The Darwinian revolution supposed and imposed a much broader and more complex concept of environment than that which, until that moment, had been considered by most as part of natural history. Until Darwin, the environment of living beings had been regarded, almost exclusively, as the inanimate surroundings. This pre-Darwinian notion of environment included physicochemical and climatic variables: the living beings themselves were scarcely considered, or they were regarded just as food to be assimilated. In contrast, with Darwin, the influence (...) of living surroundings began to be regarded as having decisive importance for understanding the distribution, configuration, and viability of living beings. The relationships established among different living beings became the main and more significant features of the biological environment. This conceptual change was an exigency derived from the formulation and justification of the theory of natural selection. The idea of struggle for existence supposed by that theory requires that the biotic environment be considered critical in determining the viability of each living being. (shrink)

The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent (...) secondary quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events. (shrink)

Two objections are raised against Oliver and Smiley’s analysis of the collective–distributive opposition in their 2016 book: They take it as a basic premise that the collective reading of ‘baked a cake’ corresponds to a predicate different from its distributive reading, and the same applies to all predicate expressions that admit both a collective and a distributive interpretation. At the same time, however, they argue that inflectional forms of the same lexeme reveal a univocity that should be preserved in a (...) formal representation of English. These two assumptions sit uneasily. In developing their analysis, Oliver and Smiley come to the conclusion that even a singular predication such as ‘Tom baked a cake’ must be regarded as ambiguous between a collective and a distributive reading. This is so artificial that it hardly makes sense, and yet there seems to be no way out of the difficulty unless we are prepared to give up the basic premise just mentioned. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, entitled ‘Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is Not Enough’ (2017), Moti Mizrahi argues that the view of progress as approximation to the truth or increasing verisimilitude is plainly false. The key premise of his argument is that on such a view of progress, in order to get closer to the truth one only needs to arbitrarily add a true disjunct to a hypothesis or theory. Since quite clearly scientific progress is not (...) a matter of adding true disjuncts to theories, the argument goes, the view of progress as approximation to the truth is untenable. We show that the key premise of Mizrahi’s argument is false: according to verisimilitude-based accounts of progress, adding arbitrary true disjuncts to existing theories is just not enough to get closer to the truth. (shrink)

The concept of ideology is central to the understanding of the many political, economic, social, and cultural processes that have occurred in the last two centuries. And yet, what is the nature of the different ideologies remains a vague, open, and much disputed question. Many political, sociological, and ideological studies have been devoted to ideology. Very little, on the other hand, has been done from the philosophical field. And this despite the fact that there are undoubtedly many philosophical questions related (...) to ideology and its role in modern industrialized societies. Just a few examples of ideology-related philosophical questions suffice to prove the point: What objects do ideologies deal with? Are the ideologies testable? Are there true ideologies? Do they evolve? How are ideologies related to societies? Is the existence of ideologies inevitable in modern societies? What is the relation of ideology to science? Is science just another kind of ideology? Are we, as human beings, innately predisposed to believe in ideologies? Or, instead, ideologies proliferate through indoctrination and propaganda? Are ideologies necessarily harmful?...and much more. In this article I try to answer some of these questions from a philosophical point of view, taking a materialist approach. I begin by characterizing ideology as a complex, multi-layered concept. Then, I briefly discuss the material systems on which ideological movements operate, that is, societies and concrete human groups. I identify at least 11 different elements that seem to be present in most ideologies, and I compare these characteristics with those of contemporary science and technology. Although some superficial similarities can be identified, there are deep differences that make ideology completely different from science. The similarities, however, are stronger with technology. Ideologies continually evolve with technological advances, social changes, and even with mere fashion. The current fragmentation of ideologies caused by the widespread use of new technologies and social networks has given rise to new phenomena of ideological propagation which, in my opinion, are very dangerous, particularly for open societies. I discuss these processes, within the context of the nature vs nurture debate, along with the question of whether we can get rid of ideologies. (shrink)

