An outstanding problem in so-called modal interpretations of quantum mechanics has been the specification of a dynamics for the properties introduced in such interpretations. We develop a general framework (in the context of the theory of stochastic processes) for specifying a dynamics for interpretations in this class, focusing on the modal interpretation by Vermaas and Dieks. This framework admits many empirically equivalent dynamics. We give some examples, and discuss some of the properties of one of them. This approach is applicable (...) to a wider class of theories, in particular, those using (discrete) strict effective—as in decoherence theory—superselection rules. (shrink)

Appreciating human movement can be a powerful aesthetic experience. We have used apparent biological motion to investigate the aesthetic effects of three levels of movement representation: body postures, movement transitions and choreographic structure. Symmetrical and asymmetrical sequences of apparent movement were created from static postures, and were presented in an artificial grammar learning paradigm. Additionally, “good” continuation of apparent movements was manipulated by changing the number of movement path reversals within a sequence. In an initial exposure phase, one group of (...) participants saw only symmetrical sequences, while another group saw only asymmetrical sequences. In a subsequent test phase, both groups rated all sequences on an aesthetic evaluation scale. We found that posture, movement, and choreographic structure all influenced aesthetic ratings. Separate ratings for the static body postures presented individually showed that both groups preferred a posture that maximized spatial symmetry. Ratings for the experimental sequences showed that both groups gave higher ratings to symmetrical sequences with “good” continuation and lower ratings to sequences with many path reversals. Further, participants who had been initially familiarized with asymmetrical sequences showed increased liking for asymmetrical sequences, suggesting a structural mere exposure effect. Aesthetic preferences thus depend on body postures, apparent movement continuation and choreographic structure. We propose a hierarchical model of aesthetic perception of human movement with distinct processing levels for body postures, movements and choreographic structure. (shrink)

I investigate the character of the definite properties defined by the Basic Rule in the Vermaas and Dieks' (1995) version of the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics, specifically for the case of the continuous model of decoherence by Joos and Zeh (1985). While this model suggests that the characteristic length that might be associated with the localisation of an individual system is the coherence length of the state (which converges rapidly to the thermal de Broglie wavelength), I show in an (...) exactly soluble case that the definite properties that are possessed with overwhelming probability in this modal interpretation are delocalized over the entire spread of the state. (shrink)

Despite society’s increasing sensitivity toward green production, companies often struggle to find effective communication strategies that induce consumers to buy green products or engage in other environmentally friendly behaviors. To add clarity to this situation, we investigated the effectiveness of negative versus positive message framing in promoting green products, whereby companies highlight the detrimental versus beneficial environmental consequences of choosing less versus more green options, respectively. Across four experiments, we show that negatively framed messages are more effective than positively framed (...) ones in prompting consumers to engage in pro-environmental behaviors. More importantly, we find that anticipated shame is the emotion responsible for this effect. Furthermore, both environmental concern and the type of product promoted serve as moderators; thus, the mediating role of anticipated shame is attenuated when environmental concern is low and the product is a luxury one. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of our work, along with its limitations and some directions for future research. (shrink)

An explanation of how we acquire concepts of kinds if they are socially constructed is a desideratum both for a successful account of concept acquisition and a successful account of social constructionism. Both face the so-called “mismatch problem” that is based on the observation that that there is often a mismatch between the descriptions proficient speakers associate with a word and the properties that its referents have in common. I argue that externalist theories of reference provide a plausible and attractive (...) account of concept acquisition, including the acquisition of concepts of social constructs, that avoids the mismatch problem. However, externalist theories are ontologically and psychologically highly demanding, which places strong constraints on accounts of the metaphysics of socially constructed kinds. In particular, they require a rather strong form of realism that is incompatible with some but not all theories of social constructionism. Finally, I show that these demands can be met by means of adopting a homeostatic property cluster view of natural kinds. (shrink)

There is a rather widespread consensus, among historians of philosophy, concerning the decline of Wittgenstein amid recent analytic philosophy. However, the exact import of such a decline,...

