As Husserl already noticed, artworks themselves have a phenomenological character. This means, however, that to experience artworks as phenomena no “epoché” and no “phenomenological reduction” is necessary. The leading question of my essay is whether, and possibly how, this observation can be methodologically generalized for understanding phenomena. I discuss if, and possibly how, a phenomenological reflection on art allows and even demands a general conception of phenomenology that nevertheless does not confuse artworks with phenomena in general. My intention is to (...) show that and how phenomenality can be clarified with reference to its spatial character. Accordingly, works of architecture that are artworks will play a decisive role in my argument. (shrink)

Figal has long been recognized as one of the most insightful interpreters working in the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics and its leading themes concerned with ancient Greek thought, art, language, and history. With this book, Figal presses this tradition of philosophical hermeneutics in new directions. In his effort to forge philosophical hermeneutics into a hermeneutical philosophy, Figal develops an original critique of the objectification of the world that emerges in modernity as the first stage in his systematic (...) treatment of the elements of experience hermeneutically understood. Breaking through the prejudices of modernity, but not sacrificing the importance and challenge of the objective world that confronts us and is in need of interpretation, Figal reorients how it is that philosophy should take up some of its most longstanding and stubborn questions. World, object, space, language, freedom, time, and life are refreshed as philosophical notions here since they are each regarded as elements of human life engaged in the task assigned to each of us—the task of understanding ourselves and our world. (shrink)

For philosophical hermeneutics as Hans‐Georg Gadamer conceived it, art plays an essential role. If hermeneutics and aesthetics are as strictly opposed as Gadamer suggests, the “abstraction” performed by aesthetic consciousness must be an abstraction from the truth of art. As the result of such an abstraction, the aesthetic view of art is secondary; it must be conceived of as nonoriginal experience of art, which, derivative as it is supposed to be, is only possible on the basis of original experience, as (...) an abstraction from it. Aesthetic objects are essentially correlated to perception, the word for which in Ancient Greek is ‘aesthesis’. But aesthetic objects cannot be coextensive with everything perceptible; otherwise, the term “aesthetic” could not be used significantly in respect to artworks. Being perceptibly present, artworks present phenomenal structures of meaning, texts in textures, which must not be directly applied to the factual world or identified with its “essence”. (shrink)

What makes philosophy metaphysical? Understood as the search for truth, philosophy has led those seeking it to the question of Being, says Gunter Figal. He shows that because this devotion to truth and Being are the heart of metaphysics, it is what makes up philosophy's metaphysical character. Figal embraces this, and, leaving arguments for simple affirmation aside, offers instead a critical discussion of the positions adopted by metaphysical philosophy's founding fathers, Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle. Alongside a phenomenological transformation (...) of the latter's ontology, Figal also sets out why he regards metaphysics as just one philosophical perspective among others, and not as a dominating `first philosophy?. The outcome is philosophy as a de-centered, non-hierarchical and liberating project. (shrink)

Nach der phänomenologischen Hermeneutik von Gegenständlichkeit (2006) und der phänomenologischen Ästhetik von Erscheinungsdinge (2010) legt Günter Figal mit Unscheinbarkeit ein Buch vor, in dem die Phänomenologie zusammen mit ihrer Sache, den Phänomenen, das Hauptthema ist. Phänomene, so der zentrale und in der phänomenologischen Philosophie neue Gedanke es Buches, sind als solche räumlich und also nur vom Raum her zu verstehen. Entsprechend muss die Phänomenologie eine Reflexion und Beschreibung des Raums sein. Der Raum ist das Unscheinbare, in dem etwas erscheinen (...) und darin Phänomen sein kann. Wenn es so ist, beschreibt die Phänomenologie nicht nur Raum, sondern ist selbst nur im Raum möglich. Die Bestimmungen des Raumes und der Räumlichkeit, die das Buch entwickelt, ergeben sich aus dem genauen Hinsehen, dem bewussten Erleben. So ist das Buch dem Gedanken Husserls verpflichtet, dass die Anschauung "die einzige Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis" ist. (shrink)

