“Congealing” is a word that evokes senses of unpleasantness where perhaps something inviting had once been. It also implies that things are becoming less fluid and more rigid. As we began organizing ETHICOMP 2018, we wanted a theme that reflected the impact of technologies on human cultures, practices and lives. Our initial draft of the theme was “Creating, Changing, and Congealing Ways of Life with Technologies.” And while we were eventually persuaded to use a more congenial way of putting the (...) idea (it became “Creating, Changing, and Coalescing Ways of Life with Technologies”), in some ways, it remains true for us that “congealing,” and its connotations of something less pleasant, gets at the original idea. As we incorporate technologies into our practices, much attention is paid to how they change our ways of doing things. But technologies can also help ways of life set-up and harden like yesterday’s leftovers – not appealing, yet difficult to budge and sometimes quite unhealthy. Once a particular process is built around a piece of technology, it can become entrenched and increasingly difficult to change. For a historical example, consider how difficult it was to adapt records and software on the eve of the 21st century in response to the so-called “Y2K” problem. In early software development, efficient use of memory was an important design consideration. It had become a standard practice to use a 2-digit field for the year, which would roll to from “99” to “00” in the year 2000, causing problems for datedependent functions. Technologies can also reflect and reinforce existing cultural tendencies. For a recent example, consider the human resources software created by Amazon that used its existing hiring data to train a machine-learning system to rate applicants. The resulting system turned out to be biased against women applicants, downranking resumes that included the word “woman” or “women’s.” Amazon ended up scrapping the project altogether. Because of these kinds of effects, we wanted to encourage people to think beyond well-worn paradigms like “technologies are disruptive” to consider other kinds of effects they can have. As it happened, the imagery of “congealing” proved distasteful enough that the steering committee opted for a more neutral term. But even with the less-dramatic wording the conference ended up attracting a rich and diverse range of papers that examined technological issues from a variety of angles, exactly as we had hoped. (shrink)

Author: Płotka Witold Title: AT ORIGINS OF THE CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF COGNITION IN THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL (U źródeł krytyki teorii poznania w szkole frankfurckiej) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 769-790 Keywords: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL, ADORNO, HUSSERL, THEORY OF COGNITION, CRITIQUE OF TECHNIQUES, CRISIS OF CULTURE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The author argues that the Frankfurt School’s critique of phenomenology as the theory of cognition (as (...) defined by Theodore W. Adorno) is unjustified. The article is divided into five main parts. In the first part, historical, as well as theoretical relations between the two philosophical currents are reconstructed. In the second part, Adorno’s critique of the theory of cognition is defined with regard to Husserl’s phenomenology in particular. The third part of the article analyses why Adorno’s critique seems to be unjustified. The author shows that Husserl denied the theses which Adorno criticized. In the fourth part, the author enlarges the argument by showing that Husserl’s critique of scientific rationality is similar with Adorno’s proposition. Nonetheless, in the fifth part the author stresses main differences between the two critiques of rationality. (shrink)

1. Phenomenology is first and foremost about intentionality. As Husserl puts it, “Intentionality is the name of the problem encompassed by the whole of phenomenology”.1 Broadly understood, the phen...

This paper seeks to define the main trends, arguments and problems regarding the question of method formulated by Twardowski and his students. In this regard, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, I situate Brentano’s project of descriptive psychology within the context of disputes in the school of Twardowski concerning the method of both psychology and phenomenology, arguing that descriptive-psychological analysis was dominant in this respect. Second, the study explores the notion of eidetic phenomenology, as founded on a methodological (...) procedure, which supposed to guarantee infallibility of its descriptions. To show this, I first reconstruct Brentano’s concept of descriptive psychology, its object, its method and aims. Second, I track the changes and reinterpretations provided by Twardowski in his view of descriptive-psychological analysis. Third, I explore Witwicki’s and Bandrowski’s—both early students of Twardowski—discussions of the descriptive approach. I try to show that the former accepted psychologism, while the latter overcame it by means of logical analysis. Fourth, I suggest that the only student of Twardowski who renounced the Brentanian method was Ingarden, who developed eidetic phenomenology. Finally, I present Blaustein’s—one of the last students of Twardowski—reappraisal of descriptive psychology and his critique of Ingarden’s method. This controversy over the method of descriptive psychology reveals how one can situate Twardowski’s legacy within early phenomenology in Poland. (shrink)