I discuss the interpretation of spontaneous collapse theories, with particular reference to Bell's suggestion that the stochastic jumps in the evolution of the wave function should be considered as local beables of the theory. I develop this analogy in some detail for the case of non-relativistic GRW-type theories, using a generalisation of Bell's notion of beables to POV measures. In the context of CSL-type theories, this strategy appears to fail, and I discuss instead Ghirardi and co-workers' mass-density interpretation and its (...) relation to Schrödinger's original charge-density interpretation. This discussion is extended to relativistic CSL-type theories. A few remarks on Everett's interpretation conclude the paper. (shrink)

So far, the value dimension underlying affectivity disorders has remained out of focus in phenomenological psychopathology. As early as at the beginning of the 20th century, however, German phenomenologist Max Scheler examined in depth the relationship between affectivity and value dimension through the concept of valueception (Wertnehmung). In this sense, a recent noteworthy contribution has been provided by John Cutting, who has drawn attention to the importance of Scheler’s analyses for psychiatry. In this work I take into consideration only two (...) aspects of Cutting’s proposal: 1) the relationship between the impairments of valueception and the perception of certain value classes; and 2) the interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological reduction and its juxtaposition with the modus vivendi of schizophrenia. According to Cutting, in the modus vivendi of schizophrenia the valueception impairment entails putting vital values in brackets and focusing on personal values, with a process that recalls Scheler’s phenomenological reduction. Regarding the first aspect, I share Cutting’s starting point, but then shift the focus on how important the valueception is for the intersubjective dimension. In particular, I maintain that rather than compromising the perception of vital values, valueception impairments in the modus vivendi of schizophrenia interfere with the intersubjective dimension and are interwoven with a process of disembodiment. My thesis is that the modus vivendi of schizophrenia involves a disturbance of the intersubjective dimension that arises from the level of valueception and that determines the person’s self-referential closure. With regard to the second point, by analyzing Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, I sustain that its main objective is to increase both the interaction with otherness and the openness to the world (Weltoffenheit). As a consequence, the modus vivendi of schizophrenia, in my opinion, is not comparable, as Cutting claims, with Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, but goes in a different direction. (shrink)

Botticelli and Tizian depict the Annunciation in two very different ways. Botticelli portrays a kneeling angel in an act of guiding from below, while Tizian represents an angel imposing himself from above with an authoritarian forefinger. Botticelli's painting suggests an intention of orientation that is not authoritarian yet able to bring about a transformation (Umbildung). It also suggests that an individual's transformation cannot be achieved in a closed solipsistic dimension, but requires a disclosure from otherness. My theory is that at (...) the origin of ethics there is a non-authoritarian way of orientation that comes from otherness and arises from the emotional sphere thanks to a "care of desire". The expression cura sui has often been interpreted as a care confined to a private and solipsistic dimension with the aim of strengthening the self-referential subject. By "care of desire" I mean a care not turned upon itself but made possible by a disclosure coming from otherness and addressed to the transformation of the individual and of society. In the human existence, emotions reveal an extraordinary plasticity. They are not already regulated by instinct but develop and get to maturity even many years after biological birth. Moreover, this maturation process does not follow a universal process identical for everyone, being different for every individual. In fact it finds its realization in the unique order of feelings (ordo amoris) that characterizes every individual. Emotions guide actions and the way we interact with the others and with the world. In the human existence they become plastic and don't have only a homeostatic function of self-regulation. They give flexibility to our way of perceiving, of existing and of taking our position in the world. The care of desire is dedicated to the plasticity of emotions and makes ethics, i.e. a person's formation process (Bildung) and flourishing, possible. It also allows the transition from the “environmental closedness” (Umweltgeschlossenheit) to the world-openness (Weltoffenheit). To sum up, the care of desire implies the transition from a solipsistic self-care to a “care for world-openness”. From this point of view, emotion is no more the secondary result of a cognitive process, but at the origin of every formative, perceptive and cognitive process: In the beginning was the emotion. Yet in this process of creative transformation not every emotion has the same significance: at the core of emotions’ plasticity there are love and wonder (thaumàzein), whose peculiar feature is “lack of envy” (aphthonoi). (shrink)

