanism. This is why, until the present day, some departments of sociology or philosophy in Germany have Spencer Brown or Guenter specialists on their payrolls, and this also explains why some of those authors have had moments of intense reception [End Page 22] in the world of the humanities and social sciences at German universities. Among them, Humberto Maturana, together with his co-author the late Francisco Varela, seem to be the exception confirming the rule that none of those Luhmann references had the intellectual power to survive Luhmann himself.Now why should one trust Luhmann's trust in Maturana? The debate about the importance of Luhmann's thought (he labeled it a "theory of social systems") in the larger context of contemporary Western philosophy has barely begun to become serious, and we are certainly many years away from a definitive consensual evaluation. But there are two—very different—features about Luhmann's work that make him fascinating at first glance. One lies in the simple fact that, probably, no other thinker since Hegel has managed to develop a restrained set of basic concepts and premises into a systematically coherent philosophical edifice of similar proportions. In this sense, entering the dimension of Luhmann's thought offers the patient reader a possibility to view many familiar positions and questions from sometimes radically different innovative angles. Less obvious, however, and more intriguing is Luhmann's intellectual bet to develop his systemic thought under strict avoidance of notions such as "subject," "subjecthood," or "agency." It was this very bet (about whose existential and political motivations he only left some rather vague remarks) that explains Luhmann's fascination for much theoretical thinking emerging from biological research, above all for Humberto Maturana's work. For from a biological perspective, subjecthood and agency are highly marginal attributes in the realm of living organisms. I believe that this (almost hidden) component in Luhmann's thinking can explain the particularly strong affinity of contemporary pedagogical thought in Germany with his work. Of course, such an affinity will not necessarily lead to a pedagogical theory that, in orthodox reliance on Luhmann, will... (shrink)

Verstehen ist nicht nur ein Grundbegriff menschlicher Lebensfuhrung und Lebenswelt, sondern besitzt auch in der Philosophie und den verschiedenen Wissenschaften eine zentrale Bedeutung. Die Frage nach der Moglichkeit von Verstehen ist dabei immer auch die Frage nach dem Subjekt und Objekt des Verstandnisses. Wer versteht wen oder was? Ist "Verstehen" also nur rationales Erfassen, Erkennen tieferer Einsichten und komplexerer Zusammenhange oder impliziert es mehr? Versteht man den Anderen, den Fremden, aber auch den Text wirklich so einfach? Und wenn ja, wie (...) strukturiert sich dieses Verstehen? Es soll in dem interdisziplinaren Band versucht werden, mit den genannten Fragen Anschlussfahigkeit zu evozieren, so dass die Vieldimensionalitat des Verstehens thematisiert und nach Funktion, Leistung und Grenzen des Verstehens vor allem in Philosophie, Geistes- und Naturwissenschaft gefragt werden kann. Mit Beitragen von Christina Brandt, Selin Gerlek, Julia Gruevska, Felix Huttemann, Bernhard Irrgang, Gudrun Kuhne-Bertram, Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Kevin Liggieri, Kate Meyer-Drawe, Sabine Ohlenbusch, Tobias Schlicht, Gunter Scholtz und Volker Steenblock. (shrink)

Everyfan -- Definitions : praise, beauty, athletics -- Discontinuities : demigods, gladiators, knights, ruffians, sportsmen, Olympians, customers -- Fascinations : bodies, suffering, grace, tools, forms, plays, timing -- Gratitude : watching, waste.