The article explores two phenomenologies of image consciousness that were formulated by Ingarden and Blaustein, both of whom were students of Husserl. Both philosophers analyze image consciousness in the context of the phenomenon of contemplating a painting. The article is divided into seven sections. Section 1 presents the historical background of Blaustein’s and Ingarden’s explorations. In Section 2, Ingarden’s description of a painting as different from an image is reconstructed. In Section 3, Ingarden’s analysis of Husserl’s image consciousness is discussed. (...) Section 4 concerns Blaustein’s theory of intentionality, which was formulated in a critical elaboration of Husserl’s philosophy. Section 5 discusses the detailed components of Blaustein’s theory of intentionality, i.e., his theory of psychic representations. This theory is then used in Section 6 in an analysis of Blaustein’s reading of § 111 of Husserl’s Ideas I. Section 7 summarizes both theories in order to draw parallels and differences between Ingarden and Blaustein. In this regard, it is argued that both philosophers refer to different theoretical contexts when discussing Husserl’s idea of image consciousness. (shrink)

This important new book provides a philosophical and historical analysis of the subject, looking at a review of sociological and political theories concerning ...

Artykuł koncentruje się na trzech aspektach doświadczenia miłosnego pragnienia. Chcę pokazać, że po pierwsze średniowieczni autorzy mistyczni – Ryszard od św. Wiktora, Beatrycze z Nazaretu i inni – w analizie ludzkiej drogi do Boga przenieśli punkt ciężkości z zaspokojenia pragnienia Boga na sam akt pragnienia (Boga, tj. przedmiotu miłości). Po drugie dopuszczali oni możliwość, że doświadczenie duchowe może manifestować się w ciele, można go doświadczać zmysłowo i cieleśnie. I po trzecie zauważyli, że pragnieniu miłości często towarzyszyły cierpienie oraz ból. Z (...) ich rozważań wyłania się obraz dynamiki miłości i pragnienia: nieobecność przedmiotu, niezaspokojone pragnienie, cielesność i elementy cierpienia są ze sobą powiązane w ten sposób, że wszystkie tworzą aspekty doświadczenia afektywnego. Powyższe cechy są zatem aspektami jednego doświadczenia: pragnienie jest związane z nieobecnością przedmiotu, cielesne doświadczanie pragnienia często przybiera postać fizycznego bólu i cierpienia. Charakterystyka trzech wymienionych aspektów – nieobecności przedmiotu pragnienia, roli cielesności w pragnieniu oraz obecności cierpienia w pragnieniu miłosnym – zostanie przedstawiona w trzech kolejnych częściach niniejszego artykułu. (shrink)

Artykuł omawia historyczny rozwój koncepcji radości w filozofii i teologii średniowiecznej. Koncentruje się na trzech autorach: Augustynie, Piotrze Lombardzie i Bonawenturze, i przedstawia kolejne trzy teorie radości: radość jako posiadanie pożądanego przedmiotu, radość jako oczekiwanie na pożądany przedmiot oraz radość jako dystans w stosunku do pożądanego przedmiotu. Wreszcie, artykuł argumentuje, że dzieje radości w okresie 395–druga połowa XIII wieku to dzieje coraz większego docenienia radości i dostrzeżenia jej właściwego znaczenia w życiu człowieka.

Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy przyjemności osób zbawionych, czyli przyjemności (zmysłowych i cielesnych), jakich zbawiony będzie doświadczał w stanie visio beatifica. Choć ze swej natury problem ten jest zagadnieniem teologicznym, wynikającym bezpośrednio z eschatologii chrześcijańskiej, to jednak w niniejszym artykule skupiono się na podstawowych problemach filozoficznych, jakie pojawiły się w badaniach Tomasza z Akwinu. Artykuł obejmuje trzy części. Pierwsza dotyczy ogólnej dyskusji Tomasza z Akwinu na temat przyjemności cielesnej w beatitudo. W szczególności zbadam argument Akwinaty, że przyjemność cielesna jest koniecznym elementem beatitudo (...) i jest immanentna w szczęściu ostatecznym. W drugiej części artykułu przyjrzę się rozumieniu przez Tomasza statusu zmartwychwstałego ciała. Wreszcie w części trzeciej przedstawię poszczególne przyjemności cielesne, których prawdopodobnie doświadczy zbawiony człowiek. ------------------------- Zgłoszono: 09/05/2022. Zrecenzowano: 29/06/2022. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 16/09/2022. (shrink)

Artykuł jest dyskusją z wybranymi elementami interpretacji pracy Witolda Płotki pt. Studia z fenomenologii poznania. Transcendentalna filozofia Edmunda Husserla a problem wiedzy, którą sformułował Michał Piekarski. W artykule pyta się o relację metody fenomenologicznej do szeroko pojętego postępowania analitycznego, wskazując na podobieństwa i różnice pomiędzy oboma podejściami. Ponadto autor przybliża rozumienie języka przez Husserla, zwłaszcza w kontekście analizy noematu.