Decision making often takes place in social environments where other actors influence individuals' decisions. The present article examines how advice affects individual learning. Five social learning models combining advice and individual learning‐four based on reinforcement learning and one on Bayesian learning‐and one individual learning model are tested against each other. In two experiments, some participants received good or bad advice prior to a repeated multioption choice task. Receivers of advice adhered to the advice, so that good advice improved performance. The (...) social learning models described the observed learning processes better than the individual learning model. Of the models tested, the best social learning model assumes that outcomes from recommended options are more positively evaluated than outcomes from nonrecommended options. This model correctly predicted that receivers first adhere to advice, then explore other options, and finally return to the recommended option. The model also predicted accurately that good advice has a stronger impact on learning than bad advice. One‐time advice can have a long‐lasting influence on learning by changing the subjective evaluation of outcomes of recommended options. (shrink)

The main theory at the core of this monograph is that the person is an entity ontologically new, since she is able to perform an act of self-transcendence, which is meant as her critical distancing from her own “self”, understood as subject of social recognition (Anerkennung), in order to open to the encounter with the world (Weltoffenheit). This allows us to consider a person in a new way, different both from confessional interpretations that see her only as a center of (...) the spirit and from reductivistic views. Schelling examines the act of self-transcendence through the concept of ecstasy, whereas Scheler associates it with the phenomenological reduction. The act of self-transcendence, that Schelling sees as originated by the “hunger of being”, is at the roots of the formation process of a person (Bildung): the person takes her shape by exiting from her own self-referential dimension and encountering otherness. If considered from this viewpoint, Plato’s “epimeleia heautou” exceeds an intimistic perspective: the “care” is no more a solipsistic self-care, but rather becomes the care through which the person transcends her own self to open to the relationships with otherness. It turns, therefore, into a care for world-openness (care for Weltoffenheit). The transformation of the individual and of society so becomes the double-faced aspect of the same process. The development of this set of problems occurs through a dialogue with Schelling’s and Scheler’s positions, but it is also supported by a historical-philosophical investigation, that for instance provides evidence of the influences of Schelling’s Berlin period on Scheler’s last theories and on the philosophical anthropology of the 20th century. Schelling was the first to conceive the concept of “eccentricity” in an anthropological sense, since until then the term had been confined to Kepler’s astronomy. Consequently, the planets’ elliptic (eccentric) movement heightens to an emblematic metaphor of human nature and freedom. The monograph also examines a possible convergence between Plato’s epimeleia heautou and Scheler’s phenomenological reduction. The book ends with a chapter on the topic of Vorbild. The exemplary testimony, that is Vorbild, becomes witnessing evidence immune from any pedagogical-moralistic intent: in fact, if it should relapse into the rhetoric of the “wish to give a good example”, it would immediately conform to the opposite logic of the model. A model is universal in so far as it makes everyone more like the others, nullifying the diversity, whereas exemplariness is universal in so far as it makes everyone more unique and motivates each one to follow her own characteristic path of existential trans-formation. Exemplarity doesn’t convey any contents, but rather encourages a kind of solidaristic involvement. Yet there are also negative exemplarities (Gegenbild) that place obstacles in the formation and block the existence of the personal center. (shrink)

The main claim of this article is that the plasticity of the human formation process does not consist in receiving passively an already-given shape, like hot wax stamped by a seal. Rather, it creates ever new shapes and makes a person overcome her own self-referential horizon. Furthermore, I argue that this formation process is directed by desire, meant as “hunger for being born completely” (Zambrano). The human being comes into the world without being born completely, and it is precisely such (...) hunger that directs human positioning into the world. (shrink)

We prove a generalization of Maehara’s lemma to show that the extensions of classical and intuitionistic first-order logic with a special type of geometric axioms, called singular geometric axioms, have Craig’s interpolation property. As a corollary, we obtain a direct proof of interpolation for (classical and intuitionistic) first-order logic with identity, as well as interpolation for several mathematical theories, including the theory of equivalence relations, (strict) partial and linear orders, and various intuitionistic order theories such as apartness and positive partial (...) and linear orders. (shrink)