If identity is to be taken as a relation, not between any object and itself, nor between expressions , but between "intensions" or Fregean "Sinnen" of individual constants , then not only definite descriptions but also grammatically proper names ought to have intensions. This, however, has been repudiated by J. St. Mill and, more recently and more persuasively, by Saul Kripke. So an attempt will be made to interpret proper names as definite descriptions sui generis, namely, "rigid" descriptions referring to (...) the way the bearer of the name is called, in certain contexts, in the real world. To avoid circularity or a vicious regressus in infinitum, however, one has to do this on the basis of a distinction between "names" and "name-radicals". (shrink)

Juli Zeh, who enjoys an international reputation, is one of the most gifted and productive writers of Germany today. Her dystopian tale Corpus Delicti: Ein Prozess represents a lively, intelligent, and innovative addition to the genre. It presents a picture of a benevolent dictatorship that demands good health as the highest duty of its citizens, in a sequence of dramatic scenes combining the virtues of a thriller with a dystopia focusing on the present-day preoccupation with health and the body. Most (...) segments are presented as scenes of a trial against a biologist who is accused of rebellion against “The Method,” the ruling order of the future state, whose dominant ideology is “Health as the Principle of State Legitimacy.” Thus metaphysical morality and Enlightenment values such as freedom, democracy, and justice have been replaced by a scientific, secular notion of life as the ultimate criterion and value. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 30.4 (2000) 83-101 [Access article in PDF] Martin Heidegger and his Japanese InterlocutorsAbout A Limit of Western Metaphysics Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht 1 Quite obviously, the central position that Western philosophical discourses have assigned, over the past two centuries, to the concept of "sense" hinges upon the epistemological dominance of the Subject/Object paradigm. In whichever specific ways this concept has been defined (and we all know how (...) confusing the range of those proposals has become), 1 it always ends up referring to the modalities in which an "Observer-Subject" can refer to what (s)he is observing as the "World of Objects." "Making sense," then, may be described as the selection, performed by an observer, of a specific object of reference among all the objects of which the world is believed to consist; or as the drawing of a line by which (s)he makes a distinction, at every given moment, between those parts of the world that (s)he is observing and those that (s)he is not observing; or as the positioning of a chosen topic within a preexisting context of possible associations. All these different descriptions can be turned into definitions of "sense making" as long as they point to the awareness that whatever has been chosen, divided, or contextualized could have been chosen, divided, or contextualized differently. Another way of evoking the same type of relation between what remains "potential" and what becomes "actual" would be to say that the concept of "sense" always refers to cases of entropy transformed into structure—under the condition that alternative patterns of transforming entropy into structure remain available. What we call the Subject's consciousness (Bewusstsein) is the place where these selections take place and where their alternatives are held available.If we consider the Subject/Object paradigm as the core element of that style of philosophizing which has been called (sometimes from a purely descriptive and sometimes from a critical angle) "Western metaphysics," then it is a both true and trivial conclusion to say that, within Western metaphysics, sense making is inevitable (that is, that Subjects cannot help producing sense and, also, that there can be no effects of sense without pointing to a Subject). An interesting case that proves the point of this implicational relationship is Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. Despite Luhmann's sustained effort to be epistemologically eccentric, despite all his great conceptual ambition to bypass the instance of the Subject, 2 his books (and, above all, their reception) make it [End Page 83] very clear how a philosophical discourse that gives as central a position to the concept of "sense" as Luhmann's cannot help producing Subject-effects. The frequently used everyday expression, on the other hand, that "something makes no sense" is not in conflict with our point about the inevitability of sense making within the metaphysical—and also within our Western everyday—framework of discursive presuppositions.For if we say that "something makes no sense," we are not using the word "sense" in accordance with the conventional philosophical meaning of "sense making," and we are thus not referring to individual phenomena that would "resist" individual acts of sense attribution. 3 Rather, when we say that "something makes no sense," we react to situations where a (shorter or longer) sequence of those elementary and inevitable acts of sense attribution does not produce an impression of "coherence" or "consistency"; we refer to situations where we lack a larger perspective from which we could subsume the results of different individual acts of sense making [see Hahn]. Astonishingly enough (or not astonishingly at all), all those loud intellectual slogans from a decade or two ago about the "death of the Subject" never reached this—altogether unsurprising—point: that any attempt at (or the mere historical process of) overcoming a Subject-centered epistemological tradition (or, with the more Heideggerian concept, of overcoming "metaphysics") would have to ask how one could—begin to—avoid sense making. On the contrary, that "weak subject" and that so-called "weak thinking" as which the Subject/Object paradigm seems to... (shrink)

