Stakeholder theory is a pertinent example of a framework that has been stretched over many conceptual contexts and that has been applied to a wide variety of empirical phenomena. A pressing issue involves the scope of application of stakeholder theory, however, because it is not a comprehensive ethical scheme or problem-solving algorithm. We begin our search for the boundaries of stakeholder management by identifying a presently under-acknowledged yet major underlying assumption, notably that the approach is rooted in voluntary action and (...) association. Building on this presumption, we argue that firm - stakeholder relationships are best to be understood in contractualist terms; i.e. as voluntary arrangements between two or more parties seeking mutual benefit. This assertion subsequently allows us to identify three boundary conditions applying to stakeholder theory: (1) the parties should be sufficiently autonomous; (2) their interests need to be alignable; and (3) they should be capable of living up to their commitments. We substantiate these criteria with evidence from a collective case study of buyer - supplier relationships in the Dutch manufacturing sector, demonstrating that the stakeholder management model fails when these boundary criteria are violated. (shrink)

A response to the discussants, Nien-hê Hsieh, Jeffrey Moriarty and J. (Hans) van Oosterhout, who took part in the March, 2005 symposium “The Political Theory of Organizations: A Retrospective Examination of Christopher McMahon’s Authority and Democracy: A General Theory of Government and Management” held in San Francisco as part of the Society for Business Ethics Group Meeting at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association.

The central aim of this paper is to present a Boolean algebraic approach to the classical Aristotelian Relations of Opposition, namely Contradiction and (Sub)contrariety, and to provide a 3D visualisation of those relations based on the geometrical properties of Platonic and Archimedean solids. In the first part we start from the standard Generalized Quantifier analysis of expressions for comparative quantification to build the Comparative Quantifier Algebra CQA. The underlying scalar structure allows us to define the Aristotelian relations in Boolean terms (...) and to propose a 3D visualisation by transforming a cube into an octahedron. In part two, the architecture of the CQA is shown to carry over, both to the classical quantifiers of Predicate Calculus and to the modal operators—which are given a Generalized Quantifier style re-interpretation. In this way we provide an algebraic foundation for Blanché’s Aristotelian hexagon as well as a 3D alternative to his 2D star-like visualisation. In a final part, a richer scalar structure is argued to underly the realm of Modality, thus generalizing the 3D algebra with eight (2 3 ) operators to a 4D algebra with sixteen (2 4 ) operators. The visual representation of the latter structure involves a transformation of the hypercube to a rhombic dodecahedron. The resulting 3D visualisation allows a straightforward embedding, not only of the classical Blanché star of Aristotelian relations or the paracomplete and paraconsistent stars of Béziau (Log Investig 10, 218–232, 2003) but also of three additional isomorphic Aristotelian constellations. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn the first part of this paper, issues concerning an “epistemology of time” are raised. The Derridean theme of the historial movement of a trace is connected to Prigogine's notion of an operator-time. It is suggested that both conceptions can be used to characterize the dynamics of experimental systems in contemporary science. It is argued that such systems have, to speak with Hacking, “a life of their own” and that this is precisely the reason for their inherent unpredictability.In the (...) second part, a case from the history of virology and cytomorphology is presented. The movement of a particular experimental system is followed in its peculiar tension between deferring and becoming different—i.e., between the persistence of a problem and the vagaries of its successive transformations. They are rendered possible by novel technical implementations, but they are not determined in any meaningful sense on a mere technological level.In conclusion, a point is made for a deconstructive approach to the history of science. (shrink)

This article discusses the problems which concepts pose for the attribution of thoughts to animals. It locates these problems within a range of other issues concerning animal minds (section 1), and presents a ‘lingualist master argument’ according to which one cannot entertain a thought without possessing its constituent concepts and cannot possess concepts without possessing language (section 2). The first premise is compelling if one accepts the building-block model of concepts as parts of wholes – propositions – and the idea (...) that intentional verbs signify relations between subjects and such propositions. But I shall find fault with both (section 3). This opens the way for recognizing a form of ‘holodoxastic’ thought-ascription which does not presuppose concept-possession on the part of the subject (section 4). Section 5 defends this idea against objections. Section 6 turns to the second premise of the lingualist master argument. I press the idea of judgement into service as a label for conceptual thought that need not be linguistic and argue that the possession of concepts is an ability. Section 7 accepts that concept-possession requires the ability to classify rather than merely to discriminate, but suggests that this need not disqualify animals. In the final section I confirm this verdict by returning to the notion of judgement: classification is the deliberate and considered response to a range of options in a sorting or discrimination task. Notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, the capacity for such a response does not presuppose the linguistic ability to answer questions. Judgement is a feature of a type of problem-solving that we share with some non-linguistic creatures. (shrink)