Apontamentos retóricos sobre o conceito de oração em Teresa d'Ávila: rumo a uma pedagogia mística Resumo: Neste texto apresento algumas reflexões que se constituíram por meio de leituras do pensamento filosófico e religioso de Teresa D’Ávila. Meus objetivos concentram-se em identificar elementos teóricos vinculados à educação do pensamento renascentista-moderno na Espanha. Dentre os conceitos investigados, ressalto a relação entre ensino, oração e praxis no discurso cristão, inferindo, neste contexto, sobre a possibilidade de uma pedagogia teresiana. O foco de minha análise (...) repousa na obra Castelo interior, a qual, do ponto de vista retórico, configura-se como um relato da experiência vivida pela autora. Tal fato leva-me a refletir os escritos da monja carmelita como um certo tipo de ensino, fundado na experiência mística. Assim, a estrutura do conceito de oração em Teresa desvela-se em uma prática de meditação que gera e impulsiona o conhecimento de si e para o outro. A oração, então, pode ser apreendida tal como qualquer outro tipo de instrução (técnica), por meio de etapas (método), e apresentando um resultado: a união entre a alma e Deus. Dessa união resulta um tipo subjetivo de conhecimento, a saber: o conhecimento místico. Palavras chaves: oração; técnica; ensino; retórica; conhecimento. Rhetorical notes on the concept of prayer in Teresa of Ávila: towards a mystical pedagogy Abstract: In this paper, I present some reflections resulting from readings on Teresa of Ávila philosophical and religious thought. My objectives are focused on identifying theoretical elements that are linked to education in the Renaissance Modern thought in Spain. Among the concepts investigated, I highlight the relationship between teaching, prayer and praxis in Christian discourse, inferring, in this context, the existence of a Teresian pedagogy. The focus of my analysis is on Interior castle, which, from a rhetorical point of view, is configured as an account of the experience lived by the author. This fact leads me to reflect on the writings of the Carmelite nun as a certain type of teaching, based on mystical experience. Thus, the structure of the concept of prayer in Teresa is revealed in a meditation practice that generates and impels knowledge of oneself and for the other. Prayer, then, can be apprehended just like any other kind of instruction (technique), through stages (method), and presenting a result: the union between the soul and God (mystical knowledge). From this union results a subjective type of knowledge, namely: mystical knowledge. Key-words: prayer; technique; teaching, rhetoric; knowledge. Note retoriche sul concetto preghiera in pensiero teresiano: verso uma pedagogia mistica Astratto: In questo testo presentiamo alcune riflessioni che sono state costituite attraverso letture del pensiero filosofico e religioso di Teresa de Ávila. Nostri obiettivi sono focalizzati sull'individuazione di elementi teorici legati all'educazione del pensiero medievale. Tra i concetti indagati, si evidenzia il rapporto tra insegnamento, preghiera e prassi nel discorso cristiano, inferendo, in questo contesto, la possibilità di una pedagogia teresiana. Il fulcro della nostra analisi poggia sull'opera Castelo interior, che, da un punto di vista retorico, si configura come racconto dell'esperienza vissuta dall'autore. Questo fatto ci porta a riflettere gli scritti della monaca carmelitana come un certo tipo di insegnamento, basato sull'esperienza mistica. Così, la struttura del concetto di preghiera in Teresa si rivela in una pratica meditativa che genera e spinge alla conoscenza di sé e per l'altro. La preghiera, quindi, può essere appresa proprio come qualsiasi altro tipo di istruzione (tecnica), attraverso passaggi (metodo), e presentando un risultato finale: l'unione tra l'anima e Dio (conoscenza mistica). Parola chiave: preghiera; técnica; insgnamento; retorica; conoscenza. Data de registro: 19/02/2021 Data de aceite: 20/10/2021. (shrink)