Plena are the characteristic properties of material thing, of the thing we perceive in our daily experience. According to Husserl, the attempt to explain their features into the language of Physics is the core of the modern science of nature. Colours and smells are not directly reducible to geometrical forms and algebraic functions. In order to explain natural processes using mathematical terms, scientists need to find out how it is possible to measure them. Galileo claims that the world is made (...) up of mathematical formulae, Husserl instead tries to understand the limits of the validity of this claim. In order to do this, the role of subjective experience must be taken into account. (shrink)

The main theme of this paper will be the elimination of the sensible features of our experience from the philosophical account of what it means to know something. The textual source on which we will focus our attention is Benedetto Croce’s Estetica come scienza dell’espressione e linguistica generale. Besides an epistemological dimension , what is sensible in our experience has also an ontological connotation . According to Croce, neither of them can be the basis of our knowledge. What we mean (...) when we say to know something is neither that we have impressions nor that we possess sensations, but rather that we have a representation of that thing. In this way, the sensible features of our experience are ruled out from its philosophical account and are replaced through spiritual activities pertaining to the practical realm of the Spirit. (shrink)

Los fetos, los animales, los cristos malapartianos y pasolinianos nos recuerdan, por encima de todo, que la diagnosis del final de Europa y de su cultura dos veces milenaria comienza con el eclipse del llanto, con la desaparición de la piedad. Porque, a fin de cuentas, de las lágrimas de Aquiles sobre la cabeza canosa de Príamo nació todo. Pasolini y Malaparte sienten intensamente este colapso de la civilización y responden de maneras sorprendentemente afines. Esta contribución inicia una verificación sobre (...) la relación entre los dos escritores más heterodoxos del Novecientos italiano. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe paper compares Mead’s and Quine’s behaviouristic theories of meaning and language, focusing in particular on Mead’s notion of sympathy and Quine’s notion of empathy. On the one hand, Quine seems to resort to an explanation similar to Mead’s notion of sympathy, referring to ‘empathy’ in order to justify the human ability to project ourselves into the witness’s position; on the other hand, Quine’s reference to the notion of empathy paves the way to a more insightful comparison between Mead’s behaviourism (...) and an explanation of the emergence of the linguistic from pre-linguistic communication based on empathic identification processes. However, Mead is less ambiguous than Quine in his use of the notion of sympathy finds a fecund parallel in the current neuroscientific and neuro-phenomenological hypothesis on ‘empathy’. The article contends that the ambiguity in Quine’s account of empathy is due to the exigency of trying to elucidate the link between the rules of language in a cultural context and... (shrink)

We study access control policies based on the says operator by introducing a logical framework called Fibred Security Language (FSL) which is able to deal with features like joint responsibility between sets of principals and to identify them by means of first-order formulas. FSL is based on a multimodal logic methodology. We first discuss the main contributions from the expressiveness point of view, we give semantics for the language both for classical and intuitionistic fragment), we then prove that in order (...) to express well-known properties like ‘speaks-for’ or ‘hand-off’, defined in terms of says, we do not need second-order logic (unlike previous approaches) but a decidable fragment of first-order logic suffices. We propose a model-driven study of the says axiomatization by constraining the Kripke models in order to respect desirable security properties, we study how existing access control logics can be translated into FSL and we give completeness for the logic. (shrink)