In this article, Hans Schildermans suggests practices of study as a way for universities to respond to socio-ecological questions, issues, and problems related to the Anthropocene. He elaborates the concept of study practices by drawing on traditional pragmatic notions, such as problematic situation and problematization, as these are articulated in John Dewey's theory of inquiry. Prompted by concerns about the closed problem–solution nexus, as well as questions concerning the (egological) worldview underlying this theory, Schildermans aims to reread these ideas (...) through the lens of contemporary authors such as Isabelle Stengers. In doing so, he articulates the educational dynamics of practices of study that address problematic situations, with specific attention to matters of educational futurity. In other words, centrally important to this analysis is the question of how these practices of study participate in a world in-the-making by activating possible futures — or, to formulate it somewhat differently, how practices of study give shape to a pragmatics of a world to-be-made. (shrink)

This is my translation of Gadamer's 1990 lecture "The Diversity of Languages and Understanding of the World." "In his lecture, Gadamer presents his views of language and world in a distinctively hermeneutical key. For example, he emphasizes language as that which 'belongs to conversation.' That is, language as conversation helps to bring about understanding and involves the play of dialogical exchange. 'Language is not proposition and judgment; rather, it is what it is, only when it is question and answer.' Language (...) involves another; it is on-the-way [unterwegs] to another. In fact, when addressing his question—what does world mean—Gadamer clarifies that humans and world are intimately connected; the world is that in which we are 'in the midst' and 'understanding is understanding oneself in the world.' But we are also in-the-world with others, and understanding ourselves in the world, means to understand ourselves with others. Gadamer goes so far as to say that our self-understanding as achieved in relation to others, as well as our understanding of others, should be taken in a moral and political sense. That is, the other is not there as merely a means to our ends or to exploit. Rather, 'the other indicates a principal limit to our self-love and self-centeredness. This is a general moral problem. It is also a political problem.' He goes on to emphasize the difficult task of achieving genuine solidarity with those from different cultures. Such a task requires language as conversation, the back-and-forth of dialogical exchange in which we come to understand the other and the other comes to understand us. Again and again, Gadamer underscores the task that each of has in light of our pluralistic world “to learn to bridge and reconcile the distances and differences between us and that means that we respect, look after, care for the other, and give one other a new hearing.” In contrast with the story of the Tower of Babel in which the people sought a pseudo-unity or 'oneness' driven by a will to dominate, Gadamer embraces both cultural and linguistic diversity and warns against reducing these multiple horizons 'by any special contrivance of unity [Einheitsmechanik].' He encourages us to seek out the open spaces that arise in our interactions with one another, to resist the levelling of language that information technology tends toward, and to 'cultivate language in its most distinctive possibilities.' In our present age of disinformation warfare, which threatens democracies worldwide and is a direct challenge to truth and the possibility of a meaningful dialogue with others, we would do well to linger with Gadamer’s hermeneutical and ethical insights and contemplate how we might bring these insights to bear on the global and political crises that we face today—Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, our climate catastrophe, and ever new forms of technical sophistry and disinformation that seek to erode our trust in truth, reality, and language itself.". (shrink)

Sous ce titre qui rend hommage à la pensée de Derrida, sont rassemblées des conférences tenues par le biologiste Hans-Jörg Rheinberger. Six textes aussi brefs que denses, nourris de vie de laboratoire et de philosophie franco-allemande - de Gaston Bachelard à Bruno Latour en passant par Martin Heidegger et Jacques Lacan, qui donnent à voir un mouvement épistémologique sur le temps long. Tentant de faire dialoguer cet héritage philosophique avec la biologie moléculaire contemporaine, Itérations propose des variations sur l'inconnu (...) et l'insoupçonné dans la recherche scientifique, et sur les systèmes expérimentaux comme contextes déterminants de la production des savoirs - cernant toujours les manifestations de l'Etre comme écriture. Excellente introduction à l'épistémologie historique, Itérations présente également l'un des prolongements les plus féconds de la pensée de Derrida. (shrink)