¿Why is it that Human Rights must be respected if it seems fashionable the apology for scorning them? This paper intends a review of how is it that Human Rights and the Humanitarian Right have developed, and of why they are not just moral ideals but a universal system of right, not without lacks, but also with plenty of developments. In that order of ideas three devices created to make the Human Rights exigible are analyzed. Such devices are: The (...) incorporation of the International Right in the internal right; the Office of the High Commissioner of United Nations for Human Rights; and the actions that could be accomplished by the States in relations of cooperation with a particular country. In Colombia, since 2003, among the imperfect situation of the International Right, the Human Rights have made the biggest advances to obtain the condition of being exigible. But, despite of such development a lot is still necessary for an acceptable degree of respect of Human Rights in Colombia. Each year a great deal of people die because of political reasons. And, unfortunately, in the last years the Colombian government has promoted legislation very encouraging of war and humanity crimes impunity. Supposedly the government effort is directed to achieve peace and reconciliation among Colombians, but such objective will be reached with great difficulty following such path. The reasons for those difficulties are basically three: Justice Simulation; a preservation of the power of the mobs, and a concealment of the responsibility of the state. But, ¿Does these difficulties mean that there is nothing to be done to find a civilized exit to the Colombian crisis? No. As is pointed out in this article, there are three considerations of logical, historical and political character that allow thinking the following: It is no reasonable to think in dismantling the Social State of Right for preserving the State of right; and a society that deliberately leaves to impunity great crimes of the past can hardly create confidence and guarantee the rights to justice and life for the great crimes of the future. Because of all of this making the Human Rights the minimum common denominator of all political parties, the State and the whole society would be a key to achieve the overcoming of social exclusion in our country and to generate just foundations for a democratic coexistence. (shrink)

I offer an analysis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and its relevancy for the scientific endeavour. I submit that the world is not, and cannot be, rational—only some brained beings are. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is not a necessary truth nor a physical law. It is just a guiding metanomological hypothesis justified a posteriori by its success in helping us to unveil the mechanisms that operate in Nature.

In this paper we propose an ‘undisciplinary’ meeting between Elinor Ostrom and Judith Butler, with the intent to broaden the theory of the commons by discussing it as a relational politics. We use Butler’s theory of power to problematize existing visions of commons, shifting from Ostrom’s ‘bounded rationality’ to Butler’s concepts of ‘bounded selves’ and mutual vulnerability. To be bounded – as opposed to autonomous being – implies being an (ambiguous) effect of socio-power relations and norms that are often beyond (...) control. Thus, to be a collective of bounded selves implies being mutually vulnerable in power relations which are enabling, albeit injurious. A politics of commoning is not a mere technical management of resources (in space) but a struggle to perform common livable relations (in time). We argue that the multiple exposures which produce us are also the conditions of possibility for more just and equalitarian ‘re-commoning’ of democracies around the world. (shrink)

While mechanics was developed under the idea of reciprocal action (interactions), electromagnetism, as we know it today, takes a form more akin to unilateral action. Interactions call for spatial relations, unilateral action calls for space, just one reference centre. In contrast, interactions are matters of relations that require at least two centres. The development of the relational electromagnetism encouraged by Gauss appears to stop around 1870 for reasons that are not completely clear but are certainly not solely scientific. By (...) the same time, Maxwell recognised the equivalence in formulae of his electromagnetism and the one advocated by Gauss and called for an explanation of why such theories so differently conceived have such a large part in common. In this work we reconstruct and update the relational electromagnetism up to the contributions of Lorentz guided by the non-arbitrariness principle (NAP) that requests arbitrary choices to be accompanied by groups of symmetries. We show that a-priori there must be two more symmetries in electromagnetism, one related to the breaking (in the description) of the relation source/detector and one relating all the perceptions of the same source by detectors moving with different (constant) relative velocities. We show that the idea of electromagnetic waves put forward in concept by Lorenz (1861-1863) before Maxwell (1865) and in formulae (1867) just after Maxwell, together with the ``least action principle'' proposed by Lorentz are enough to derive Maxwell's equations, the continuity equation and the Lorentz' force, and that there is a dual formulation in terms of fields of the receiver (as opposed to fields of the source). While Galilean transformations are associated with removing the arbitrariness implied in the election of a reference space, they will not explicitly appear in a formulation based upon a relational space although we occasionally mention their usefulness. In contrast, Lorentz' transformations will emerge in this formulation involving the relations between the perceived fields of different receivers. Moreover, the role of the full Poincaré-Lorentz group as a group of transformations of the perceived actions is elucidated. In summary, we answer Maxwell's philosophical question showing how the same theory in formulae can be abduced using different inferred entities. Each form of abduction implies as well an interpretation and a facilitation of the theoretical construction. This work relies heavily on logical concepts as abduction put forward by C. Peirce, needed for the construction of theories. (shrink)

