t. 1. Autographa et bibliothecae A-F -- t. 2. Bibliothecae Gdańsk-Münster.

Coggon’s remarks on a previous paper on active and passive euthanasia elicit a clarification and an elaboration of the argument in support of the claim that there is a moral difference between killing and letting die. The relevant moral duties are different in nature, strength and content. Moreover, not all people who are involved in the relevant situations have the same moral duties. The particular case that is presented in support of the claim that to kill is not the same (...) as to let die is based upon a rejection of consequentialism. (shrink)

Now, we can draw a conclusion on the matter of the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's grammar. We have seen that angādhikāra constitutes a very important section of the grammar where the relation of the suffixes and their bases is crucial. We also have observed that the concept of anga cannot be separated from Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's system due to its being a part of many sūtras as well as many paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās. We have also (...) seen that at least three exclusive prayojanas exist for the justification of angādhikāra. Another justification can be given in the form of preventing the double samprasāra $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ a in forms like vavraś which we discussed while determining the limit of angādhikāra. We saw that three important paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās, which are accepted by Patañjali, depend on angādhikāra. Finally we saw that an alternative suggested by Patañjali for angādhikāra is in no way better, but actually defective.Kātyāyana's use of angādhikāra in other sections to counter some objections has been shown too. Patañjali's apparent rejection of angādhikāra on the basis of Kātyāyana's vārtika on ‘angasya’ (6-4-1) is not supported by his own treatment of the subject in other places. So, we conclude that Patañjali did not really intend to refute the angādhikāra and the view which appears in his commentary on 6-4-1 should not be taken as his siddhānta on this matter. Tasmād angādhikāra iti bhagavato gūdho 'bhisandhir iti bhāvah. Naitāni ity ādi grantha $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$$ ekadeśyuktir iti tātparyam. Nāgeśa, ‘Uddyota’, MB, Vol. 5, p. 273.Thus the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's A $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t}$$ ādhyāyī is established. (shrink)

In his paper , Culyer talks about “values” and “value judgments” in relation to equity.1 He says: “The focus is on equity in the allocation of health care resources .... These are value laden questions because any idea of “equity” must embody value judgments about what it is that makes for a good society”. He says too: “Equity in health care policy, as in other arenas of policy, is a question of ethics and therefore of values”.I disagree with this way (...) of talking: it suggests a sort of “postmodernist” moral relativism. It sounds as if there might be, say, socialist beliefs which were vouched for by socialist values while …. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Philologus Heft: Ahead of print.

The nature and significance of equity and equality in relation to health and healthcare policy is discussed in the light of a recent article by Culyer. Culyer makes the following claims: the importance of equity in relation to the provision of health care derives from the human need for health in order to flourish; and for the sake of equity, equality of health among the members of particular political jurisdictions should be the aim of health policy. Both these claims are (...) challenged in this paper.The argument put forward is that it is only when needs arise and are met in particular contexts that need and equity are fused. The state and its agents and agencies should distribute what it distributes impartially, whatever it distributes. Whether or not equity applies to the distribution of healthcare services depends on how they are provided and not on their nature as “primary goods”. Contrary to what Culyer suggests, a policy of trying to produce the outcome of health equality would be inequitable. It would not be impartial and it would fail to treat persons as persons ought to be treated. (shrink)

A study of the place of human sexuality in religious systems indicates a possible universal stress on sexual attraction. This could be explained by using the theories of Richard Dawkins and other sociobiologists: the philandering male and the coy female express the best strategies for the survival of the “selfish gene.” Closer analysis of four religious systems throws doubt on these theories. In some systems the strategies are contradicted while in others there is stress on cooperative restraint rather than on (...) survival through selfish propagation. The principal objection to the sociobiological approach is its assumption of conflict between the sexes. (shrink)

Julian Le Grand's case for saying that it would be equitable if smokers and smokers alone were to pay the costs of smoking-related health care is considered and found to be deficient.

In their account of passive euthanasia, Garrard and Wilkinson present arguments that might lead one to overlook significant moral differences between killing and letting die. To kill is not the same as to let die. Similarly, there are significant differences between active and passive euthanasia. Our moral duties differ with regard to them. We are, in general, obliged to refrain from killing each and everyone. We do not have a similar obligation to try to prevent each and everyone from dying. (...) In any case, to be morally obliged to persist in trying to prevent their deaths would be different from being morally obliged to refrain from killing all other people even if we had both obligations. (shrink)