The author argues that static and genetic phenomenological methods are complementary, rather than opposite, and by claiming this, the article presents a discussion with Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy. It is claimed that for an adequate understanding of the two forms of a phenomenological method, one has to take into consideration especially Husserl’s B III 10 signature manuscripts. By referring to the manuscripts, the author reconstructs the object, limits, presuppositions, aims and character of both ways of inquiry. Moreover, the author (...) claims that the differentiation of the two forms of the phenomenological method steams from Husserl’s inquiries into the concept of consciousness as defined in Ideas I. (shrink)

The article is an attempt at establishing a theoretical basis for a dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary philosophy, with regard to the problem of internalism-externalism. It is argued, according to Roman Ingarden, that one has to first of all put forward an adequate question about the problem, to be able to understand it appropriately. Moreover, the analysis is limited to the two forms of the internalism-externalism debate, namely semantics and the philosophy of the mind. Within Husserl’s phenomenology one can easily (...) point to basic intuitions that justify thesis that this philosophy refers to the internalism-externalism problem. Ultimately, by using phenomenological terminology, the article arrives at questions about possible internalism-or-externalism within Husserl’s phenomenological project. The questions, however, suggest that phenomenology can be neither clearly nor completely classified either as internalism or as externalism. (shrink)

The Republic of the Ukraine has a huge prison population and a large prison health care system. Like all other public services in that country it is lacking in sufficient funds to operate adequately and with due respect to the human rights of the prisoners and its health care employees. This report and observations are based on my knowledge of the Ukrainian health care system and a visit to a Ukrainian prison hospital. It includes some ethical reflections stemming from this (...) experience. Although problem-solving exercises can often help to point to areas of potential intervention that could ameliorate a troublesome situation, in this case prison health care conditions cannot be substituted for economic growth, political stability or increased awareness of societal moral obligations. (shrink)

La compréhension de la raison humaine a été déterminante pour la phénoménologie de Husserl. Des Recherches logiques à la Krisis , le problème de la raison semble l'un de ses principaux thèmes de réflexion. Husserl aborde la question sous plusieurs angles distincts, évoquant les concepts de monde, de temps et de responsabilité. Ses découvertes l'ont conduit à identifier la crise de la culture. Les commentateurs doivent aujourd'hui mettre en question le concept husserlien de raison, s'ils veulent comprendre pleinement cette thèse. (...) Cet article fait valoir que le concept de raison de Husserl est élaboré en corrélation avec celui de non-raison, conduisant les phénoménologues à adopter une division binaire entre rationalité et irrationalité. Par contraste avec les commentateurs qui accentuent le caractère rationnel de la phénoménologie husserlienne, cet article affirme que l'introduction du concept d'irrationalité dans l'investigation phénoménologique élargit significativement la compréhension initiale de la phénoménologie telle qu'elle est définie dans les Recherches . Husserl fut confronté à cette question par ses propres recherches. En conséquence, on affirme ici que la phénoménologie a connu un développement immanent menant de la thèse de la raison objective à celle de la corrélation entre raison et non-raison. (shrink)

Tematem artykułu jest Tomasza z Akwinu koncepcja radości, której źródłem jest cierpienie innych osób (Schadenfreude). Pierwsza część obejmuje opis starożytnych źródeł Schadenfreude, którymi inspirował się Akwinata. Druga część dotyczy koncepcji nienawiści, która stanowi podstawę dla Schadenfreude. W trzeciej zaś części jest przedstawiona Tomaszowa próba rozróżnienia rozmaitych przypadków występowania Schadenfreude oraz ich częściowego moralnego usprawiedliwienia.

The aim of the article is to define and investigate an interpretative framework for the philosophy of Leopold Blaustein, a student of Twardowski in Lwów and Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. The author defends the thesis that it is justified to refer to Blaustein’s philosophy not as phenomenology sensu stricto, but as a phenomenologically-oriented descriptive psychology related but not equivalent to the project expounded by Husserl in the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen as well as in his project of phenomenological (...) psychology. The article traces Blaustein’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenological methods, putting it in the historical context of the discussion with Ingarden. Next, the author juxtaposes Blaustein’s understanding of psychology with Husserl’s project of 1925, which makes it possible to identify not only the differences between the two projects, but also their similarities. The article also raises questions about the scope of descriptive-psychological analyses. (shrink)