“I don’t like the term ‘woke’ because I hear, ‘Woke, woke, woke.’ It’s just a term they use, half the people can’t even define it, they don’t know what it is.” This is what Donald Trump said admitt...

According to the so-called Lockean thesis, a rational agent believes a proposition just in case its probability is sufficiently high, i.e., greater than some suitably fixed threshold. The Preface paradox is usually taken to show that the Lockean thesis is untenable, if one also assumes that rational agents should believe the conjunction of their own beliefs: high probability and rational belief are in a sense incompatible. In this paper, we show that this is not the case in general. More (...) precisely, we consider two methods of computing how probable must each of a series of propositions be in order to rationally believe their conjunction under the Lockean thesis. The price one has to pay for the proposed solutions to the paradox is what we call “quasi-dogmatism”: the view that a rational agent should believe only those propositions which are “nearly certain” in a suitably defined sense. (shrink)

This paper continues a debate on the normative limits of conceptual engineering. In particular, it responds to Manuel Gustavo Isaac’s (2021) claim, in response to Simion (2018a) and Podosky (2018), but in particular Podosky, that cognitive efficacy, rather than truth and knowledge, should be the normative standard by which we assess the legitimacy of a conceptual engineering project – at least for ideological concepts. I argue Isaac has not done enough to show us that truth and knowledge are insignificant (...) for the conceptual engineering of ideological concepts. (shrink)

El liberalismo de Carlos S. Nino evolucionó desde sus primeros trabajos vinculados al derecho penal, hacia la construcción de una teoría de la democracia deliberativa. Desde sus comienzos, siguiendo a los autores liberales clásicos como John Stuart Mill, hasta el final en donde adhirió a un liberalismo igualitario, hubo construcciones que acompañaron este proceso, como el concepto de autonomía personal, y también ciertos ideales morales, como un oposición concreta al perfeccionismo. El texto presenta al liberalismo de Nino al comienzo y (...) al final de su obra para mostrar que el antiperfeccionismo originado en el liberalismo clásico que servía de base para construir su concepción de la autonomía, se mantuvo inalterado durante todo este proceso de evolución dificultando la compatibilización de su teoría de la responsabilidad penal con su teoría de la democracia deliberativa, orientada hacia el liberalismo igualitario. (shrink)

After Karl Popper’s original work, several approaches were developed to provide a sound explication of the notion of verisimilitude. With few exceptions, these contributions have assumed that the truth to be approximated is deterministic. This collection of ten papers addresses the more general problem of approaching probabilistic truths. They include attempts to find appropriate measures for the closeness to probabilistic truth and to evaluate claims about such distances on the basis of empirical evidence. The papers employ multiple analytical approaches, and (...) connect the research to related issues in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Un vínculo necesario entre estética y socialización explica la profundidad sensible que debe construir todo cambio de paradigma y toda re-socialización. La democracia no funciona sin una apropiación individual y colectiva del sentir y de la producción de sentir. Es a partir entonces del trabajo artístico y de la instrospección y exteriorización de la dimensión sensible, que toda transformación puede ser aplicada. Se recorren parcialmente los pensamientos de Alain Badiou y Bernard Stiegler. A required link between aesthetic and socialization explains (...) the sensitive depth that all paradigm and re-socialization must build. Democracy does not work without an individual and collective ownership of feeling and feeling's production. It is from the artwork and the introspection and externalization of the sensitive dimension, that any transformation can be applied. The article covers partially the thoughts of Alain Badiou and Bernard Stiegler. (shrink)

São descritas Oficinas Terapêuticas conduzidas por psicólogos em um Centro de Atenção Psicossocial – álcool e drogas, direcionadas a adultos de ambos os sexos, usuários de álcool e/ou outras drogas. Seus objetivos principais eram proporcionar espaços de expressão, construção e transformação subjeti..

