Even though some recent research revealed individuals with HSA typically display enhanced processing in the early stages of emotional information processing due to hypervigilance and vulnerability to negative stimuli, it is still unclear whether social anxiety affects the time course underlying processing bias for emotional stimuli. Therefore, the present study aimed to explore the early stage of processing social threat stimuli in high social anxiety (HSA) individuals by recording RTs and EEG data in the emotional Stroop task. Behavioral data showed (...) that the HSA group responded to the threat words faster than neutral words (i.e. negative bias), but no emotional effects in the low social anxiety (LSA) group. Although the P1 component did not show any early effects, ERP data exhibited an enhanced N170 for HSA than for LSA groups. Threat words elicited larger N170 than neutral words in the LSA group only; this emotion effect was not evident in the HSA group. These findings indicated that social anxiety modulates early processing for social threat words. This study revealed the neural mechanisms underlying early emotional processing in individuals with social anxiety, providing insights for the evaluation and intervention of social anxiety. (shrink)

The affect-as-information (AAI) model proposes that emotions influence the accessibility and value of information (Avramova & Inbar, Citation2013). Furthermore, according to the dual-process model of moral judgement, emotions and cognition influence moral judgement (Greene, Citation2007; Greene et al., Citation2001, Citation2008); however, there is no direct evidence of a causal chain to support this model’s proposition. By using a 3 (emotions: positive vs. neutral vs. negative) × 2 (primed rule: save lives vs. do not kill) between-participants design, we examined two hypotheses (...) in two experiments: supraliminal (Experiment 1) and subliminal (Experiment 2) priming. Our results partially supported the AAI model and confirmed that emotions and cognition independently influence moral judgement. Specifically, the positive emotions group made more utilitarian decisions after being primed with the “save lives” rule and more deontological decisions after being primed with the do not kill rule. However, priming did not affect moral judgement in the negative emotion condition. Further, irrespective of whether priming was done, the negative emotion group mostly made utilitarian decisions. Accordingly, we propose a dynamic dual-process model of moral judgement, that can help clarify how emotion and cognition influence moral judgement. (shrink)