L’article constitue un essai de caractéristique du motif cartésien dans la phénoménologie polonaise, dès ses premières réactions jusqu’à ses formulations les plus récentes. Son autre objectif est de présenter les positions, les argumentations et les transformations principales qui, toutes ensemble, forment le motif cartésien. Par « motif cartésien », l’auteur entend un ensemble de questions, de problèmes et de propositions de les résoudre, liés entre eux et se rapportant aux éléments spécifiques des philosophies de Descartes et de Husserl. Cet article, (...) en présentant les penseurs choisis, essaie de cerner de plus près ce qu’est le motif cartésien. Dans ce contexte, il a encore pour objectif de déterminer la direction possible que peut prendre le développement de la phénoménologie non-cartésienne. L’auteur défend la position selon laquelle le cartésianisme de la phénoménologie résulte surtout de la façon dont cette philosophie a été exposée. D’après lui, une application de la méthode phénoménologique avec des visées modérées élargit le champ des recherches phénoménologiques. (shrink)

The paper critically examines the thesis, popular in the literature, that Leopold Blaustein’s aesthetics is first and foremost a phenomenological discipline. I argue that the “phenomenological” nature of Blaustein’s philosophy follows from Brentano and Twardowski, rather than from Husserl. I therefore claim that Blaustein’s aesthetics is determined by two equally important themes: (1) a descriptive-psychological and (2) a “phenomenological” one. The article is structured as follows. The introduction situates Blaustein’s aesthetics within classical aesthetics. Section 1 reconstructs the Brentanian background of (...) Blaustein’s aesthetics. Section 2 contains a discussion of Blaustein’s assessment of Twardowski’s theory of presentations, which is followed, in Section 3, by an analysis of Blaustein’s example descriptions of aesthetic experiences. These descriptions are discussed in Section 4, which also reconstructs the main elements of Blaustein’s phenomenology of aesthetic experiences. Against this background, the question of the alleged psychologism of Blaustein’s aesthetics is addressed in Conclusions. (shrink)

The article addresses the popular reading of Ingarden that his aesthetic theory is determined by ontology. This reading seems to suggest that, firstly, aesthetics lacks its autonomy, and, secondly, the subject of aesthetic experience is reproductive, and passive. The author focuses on Ingarden’s aesthetics formulated by him in the period of 1925–1944. Moreover, the study presents selected elements of Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience, and by doing so, the author aims at showing how Ingarden’s aesthetics was reconsidered by Blaustein, a (...) student of Ingarden, whose theory seems to lead one beyond the scope of ontology. Blaustein, namely, reconsiders Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects by interpreting it in a descriptive-psychological, or phenomenological fashion. The article is divided into four parts. In section 1, the author highlights historical interconnections between Ingarden, and Blaustein. Section 2.1. is devoted to Ingarden’s phenomenological approach towards aesthetic experience as a phasic structure. At this basis, in section 2.2., Ingarden’s early theory of intentional objects is to be discussed. Section 3 concerns Blaustein’s contribution to phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Given that Blaustein formulates his theory in discussion with Ingarden, section 3.1. is devoted to Blaustein’s critical assessment of Ingarden’s method, and aesthetics. Next, in section 3.2., the author presents Blaustein’s original theory of presentations, and its use in aesthetics. Finally, in section 4, the author lists similarities, and differences between Blaustein’s and Ingarden’s aesthetic theories. (shrink)

The article is an attempt to define reduction as the beginning of philosophy. The author considers such questions as: What motivates a phenomenologist to do reduction? Can one speak of philosophy before reduction? What is the essence of reduction? To answer these questions the author refers to Husserl, Fink and, Patočka, and tries to show that reduction is to be understood as an unmotivated expression of philosopher’s will to overcome evidence inherent to natural attitude. The author argues that reduction enables (...) one a problematization of the world as such. Finally, reduction is defined as an attempt to take doing philosophy seriously. (shrink)

The article presents the transcendental reduction as a type of questioning, and by so doing formulates the problem of the structure and motivation of reduction. Transcendental questioning is presented as a permanent formulation and reformulation of questions, which, it is argued, make it possible to overcome the naïveté of the natural attitude. However, the phenomenologist does not overcome naïveté in the sense of excluding it; instead, he is conscious of it. It is argued that one should understand transcendental questioning as (...) a practical activity that makes the phenomenologist responsible for knowledge by leading toward the essence, which seems to be “unquestionable.”. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to a%empt to provide a more precise answer to the question of Paul Vladimiri’s account of the concept of permissive natural law. This purpose is realized in two steps. First, a brief history of permissive natural laws in the tradition of medieval philosophy is discussed, and the historical context, in which Paul Vladimiri developed his theory of natural law, is outlined. Next, some excerpts from Vladimir’s writings are analysed, in which he uses phrases indicating (...) the presence of the concept of permissive law in his philosophy. (shrink)