Con el recibo del agua llegó un cartón impreso y plastificado, en cuyo interior estaba adherida una cápsula verde, de esas de material digerible en que suelen venir los antibióticos. El cartón promocionaba “la nueva maravilla” que traía la cápsula: Dream Peace (la paz soñada).Dream Peace, de acuerdo con la propaganda, pone en nuestras manos “secretos pertenecientes a antiguas culturas milenarias” y sirve, entre otras muchas virtudes, para combatir el stress, mejorar la concentración, agudizar..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Overcoming Greed:Buddhists and Christians in Consumerist SocietyPaul F. KnitterAs I understand my assignment, I don't find it an easy one. I've been instructed to carry on a lopsided dialogue. Generally, what generates productive dialogue is a proper balance of learning and questioning. My assigned job in this exchange is to question more than learn—to offer some Christian queries about how Buddhists think we can overcome greed and find a (...) path out of the consumerist jungle that surrounds us. Actually, I'd prefer it the other way around, for I'm convinced that we Christians have some very important, if not absolutely vital, things to learn from Buddhists in our own efforts to deal with the jungle. And I will mention some of them. But, following instructions, my main focus in what follows will be on areas where I suspect that Buddhists can learn something, maybe something very helpful, in our shared efforts to deal with greed and the havoc it is working on people and planet.I need to specify my Christian voice in this conversation—or, as they say, where I'm coming from within the many and diverse neighborhoods that make up the Christian community. I'll be reflecting and speaking out of my knowledge of and experience with Christian liberation theology, especially as it has been born, developed, and taken new shapes among the poor and suffering of Latin America. The voices and concerns you will hear in my own remarks are originally those of Christian thinkers and activists such as Jon Sobrino, Gustavo Gutiérrez, Leonardo Boff.In order to bring some order into the swarm of insights and questions that these extremely rich presentations have stirred up in me, I'll gather my comments around two broad topics.The Inner and the Outer: Enlightenment and the Reign of GodMy first general area of conversation is a familiar one not just for the Buddhist-Christian conversation but also for all activists who call themselves religious: the need for, but the difficulty of, holding together the "inner and the outer"—action and [End Page 65] contemplation, personal and social transformation, or what I will term Buddha's enlightenment and Jesus' vision of the Reign of God.What Christian Liberation Theologians Need to Hear from BuddhistsFirst, let me simply list, and hold back from delving into, some crucial lessons that we Christians not only can but drastically need to learn.First, what Jesus and his followers call the Reign of God will be built on sand unless it is grounded in the personal, inner conversion of those who are trying to build it. The church will be only a empty building—or worse, a den of thieves—if its members, and that includes its leaders, are not transformed by the Spirit. Or, in Judith Simmer-Brown's words, "No fundamental transformation can take place anywhere without the joining of inner change and outer change" (emphasis mine). Or, in Ken Barnhill's words (quoted by Brown), "Social work entails inner work.... social change and inner change are inseparable." Or, in the powerful and widely quoted admonition of Thich Nhat Hanh: We have to be peace if we want to make peace. Christians know this, and they talk about it. But in my own life and in what I see in my church, how often we forget it in our efforts to get things done, in our concern for the institution, in our determination to bring about political change.Second, I both cringed and nodded approvingly when I read about Judith Simmer-Brown speaking about "idiot compassion." In opposing wealthy landowners in El Salvador, or in a business-controlled city council in Cincinnati, how often I have felt but perhaps not identified in myself and in my fellow Christian activists "...unskillful acts...the impulsive response based on insufficient knowledge [that] can quickly become ineffective, causing personal burnout." Such idiocy, grounded in goodwill, derives, again, from an insufficient balancing of the inner and the outer.Third, and more sharply focused on the suffering caused by greed, Judith offers a hope, or deep belief, that is often not clearly present among liberation theologians since... (shrink)