Realism is a term that can be understood only by contrasting it with an opposite term, such as idealism or representationalism. But representationalism has indeed to presuppose something that is represented,in order for the representation to be possible at all. This does not mean,however, to fall prey to a naïve realism: our grasp on reality is always determined by our own way of accessing it. A realism which can take hold of this presupposition is to be called phenomenological realism. In (...) this sense, reality is always given only in representation, that is, mediated by our access to it, but is not itself representation. It is an objectivity opposed to ourself, it has a particular place and it appears, but its appearance does not belong to the subject, it is simply there. Therefore, appearances are spatial and have to be described as such. (shrink)

This paper discusses the question if there is any truth in art. Initially it poses the question whether artworks are just mere appearances or whether they have a special truth. In critical reflection on Heidegger’s conception of art as the “setting-itself-to-work of truth” this question is then elaborated and answered: The appearance character of artworks cannot be conceived as truth. What true artworks show, namely mere possibilities, is beyond truth, because it does not belong to the real world. Artworks are (...) not true; in their decentered order and their self-showing nature they are beautiful. (shrink)

This first book-length work of the prominent German philosopher Gunter Figal to appear in English offers a radical defense of metaphysical philosophy in the era of postmodern thought.

Heideggers »Schwarze Hefte« enthalten antisemitische Ressentiments von einer bisher nicht bekannten Schärfe. Sie erlauben, Heideggers politische Position genauer zu bestimmen als bisher, und geben darüber hinaus Aufschluss über dessen Geschichts-, Philosophie- und Selbstbild. Die Beiträge dieses Bandes bieten eine fundierte philosophische Kontextualisierung und Bewertung.

In the article I discuss Husserl’s conception of the Lifeworld as developed in his Crisis Book, in order to find out whether art can be especially illuminative in order to understand the Lifeworld and one’s own living in it. I draw a parallel between the sciences as discussed by Husserl as abstractions from the Lifeworld that offer a special view of what in the Lifeworld as such remains disclosed. However, scientific and artistic abstraction differs in character. Whereas the sciences establish (...) formal systems and thereby discover the world as to its computability, the arts abstract from the everyday set of meanings and go back to the primordial and original experience of the world in its perceptibility. Thus they are able to draw attention to the essential character of the Lifeworld as such. (shrink)

Plato's cntique of poetry in the Republic aims at elucidating the relationship between poetry and philosophy to show the possibility of philosophical thinking. Both philosophy and poetry represent two own ways of experience depending on each other. While poetry is characterized as deceptive, philo- sophy proves herself as experience of tmth with an offspnng in her strife with poetry's untmth, since the latter is unable to express the difference fundamental to her st~cture as mimesis or representation: the difference between the (...) represented Sache and mimesis herself, this recognition of difference being the only way to a measure of her appropriateness to the Sache. Criticizing the mimetic lack of poetry, philosophy leams about her exclusive abilities as mimetic art herself: to perform the mimetic distance in interrogating her mimetic appropriateness and by this to gain a tme understanding about the represented. (shrink)

La phénoménologie s’est définie chez Husserl et chez le premier Heidegger comme une « auto-interprétation de la vie ». Mais ils n’ont pas suffisamment élucidé la signification propre de la vie, ce qui a amené Heidegger à s’écarter de cette orientation pour se tourner vers l’ontologie du Dasein. Cette élucidation demeure aujourd’hui encore une tâche majeure de la phénoménologie. En partant de la distinction entre facultés du vivre et modes du vécu, l’on découvre que le vécu est d’essence spatiale. Le (...) primat de la temporalité sur la spatialité affirmé à la fois par Husserl et par Heidegger doit donc être renversé. Il s’agit alors, en réélaborant les thèses classiques de Husserl sur le « corps vivant » (Leib) et l’Ici absolu, d’analyser la spatialité du vivre telle qu’elle se donne dans le phénomène originaire de la mobilité. En développant certaines indications de Merleau-Ponty, il devient possible d’envisager l’espace dans sa dimension charnelle : désormais, les êtres vivants et la vie elle-même nous apparaissent comme des possibilités de l’espace. (shrink)

Hermeneutical philosophy as developed by Heidegger and Gadamer is not compatible with the classical phenomenological programme elaborated by Husserl. The hermeneutical stress on historicity as a necessary condition for understanding is unfamiliar to Husserl's strictly theoretical approach. However, this does not mean that a hermeneutical philosophy as such cannot be conceived in a phenomenological sense. Whether or not hermeneutical philosophy is phenomenological depends on the paradigm chosen for hermeneutical explanation. A hermeneutics referring to the interpretation of texts may elucidate constitutional (...) elements of phenomenology, e.g. phenomenological reduction and reflection. In this way it even can initiate a modification of phenomenology which, instead of being caught up in its subjective foundation, now appears as elucidating the openness of the correlation between intentional attitudes and their 'objects'. For this correlation the interpretation is a paradigm, whereas the openness of the correlation can be explained in respect of freedom, language, and time. (shrink)