T. 1. Synthese und Theorie. Trägerschichten.

O impulso filosófico fundamental de Dilthey é uma fundamentação filosófica das ciências humanas. Ele segue esse projeto de uma “Crítica da Razão Histórica”, como ele chegou a chamar seu plano, desde a metade dos anos 60 do século XIX até o final de sua vida em 1911. Essa intenção de uma fundamentação das ciências do homem, da sociedade e da história remete à confrontação da Escola Histórica, cujos representantes principais Dilthey conheceu durante sua época de estudante em Berlim, com o (...) positivismo franco-inglês, ou seja, o empirismo de Comte, Mill e Buckle. O presente texto procura apresentar e comentar detalhadamente esse projeto, que encontrou sua forma mais madura na obra tardia A Construção do Mundo Histórico nas Ciências Humanas (1911). (shrink)

There has been much speculation among intellectuals and philosophers about the qualitative changes in our habits of communication that have come with electronic technology - so much so that we have perhaps neglected the most obvious quantitative effect: without any doubt, human beings have never been obliged to communicate as frequently as is the case in our electronic present - with the unsurprising and well known consequence that we constantly feel "behind" in our electronic obligations to communicate. From a (pseudo-) (...) ethical point of view, the even more oppressive flip side of this phenomenon is one's need to be constantly "available," the result of which we all know: seminar discussions, religious services, or moments of erotic delight interrupted by ringing cellphones or by a constant anxiety that one needs to check one's e-mail. The main interest of this essay is to explore the existential consequences of this new - and enslaving - law of "universal availability." But this entire polemic is accompanied by the author's concession that his own - very subjective - reaction to electronic communication may well be the (legitimate) reaction of old age. (shrink)

Adopting an ontology of full concreteness , one has to distinguish between human action in the internal view of the actor himself and human action in the external view of a fellow human being, or spectator. As seen from the latter point of view, human action is nothing but observable behavior. As such, it belongs in the objective realm of natural necessity, as does any other macrophysical event . As seen from the former point of view, human action may be (...) characterized as a system of non-indicative subjective traits of the actor's intentional objects, appealing to him, in the light of his motives, in a 'gerundive' way. As such, it does not belong in the objective realm of natural necessity, and is free, moreover, in the positive sense that the actor could have acted otherwise. If these perspectives are commingled - as there is a strong tendency to do by arguing, or construing, from analogy -, the result is confusion. But if they are seen as disjunct alternatives, the result is complementarity in the sense of Bohr. However, we must not misconstrue such complementarity as a dual-aspect-conception, for there seems to be no good sense in saying that action as a system of non-indicative subjective traits and action as objective behavior are but two aspects of one and the same human action 'in itself', i.e., irrespective of the modes of subjective givenness. Auf dem Boden einer Ontologie der vollen Konkretion muß man zwischen dem menschlichen Handeln in der Innensicht des Handelnden selbst und dem menschlichen Handeln in der Außensicht eines Mitmenschen unterscheiden. Vom Standpunkt eines mitmenschlichen Zuschauers aus ist menschliches Handeln nichts anderes als beobachtbares Verhalten; als solches gehört es, genau wie jedes andere makrophysikalische Ereignis, ungeachtet mikrophysikalischer Indeterminismen in den objektiven Bereich der Naturnotwendigkeit. Vom Standpunkt des Handelnden selbst aus läßt sich menschliches Handeln dagegen als ein System motivbedingter 'gerundiver' Charaktere der subjektiven Bezugsgegenstände des jeweils Handelnden kennzeichnen; als solches gehört es nicht in den objektiven Bereich der Naturnotwendigkeit und ist überdies auch in dem positiven Sinne frei, daß der Handelnde auch anders hätte handeln können. Wenn man beide Perspektiven vermengt - und es gibt eine starke Tendenz, dies aufgrund von Analogieschlüssen oder analogisierenden Auffassungen zu tun -, entsteht Konfusion; aber wenn man die beiden Perspektiven als disjunkte Alternativen sieht, ergibt sich Komplementarität im Sinne Bohrs. Wir dürfen solche Komplementarität freilich nicht als eine Zwei-Aspekte-Konzeption mißdeuten; denn man scheint nicht wirklich sinnvoll sagen zu können, Handeln als ein System von gerundiven subjektiven Charakteren und Handeln als objektives Verhalten seien nur zwei Aspekte einer und derselben menschlichen Handlung 'an sich', nämlich ohne Rücksicht auf ihre subjektiven Gegebenheitsweisen. (shrink)