Rastrear en la escritura de Jacques Derrida la existencia de un pensamiento otro de la materialidad no es tarea sencilla. Sin embargo, es la tarea que se propone delinear, al menos en sus coordenadas generales, el presente artículo. Ello, inicialmente, implicaría seguir una serie de elementos propios de la tradición presocrática que estarían inscritos a modo de huellas en la escritura deconstructiva. En tal sentido, nociones como las de átomo, vacío y movimiento serán consideradas, en diversos momentos del presente texto, (...) en el marco de una interpretación contemporánea de la divisibilidad y fragmentación de lo existente. A partir de estas consideraciones y su relación con la escritura en el pensamiento de la deconstrucción se sostendrá el carácter cuasi-trascendental de la materia. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende investigar a maneira pela qual o filósofo alemão Edmund Husserl, em Meditações Cartesianas (1929), modaliza e pretende solucionar o problema do solipsismo a partir dos expedientes de sua fenomenologia transcendental. Neste registro, a “tensão” a ser efetivamente superada está na passagem do ego transcendental ao alter ego: de que maneira poder-se-ia escapar ao solipsismo se, em regime de redução fenomenológica transcendental, descubro-me como ego transcendental e, portanto, como o fiador último da experiência? Tendo em vista essas considerações, (...) o interesse do presente artigo será o de, partindo da descrição do ego cogito husserliano por meio do método da redução fenomenológica transcendental, descobrir como, refutando a objeção de solipsismo, Husserl teria chego à descoberta do alter ego e em seguida teria mapeado a possibilidade da intersubjetividade transcendental e, consequentemente, do mundo objetivo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:TRANSCENDENTAL THOMISM AND THE THOMISTIC TEXTS JOHN F. x. KNASAS Genter for Thomistic Studies Houston, Temas SOME THIRTY YEARS ago in the journal Thought, there appeared an article by Fr. Joseph Donceel, S.J., entitled " A Thomistic Misapprehension? " Its thesis is that American Thomism had seen too much of the a posteriori in Aquinas's noetic.1 In fact the interpretation was so a posteriori that it bordered on empiricism (...) and positivism. Donceel intends to balance the American understanding of Aquinas by spotlighting various Thomistic texts that speak of an a priori contribution of the intellect to human knowledge. Donceel is merely calling attention to something that some outstanding European Thomists, e.g., Defever, Marechal, and Rahner have known for some time. Donceel's " balanced" interpretation is what is called Transcendental Thomism. In sum, the position claims that the human intellect is not so complete a tabula rasa that it fails to make an a priori contribution to the data of sensation. This contribution is the intellect's very dynamism to Infinite Being. The dynamism has a constitutive role in human experience. Swept up within this intellectual torrent, the data of sensation stand before us in consciousness as finite and limited. So " objectified " the data are disposed for the traditional abstvactive account of the specific and generic natures. After the Second Vatican Council, Thomism generally fell into disrepute among American Catholic intellectuals. Phi1 Joseph Donceel, " A Thomistic Misapprehension?" Thought, 32 (1957) : 189. 81 82 JOHN F. X. KNASAS losophy departments " pluralized." Their members represented analytic, existential, and process philosophy.2 If Thomism remained vibrant, it was in the a priori strain. Both on the philosophical and theological levels, it was at home with the pluralism tha.t marked the time.3 The current emphasis on political activism, however, ha:s caused even Transcendental Thomism to suffer an eclipse. In the heat of political struggle, Transcendental Thomism, too, appears decadent and bourgeois. The case can be made, though, that the uncovering of the intellect's a priori dynamism to the Infinite was a crucial move for liberationists. Gutierrez notes 4 that the Transcendental Thomist understanding of the human intellect posits a single finality for human nature. The traditional distinction between the temporal and eternal planes loses meaning. Human history becomes salvation history. In this way, then, Transcendental Thomism continues to exercise its influence. This paper investigates the purported Thomistic texts expressing an apriorism. The texts cited by Donceel are all found in Marechal's Cahier V.5 There MarechaI mentions many others besides. Hence, my paper will use the Marechalian collection. My treatment focuses upon the texts that are seemingly most a priori. I. A central text for Marechal is De Veritate, q.l, a.4, ad 5m (first set). Aquinas remarks: 2 See "Is a 'Catholic' Philosophy Department Possible? " by the Committee on Research (Thomas I.angan, K. I,. Schmitz, Jude P. Dougherty) of the ACPA (HJ78). 3 On Transcendental Thomism's capacity to admit a theological pluralism without falling into a relativism, see Gerald A. McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Gent1.ry (New York: The Seab1iry Pres8, 1977), pp. 258-9. 4 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, trans. by Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (New York: Orbis Books, 1973), p. 69. 