In this paper I take up the "claim to universality" of hermeneutics, as put forth by Hans-Georg Gadamer; the aim is to grasp the "life that can understand," to grasp it in its essence and in terms of understanding. In this way I deal critically with Gadamer's idea that all understanding is "self-understanding" and work out the dependence of understanding on the other, on the "hermeneutic object" of understanding. But a "hermeneutic object" is not a "mere object" . On the (...) basis of this distinction, I develop, in conclusion, a critical reflection on the selfobjectification of the human in those interpretations of human life that are oriented solely to natural science. Self-objectfication is a wrongly directed understanding and can therefore be corrected on the basis of a developed concept of life as understanding. (shrink)

Der Beitrag handelt von den Bezügen zwischen Philosophie, Kunst und Leben bei Nietzsche und Heidegger: Kunst und das emphatische Verständnis des Künstlers sind bei beiden 'Modelle' für die Philosophie. Im Vergleich mit Nietzsches Wagner-Deutung zeigt sich, dass Heideggers Hölderlin-Verständnis ganz in der Macht der Wirkungsgeschicht Nietzsches steht. Dennoch bringt er in seiner "Auseinandersetzung" mit Nietzsche disen dadurch auf Abstand, dass er die Absage an die Philosophie noch als eine philosophische Aussage versteht, als "Willen zur Macht". Über das Kunstverständnis Heideggers und (...) Nietzsches als "Ins-Werk-setzen der Wahrheit" und als "scheinhafter Abstand zum Leben" hinaus eröffnet sich über den Begriff der Schönheit ein Verständnis der Kunst, in dem die Philosophie, von der Erwartung, künstlerisch zu sein, befreit, sich auf die betrachtende Reflexion zurücknehmen kann.This contribution discusses the relations between philosophy, art, and life in Nietzsche and Heidegger. Art and the emphatic understanding of the artist serve as "model" for philosophy in both. In comparison to Nietzsche's interpretation of Wagner, Heidegger's discussion of Hölderlin demonstrates that Heidegger distances himself from Nietzsche's refusal of philosophy by showing that this refusal is itself a philosophical proposition and a "will to power". Exceeding Heidegger's "setting-into-work of truth" and Nietzsche's "appearing distance to life", though a concept of beauty a new understanding of art is opened up. Hence, philosophy is freed from the expectation of being artistic and contents itself with contemplative reflection. (shrink)

Earth possesses a double-character: it supports life and grounds perception and experience, but because of being this very base, also restricts these stances, since as base of any activity, theoretical or practical, it cannot be overstepped. Thus, earth itself is also groundless. Nevertheless, this duplicity is not contradictory, is no dualism, when formulated as earth being both a space of movement and a space of sense. Understanding this duplicity means understanding the intertwining of these two spaces by articulating the possibilities (...) of movements within sense; it means an understanding of sense and meaning in moving. This is the task of philosophy: both alienation from earth and the matter-of-course of its sense and return to it by taking part in its sense of moving and becoming. This is gained by interpretation, of which we draw on as a model reading Nietzsche on 'Will to Power' and perspectivity, and Plato's conception of dialectic. Thus, interpretation represents itself sensibly in earth's duplicity. (shrink)

Gadamer’s hermeneutics is no discipline or simply a foundation of the Humanities, but addresses the fundamental problem of phenomenology: how things show themselves and can be attained. It does so, however, not in Husserl’s terminology but in its “ontological turn”. In elaborating on the ontology of language, Gadamer equates the accessibility of things and their Being, a move eminent in the “speculative character of language” discussed in the third part of Truth and Method. For Gadamer as well as for Heidegger, (...) ontology is possible only as phenomenology. How things show themselves, however, cannot be understood in relation to an absolute consciousness or understanding Dasein, but, following Plato, from the “evidence of the beautiful” in an hermeneutics of the artwork. Gadamer’s phenomenology thus describes the accessibility of things as the coming to pass of their truth and presence, much as the later Heidegger does in relation to physis and openness. Hermeneutical reflection of the fundamental problem of phenomenology also reveals the displacement in the continuity of coming to pass as the “space between words” opened in the manifold of interpretations. (shrink)

