Many naive realists endorse a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable halucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider (...) and evaluate a somewhat similar but rival view of hallucination developed by Mark Johnston. (shrink)

Idealist philosophers have traditionally tried to defend their views by appealing to the claim that nonmental reality is inconceivable. A standard response to this inconceivability claim is to try to show that it is only plausible if one blurs the fundamental distinction between consciousness and its object. I try to rehabilitate the idealistic argument by presenting an alternative formulation of the idealist’s basic inconceivability claim. Rather than suggesting that all objects are inconceivable apart from consciousness, I suggest that it is (...) impossible to conceive of any such object as genuinely existent. This thesis is lent credence by the fact that only in reflective self-consciousness is existence a phenomenological datum. Not only is it the case that we are not ever aware of an object as existing, we do not have a clear understanding of what it would be like to have such an awareness. If this is true, then we have reason to believe that while consciousness exists, the objects of consciousness cannot exist. (shrink)

Books reviewed:Kenneth J. Howell, God's Two Books: Copernican Cosmology and Biblical Interpretation in Early Modern ScienceRichard A. Horsley and Neil Asher Silberman, The Message and the Kingdom: How Jesus and Paul Ignited a Revolution and Transformed the Ancient WorldJ. Painter, 1, 2, and 3 John Sarah Coakley, Re‐thinking Gregory of Nyssa Andrew Jotischky, The Carmelites and Antiquity: Mendicants and their Pasts in the Middle AgesTerryl N. Kinder, Cistercian Europe: Architecture of ContemplationM. G. Snape, English Episcopal Acta, 24: Durham 1153–1195Gillian R. (...) Knight, The Correspondence between Peter the Venerable and Bernard of Clairvaux: a Semantic and Structural AnalysisRichard Rex, The LollardsKathleen Kamerick, Popular Piety and Art in the Late Middle Ages: Image Worship and Idolatry in England, 1350–1500Norman Housley, Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536Anthony Levi, Renaissance and Reformation: The Intellectual GenesisAnne T. Thayer, Penitence, Preaching and the Coming of the ReformationMarjo Kaartinen, Religious Life and English Culture in the ReformationAnne Dillon, The Construction of Martyrdom in the English Catholic CommunityCharles Libois SJ, Monumenta Proximi‐Orientis. V. Égypte Charles Libois SJ, Monumenta Proximi‐Orientis. VI. Égypte Michael Davies, Graceful Reading: Theology and Narrative in the Works of John BunyanDavid Womersley, Gibbon and the ‘Watchmen of the Holy City’. The Historian and his Reputation, 1776–1815Anthony C. Thiselton, A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of ReligionDavid Naugle, Worldview: The History of a ConceptRobert Kane, Free Will Tamar Szabo Gendler and James Hawthorne, Conceivability and PossibilitySimon Critchley, On Humour Gerard J. Pendrick, Antiphon the Sophist: The FragmentsA. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to LifeVictor Nuovo, John Locke: Writings on ReligionTerry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of IdealismBrian Shanley, The Thomist TraditionGianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An IntroductionAmy Laura Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of LovePeter V. Zima, Deconstruction and Critical TheoryL. Gormally, Culture of Life – Culture of DeathMark E. Graham, Joseph Fuchs on Natural Law Norman M. Ford, The Prenatal Person. Ethics from Conception to BirthOnora O'Neill, Autonomy and Trust in BioethicsEllen Frankel Paul, Fred D.Miller Jr. and Jeffrey Paul, Should Differences in Income and Wealth Matter? (shrink)

Thomas Talbott has recently argued in this journal that the three propositions 1) God wills universal salvation 2) God has the power to produce universal salvation and 3) some persons are not saved are inconsistent. I contend that this claim is only true if God has no overriding purposes that would place restrictions on the means God uses to achieve God’s ends. One possible example of such an overriding purpose would be God’s aim to produce the most good. I end (...) by suggesting that while God’s purpose of universal salvation does render the achievement of this end probable, it is by no means necessary. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the denial of middle knowledge and emphasis on human freedom characteristic of open theism makes the traditional concept of hell even more morally problematic than it would otherwise be. But these same features of open theism present serious difficulties for the view that all will necessarily be saved. I conclude by arguing that the most promising approach for open theists is to adopt a version of contingent, as opposed to necessary, universalism. (Published Online April (...) 7 2006). (shrink)