5 Oahier V is a volume in Jl.riarechal's monumenfal Le point de depart de la metaphysique. Subsequent references to Oahier V are from Donceel's substantive translation A J,[wrechal Reader (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970). TRANSCENDENTAL THOMISM AND THE TEXTS 83 The truth by which the soul passes judgment on all things is the first truth; for, just as from the truth of the divine intellect there flow into the angelic intellects those: intelligible species by which angels know all things, so does the truth of the first principles by which we judge everything proceed from the truth of the divine intellect as from its exemplary cause. Since we can judge by means of the truth of these first principles only insofar as this truth is a likeness of the first truth, we are said to judge everything according to the first truth.6 The text illustrates a " dynamic exemplarism " in Aquinas... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Advances in Peircean Mathematics: The Colombian School ed. by Fernando ZalameaGianluca CaterinaFernando Zalamea (Ed.) Advances in Peircean Mathematics: The Colombian School Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2022. 212 pp. (incl. index).The volume Advances in Peircean Mathematics is an important, very much needed contribution towards a deeper understanding of the impact of Peirce's work especially in the fields of mathematics, logic, and semiotic. It fills a gap in the current (...) literature by recasting some of [End Page 373] Peirce's profound mathematical insights into a formal framework. This is a finely edited editorial project, which summarizes the work of more than two decades done by a group of scholars—the Colombian School—lead by Fernando Zalamea, a pioneer of Peirce studies, and pragmatism in general, in Latin America.The structure of the volume unfolds in three dense chapters, each corresponding to a specific mathematical context connected to various aspects of Peirce's work. Broadly speaking, in the first chapter, Gustavo Arengas proposes the theory of higher category theory as a natural framework to represent the main traits of Peirce's semiotic; in the second chapter, Francisco Vargas develops a thorough set-theoretical model of Peirce's continuum; in the third chapter, Arnold Oostra, in a truly Peircean spirit, formalizes the notion of Intuitionistic Existential Graphs, emphasizing the idea that intuitionistic logic is the most natural context to represent and understand Peirce's diagrammatic logic. The fourth and last chapter, penned by Zalamea, provides the reader with a solid summary of the main results presented in the volume along with a robust road map to navigate through the technical details of the text.Mathematics, as implied by the title of the volume, is at the core of this project, and the authors do not shy away from the complexity, details, and depth of it in order to shed light on some of the most fundamental and groundbreaking nature of Peirce's ideas. That level of rigor and formal soundness is certainly one of the strengths of the volume, although readers who may not be acquainted with at least some basic notions of category theory or with the mathematics of Peirce's work, may find some of the text a bit terse—this is not a casual reading and it does require a certain level of commitment in order to appreciate the depth of the provided insights. On the other hand, all the background material is clearly laid out, making the volume a self-contained work which can be thoroughly enjoyed by a general audience.The real upshot of recasting some of Peirce's intuitions within the fabric of formal mathematics is not only that of providing the instruments to clarify those ideas, but also that of highlighting the role that Peirce's work has been playing in the development of modern mathematics in many relevant aspects, from the very genesis of category theory—which today is widely regarded as a necessary and unifying language in several fields of the mathematical and physical sciences—to the development of non-standard analysis, just to mention a few of them.An elegant instance of such perspective is offered by Gustavo Arengas in the first chapter, where it is argued that ∞-categories can be used to model the natural order of hierarchies implicit in Peirce's conception of the basic triadic relation between sign, object, and interpreter. What, at first glance, may seem just a simple analogy, unfolds onto a methodical and enlightening analysis of Peirce's semiotic, as the author builds [End Page 374] the connections with the relevant categorical constructions in a precise manner. Most of the rest of the chapter focuses on Peirce's notions of the pragmatic and pragmaticist maxim, and the use of basic structures such as monads, limits, presheaves and sheaves as the natural environment to better convey their meaning, both from a mathematical and a philosophical perspective. The reader will find it interesting to realize that, by delving deeper into the understanding of the relational nature of category theory, a great chunk of Peirce's work can be seen as fundamentally intertwined with the apparatus and the language of modern mathematics... (shrink)