Husserl’s transcendental reduction admits of two motivations: the general methodological ban on begging the question, and the principle that a typology of objects ought to be based on a typology of my ways of cognizing them. As Husserl’s ‘transcendental phenomenology’ agrees with the ‘linguistic phenomenology’ of many analytic philosophers in being at bottom an effort to understand what precisely we mean to say by asserting that there ‘exists’ a ‘consciousness-independent’ or ‘transcendent’ world, the ‘residue’ of transcendental reduction is my subjective (...) consciousness. My cognitive approaches to the latter and to that of somebody else are not only entirely different but ‘complementary’ in the sense of Bohr’s. In the course of searching for an identity criterion for temporal entities lacking a spatial localisation in the world, we can show that the allegedly noetic phenomenon of, say, my now seeing a cat is a noema, to wit, the cat-as-now-beingseen-by-me-in-such-and-such-a-manner. There is no sound base for postulating, over and above the noematic nature of my consciousness, a second, noetic, aspect thereof. (shrink)

The author discusses Niklas Luhmann's concept of ethics and morals. Therefore he sketches the main traits of Luhmann's theory of systems (e.g. the terms autopoiesis, system and environment, code and programme). From the system-theoretical point of view, ethics are characterized as the reflexive theory of morals. Morals are described as the communication of regard or disregard. The author shows which consequences follow from this concept by discussing problems concerning several subsystems at the same time. The problems of Luhmann's theory of (...) morals and ethics are demonstrated by analyzing the concepts of risk and responsibility. Finally, the author demands that ethics should be understood even more as social ethics which reflect upon their social foundation in a more consequent way. (shrink)

In diesem Buch liefert Hans-Ulrich Wöhler einen repräsentativen geschichtlichen Überblick zum dialektischen Denken in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie. Untersucht werden ausgewählte Texte von Autoren unterschiedlicher sprachlicher, religiöser und philosophischer Provenienz aus dem Zeitraum zwischen dem 6. und dem 17. Jahrhundert. Die den Autor dabei leitende Frage lautet: Inwiefern dachten diese Denker in ihrer Philosophie dialektisch? Im Zentrum des Bandes steht somit die Beschreibung und Rekonstruktion von konkreten Äußerungs- und Anwendungsformen und vor allem von Inhalten eines dialektischen Denkens, unabhängig von (...) ihrer Selbstkennzeichnung durch deren Urheber. Entscheidend für die Beantwortung der Leitfrage ist es, ob und in welcher Weise in den untersuchten Texten ein Verständnis für die Kompatibilität, die Relativität, die Vermittelbarkeit oder auch die Einheit von Gegensätzen artikuliert wird. Der gewählte zeitliche Rahmen integriert in die Darstellung nicht nur einige klassische Vertreter der Philosophie im lateinischen, islamischen und jüdischen Mittelalter, sondern er bezieht zugleich die Perioden der Rezeption und Aneignung des antiken Erbes am Anfang und des kritischen Rekurses darauf am Ende der Epoche ein. (shrink)

