This note is a critical response to Kentaro Fujimoto’s new conservativeness argument about truth, which centres on the notion of finite conjunction. We argue that Fujimoto’s arguments turn on a specific way of formalizing the notions of finite collection and finite conjunction in first-order logic. In particular, by instead formalizing these concepts in a natural way in set theory or in second-order logic, Fujimoto’s new conservativeness argument can be resisted.

In a recent article in this journal, Calemi challenges the Küng-Armstrong trilemma, a well-known objection to traditional class nominalism, by proposing a fusion of class nominalism with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF). In this note, we argue that ZF-class nominalism faces significant challenges in the form of incompleteness and potential paradoxes stemming from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. We will explore these issues in detail, highlighting the key implications for the viability of ZF-class nominalism as a philosophical position.

According to deflationism, truth is insubstantial. Edwards (2018) argues that the deflationist thesis of insubstantiality is incoherent, regardless of how it is characterized. By clarifying the deflationist concepts of reference and truth (and their relations) and addressing the distinction between substantial properties and insubstantial properties within the deflationist framework, we will argue that Edwards’s self-defeating argument is problematic and ultimately unconvincing.

Type 2 diabetes mellitus is associated with cognitive impairment in many domains. There are several pieces of evidence that changes in neuronal neuropathies and metabolism have been observed in T2DM. Structural and functional MRI shows that abnormal connections and synchronization occur in T2DM brain circuits and related networks. Neuroplasticity and energy metabolism appear to be principal effector systems, which may be related to amyloid beta deposition, although there is no unified explanation that includes the complex etiology of T2DM with cognitive (...) impairment. Herein, we assume that cognitive impairment in diabetes may lead to abnormalities in neuroplasticity and energy metabolism in the brain, and those reflected to MRI structural connectivity and functional connectivity, respectively. (shrink)

We observe that Putnam’s model-theoretic argument against determinacy of the concept of second-order quantification or that of the set is harmless to the nominalist. It serves as a good motivation for the nominalist philosophy of mathematics. But in the end it can lead to a serious challenge to the nominalist account of mathematical objectivity if some minimal assumptions about the relation between mathematical objectivity and logical objectivity are made. We consider three strategies the nominalist might take to meet this challenge, (...) and we argue that all these strategies are untenable. (shrink)

v. 1. Li ze xue -- v. 2. Yu zhou lun xin li xue -- v. 3 Xing shang xue.