"Siamo come lucciole che hanno disimparato a illuminare e che prima si sono messe a girare attorno alla lanterna magica dell'ideale ascetico e ora attorno alle insegne pubblicitarie al neon. Lucciole che hanno scordato d’avere una potenzialità di orientatività preziosa nel proprio sistema affettivo" (G. Cusinato, La totalità incompiuta, Milano 2008, 314). Che cos'è una persona? Come si costituisce concretamente l'identità personale? Che rapporto c'è fra identità personale e identità psichica? C'è coincidenza fra persona e homo sapiens? La persona è (...) ancora oggi, nonostante tutto, al centro del dibattito filosofico, sociologico, giuridico e bioetico, eppure la sua dimensione sembra sfuggire continuamente alle reti concettuali e alle categorie epistemologiche della scienza. In questo lavoro si propone una fenomenologia della persona a partire dal confronto con la teoria dei sistemi autopoietici di Maturana e Varela e dei sistemi sociali di Luhmann, mettendo in luce che la persona non può essere considerata un sistema autopoietico. La persona si delinea piuttosto come un sistema excentrico che si costituisce mediante l'esecuzione dell'atto. Questa prospettiva viene esplorata attraverso un dialogo serrato con l'antropologia filosofica tedesca, la stessa che all'inizio del Novecento mette in luce che l'uomo non ha un'essenza precostituita e proprio per questo necessita di un processo di Bildung. L'antropologia filosofica di Scheler e Plessner nasce nella Germania degli anni Venti in un periodo ancora fluido in cui l'eclissi delle tradizionali concezioni dell'uomo non aveva ancora lasciato il posto alla cristallizzazione totalitaria dell'uomo di massa che si sarebbe imposta negli anni Trenta. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that, although Husserl explicitly explains a kinetic theory of Leib already in § 83 of Raum und Ding, a real phenomenology of the distinction between Leib (living body) and Körper (corporeal object) is not conceivable without Scheler's contribution. It’s quite common to search for the origin of this distinction in Ideen II, in a work composed of texts written in different moments from 1912 on. Before 1912 Husserl dedicated himself to the theme of corporeality in (...) the first part of Göttinger Vorlesungen 1904/1905 as well as in the lectures in the Sommersemester of 1907 titled Ding und Raum [Hua XVI]. Both lectures, however, lack an explicit analysis on the distinction between Leib and Körper. Scheler instead mentions it already in an unpublished text from 1908/1909 and fully develops it in the years 1911 and 1912, where the issue is explored in a more organic and radical way than in the writings of Husserl. -/- In diesem Beitrag möchte ich darauf hinweisen, dass, obwohl Husserl bereits in § 83 von Raum und Ding eine kinetische Theorie von Leib erklärt, eine reale Phänomenologie der Unterscheidung zwischen Leib und Körper ohne Schelers Beitrag nicht denkbar wäre. Im Allgemeinen wird ihr Ursprung in den Ideen II festgestellt, einer Schrift, die aus den Texten verschiedener Zeiten nach 1912 besteht. Vor 1912 widmet sich Husserl dem Thema der Körperlichkeit in dem ersten Teil der Göttinger Vorlesungen 1904/1905 sowie in den Vorlesungen aus dem Sommersemester 1907 über Ding und Raum [Hua XVI]. In beiden Vorlesungen fehlt jedoch eine explizite Untersuchung zum Unterschied zwischen Leib und Körper. Bei Scheler hingegen ist sie bereits in einem Nachlasstext aus 1908/1909 auffindbar und wird in den Jahren 1911 und 1912 sehr ausführlich entfaltet. Die Auseinandersetzung mit dieser Thematik erfolgt bei ihm viel organischer und eingehender als bei Husserl. -/- In questo scritto dimostro che, sebbene Husserl espliciti una teoria cinetica del Leib già nel § 83 di Raum und Ding, una vera e propria fenomenologia della distinzione fra Leib (corpo vivente) e Körper (oggetto corporeo) è inconcepibile senza il contributo di Scheler. Generalmente tale distinzione viene ricondotta a Idee II, un testo che è il risultato di diverse versioni composte a partire dal 1912. Prima del 1912 Husserl si dedica al tema della corporeità nella prima parte delle Göttinger Vorlesungen del 1904/5, e nelle lezioni del Sommersemester del 1907 dedicate a Ding und Raum [Hua XVI]. In entrambi questi testi manca però un’analisi esplicita sulla differenza fra Leib e Körper. In Scheler invece tale distinzione è già rintracciabile in un inedito del 1908/09 per poi essere pienamente esplicitata nel biennio 1911-1912, dove è presente un’elaborazione di questa tematica ben più organica e radicale rispetto a quella presente negli scritti di Husserl. (shrink)

[v. 1] Corso A. -- [v. 2] Corso B, Intorno al materialismo storico.