We provide a 'verisimilitudinarian' analysis of the well-known Linda paradox or conjunction fallacy, i.e., the fact that most people judge the probability of the conjunctive statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" (B & F) as more probable than the isolated statement "Linda is a bank teller" (B), contrary to an uncontroversial principle of probability theory. The basic idea is that experimental participants may judge B & F a better hypothesis about Linda as compared (...) to B because they evaluate B & F as more verisimilar than B. In fact, the hypothesis "feminist bank teller", while less likely to be true than "bank teller", may well be a better approximation to the truth about Linda. (shrink)

This textbook presents the basics of philosophy that are necessary for the student and researcher in science in order to better understand scientific work. The approach is not historical but formative: tools for semantical analysis, ontology of science, epistemology, and scientific ethics are presented in a formal and direct way. The book has two parts: one with the general theory and a second part with application to some problems such as the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the nature of mathematics, and (...) the ontology of spacetime. The book addresses questions such as "What is meaning?", "What is truth?", "What are truth criteria in science?", "What is a theory?", "What is a model?" "What is a datum?", "What is information?", "What does it mean to understand something?", "What is space?", "What is time?", "How are these concepts articulated in science?" "What are values?" "What are the limits of science?", and many more. The philosophical views presented are "scientific" in the sense that they are informed by current science, they are relevant for scientific research, and the method adopted uses the hypothetical-deductive approach that is characteristic of science. The results and conclusions, as any scientific conclusion, are open to revision in the light of future advances. Hence, this philosophical approach opposes to dogmatic philosophy. Supported by end-of-chapter summaries and a list of special symbols used, the material will be of interest for students and researchers in both science and philosophy. The second part will appeal to physicists and mathematicians. (shrink)

We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of ‘(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief change’ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some recent discussions concerning (...) belief revision aiming at truth approximation and inference to the best explanation are also highlighted. (shrink)

Theory change is a central concern in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between two ongoing research programs providing formal treatments of theory change: the (post-Popperian) approach to verisimilitude and the AGM theory of belief change. We show that appropriately construed accounts emerging from those two lines of epistemological research do yield convergences relative to a specified kind of theories, here labeled “conjunctive”. In this domain, a set of plausible conditions are identified which (...) demonstrably capture the verisimilitudinarian effectiveness of AGM belief change, i.e., its effectiveness in tracking truth approximation. We conclude by indicating some further developments and open issues arising from our results. (shrink)

This article provides a comparative and interpretative analysis of the emerging projects in Latin America after the crisis of the neoliberal modernity project. It offers a critical interpretation of the current tendencies in Latin American politics at the national level, while suggesting some hints to understand the current neoliberal crisis in Western countries after Trump’s electoral triumph. The purpose is to figure out the collective meanings behind the new national projects in Latin America (postcolonial indigeneity, confrontational populism, defective neoliberalism, and (...) social liberalism) that are constructing a new regional order. The work examines how the neoliberal modernity project came to be dominant in the late 1980s, only to enter into a period of crisis in the current century. That crisis, in turn, provides the basis for exploring four different alternative projects of modernity, based on the kind of rationality and agency promoted by them. (shrink)