Das kunstlerische Denken, das auf dem Denken der Sinne beruht, stellt sich seine Zeichen - in der Musik also: seine Klange - nicht vor, sondern lebt unmittelbar in ihnen, badet, watet, schwimmt in ihrer Materie und gestaltet aus ihr neue geistige Lebensformen. Ich nenne das Musikdenken das flussige Denken - so Hans Zender in einer programmatischen Ausserung. Im Hintergrund seines vielschichtigen kompositorischen Werks stehen grundlegende philosophische Fragen: Wie ist das Verhaltnis von Logos und Mythos? Was bedeutet Wahrheit in der (...) Kunst? Wo liegen die Grenzen der Rationalitat? Wie hangen Glaube und Liebe, Leere und Schweigen, Sagbares und Unsagbares zusammen? In neueren Aufsatzen und Aphorismen beruhrt Hans Zender diese und andere grosse Themen des Menschseins. Im Dialog mit Texten der religiosen und philosophischen Weltliteratur - vom I Ging bis zu Nietzsche, von der Bibel bis zum Herz-Sutra - zeigt er, dass es gerade die Paradoxa und Grenzgange des Denkens sind, die Kunstwerk zum Elementarereignis machen. (shrink)

J.M. R. Lenz hat sich keineswegs als ein „vorübergehendes Meteor“ erwiesen, wie Goethe urteilte, sondern gilt inzwischen als einer der wichtigsten Autoren des 18. Jahrhunderts. Sein unglückliches Schicksal ist, vor allem über Büchner vermittelt, ein bis heute aktuelles Thema der produktiven Rezeption. Seine Werke entziehen sich aufgrund ihrer formalen und thematischen Vielschichtigkeit schnellen Deutungen. Das Lenz-Handbuch, an dem namhafte Vertreter der einschlägigen Forschung wie auch junge Autoren mitgearbeitet haben, vermittelt ein umfassendes und differenziertes Bild von Leben und Werk. Die Artikel (...) erschließen das Werk nach Gattungen sowie nach übergreifenden innovativen Gesichtspunkten. Die Rezeption von Autor und Werk in Wissenschaft, Literatur, Kunst, Musik und Film wird einbezogen. Dem ‚Lenz-Kenner‘ vermittelt das Handbuch den aktuellen Stand der Wissenschaft, aber auch neue Einsichten und damit die Grundlage für weitere eigene Forschungsarbeiten, dem Interessenten am Autor, an der Literaturgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts und ihrer Aneignung heute bietet das Handbuch eine Fülle von Informationen und Anregungen, die zugleich der besonderen Rolle von Lenz im literarischen Feld seiner Zeit gerecht zu werden versuchen. (shrink)

Donald Davidson has shocked his readers by arguing that assertion is not a conventional activity, thus attacking what was taken to be a truism by most philosophers of language. The paper claims that Davidson's argument is seriously flawed by his failure to distinguish a number of questions which should be kept separate. Assertion is a matter of seriousness, not of sincerity; departures from seriousness are marked by techniques which are undeniably conventional. There are no parallel indicators of seriousness, i. e. (...) there is no assertion-sign. But this necessary absence of a conventional marker of seriousness from our communicative repertoire does not imply that the activity of asserting is not conventional. Assertion differs in important ways from eating or walking; it is these differences which have led Searle, Lewis, EHimmett and countless others to conceive of language as essentially conventional'. The paper argues that Davidson'snaturalistic challenge illuminates the (non-existing) role of the assertion-sign, while failing to undermine the credentials of the 'truism'. (shrink)

This essay attempts to give definitions and identity conditions for the two predominant senses of ‘Argument’ currently in use, the one involving reasons for a conclusion and the other denoting an expressed disagreement with ensuing verbal behaviour by two parties. I see Johnson's new concept of ‘Argument’, as developed in his book Manifest Rationality, as a hybrid of the two common senses of ‘Argument’, and, accordingly, I try to define and give the identity conditions of Johnson-arguments. Finally, I disagree with (...) Johnson on the nature of the definition he thinks he has proposed, and I conclude with observations suggesting that his logical perspective has dialectical and rhetorical components. (shrink)