The Symposium is one of Plato’s most literary and poetic dialogues. How might one reconcile this evidence of Plato’s predilection for poetry in light of his severe critique of poetry in the Republic? Though his critique is modified and refined in other dialogues, the power of his critique is nowhere significantly undermined. I argue in this paper that Plato’s poetic writing is not inconsistent with his critique, and that in fact there is an affinity between his practice of poetry and (...) his critique. Plato’s critique of poetry is not aimed against poetry itself, but just against its problematic claims and false promises. In turn, Plato’s use of the poetic image, especially in relationship to eros, delimits philosophy, and places it in relation to that which is not attainable for it. The battle between poetry and philosophy is seen to involve a reciprocal benefit for both, and a hidden affinity. In this sense, the poetic image has its philosophical sense precisely because it falls outside of the philosophical perspective. (shrink)

Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes erkunden das Phänomen der Musse in seiner Räumlichkeit und in seinem Verhältnis zur Zeit. Im mussetypischen Verweilen tritt das Nacheinander der Zeit zurück, während der Raum mit seinen Ordnungen des Nebeneinander bestimmend wird. Diese spezifische Raumzeitlichkeit wird in vier Abschnitten ausgelotet: Der erste ist Konzepten und Theorien der Musse gewidmet, der zweite der ästhetischen Erfahrung von Räumen der Natur und Kunst, der dritte gebauten Räumen der Musse, der vierte der Musseerfahrung, wie sie sich in Kommunikations- (...) und Schreibprozessen darstellt. Die Bandbreite der Untersuchungen reicht von der philosophischen, begriffsanalytischen Reflexion über die phänomenologische Analyse sowie von der literaturwissenschaftlichen Falluntersuchung hin zur kunsthistorischen Betrachtung. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 4 Seiten: 798-806.

Mohr Siebeck publishing company, Tuebingen, Germany. Academic books since 1801 in the fields of theology, philosophy, law.

"Dionysos" ist in Nietzsches Spätwerk das "Gegenwort" zum "Willen zur Macht". Anders als der philosophische Begriff des Dionysischen in der Geburt der Tragödie bündelt der Name "Dionysos" die Erfahrungen des Ewigen im menschlichen Leben. Dieses entdeckt Nietzsche in den Möglichkeiten, sich zum Gedanken der "ewigen Wiederkehr" zu verhalten. Diesem Gedanken vernag weder Gleichgültigkeit noch das Festhalten an einer moralischen Instanz, sondern allein die religiöse, aber nicht mehr christliche Erfahrung des "ungeheuren Augenblicks" grecht zu werden. Eine solche Erfahrung des Göttlichen lässt (...) aus dem "grössten Schwergewicht" die "leichte" Freheit von der letztlich noch moralisch gebundenen Selbstüberwindung werden. Während der philosophische "Lehrer der weigen Wiederkunft" Zarathustra - als "alter Atheist", der er für Nietzsche ist - nur den "Begriff des Dionysos" kennt, zielt Nietzsche selbst mit dem Namen des griechischen Gottes des "grossen Zweideutigen und Versuchers", auf ein Erfahrung des Göttlichen, das als "Genie des Herzens" jenseits des "moralischen Gottes" ist.In Nietzsche's later work, "Dionysos" is the counterconcept to the "will to power". Unlike the philosophical concept of Dionysos in The Birth of Tragedy, the name "Dionysos" in this later work signifies that which is eternal in human life. Nietzsche discovers this in the possibility of taking an attitude towards the thought of "eternal recurrence." Neither indifference nor retreat to a moral authority is appropriate when facing this thought. The correct attitude is rather an embrace of a religious yet no longer Christian experience of the "terrible moment." Such an experience of godliness allows "the most heavy weight" to become the "light" freedom of a self-overcoming still bound to mortality. While Zarathustra, the "teacher of eternal recurrance," only know the "concept of Dionysos," Nietzsche himself is in touch with the experience of the divine. This experience, with the name of the Greek God who is "the most ambiguous and seductive" and a "genius of the heart," is beyond the "mortal God.". (shrink)