Summary Ordinary language philosophers frequently draw on the fact that an appropriately selected sentential combination of the form p but not q can, or cannot, be uttered without absurdity; however, they do so without sufficient reflection on the methodology of such combination tests, which results in considerable shortcomings even in practical application. To improve things, I shall discuss two criteria for distinguishing ‘pragmatic’ from ‘non-pragmatic’ implications and for separating the latter into ‘linguistic’ (‘semantic’ and ‘syntactical’) and ‘non-linguistic’ ones (2–3); consider (...) the bearing of the principle of ‘sense-constancy‘ on the applicability of combination tests (4); and call attention to the important, though merely heuristic, function of investigating pragmatic, as opposed to semantic, implications (5.1–5.2). Finally, I shall hint at a striking analogy between the linguistic (yet non-empirical) method of combination tests, the phenomenological method of ‘fictional variation’, and the empirical method of ‘conjectures and refutations’ (5.3). (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 7 Heft: 1 Seiten: 285-292.

Having stated, in section I., what the reader may expect from this paper, I will sum up, in section II., my views on the question how to justify a moral ‚ought‘-statement (a statement of moral obligation), notably a statement of the first-person form ‚I morally ought not to act in such and such a way if and when (I believe that) I am in such und such a situation.‘ In my view, its justification should consist of two quite different parts. (...) The first part is a logical proof based on my own personal language usage (‚idiolect‘) – namely, the proof that a time-honoured and highly efficient moral principle that I suggest to call the Universalized Golden Rule (UGR) is, in my idiolect (which I think to be shared by many other speakers of any sufficiently developed natural language), a locically true conditional statement (II. 1. – 5.). This part belongs, of course, to the jobs of the philosophical ethicist (metaethicist), who has to cope with it once for all. The second part, however, is a daily task of each of us and seems to me, pace R. M. Hare, to be a kind of ‚verification‘; I use to call it a ‚Nathan-David‘ procedure and will expound it in detail (II. 6. – 9.). In section III., I will try to offer an array of more or less elaborated Nathan-David procedures to the effect that he who shares my personal idiolect, my basic preferences, and my factual knowledge cannot but consider himself morally obligated to ask for his Covid-19 vaccinations as soon as possible. In section IV., I will argue in favour of the view that the German State is not only entitled but, if need be, legally obligated to make the Covid-19 vaccination compulsary. In the final section V., I will try and give a relentless assessment of the situation, a short outlook into the future, and a succinct analysis of how to most efficiently handle the pandemic under the factual boundary conditions given. (shrink)

The authors believe that the questions raised at the beginning of Frege’s On Sense and Reference – ‘Is [identity] a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects?’ – set the course for a long-lasting but not at all satisfying discussion. For the disputants tend to advocate, either a ‘name-view’ of identity in a straightforward but rudimentary and logically untenable form, or else a version of an ‘object-view’ that makes all too light of the analysandum–analysans distinction (...) and hence is damned to analytical barrenness. In contrast, by unfolding the underlying idea of the original ‘name-view’, the authors offer three alternative and mutually compatible interpretations of identity that may best be characterized as the ‘name-based’, the ‘hybrid’ and the ‘sense-based’ variant of a ‘concept-view of identity’. At the same time, however, these interpretations may well be considered variants of a non-barren ‘object-view’. (shrink)

This book, inspired by the sociologist Günter Dux, co-edited by the historian Hans Ulrich Vogel, and introduced by Mark Elvin, is a collective intellectual ...

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.

In light of the detailed biographical studies of the past two decades, Martin Heidegger's active pursuit of ideological proximity to the National Socialist state should no longer elicit astonishment or intellectual revulsion. The language of facts speaks too clearly to allow room for euphemism, but too clearly as well on the other side to support demonizing speculations about Heidegger's absolute ideological orthodoxy or even a hypothetical powerful political influence, as recently attempted again by the French philosopher Emannuel Faye. From the (...) early 1930s and probably until the end of the war, Heidegger wanted to prove himself a good National Socialist…. (shrink)

Conversation about expected translation into Ukrainian of Gumbrecht's book Production of Presence. What Meaning Cannot Convey (Stanford UP: Stanford, 2004).